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METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: HEGEL'S 1820 INTRODUCTION TO THE LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

ALLEGRA DE LAURENTIIS

HEGEL EXPLICATES HIS THEORY of the history of philosophic thinking in several introductions to the various cycles of *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* held in Jena, Heidelberg, and Berlin. Only the introductions to the first cycle of Heidelberg lectures (1816) and to the second cycle of Berlin lectures (1820) survive in Hegel's own hand.¹ Since the earlier of these is an integral part of the latter, an analysis of the 1820 Introduction provides a reliable account of Hegel's theory.

Hegel lectures on the history of philosophy mainly as a philosopher, not as a historian. "The history of philosophy must itself be philosophical,"² he declares in the address delivered ahead of the 1820 Introduction.³ Thus, he is not interested primarily in delivering a chronicle of philosophic ideas, propositions, claims, arguments, and counterarguments in the historical order of their formulation. He presupposes his audience's general acquaintance with historical facts and

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¹ The introductions to all other cycles of lectures on the history of philosophy survive—some of them in fragmentary form—in students' manuscripts. The editorial history of the introductions is told in Georg W. F. Hegel, *Werke in zwanzig Bänden* (hereafter, "W"), ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl M. Michel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969–79), 20:520.

² "Die Geschichte der Philosophie muss selbst philosophisch seyn"; Georg W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1816–1831)*. *Gesammelte Werke* (hereafter, "GW"), vol. 18, ed. Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Meiner, 1995), 18:39.

³ The textual basis for my analysis is the critical edition cited above (n. 2). The translations are my own, but I consult throughout the Haldane/Simson 1892–96 edition (*Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson [New York: The Humanities Press, 1974]) and the Knox/Miller 1985 translation of the Heidelberg and Berlin introductions (*G.W.F. Hegel. Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. Thomas M. Knox and Arnold V. Miller [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985]).

events pertaining to philosophic theories, as well as with major thinkers' general tenets. Hegel is rather concerned with showing, first, why these tenets were relevant and enjoyed recognition in their time; second, how and why they were subsequently transformed; and third, how a core meaning may be discerned in them throughout their transformations.

A paradigmatic illustration of Hegel's procedure in interpreting fundamental principles of the philosophic tradition is provided by the following comment on "being person" in a Remark to his treatment of "property" in the 1821 *Philosophy of Right*:

The notion that what spirit is according to its concept or *in itself*, it should be also in its *Dasein* and for-itself (thereby that it be person capable of property, having ethicality [and] religion)—this idea is itself spirit's concept (as *causa sui*, i.e. as free causation, spirit is such *cuius natura non potest concipi nisi existens*; Spinoza, *Ethics* I, Def. 1.) Precisely in this concept . . . there lies the possibility of the opposition between what spirit is merely *in itself* and its being also *for itself* . . . and thus the *possibility of the alienation of personhood*.⁴

In other words: the late modern conception of personhood as subjectivity with rights (to property, to moral convictions, beliefs, and so forth) is explained by Hegel as realization of the core meaning of Spinoza's "god" (or, as in other passages, of Descartes's *res cogitans*, equally inconceivable unless as existent). The core meaning of "spirit" since its inception as *nous* is the idea of a being that determines itself into being what it is—one important expression of which is, for example, modern political philosophy's notion of an autonomous, self-determining subject.

⁴"Dass das, was der Geist seinem Begriffe nach oder *an sich* ist, auch im *Dasein* und fuer sich sei (somit Person, des Eigentums faehig sei, Sittlichkeit, Religion habe)—diese Idee ist selbst sein Begriff (als *causa sui*, d.i. als freie Ursache, ist er solches, *cuius natura non potest concipi nisi existens*; Spinoza, *Ethik* I, Def. I). In eben diesem Begriffe . . . liegt die Moeglichkeit des Gegensatzes zwischen dem, was er nur *an sich* und nicht auch *fuer sich* ist . . . und hierin die *Moeglichkeit der Entaeusserung der Persoenlichkeit*"; Georg W. F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse*, 1821, §66, Remark. (In the following, this work is cited as "W 7," followed by page or section number.) The translations are mine but I consult throughout Thomas M. Knox, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), and Hugh B. Nisbet, *Hegel. Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

The first of the goals outlined in the address and Introduction to these *Lectures* (see above) implies a serious attempt to grasp and to convey the sense in which philosophic concepts and arguments are meant and understood at their inception. This is where the philological and historiographic skill of the *historian* of philosophy has its rightful and necessary place. The second and third goals presuppose a theory of philosophy as a particular kind of thinking with specific logical and epistemological features. Here is where the *philosopher* must deliver an interpretation of historically documented theories and their principles that includes but also goes beyond the meaning ostensibly intended by each of them.

The philosopher lecturing on the history of philosophy has, then, two sets of criteria guiding the exposition: the theoretical order of philosophic concepts (dictated by the analysis of their meanings, which is for Hegel a logical and metaphysical task at once) and the chronological order of their expression in the history of philosophic systems. These two sets of criteria do not operate independently of one another. Hegel's explicit claim is actually stronger than this. The two orders of reconstruction of the history of philosophic thought are in principle the same: "According to this idea I now maintain that the succession of the systems of philosophy in *history* is *the same* as the *succession in the logical derivation* of the conceptual determinations of the Idea."⁵

As the logical sequence cannot be random, so the historical sequence is not accidental. Just as little can the reconstruction of these sequences in a history of philosophy (as a discipline) be arbitrary. Indeed, only the most superficial observer would think of philosophers' choices of themes and methods as a random series. To the contrary, as if engaging in an epoch-transcending conversation, philosophers invariably relate to, criticize, or make use of preceding ethical and

⁵ "Nach dieser Idee behaupte ich nun, dass die Aufeinanderfolge der Systeme der Philosophie in der *Geschichte* *dieselbe* ist, als die *Aufeinanderfolge in der* logischen *Ableitung* der Begriffsbestimmungen der Idee" (GW 18:49). See also Georg W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik. Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832) (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990), where, regarding Parmenides, Hegel writes: "What is *first* in the *science* must have shown itself as the *historically* first. And we have to regard the Eleatic *One* or *Being* as the first in the knowing of thought" (GW 21:76). In the following, the translations are mine but I consult throughout Arnold V. Miller, *Hegel's Science of Logic* (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).

cognitive concerns. Where no philosophic precedents are given, as in the case of the Presocratics, philosophers refer to concepts implicit in the representational thinking (*vorstellendes Denken*), in the language, mythology, religion, poetry, and wisdom that have preceded and still surround them. Even the most skeptical eye perceives philosophic theories in their historical succession as engaged in some sort of sense-making. Hegel's *Lectures* follow the logic of this sense-making as their thread of Ariadne through the history of philosophy.

While neither an exhaustive account nor a thorough justification can be given here of Hegel's strong claim on the logical and historical orders of philosophic thought, this brief study aims at clarifying the claim, elucidating two supporting theories from the body of Hegel's system, and correcting a pertinacious view on Hegel's understanding of the nature of philosophy.

According to Hegel, the primary (that is, both first and fundamental) subject matter of philosophy is human thinking itself. The history of philosophy is thus a gradual fulfillment of the Socratic command: know thyself. Thought's simultaneous double role as subject and subject-matter in philosophy lends the latter the character of a peculiarly "speculative" enterprise, much in the sense adumbrated in Aristotle's investigation of the soul: "The mind itself is included among the objects which can be thought. For where the objects are immaterial that which thinks and that which is thought are identical. Speculative knowledge and its object are identical."⁶ In the same Aristotelian spirit, Hegel explains the dynamics of philosophic thinking as progressive actualization (a becoming *fuer sich*) of what thinking is potentially (according to its concept [*dem Begriffe nach*] or *an sich*). This is the background for his claim that there is not only chronological but also, and more fundamentally, logical continuity among philosophic principles in the course of their history. Thus, it is possible for him to identify a common (and evolving) meaning in notions that apparently refer to vastly different objects of reflection. The introductory chapter to the Doctrine of Being in the Greater Logic is dedicated to justifying precisely this claim: "Thus the beginning of philosophy is the foundation that is present and self-preserving in all subsequent de-

⁶ Aristotle, *De Anima*, ed. and trans. R. D. Hicks (New York: Prometheus Books, 1991), 3.4.430a5. Hick's translation of *he episteme he theoretike* with "speculative knowledge" is fully justified in this context.

velopments, that which remains immanent in all its further determinations.”⁷

The thesis that the history of philosophic systems is the expression of a process of human thinking toward absolute self-knowing (and thus also self-determining) is strong enough to merit an isolated treatment. Its attempted justification has to be sought in the *Greater Logic*⁸ and not in the *History of Philosophy*. In section 1 below I treat Hegel’s claim that an in-depth knowledge of the history of philosophy is an integral part of philosophizing as such, and I elucidate the arguments by which he defends this claim. The interpretation of the 1820 Introduction contained in this part highlights important aspects of Hegel’s perspective that, although aimed at grounding the controversial metaphysical thesis of the inner unity of thought’s logic and history, can by themselves offer a much needed antidote to contemporary notions of the history of philosophy as a discipline having merely instrumental value for doing philosophy proper—as if the latter were a fundamentally nonhistorical discipline. Section 2 provides then support for Hegel’s thesis from the perspective of the internal coherence of his system. In the conclusion (3) I briefly respond, in the light of the theory expounded in the 1820 text, to what I take to be an influential misconception of Hegel’s understanding of the relation of philosophy to *Zeitgeist*.

I

The History of Philosophy Is Philosophy. The 1820 Introduction begins by highlighting the continuity of, and marking the distinction between, the natural and the spiritual grounds of human life and thinking. While nature remains fastened to unchanging laws throughout its metamorphoses, spirit, though necessarily anchored in habit-forming tradition, is capable of transforming the “principles, prejudices and . . .

⁷ “So ist der Anfang der Philosophie, die in allen folgenden Entwicklungen gegenwaertige und sich erhaltende Grundlage, das seinen weitem Bestimmungen durchaus immanent Bleibende” (GW 21:58).

⁸ Especially in the preliminary essay, “With what must the science begin?”, and in the actual treatment of the historical instantiations of the transitions from each category to the next.

riches"⁹ constituting that tradition. The productions of each generation are both form and matter of the next: they are "its soul, spiritual substance . . . but also . . . the *material* present to it."¹⁰ Thus, in the history of our "second nature" the matter being transformed and the activity producing the transformation do not differ in substance. One epoch's spirit is made up of that of all previous epochs and transforms the latter by assimilation into something new, namely itself. This is why to read history is for us not to read a story of extraneous events but our own story. As for the history of philosophy, it does not tell a tale of strange and alien thoughts but rather the story of our own thinking in one peculiar mode. The development of this thinking mode is articulated in a multiplicity of forms—the philosophic systems.

Accordingly, a history of philosophy is not a history of opinions, not even of opinions about topics of general interest such as god, justice, or human nature. When studying the history of philosophy we are being confronted with concepts that are not just convictions of groups or individuals but rather principles of theories. What makes a concept be a mere opinion is the fact of its intrinsic particularity or perhaps even singularity.¹¹ There are, of course, in the body of every philosophic work innumerable concepts that represent merely particular or singular convictions. But not just any concept featured in a philosophic theory is for this reason alone a philosophic concept. This is rather a notion that functions as theoretical principle: the whole theory (as a system) depends upon its meaning and consistency. Such a principle is the kind of system-identifying concept Hegel refers to as *Grundbegriff*.

The singularity or particularity of thoughts embodying mere opinion affects both their form and their content. As long as my (or my community's) ideas about divinity, morality, or right are merely my (or our) opinions, their referents are merely my (or our) gods, customs, or sense of justice. As such, these thoughts are of no philosophic import—except as cultural, psychological, or historical beginnings of properly philosophic concepts. What enables such thoughts

⁹ "Grundsätze, Vorurtheile und . . . Reichthum" (GW 18:37).

¹⁰ "deren Seele, geistige Substanz, . . . aber zugleich . . . ein vorliegender Stoff fuer sie" (GW 18:37).

¹¹ Compare GW 18:42.

to develop into philosophic concepts, on the other hand, is the fact of their intrinsic universality.¹² The thoughts of divinity, justice, or personhood, in their many mythological, aesthetic, religious, or theological guises, have potentially universal content. Their objective meaning is inextricable from the connotation of universality. "God" is not divine if he presides over Athens alone; "justice" is not just if it admits of exceptions; and, by virtue of its intension alone, the concept of "personhood" cannot extend to some but not other persons. These concepts are implicitly universal from the moment of their inception, but it is only in the course of history that they do become explicitly so.

As for the truth content of universal concepts, Hegel reminds his audience that philosophic theories' differences and mutual contradictions do not prove that philosophic truth is relative or, what is the same, that there is no truth in philosophy.¹³ Skeptic or relativistic truth abstinence, Hegel comments, only stimulates thought's hunger for truth.¹⁴ At first, the variance and disagreement among parts of a cognitive undertaking each equally claiming to provide us with truth seem to contradict our legitimate rational expectations. Upon reflection, however, it becomes clear that we can only notice, compare, and grasp theories' differences against a common ground. This ground is the "instinct" that drives thought to find truth: "*The truth however is one*,—the instinct of reason possesses this invincible feeling or belief. . . . Already the instinct of thinking pursues [the idea] . . . that the truth is one."¹⁵ To engage in thinking without an instinctive belief in the possibility of truth would be akin to engaging in eating without belief in the possibility of satiety.

The subject matter ubiquitous in philosophy is neither individual witticisms nor particular cultural beliefs, but rather the concept of what is true. The history of philosophy consists of a meaningful series of formulations of this concept. Akin to the *Phenomenology's* description of the path of consciousness, the *Lectures on the History of*

¹² Compare GW 18:43.

¹³ This observation applies of course equally to the history of the positive sciences.

¹⁴ Compare GW 18:43.

¹⁵ "*Die Wahrheit aber ist Eine*,—dieses unueberwindliche Gefuehl oder Glauben hat der Instinct der Vernunft . . . —dass die Wahrheit nur eine ist . . . darin folgt schon der Instinct des Denkens" (GW 18:43 and 45).

Philosophy describe the continuous process of self-differentiations of one thinking activity. As the *Phenomenology* presents self-conscious reason's reconstruction of its development out of its own natural stages, so do these lectures present philosophic thinking as incessantly retracing its own history in the endeavor to grasp itself.

To say that conceptual thinking is philosophy's medium and subject matter is not to say that philosophy is a science of abstractions. Philosophic thinking does not consist only of a formal determination of concepts and their relations—that is, it is not reducible to formal logic, linguistics, or mathematics. It consists, rather, of the analysis and determination of the meaning of system-identifying concepts. The content of a concept that functions as principle in a system is not exhausted by its relations to sub- or superordinate concepts. As already mentioned, not just any concept that arises in a philosophic theory is for Hegel a philosophic concept in the technical sense. *Grundbegriffe* are concepts whose meaning, internal consistency, and mutual compatibility provide the grounds of justification of the theory they are embedded in. A system-identifying concept, for example Plato's "idea" or Leibniz's "monad," is a unity of other concepts differing from it and among themselves. In virtue of its being an internally differentiated unity, this "concrete concept" contains not the common but rather the differentiating features of the notions it encompasses. At this point,¹⁶ Hegel illustrates the distinction between abstract and concrete concepts through that between abstract and concrete sensible representations (*sinnliche Vorstellung[en]*). The sensible representation of "red" is abstract because it is an abstraction from many representations. The sensible representation of "rose," on the other hand, is more concrete, because it is also a unity of many representations (life, shape, color, smell, and so forth), that is, it is "One Subject, One Idea."¹⁷

Contrary to the familiar rule holding for concepts as classes, according to which a concept's increasing extension always implies its decreasing intension, the more general a system-identifying principle is, the more determinations it contains: "Here the most extensive is

¹⁶ *GW* 18:46.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

also the most intensive."¹⁸ This is why Hegel refers to philosophy as the most concrete of sciences and why he maintains that common sense and even enlightened ratiocination are insufficient by themselves to account for philosophic principles and what derives from them:

It is in this that knowledge of reason distinguishes itself from knowledge of the understanding, and it is the business of philosophizing to show against the understanding that the true, the Idea does not consist of empty generalities, but of a universal that in itself is the particular, the determinate.¹⁹

This definition of the Idea (or "the true") as concrete universal containing particularity or determinacy is an abbreviated form of the definition of "the Concept as such" (*der Begriff*) from the *Logic*:²⁰

The *Concept* as such contains the moment of *universality*, as free equality with itself in its determinacy; it contains the moment of *particularity*, or of the determinacy in which the Universal remains serenely equal to itself, and it contains the moment of *singularity*, as the inward reflection of the determinacies of universality and particularity. This singular negative unity with itself is what is *in and for itself determined*, and at the same time identical with itself or universal.²¹

The notion of a universality that by self-particularization posits itself as a (universal) singularity is elucidated by Hegel in the sections of the

¹⁸ "Hier ist das Extensivste auch das Intensivste" (*GW* 18:47–8).

¹⁹ "Es ist hierin dass sich die Vernunftkenntnis von der blossen Verstandeskenntnis unterscheidet, und es ist das Geschaeft des Philosophirens gegen den Verstand zu zeigen, dass das Wahre, die Idee nicht in leeren Allgemeinheiten besteht, sondern in einem Allgemeinen, das in sich selbst das Besondere, das Bestimmte ist" (*GW* 18:45).

²⁰ I use (with few exceptions noted explicitly) the following translation of the *Encyclopaedia Logic*: G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic (with the Zusaetze)*, ed. and trans. Theodore F. Geraets, Wallis A. Suchting, and Henry S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991). The textual basis of my analysis of the main text is *GW*, vol. 20 and, for the Remarks and Additions, *W*, vol. 8. The *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* (1830) is cited in the following as "E," followed by section number.

²¹ "Der *Begriff* als solcher enthaelt die Momente der *Allgemeinheit*, als freier Gleichheit mit sich selbst in ihrer Bestimmtheit—der *Besonderheit*, der Bestimmtheit, in welcher das Allgemeine ungetruebt sich selbst gleich bleibt, und der *Einzelheit*, als der Reflexion in sich der Bestimmtheiten der Allgemeinheit und Besonderheit, welche negative Einheit mit sich das *an und fuer sich Bestimmte* und zugleich mit sich Identische oder Allgemeine ist" (*E*, §163).

Doctrine of the Concept that follow this passage. In the 1820 Introduction, however, he merely comments that this notion cannot be grasped by understanding alone, but requires reason (*Vernunft*).

Reason grasps a particular kind of concepts that can be characterized, in a first and general way, as sharing the mark of self-referentiality. Both this kind of notion and the kind of thinking that makes such notions intelligible—namely reason—may thus be called “speculative.” One such notion, for example, is “self-consciousness.” As explained in the chapter of the *Phenomenology* bearing this name,²² “self-consciousness” refers to mind’s taking on the contradictory (and thus also self-negating) role of being subject and object of one and the same act of cognition, simultaneously and in the same respect:

If we call the movement of knowing, *concept*, but knowing as motionless unity, or the Ego, the *object*, then we see that not only for us, but for knowing itself, the object corresponds to the concept.—Or alternatively, by calling what the object is *in itself*, the *concept*, while [calling] the object what it is as *object* or *for an* other, it becomes clear that the being-in-itself and the being-for-another is the same.²³

Self-consciousness is a concept that the understanding cannot analyze because it involves the sublation, and thus the inclusion, of a contradiction. It is a speculative concept arrived at and grasped only by speculative reason.²⁴

²² The translations of the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* are my own. The textual basis is *GW*, vol. 9. I have consulted throughout Miller’s *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

²³ “Nennen wir *Begriff*, die Bewegung des Wissens, den *Gegenstand* aber, das Wissen als ruhige Einheit, oder als Ich, so sehen wir, dass nicht nur fuer uns, sondern fuer das Wissen selbst, der *Gegenstand* dem *Begriffe* entspricht. – Oder auf die andere Weise, den *Begriff* das genannt, was der *Gegenstand* *ansich* ist, den *Gegenstand* aber das, was er als *Gegenstand*, oder fuer ein anderes ist, so erhellt, dass das *Ansichseyn*, und das fuer ein anderes seyn dasselbe ist” (*GW* 9:103).

²⁴ Nonstandard analytic philosophy of logic does share Hegel’s views with regards to the meaningfulness and viability of some contradictions. See for example the numerous outstanding contributions of Graham Priest on this subject, such as his *In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhof, 1987); the two historical introductions to *Paraconsistent Logic. Essays on the Inconsistent*, ed. Graham Priest, Richard Routley, and Jean Norman (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1989); and “What’s So Bad about Contradictions?” *Journal of Philosophy* 95, no. 8 (1998): 410–26.

Thus, Hegel's characterization of the discipline of the history of philosophy as description of the development of the Idea can be usefully summarized in the following terms. According to this theory, the subject matter of this discipline is thinking as articulated in time through a series of theories (*Systeme*) centered upon concepts (*Grundbegriffe*) that are intrinsically speculative and thus intelligible only to reason.

The 1820 Introduction continues by highlighting different but connected features of philosophic thinking, or of the developing Idea: (1) its "organic" structure (philosophy is an evolving system of systems); (2) its speculative nature (philosophy is self-knowing knowledge); and (3) the characteristic dynamics of its movement, namely a simultaneously outward and inward development. As these are the features that justify the claim of the intrinsically historical character of theoretical concepts, we turn to them first. Incursions into the Greater Logic are made necessary by Hegel's present use of terms whose technical meaning he has explained previously, namely in the 1812, 1813, and 1816 editions of the three books of the Logic. Since the spirit's "deeds" on the stage of history (compare *Philosophy of Right*, §343) parallel the processes of consciousness described in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, passages from the latter will be used to illustrate Hegel's present argument.

(1) *Philosophic thinking is an organic system.* In its historical unfolding philosophy can be likened to a living organism. Philosophic thinking is one, but it exists only as a dynamic whole of vitally interrelated parts (theories). It maintains its specific identity throughout its transformations. It develops through time due to an internal drive.

Physical liveliness . . . like the liveliness of spirit . . . is an urge, passes over into the hunger and thirst for truth, presses for knowledge of it, for the satisfaction of this urge . . . [T]he true has the urge . . . to *develop* itself. Only the living, the spiritual moves, stirs itself inside itself, self-develops. In this way the Idea, concrete in itself and self-developing, is an organic system, a totality that *contains in itself a wealth of stages and moments*.²⁵

²⁵ "Die physische Lebendigkeit . . . wie die Lebendigkeit des Geistes . . . ist Trieb, geht ueber in den Hunger und Durst nach Wahrheit, nach Erkenntnis derselben, dringt nach Befriedigung dieses Triebs . . . [D]as Wahre [hat] den Trieb . . . sich zu *entwickeln*. Nur das Lebendige, das Geistige bewegt, ruehrt sich in sich, entwickelt sich. Die Idee ist so, concret an sich und sich entwickelnd, ein organisches System, eine Totalitaet welche ein *Reichtum von Stufen und Momenten in sich enthaelt*" (GW 18:43 and 47).

Like the description of an organism's ontogenesis, the description of philosophy in history requires a concept of self-movement in which the connotation of change does not imply that of transition to another. Hegel's technical term for organic or self-movement—and the term he uses in this Introduction to characterize philosophy's history—is “development” (*Entwicklung*).

Rather than using the term indiscriminately to denote any kind of process, Hegel confines the use of “development” in the *Logic* to the dynamic structure of self-related thinking. He sets it apart from other dynamic configurations by which thinking relates to the being and to the essence of things other than thought. In the opening of the *Encyclopaedia's* Doctrine of the Concept we read:

The progression of the Concept is no longer either passing-over or shining into an other, but *development*; for the [moments] that are distinguished are immediately posited at the same time as identical with one another and with the whole, and the determinacy is as a free being of the whole Concept.²⁶

This passage summarizes the three structural features of thinking whose distinction Hegel considers so fundamental as to constitute the organizational principle of the entire *Logic*. The differences in thinking Being, Essence, and the Concept are functions of the difference in the relation of each to thinking itself.

When thinking has categories of Being for its generic objects (for example, indeterminate being, nothing, becoming; determinate being, its quality, quantity or intrinsic measure, and so forth) its dynamic is described by Hegel as a “passing over” (*Uebergehen*) from one to another category. In this context, the denotation (the signified) of each category is seemingly independent of thinking itself and is related to the next category by a reflection extrinsic to it.

When thinking has categories of the Essence of Being for its generic objects, Hegel prefers to describe its movement as a “shining into another” (*Scheinen in Anderes*), that is, a reciprocal reflection among the meanings of different categories. Each of the categories

²⁶ “Das Fortgehen des Begriffs ist nicht mehr Uebergehen noch Scheinen in Anderes, sondern *Entwicklung*, indem das Unterschiedene unmittelbar zugleich als das Identische mit einander und mit dem Ganzen gesetzt, die Bestimmtheit als ein freies Seyn des ganzen Begriffes ist” (*E*, §161).

involved in this logical sphere constitutes part of the meaning of the preceding as well as of the following one, though only logical analysis can detect this reciprocal “shine.” For example, the category of identity already contains—upon reflection—the category of distinction (*Unterschied*)²⁷ and vice versa. Both, in turn, contain the category of ground and vice versa: the ground of something’s identity is necessarily distinguishable from, though also identical with, what is grounded by it. Equally, the notion of the world as appearance implies a notion of the world’s essence and vice versa. Through both, in turn, “shines” a notion of the world’s actuality that includes both its essence and its appearance. Each of the categories of essence is meant as referring simultaneously to a determinacy of Being (Essence is the Essence of Being) and a determinacy of thought (Essence is also the Concept—or truth—of Being): the ground of x provides the objective reason for the existence of x while providing also the concept of what x essentially or truly is.

It is only when thinking has itself as its explicit object—as in the system-identifying concepts of philosophic theories: idea, *nous*, god, *res cogitans*, substance, monad, reason, mind—that Hegel refers to its movement as development. In the 1820 Introduction, in particular, he makes it explicit that self-referentiality is the *differentia specifica* of genuinely philosophic thinking over against all other kinds of thought. Thus, the logical and chronological movement of philosophic thinking is correctly identified as self-development:

[T]hat philosophically known truth exists in the element of thought, in the form of universality, . . . this is familiar to our common way of thinking. But [to say] that the universal itself contains its own determination, . . . here begins a properly philosophic proposition—here it is, therefore, that a consciousness that does not yet cognize philosophically withdraws and says that it doesn’t *understand* this.²⁸

²⁷ Two excellent and concise discussions of Hegel’s uses of *Unterschied* and *Differenz* in the Logic are in *E*, pp. xxiii–xxiv, and Michael Inwood, *A Hegel Dictionary* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 131–3.

²⁸ “[D]ass die philosophisch erkannte Wahrheit im Elemente des Gedankens, in der Form der Allgemeinheit ist, . . . es ist diss unserer gewöhnlichen Vorstellung gelaueffig. Aber dass das Allgemeine selbst in sich seine Bestimmung enthalte, . . . hier faengt ein eigentlich philosophischer Satz an—hier tritt darum das noch nicht philosophisch erkennende Bewusstseyn zurueck, und sagt es *verstehe* diss nicht” (*GW* 18:45–6).

Accordingly, the organic-systematic character of philosophy is a consequence of its self-referential nature, that is, of its being speculative.

(2) *Philosophic thinking is a speculative organic system.* The reason for philosophy's organic nature is its speculative character.

In a move parallel to that described in the *Phenomenology*, where natural consciousness discovers itself in its rebirth as self-consciousness ("Ego is the content of the relation [of knowing to object] and the relating itself")²⁹ philosophic inquiry always already includes the investigation of the agent (that is, thinking itself or "the universal") and the medium of investigation (that is, concepts or "universals"). In order to determine what thinking is, how it affects its objects, whether it constitutes or distorts them, whether it is adequate to or incongruous with them, there is no other tribunal to turn to or instrument to use but thinking itself. Philosophy proper begins with the recognition of a universal containing its own determination, as defined in the *Logic*: "The *Concept* as such contains the moment of *universality*, . . . of *particularity*, . . . and . . . of *singularity*, as the inward reflection of . . . universality and particularity. This . . . negative unity with itself is what is *in and for itself determined*."³⁰ One fundamental meaning of "speculative thinking" is that it objectifies what is otherwise (for example, for ratiocination) merely subjective. To make theoretical and practical human thinking into an object of logical and historical investigation is to turn thought into an object for thought. This is why both the historical whole of philosophic theories and the theory of this history merit being characterized as "speculative."

These introductory reflections premised to the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* parallel what Hegel had written in 1807 when introducing the history of consciousness. Thinking as generic activity (*Denken ueberhaupt*) is to conceptual cognition (*begreifendes Erkennen*)³¹ as natural consciousness is to self-consciousness. Philosophic

²⁹ "Ich ist der Inhalt der Beziehung, und das Beziehen selbst" (GW 9:103).

³⁰ "Der Begriff als solcher enthaelt die Momente der *Allgemeinheit* . . . , der *Besonderheit* . . . und der *Einzelheit*, als der Reflexion-in-sich der . . . Allgemeinheit und Besonderheit, welche negative Einheit mit sich das *an und fuer sich Bestimmte* . . . ist" (E, §163; see above, n. 21).

³¹ The distinction is also outlined and illustrated by Hegel in §2 and Remark of the 1830 *Encyclopedia*, GW 20:40–1 and W 8:42–3, respectively.

science, we read in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology*, is apt to convey the truth because thinking is neither merely an instrument nor a medium that modifies or distorts a subject matter alien to it but rather this subject matter itself. Since any object of philosophic investigation must be conceptual, philosophic thinking always investigates itself in the investigation of truth.³² Thus, the historical inception of philosophic thinking coincides with the rise of the self-reflexive stage of consciousness, namely self-consciousness. As long as consciousness has for its object a content which it does not consider to belong to itself—"beings" that it senses, "things" that it perceives, "forces" that it understands to exist beyond the things perceived—its history is part and parcel of the natural history of knowing. The stages of natural consciousness do not yet constitute knowing proper, let alone philosophic cognition, just as the stages of the natural soul do not yet constitute spirit proper.

Now, since this exposition has for its object only appearing knowledge, . . . it can be taken as the path of natural consciousness making its way to true knowledge; or as the path of the soul that journeys through a series of its own configurations as stages set for it by its own nature, that it may purify itself into spirit. . . . Natural consciousness will prove itself to be only [the] concept of knowing, or nonreal knowing.³³

Real or philosophic knowing begins when thinking realizes³⁴ that its objects are being determined by itself. Knowing the object and self-knowing, then, come together in one act: "Ego is the content of the relation, and the relating itself; Ego is itself over against an other, and

³² See *GW* 9:53–4.

³³ "Weil nun diese Darstellung nur das erscheinende Wissen zum Gegenstande hat, so . . . kann [sie] . . . als der Weg des natuerlichen Bewusstseyns, das zum wahren Wissen dringt, genommen werden; oder als der Weg der Seele, welche die Reihe ihrer Gestaltungen, als durch ihre Natur ihr vorgesteckter Stationen durchwandert, dass sie sich zum Geiste laeutere . . . Das natuerliche Bewusstseyn wird sich erweisen, nur Begriff des Wissens, oder nicht reales Wissen zu seyn" (*GW* 9:55–6). Hegel insists that natural consciousness *per se* "loses its truth" on the path of philosophy: "Das natuerliche Bewusstseyn . . . verliert auf diesem Wege seine Wahrheit" (*GW* 9:56).

³⁴ English offers as many speculative insights as German does. The use of "to realize" for "to become aware of" is the perfect psychological counterpart to the speculative meaning of Hegel's "self-actualization of consciousness."

simultaneously grasps beyond³⁵ this other which for the Ego is likewise only the Ego itself."³⁶

The phenomenological presentation of knowing as it merely appears,³⁷ namely in relation to what is allegedly other than knowing, is, then, the negative prelude to "free science moving in the form proper to it."³⁸ The latter, then, is the proper subject matter of a philosophical history of philosophy: self-investigating and thereby self-determining or "free" thought.

(3) *Philosophic thinking is outward and inward development.* The 1820 Introduction also claims that the externalization of philosophic thinking in the historical sequence of its systems is at the same time an inwardization (*Insichgehen*) or recollection (*Erinnerung*) of philosophic consciousness—a deepening of its self-reflexive character.

Further, this development is not directed [only] outwards as in externality, but the developmental unfolding is also a going inwards; . . . As the outward going of the philosophical Idea in its development is not . . . a becoming other but likewise a going-into-itself, a deepening of itself in itself, so does the progression render the Idea, previously general and rather undeterminate, more *determinate* in itself.³⁹

³⁵ Michael J. Petry, *Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* (hereafter, "*Subjective Spirit*"), vols. 1–3 (Boston: Reidel, 1978), uses "to include" to translate Hegel's *uebergreifen* in the definition of the Ego in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (*E*, §438), where the universality of reason is explained as the Ego's capacity of being permeated and grasped by the object as well as the Ego's activity of "grasping beyond" and incorporating the object. Inwood, *Dictionary*, suggests "to embrace" or "to overreach" (58–9).

³⁶ "Ich ist der Inhalt der Beziehung, und das Beziehen selbst; es ist selbst gegen ein anderes, und greift zugleich ueber diss andre ueber, das fuer es ebenso nur es selbst ist" (*GW* 9:103).

³⁷ Compare *GW* 9:55, quoted above: "nur das erscheinende Wissen."

³⁸ "die freye, in ihrer eigenthuemlichen Gestalt sich bewegende Wissenschaft" (*GW* 9:55).

³⁹ "Ferner geht diese Entwicklung nicht nach Aussen als in die Aeusserlichkeit, sondern das Auseinandergehen der Entwicklung ist eben so ein Gehen nach Innen; . . . Indem das Hinausgehen der philosophischen Idee in ihrer Entwicklung nicht . . . ein Werden zu einem Andern sondern ebenso ein In-sich-hineingehen, ein sich in [sich] Vertieffen ist, so macht das Fortschreiten die vorher allgemeine, unbestimmtere Idee in sich *bestimmter*" (*GW* 18:47).

If self-referentiality, or the inclusion of thought in the thinking of the object, is characteristic of philosophy, then the advance of philosophy in time will also follow, in conformity with the Socratic command issued at the beginning of its history, an inward trajectory: advancing philosophic knowledge will imply increased cognition of the knowing self.

It is true, of course, not only of philosophy but of other forms of spirit as well that their movement is always more than objectification in an "other," be this the spiritual or the material products of our species's second nature. Their development is as well a recollection (*Erinnerung*), whereby spirit enhances its grasp and determination of itself precisely through its self-externalization.⁴⁰ By apparently becoming other, spirit attains an ever more concrete shape of itself. As in the *Phenomenology* self-experience is said to lead the soul to self-knowledge (the soul "achieves cognition of what it is in itself through the complete experience of itself"),⁴¹ so in the *Philosophy of Spirit*, spirit's experience of its own externalizations leads to its increasing self-knowledge. And since spirit consists of human thought's development in self-knowing, increased self-knowledge means also increased inner determination (and "concretion") of the very nature of spirit. This, again, may be illustrated by recourse to the Anthropology of the soul. In the development of spirit from natural soul to consciousness proper, every stage in the externalization of the soul—its taking possession of corporeality, its positing and taking possession of the external world, and so on—also represents a phase of spirit's inwardization, that is, the progressive transformation of its in-itself into for-itself, or of its corporeity into subjectivity. Both sides of the soul's development, externalization and inwardization, are teleologically directed toward the full sublation of soul into conscious selfness or Egoity:

⁴⁰ For a detailed overview of the role of *Erinnerung* in the general economy of the logic and psychology of thinking in Hegel see Angelica Nuzzo, "Thinking and Recollecting. Logic and Psychology in Hegel's Philosophy," forthcoming in *La memoria*, ed. Gianna Gigliotti (Naples: Bibliopolis/Vrin, 2005).

⁴¹ "durch die vollstaendige Erfahrung ihrer selbst zur Kenntnis desjenigen gelangt, was sie an sich selbst ist" (*GW* 9:55).

In itself, matter has no truth within the soul; as being-for-itself, the soul separates itself from its immediate being, and sets the latter over against itself as corporeity. . . . The soul that has posited⁴² its being over against itself, that has sublated and determined it as its own, has lost the meaning of *soul* as *immediacy* of the spirit. The actual soul . . . is in-itself the *ideality* for-itself of its determinacies; in its externality [it is] *recollected* in and infinitely related to itself.⁴³

Only a philosophical history of philosophy can capture the inwardizing or recollective dimension of spirit's external development, namely by reconstructing the successive sublations of philosophic principles in the history of the systems. The logical concretization, that is, increasing intension and extension,⁴⁴ of philosophic concepts is then the necessary complement to their chronological succession. The principles of ancient philosophies are comparatively more "abstract" and their signification more "external" than later ones, but they are included or recollected in these: "Philosophy is, now, for itself the knowing of this development and, as conceptual thinking, is itself this thinking development. The further this development has thriven, the more complete philosophy is."⁴⁵

The history of philosophy is not *Historie*, a story told from a perspective external to philosophy or a report on real occurrences as op-

⁴² Petry, *Subjective Spirit*, translates "Soul which posits its being over against itself," but Hegel uses the verb in the past tense: *entgegengesetzt hat*. Indeed, the soul's process of positing its own content as an other from itself must be concluded for it to cease to be mere soul and to begin its journey as consciousness. The logic underlying this process is explained in the Greater Logic, Doctrine of Being, chap. 1.C: the truth resulting from the analysis of undetermined being and undetermined nothing (namely that they are becoming) is not just that being and nothing are permanently passing into each other, but that they have always already done so (GW 21:69).

⁴³ "An sich hat die Materie keine Wahrheit in der Seele; als fuersichseyende scheidet diese sich von ihrem unmittelbaren Seyn, und stellt sich dasselbe als Leiblichkeit gegenueber. . . . Die Seele, die ihr Seyn sich entgegengesetzt, es aufgehoben und als das ihrige bestimmt hat, hat die Bedeutung der Seele, der Unmittelbarkeit des Geistes, verloren. Die wirkliche Seele . . . ist an sich die fuer sich seyende *Idealitaet* ihrer Bestimmtheiten, in ihrer Aeusserlichkeit *erinnert* in sich und unendliche Beziehung auf sich" (E, §412).

⁴⁴ See above, n. 18.

⁴⁵ "Die Philosophie ist nun fuer sich das Erkennen dieser Entwicklung, und ist als begreifendes Denken selbst diese denkende Entwicklung. Je weiter diese Entwicklung gediehen, desto vollkommner ist die Philosophie" (GW 18:47).

posed to a fable about unreal ones. The history of philosophy is *Geschichte*, the developmental history without which what has developed cannot be made intelligible.⁴⁶ For example, a philosophic investigation of mind ignoring all that "mind" has meant since Anaxagoras resembles the efforts of psychologists attempting to grasp their patients' personalities without knowledge of their personal history.⁴⁷ Mind per se does not name a thing but a concept. In theorizing "mind" one cannot indicate any signified thing to which the term corresponds

⁴⁶ *Geschichte* derives from *geschehen*, whose core meaning in its Old High German form (*scehanto*) is "to turn [out] suddenly." Over time, the latter acquired the connotation of the unexpected, new event (*Ereignis*) and finally that of *Werden*, becoming in general.

⁴⁷ For such an ahistorical approach see John R. Searle's *The Mystery of Consciousness* (New York: New York Review of Books, 1997). In the introduction, "errors" and "obsolete categories" of the "religious and philosophical tradition" are said to "plague" contemporary mind theory (p. xii). But Searle's own thesis—"consciousness is a natural, biological phenomenon. It is as much part of our biological life as digestion, growth, or photosynthesis" (p. xiii)—hardly differs from those of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thinkers like de la Mettrie, Cabanis, C. Vogt, or Du Bois-Reymond. This peculiar a-historicity is reproduced in Daniel Dennett's study of "the mind (or brain)" (*The Intentional Stance* [Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997], 123). Despite assurances that his investigations into "mind" are philosophical, Dennett's sparse references to mind theories in Western philosophy are oddly selective. In *The Mind's I* (with Douglas R. Hofstadter) (New York: Bantam, 1982), he leaps from a sketch of Locke's conception of conscious mind as "transparent to itself" to Freud as discoverer of "the existence of unconscious mental processes" (ibid., 11–2). No reference is made to Leibniz's rebuttal of Locke, his theory of *petites perceptions* (*New Essays on Human Understanding*), of life-degrees in the monad (*Monadology*), or of the difference of "perception" from "apperception" (*Principles of Nature and Grace*); to apperception's central role in Kant's theory of mind; to Hegel's distinction between conscious and unconscious thinking (*E*, §398) and implicit and explicit soul content (*E*, §§402–3); or to Freud's extensive debt to Nietzsche on this subject. Thus, there are certainly more "somewhat distinct ancestries worth noting" (*Consciousness Explained*, 44) than Dennett suspects. Thomas Nagel (*Other Minds* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1995], 7) offers an interesting explanation for this philosophizing. He claims, "philosophers don't have to know much about history or anything about literature, but they are expected . . . to have at least an amateur's grasp of the contributions of Newton, Maxwell, Darwin, Einstein, Heisenberg, Cantor, Goedel, and Turing . . . all of which provide data for philosophical reflection." One cannot help wondering why a (preferably nonamateurish) grasp of Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, or Hegel is not seen as providing at least as good "data" for doing philosophy.

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other than the concept of mind itself. "Mind" signifies "the concept of mind" and this, as all concepts, has a history. The contemporary meaning of "mind" must thus be codetermined by the meanings it has embodied in the history of philosophy. An adequate contemporary concept of mind will have to overcome and include (sublate) all previous ones. In announcing that "the STUDY of the history of philosophy is study of philosophy itself,—as cannot be otherwise,"⁴⁸ Hegel prepares his audience for the radical idea that a philosophical history of philosophy is a chronological recapitulation of the intrinsic logic of philosophic thinking.

II

The History of Philosophy Parallels the Logic of the Idea. It is probably not extravagant to maintain that Hegel's thesis (quoted in the opening section but to be repeated here) lies at the foundation of his entire philosophy as system: "According to this idea, I now maintain that the succession of the systems of philosophy in *history* is the same as the *succession in the logical derivation* of the conceptual determinations of the Idea."⁴⁹

The thesis can be paraphrased as stating that the historical succession of systems in the history of philosophy parallels (to use a weak version of the claim) or coincides with (to use Hegel's strong version) the logical succession of spirit's phases in its practical and theoretical activity of knowing itself.⁵⁰ The sequential whole of theories (*die Aufeinanderfolge der Systeme*) displays phases that correspond to internal principles of human thinking and acting (*Begriffsbestimmungen der Idee*), and the sequence of the phases is dictated by the necessity intrinsic to the logic of these principles. Since the systems in the history of philosophy are different expressions of one thinking process, Hegel claims further that their principles, though necessarily known (*erkannt*) only through historically documented

⁴⁸ "das STUDIUM der Geschichte der Philosophie [ist] Studium der Philosophie selbst,—wie es denn nicht anders seyn kann" (GW 18:50).

⁴⁹ GW 18:49. See n. 5.

⁵⁰ See GW 18:52.

theories, can only be adequately grasped (*begriffen*) as determinations of the Idea, determinations whose logical connection is expounded in the Logic:

I maintain that if one strips the fundamental concepts [*Grundbegriffe*] of the systems that have appeared in the history of philosophy of what concerns their exterior shape, their application to the particular, and similar features, then one obtains the various stages of determination of the Idea itself in its logical concept.⁵¹

Put in a somewhat different way: the philosopher reconstructing the history of philosophy understands the theories succeeding each other in time to be expressions (or real appearances: *Erscheinungen*)⁵² of principles of the theoretical and practical activity of self-knowing called "the Idea."⁵³

In the text under discussion Hegel does not develop an explicit argument for the idea that the history and logic of philosophic thinking correspond to each other—let alone for the stronger version purporting that they are "the same." In support of his thesis he merely refers us here to the metaphysics of time from his *Philosophy of Nature*.⁵⁴

After a brief treatment of the philosophy of time being invoked here as explanatory of this thesis (1), we shall turn to a related but different doctrine of Hegel's that provides additional (though far from definitive) support for it (2). This is the theory of the parallel and seemingly inverse directions of the ontological and logical developments of "knowing substance" (*wissende Substanz*) into its

⁵¹ "Ich behaupte, dass wenn man die *Grundbegriffe* der in der Geschichte der Philosophie erschienenen Systeme rein dessen entkleidet, was ihre äusserliche Gestaltung, ihre Anwendung auf das Besondere, und dergleichen betrifft, so erhält man die verschiedenen Stufen der Bestimmung der Idee selbst in ihrem logischen Begriffe" (GW 18:49–50). For an exhausting explication and critical assessment of Hegel's thesis and its metaphysical presuppositions see Klaus Duesing, *Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie. Ontologie und Dialektik in Antike und Neuzeit* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983).

⁵² GW 18:51.

⁵³ On margin of this passage in the manuscript Hegel notes: "only because of this do I bother to deal with it, to lecture on it [nur darum gebe ich mich damit ab, halte Vorlesungen darüber]" (GW 18:51), that is, on the history of philosophy.

⁵⁴ *E*, §§254–9.

conceptual form (*Begriffsgestalt*), that is, into self-knowing substance or subjectivity proper. This theory is found in the section on Absolute Knowing of the 1807 *Phenomenology*.⁵⁵

(1) By referring to the time metaphysics from the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel is reminding his audience of the theory that nature and spirit are both forms of the self-external being (*Aussersichsein*) of the Idea. This self-externality, common to the existence of nature and spirit, consists of their spatiality and temporality. In the section on Mechanics, for example, space and time are defined as derivations from a more fundamental determination of nature, namely pure externality (*Aeussertlichkeit*). Space is nature's externality in-itself, thus it is called immediate externality;⁵⁶ time is nature's externality for-itself, thus it is called mediated externality.⁵⁷

The same conception underlies the exposition of the spatial and temporal dimensions of the "natural soul"⁵⁸ in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. Spirit as natural soul is described at first in its spatial existence, that is, as a multiplicity of geographic, ethnic, familial, and individual traits and temperaments characterized by the inertia and reciprocal indifference typical of all natural things regarded as phenomena in space. These are the "places" of spirit's first self-externalization, or the soul's natural qualities as they coexist on earth.⁵⁹ The second dimension of the natural soul is temporal: the stages of life, reproduction, and the individual soul's oscillations between the sleeping and the waking state. These are the "epochs" of spirit's first shape as soul. Each of these is a way in which the soul undergoes natural changes. They lend human and other animal life its character as a continuum of differentiations.⁶⁰ This distinction of spatial (or immediate) and temporal (or mediated) forms of the natural soul is, of course, purely analytical. What there is, in all places and at all times, is their unity, that is, the mediated immediacy of the living body.⁶¹ It is

⁵⁵ *GW* 9:428.

⁵⁶ Compare *E*, §§254–6.

⁵⁷ Compare *E*, §§257–9.

⁵⁸ *E*, §§391–402.

⁵⁹ Compare *E*, §§392–5.

⁶⁰ Compare *E*, §§396–8.

⁶¹ On the logical identity of "soul" and "living body" in Hegel see Michael Wolff, *Das Koerper-Seele Problem. Kommentar zu Hegel, Enzyklopaedie (1830)*, § 389 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1992).

precisely the dynamic unity of qualities and changes in and of the soul that explains how this phenomenon of nature can eventually distinguish itself from its own corporeality and acquire inwardness. Soul is the stage at which nature begins to lose its one-sided extrinsicality. It is the first turning point in the actualization of the concept of corporeal nature: "Spirit is the existent truth of matter, [namely] that matter itself has no truth."⁶² Thus soul, the first concrete unity of spirit, consists of the simultaneous perception of diverse qualities (sensations) and the continuous experience (as *Erlebnis*) of a variety of changes. The soul that senses or finds in itself (*emp-findet*) one totality of sensations is the feeling soul (*die fühlende Seele*).⁶³ Merely feeling soul will eventually, through the repetition of sensations or habitual sentience,⁶⁴ turn into actual soul, the precursor of consciousness: "The ego is the *lightning* that strikes through the natural soul and consumes its naturalness."⁶⁵ These primitive features of the existence of spirit in its most natural mode carry over into all its subsequent shapes. Spirit exists and acts always and exclusively in the external dimensions of space and time.

The 1820 Introduction to the History of Philosophy stresses the role of space and time as particular representations (*Vorstellungen*) of self-reflective thinking. As all activity, thinking exists only in its externalization: only what is actual (*wirklich* or *wirkend*, that is, having effects) exists. Philosophic thinking is no exception: it only exists through its actualizations.⁶⁶ If time and space are dimensions of extrinsicality in general and if thinking exists only in extrinsic forms, then time and space are constitutive of thinking as much as of nature, of the natural soul, and of all other determinations of the Idea. This, Hegel clarifies, applies to individual consciousness as much as to spirit in general and its absolute expressions, that is, art, religion, and philosophy. The time-space of individual consciousness is individual

⁶² "Der Geist ist die existierende Wahrheit der Materie, dass die Materie selbst keine Wahrheit hat" (*E*, §389 Remark).

⁶³ Compare *E*, §§399–403.

⁶⁴ Habituation is described in §§409–10.

⁶⁵ "Das Ich ist der durch die Naturseele schlagende und ihre Naturlichkeit verzehrende *Blitz*" (*E*, §412 Addition).

⁶⁶ Compare *GW* 18:52.

life; the time-space of spirit is human history; and the time-space of philosophy, the history of philosophy:

This *being-there* and thereby being-in-time is a moment, not only of single consciousness in general that as such is essentially finite, but also [a moment] of the development of the philosophical Idea in the element of thinking . . . and so pure philosophy appears in thinking as an existence proceeding through time.⁶⁷

Thus, Hegel determines space and time as, respectively, the immediate and mediated dimensions of the Idea's externality. In the element of thought—the speculative mode of which is philosophy—the Idea displays its immediacy in thought's logic and its mediation in thought's history. The fact that nature as a whole is one mode of actualization of the Idea explains why every natural event must always be codetermined by space and time. The fact that spirit as a whole is the other mode of actualization of the Idea makes it intelligible why both logic and history are quintessential determinations of thinking in general—and of philosophic thinking in particular. Only the kind of ratiocination that abstracts from thought's actual existence separates artificially its logic from its history. In actuality, however, they will always be found to codetermine the self-actualization of spirit that thinking is.

(2) The thesis of the coincidence of logical and historical dimensions in the Idea's development as philosophy finds some intrasystematic support also in Hegel's conception of the movement of consciousness from substance to subjectivity. In the chapter on Absolute Knowing from the 1807 *Phenomenology*, Hegel recapitulates briefly the phases of consciousness described in the book. Consciousness starts out as "substance," that is, as simple identity of form and content or thought and object. It then develops by progressive internal diremptions, by which the originally immediate identity reveals itself to be (and thus becomes for itself) a mediated one, or a unity of opposite determinations. In the end, absolute knowing represents a phase

⁶⁷ "Diss *Daseyn* und damit in der Zeit seyn, ist ein Moment nicht nur des einzelnen Bewusstseyns ueberhaupt, das als solches wesentlich endlich ist, sondern auch der Entwicklung der philosophischen Idee im Elemente des Denkens . . . und so erscheint im Denken die reine Philosophie als eine in der Zeit fortschreitende Existenz" (GW 18:52–3).

in which consciousness has sublated its own diremptions so that it now recognizes its initial substantiality as having been all along also subjectivity. Hegel then remarks that, taken as a whole, the movement of consciousness described in the *Phenomenology* appears to be proceeding in two parallel but seemingly contrary directions. *Realiter*, consciousness as substance must be thought of as preceding self-knowing consciousness (in the same way that nature must be thought of as preceding spirit, or the natural soul as preceding consciousness and mind): "Now, knowing substance is there in actuality earlier than its form or conceptual shape."⁶⁸ But for a substance to self-develop at all, it must contain from the beginning the internal principle of its movement. From a logical perspective, then, substance's capacity for knowing and then self-knowing, its subjective *dynamis* or "conceptual shape," precedes consciousness in the substantial mode. This *arché* is, in Hegel's terminology, the concept or truth of consciousness, namely self-consciousness. Spirit is the dynamic unity of the principle or concept of consciousness with that of which it is the principle or concept, namely substance: spirit "is in itself the movement that knowing is—the transformation of that *in-itself* into the *for-itself*, of *substance* into *subject*, of the object of *consciousness* into object of *self-consciousness*, that is, . . . into the *Concept*."⁶⁹

Being a form of spirit, self-consciousness is a process, not a state (it is *metabolé* and not *hexis*). It consists of the permanent recapitulation, that is, acknowledgment and preservation, of all stages of knowing that lead up to it. In absolute knowing, past forms of consciousness are not present only in their in-itself mode (as archeological curiosities) but always also in their for-itself mode (as stages and components of consciousness's own grasp of itself). In this way, while Hegel denies definitiveness to each stage of consciousness, he restores validity to every one of them precisely in the logical transitions by which each is overcome.

⁶⁸ "In der Wirklichkeit ist nun die wissende Substanz frueher da, als die Form oder Begriffsgestalt derselben" (GW 9:428).

⁶⁹ "[Der Geist] . . . ist an sich die Bewegung, die das Erkennen ist—die Verwandlung jenes *Ansichs* in das *Fuersich*, der *Substanz* in das *Subject*, des Gegenstands des *Bewusstseyns* in Gegenstand des *Selbstbewusstseyns*, d.h. . . . in den *Begriff*" (GW 9:429).

This entire movement from a substantial and abstract to an increasingly subjective and concrete form of spirit could never take place if the possibility of the latter were not included in the former logically, namely as its intrinsic *telos*:

Thus, in the *Concept* that knows itself as Concept the *moments* emerge earlier than the *fulfilled whole* whose becoming is the movement of those moments. Contrarywise, in *consciousness* the whole, though un-conceptualized, is earlier than the moments.⁷⁰

The phenomenological thesis that the logical and real developments of consciousness appear as parallel and contrary movements while being *realiter* the same, reemerges in the 1820 Introduction to explain the definition of philosophy as unfolding of absolute spirit. Hegel states here that philosophic thinking proceeds "on a seemingly inverse path"⁷¹ to that of its historical unfolding. The seeming inversion arises from the circumstance that the philosopher studying the real progression of philosophy has to "already bring along *the knowledge of the Idea* in order to recognize the process as development of the Idea."⁷² The philosopher knows the Idea thanks to his privileged historical position. He can look back at the Idea's historical unfolding. This unfolding is what makes up the content (the "fulfilled whole") of the concept of philosophy. Since philosophy is thought that thinks itself, it fulfills two roles at once. As object of itself, its past phases or moments appear to it as preceding present thought, the subject of philosophic knowing. As subject, however, philosophic thinking grasps its present state (the unity resulting from the sublation of those moments) as lending intelligibility to its own past in the first place. In their embodiments as principles of systems, the moments of this process are the logical elements of the present, concrete concept of philosophy. In this sense, the series of systems in the history of philo-

⁷⁰ "In dem *Begriffe*, der sich als Begriff weiss, treten hiemit die *Momente* frueher auf, als das *erfuellte Ganze*, dessen Werden die Bewegung jener Momente ist. In dem *Bewusstseyn* dagegen ist das Ganze, aber unbegriffne, frueher als die Momente" (GW 9:429).

⁷¹ "auf anscheinend umgekehrtem Wege" (GW 18:45).

⁷² "um . . . ihren [der Philosophie] Fortgang als Entwicklung der Idee zu erkennen, muss man freylich *die Erkenntnis der Idee* schon mitbringen" (GW 18:50).

sophic thinking can be interpreted as being "the same" as the logical series of self-determinations of the Idea.

III

Taking seriously the central claim from the 1820 Introduction has far reaching consequences in one's grasp, interpretation, and evaluation of Hegel's conception of philosophy as systematic science of truth. Only one such consequence, bearing upon Hegel's understanding of the history of philosophy, can be discussed here.

A widespread view attributes to Hegel the thesis that philosophy's function with regard to the cultural and political reality it expresses and responds to is purely recollective. At least in part, the popularity of this reading is strengthened by the paraphrasing character of English translations of a famous passage from the Preface to the 1821 *Philosophy of Right*. Hegel speaks here of philosophy as making its appearance "after actuality has completed its formative process and has made itself ready."⁷³ Translations usually disregard the reflexive form of *sich fertig machen*, a common expression that means "to make oneself ready," and interpret the phrase as indicating that actuality is "finished" (*fertig*).⁷⁴ But the reflexive form implies both completion and preparedness. Since completion is expressed in the preceding phrase ("actuality has completed its formative process"), and Hegel's prose is seldom redundant, the connotation of "preparedness" should be stressed in translation. Actuality has completed one of its phases and has made itself ready for the next. More importantly, since the subject of the phrase is actuality, the translation is also at odds with Hegel's consistently Aristotelian use of "actuality" as an activity that by definition does not attain any "completed state." Thus, translations neglect here to convey Hegel's idea of a recollective and simultaneously anticipatory function of philosophy. Indeed, if the

⁷³ "nachdem die Wirklichkeit ihren Bildungsprozess vollendet und sich fertig gemacht hat" (W 7:28).

⁷⁴ Knox, *Philosophy of Right*, paraphrases *sich fertig gemacht hat* with "is already there cut and dried" (12); Nisbet, *Elements*, with "has attained its completed state" (23).



history of philosophic thinking follows the logic of the Idea, then philosophic principles must be as much determined by those they have sublated as by the ones they contain as yet only implicitly. As in causal chains, where effects must be implicit in the causes they in turn sublate, or as in a chain of syllogisms (the image Hegel invokes at the end of the system⁷⁶ to illustrate the concept of philosophy as "Idea *thinking itself*"),⁷⁶ the sublation of earlier into later principles also implies the immanence of the latter in the former. Thus, while it is true that for Hegel the principles of a system, in sublating all previous ones, do express an epoch whose life cycle is concluded, it is equally true that these same principles anticipate a new epoch.

Prima facie this appears to contradict the "owl of Minerva" allegory from the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*. But the allegory (often quoted out of context) intends to highlight only one of the functions Hegel attributes to philosophy. It is embedded in a passage vigorously directed against the idea of a moralistic, ideological, or generically normative vocation of philosophy and philosophers. Hegel's main concern here is to criticize the assumption that philosophers' role is to set the world aright by positing normative criteria not already present in it: "By way of adding one more word about *giving instruction* as to how the world ought to be: philosophy at any rate always arrives too late to do so."⁷⁷ If the history of philosophy is the outward expression of spirit's process of self-knowing, the owl allegory cannot be taken to capture the whole of philosophy's functions. By expressing the final wisdom of one decaying epoch, philosophy provides the first full grasp of it. But to grasp is always to go beyond the limitations of what is being grasped (*Begreifen* is *Uebergreifen*).⁷⁸ Philosophy, says Hegel, is "the *thought* of the world."⁷⁹ Though it attains systematic completion at the end of an epoch, it thinks beyond this end. The historical conception of philosophy from the Preface to

⁷⁶ E, §§575–7.

⁷⁶ E, §574.

⁷⁷ "Um noch ueber das *Belehren*, wie die Welt sein soll, ein Wort zu sagen, so kommt dazu ohnehin die Philosophie immer zu spaet" (W 7:27–8).

⁷⁸ Compare n. 35.

⁷⁹ "der *Gedanke* der Welt" (W 7:28).

the *Philosophy of Right* is indeed the same as the conception of spirit we find at its conclusion:

The history of the spirit is its *deed*, as spirit is only what it does, and its deed consists . . . of making itself into the object of its consciousness. . . . This comprehending is its being and principle, and the *completion* of one comprehending is at once its externalization and transition.⁸⁰

Thus, each philosophic system grasps both an epochal closure of spirit and the new beginning for which it has “made itself ready.”

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⁸⁰ “Die Geschichte des Geistes is seine *Tat*, denn er ist nur, was er tut, und seine *Tat* ist, sich . . . zum Gegenstande seines Bewusstseins zu machen. . . . Dies Erfassen ist sein Sein und Prinzip, und die *Vollendung* eines Erfassens ist zugleich seine Entaeusserung und sein Uebergang” (W 7:§343).

ETHICAL CRITICISM IN HEIDEGGER'S EARLY FREIBURG LECTURES

JAMES D. REID

I

HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, CRITICISM. Philosophy has a history because human life is historical. This truism assumes a deeper, more puzzling, and unsettling significance in the programmatic section 6 of *Sein und Zeit*, which promises nothing less than a *Destruktion* of the history of philosophy centered on a few pivotal figures and guided by the problem of temporality as the horizon and transcendental condition of any understanding and explicit interpretation of the sense of being. If the *Seinsfrage* cannot be formulated, let alone answered, without this detour through the history of ontology, it is precisely because the philosophizing human being *is* its past, because the philosopher's past does not merely trail behind the present as a foregone conclusion but "always already advances ahead of it."¹ Every effort to free ourselves from tradition and to begin with a *tabula rasa* "is pervaded by traditional concepts and . . . horizons and traditional angles of approach."² An understanding shaped and governed by the past plays its enabling role whether the individual recognizes and welcomes it or not, whether he makes the past an object of study and cultivates an

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¹ *Sein und Zeit* (hereafter, "SZ") (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1993), 26, 20.

² *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 22. References to Heidegger's lecture courses will generally be to the *Gesamtausgabe* (hereafter, "GA") published by Vittorio Klostermann (Frankfurt am Main: 1976–). I follow the standard practice of naming each course by summer or winter semester ("SS" or "WS") and year. The only exception is the lecture course delivered in the "war-emergency semester" or *Kriegsnotsemester* ("KNS") of 1919. Translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. I have consulted existing translations where available and, of course, my choice of terms often reflects current practice.

interest in tradition or abandons history to the historian or philosopher. An individual or a people or an entire era can lack historical consciousness, philosophy of history, and historiography, and can remain indifferent to tradition only because the human being is historical "in the ground of its being."³

But this indebtedness is as equivocal as it is obvious. If history were not at once obstacle and vital impetus, there would be no need to dismantle our intellectual and cultural inheritance: the very tradition that makes the *Seinsfrage* and any other philosophical question possible at the same time "uproots the historicity of Dasein" and inhibits the "productive appropriation" of the past.⁴ Human life is both enabled by tradition and entangled in its obviousness, simultaneously nourished and dominated by the heritage it takes over or carelessly imbibes and takes for granted. This holds true even when the past has been explicitly interpreted and criticized in a substantial body of written and oral work undertaken from a variety of points of view and with different philosophical and ideological agendas. A culture rich in historical and philosophical self-interpretation and criticism runs the risk of losing itself in an empty and aimless proliferation of standpoints and opinions and has to struggle more vigilantly than its so-called naïve counterpart against the seduction of words divorced from serious engagement with issues and, ultimately, with life. The responsible philosopher, attuned to his embeddedness in a tradition that envelops and sustains him but troubled by the facile familiarity of his interpreted world and the questionable variety of philosophical concepts and propositions that circulate freely in the conversations and works that surround him, cannot develop a more penetrating understanding of the basic problems of philosophy without critical scrutiny of the traditional prejudices that inform his gaze.

The train of thought just sketched is almost too obvious, too much a part of how some of us think and live and what most of us take for granted to merit rehearsal. There is, it appears, little to quibble over and less to add to what has become a commonplace, with few exceptions and rare opposition, in the reception of Heidegger and, more generally, if without reference to or dependence upon Heidegger, in contemporary philosophy and the culture at large. That

³*SZ*, 20.

⁴*SZ*, 20.

this train of thought sounds as plausible as it does and strikes us as unworthy of explicit comment and serious argument and debate should draw attention to philosophical problems concealed beneath the obviousness of unquestioned philosophical and cultural convictions circulating in the *agora* of public opinion. It is the easiness itself that arouses our initial suspicions. What scarcely troubles us gave Heidegger little peace for decades and should, perhaps, make us more restless than it does. The way of philosophy is difficult, as Heidegger repeatedly, almost obsessively, insists in the early lecture courses; and philosophy is difficult because life itself is difficult; and philosophy arises from, speaks about, and returns to human life.⁵ It speaks to life not in the language of solace and reassurance but only in order to make life and philosophy more uncertain of themselves.

The account leaves a number of questions unanswered. How does the philosophical criticism of tradition work? The practice is unusual, to say the least. Heidegger repeatedly insists that criticism is nothing formal, that logic provides no norms and offers no real guidance and has itself to be subjected to criticism, and that philosophy itself demonstrates nothing in the usual sense. As long as it traffics in mere concepts and isolated propositions, phenomenology remains mere verbal knowledge, detached from the issues and matters themselves. In section 6 of *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger couches the task in the language of experience: destruction loosens a sclerotic and self-evident tradition and dissolves its concepts in the original experiences that gave them birth. But what sorts of experiences provide the measure? How are they to be approached and criticized and under what description? What guarantees their "originality"? Where does the phenomenologist discover the criteria that guide concrete studies of an extant philosophy? How compelling or definitive is phenomenological criticism? Why does it command assent? With what authority?

⁵ "A characteristic of the being of factual life is that it finds itself hard to bear. The most unmistakable manifestation of this is the fact that factual life has the tendency to make itself easy for itself. In finding itself hard to bear, life is difficult in accord with the basic sense of its being, not in the sense of a contingent feature"; *Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to 'Being and Time' and Beyond*, ed. John van Buren (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 113. The claim that philosophy arises from and returns to "factual life experience" can be sighted in section 2 of WS 1920/1 (GA 60:8). In WS 1921/2, Heidegger includes among the "basic categories of life" the tendency to take it easy. But the ease and carelessness of life conceals the more "primordial" fact of life's difficulty.

And what ultimately is the point? What is the phenomenological critic trying to do? What are the motives that come into play? These questions plagued Heidegger throughout the period leading up to the publication of *Sein und Zeit*, and they should trouble us more than they do.

The uniqueness and the difficulty of phenomenological criticism are consequences of Heidegger's commitment throughout the period to an idea of philosophy as pretheoretical science of human life. Philosophical theories cannot be measured against another, more adequate theoretical account of human life or assessed in terms of a fully developed system for the simple reason that life is not an object of possible theory that can be classified and filed away in an ordered network of concepts and propositions. Theoretical reflection and system-building are extreme instances of what in KNS 1919 Heidegger calls "unliving," the total "reification" and "destruction" of life and *Lebenserfahrung* for the sake of theory divorced from genuine human concern. The measure of phenomenological criticism is to be sought, therefore, not in a standpoint or detached philosophical or scientific theory or system, but in life itself and the undeflected course of its natural experience. Phenomenological criticism of the standpoint of epistemology amounts to something like ethical criticism of epistemological experience in the name of something like the life of personal concern (part two). But epistemology is not the only threat to the integrity of human life: the tendencies of scientific thought to take over and colonize the understanding of human life are themselves legitimate targets of ethical criticism in the name of personal life (part three). But if Heidegger's appeals to life and experience avoid the empty gestures and complaints of a shallow romanticism, it is precisely because life is interrogated under a definite description, as something that has a significance that can be understood, interpreted, and criticized. If explicit claims are traced back to their "evidence situation" in experience, experiences, in turn, are considered as the expressions of a certain way of life embodying motives and tendencies open to phenomenological scrutiny in the light of a certain paradigm of genuine life (the precursor to authentic Dasein). This movement back and forth between philosophical claim, experience, and way of life guided by an ontic ideal of human existence—the very practice of phenomenological destruction as early Heidegger understands it—is another, extended version of the practice of ethical criticism, in a sense that has to be carefully delineated and distinguished from questionable moralizing criticism and reflection (part four).

II

Against Indifference: Heidegger's Humble Beginnings in KNS 1919. How to criticize a philosophical standpoint as a whole? How to criticize a project that has not merely to be refined or brought to completion but dethroned? How is rebellion justified? With what authority does the critic speak? These questions come into play only when the authority of a global style of thinking and questioning is contested. Epistemology is in question throughout the early lecture courses precisely as first philosophy, as the basic discipline that establishes the normative framework of all other philosophical disciplines and guarantees the "reality" and knowability of their respective objects: works of art, religious beliefs, ethical claims, and scientific theories can come forward as legitimate objects of philosophical knowledge only after we have at our command a definitive, well-grounded account of the norms and principles of knowledge as such and a theory of the object of knowledge as such. If philosophy is to be brought back to life from the sterile and largely academic problems of epistemology, the phenomenologist will have to argue against his opponent uncommonly. Arguments against the presuppositions of the epistemological project that rest upon epistemological assumptions are ruled out in advance. "Formal" and immanent criticism, the detection of invalid inferences, arguments targeting the specific claims of an established theory, and other common strategies of philosophical criticism remain tied to the standpoint under attack and fail to reach the terrain upon which battle can be fruitfully waged. Productive phenomenological criticism of epistemology speaks from somewhere else, is essentially external⁶: the point is not to play a defective game better or to alter the rules of play but to stop playing, to render an account of one's dissatisfaction, to justify as far as possible one's refusal to play, and to persuade others to do the same.

Heidegger's strategy is anchored in the deceptively simple phenomenological assumption that epistemological claims are essentially experiential, are either statements about experience or propositions that can be traced back to life and experience, that the epistemological standpoint can be understood and criticized only on the soil of

⁶ Although, as we shall see, the criticism turns out to be internal to a certain form of life and is nothing more than a plea to return to the life from which epistemological reflection extracts itself.

experience. To ask, “Does the world out there really and truly exist?”—to ask the basic question of epistemology, as early Heidegger understands it—is to experience the possible unreality of the external world or at least to occupy a standpoint from which it appears to make sense to ask about and to demonstrate its reality. As Heidegger writes in SS 1919 in an effort to clarify the practice of phenomenological criticism of an extant philosophical position: “A phenomenological criterion is just the understanding evidence and the evident understanding of experience, of life in and for itself in the *eidos*.”⁷ This is not to deny that some epistemological claims are about objects that cannot be experienced. That epistemologists often traffic in highly abstract propositions and constructions is, for early Heidegger, beside the point: abstraction and construction are themselves motivated experiences or acts, in Husserl’s sense. Heidegger’s point of departure is simply an invitation to consider what it might be like to ask about the reality of the world, to abstract from the data of everyday life, and to question relentlessly our naïve, prephilosophical involvement in the world of human concern.

Heidegger’s early lecture courses take aim, then, at a target made answerable to experience and made over in the image of phenomenology. To those who distance themselves from phenomenological reflection and criticize ruthlessly every myth of experiential givens, this phenomenological makeover might seem to beg the question. It is true that Heidegger shows little abiding interest in the details of specific epistemological theories, wastes almost no time carefully responding to the specific arguments of his contemporaries, and reduces the baffling variety of epistemological theories to the experience of a driving question amenable to phenomenological criticism. But the point of construing epistemology as an account of experience or, more plausibly, as an account that rests upon a certain description of or set of assumptions about experience, is not to stack the deck in favor of phenomenology—although it will certainly appear that way to the epistemologist dedicated unflinchingly to his work—but to locate the aspirations of epistemology on a human terrain where the project becomes more fully intelligible and fruitful nontheoretical scrutiny and criticism first become possible. Phenomenological criticism assumes only that philosophy is a thoughtful and critical but ultimately human way of life.

⁷ GA 56/7:126.

Heidegger's strategy is deployed as early as KNS 1919, in a compact but suggestive critical comparison of two very different accounts of experience that illustrates what we are calling "ethical criticism" and contains *in nuce* a rich variety of theses Heidegger will develop and defend over the next decade. In the wake of a detailed presentation of the methods and basic concepts of neo-Kantian theory of knowledge, accurately construed as an effort to extract from the contingent material furnished by psychology and history the set of timelessly valid norms, basic principles, and axioms that make knowledge possible and to protect the cognitive and ideal domain of validity against unwarranted psychologistic and naturalistic intrusions, Heidegger invites his students to reflect upon the fundamental experience that motivates the search for a theory of human knowledge of the world. How do matters look when the question concerning the reality and knowability of the world is earnestly raised and lived and what, if anything, is there in or about it to criticize?

Epistemological reflection is responsive to the conceivable unreality of the external the world, a world that includes physical things, plants and animals, tools, works of art, religious and secular institutions, persons (friends, relatives, and strangers, some known better, more intimately than others, some merely seen but not personally known, still others altogether unseen but somehow known to exist thanks to the testimony of those who fall within our circle of acquaintance or experience), peoples, tribes and nations, and the objectifications of human thought (diaries, published memoirs, fictional narratives, manuscripts, philosophical essays, and scientific articles). But the world is also the place where these things interact, where natural forces contend with natural forces, and where individuals and groups struggle and strive, conquer and fail, work and play, domesticate animals for work or for pleasure, read books, use tools, contemplate aesthetic objects, wonder about the laws of nature, run for political office, flirt, marry, form temporary and lasting friendships, and demonstrate the reality of an external world that somehow contains each of these things. And the world embraces its own past: evidence of a long natural history of the earth, traces of life lived before me and my generation, monuments and records of significant historical persons and events, and the humble legacies and possessions of lives lived in obscurity all find a place in the external world.

Epistemological consideration of the world begins where this bustling confusion and tangled interweaving of significant things and

events in human life and experience ends and replaces concrete and directed interest and participation in the semiopaque arena of natural phenomena and human activity with the simple demand that the reality of the container of all these allegedly real things, including ourselves as human beings, be demonstrated and the knowability of its objects certified. The epistemologist invites us to reduce the rich diversity of our world to the sheer presence of something real, stripped of all internal qualitative differences and devoid of every aspect that fascinates or repels, facilitates or impedes, disturbs or crushes or evokes wonder, and to place even this insignificant and bloodless presence in question. He encourages us to consider ourselves as little more than the abstract locus of doubt and the theatre where the resolution of doubt plays itself out. He invites us to live, at least for the time being, the simple question, as Heidegger phrases it in the lecture course before us, "Can anything be said to be?"⁸ "It is not asked whether there are tables or chairs, houses or trees, sonatas by Mozart or religious powers but whether there is *something as such*."⁹

What sort of experience is this? What remains to be said about an experience that appears to place everything in question because, in truth, it includes and presupposes nothing? In fact, there is almost nothing that can be said about this mere "*living toward something*," an experience that has, strictly speaking, nothing before or behind it, neither world nor history, that runs its course, if it runs at all, on the outermost limits of detachment from anything recognizably human.¹⁰ The question asks about nothing in particular, and the one who questions is no one in particular.¹¹ We cannot even say that the questioner occupies a questioning standpoint or lives in a situation. Standpoints and situations are possible only where the gaze can single out something definite against a background and a possible course of action is able to come up for deliberation, in something like what we ordinarily mean by "world." It is precisely "world" in the concrete sense indicated above, as the tangled "place" where things happen, interact, and matter, that stands in question.

⁸ This is a slight paraphrase of Heidegger's "*Gibt es etwas?*"

⁹ GA 56/7:67–8.

¹⁰ GA 56/7:68.

¹¹ Of course, someone in particular raises the question, but he doesn't matter as the subject of the experience. This is at once a purely descriptive claim and the basis of Heidegger's ethical criticism of the standpoint.

How to persuade someone to adopt another stance, to detach himself from this utterly detached experience, and to consider (his own) experience otherwise? How to bring the epistemologist back to life from the grave of epistemological theory? The experience itself, stripped of every questionable presupposition, gives nothing to think, nothing to understand, and nothing to criticize. This appears to be its strength: it flows like a solitary and undeviating stream, aloof and impervious to criticism. But this remoteness is also its weakness. Heidegger's solution is swift and decisive, and amounts to an ethical argument¹² from and against impersonality and indifference: "What is decisive: simple inspection finds nothing like an 'I.'"¹³ This anonymous stream of questioning comportment leaves us¹⁴ indifferent: the subject who makes an earnest attempt to identify with the standpoint of epistemological reflection fails to find itself as a center of possible care and concern. At this point, the lecture course takes an unabashedly personal turn¹⁵: "Is there in [this experience] anything like a meaningful reference back to me, the one who stands here at the lectern, with this name and this age? Examine for yourselves. Does there lie in the question 'Can anything be said to be?' a for me (as a student of philosophy), a for me (Dr. X), a for me (as a student of law)?"¹⁶ If the experience can be said to belong somehow to me, "it is

¹² Is it an argument? Or is it rather an appeal? The train of thought we are about to summarize could, I suppose, be rendered in the form of an argument. But the argumentative form is secondary and, I think, unnecessary. And if it manages to convince, it will be because of the underlying experiences in question.

¹³ GA 56/7:66.

¹⁴ Who are *we*? Who is left indifferent? Heidegger is happy to acknowledge that epistemological questioning can go on indefinitely, that those unmoved by appeals to life under a fuller and more questionable description will probably continue to question the reality of the world and to construct epistemological theories. The argument from and against indifference has its limits. This is nothing to be lamented but comes with the territory of ethical reflection and is consistent with Heidegger's developing conception of philosophy as a certain way of life valid only for certain sorts of individuals.

¹⁵ KNS 1919 is filled with references to the person and his personal life. In the *Vorbetrachtung* on "Science and University Reform," Heidegger defines science as "the *habitus* of a personal life." In the Brecht transcript of the same lecture course, genuine phenomenological insight is said to be the fruit of "honest and uncompromising immersion in the genuineness of life as such, in the end only through the genuineness of *personal life* as such." See GA 56/7:4, 220.

¹⁶ GA 56/7:68.

still so detached from me in its sense, so absolutely *Ich-fern* that I, as this particular individual, philosophizing *hic et nunc* in an elusive but productive historical situation, with a rich set of concrete concerns, cannot properly care about it at all.¹⁷ The question leaves me cold and indifferent, relates at best to an (indifferent) "I," but fails to touch me in any vital concern. Epistemological reflection begins where significance ends, where nothing can be said to matter. From the standpoint of life, where *I* am at stake in what I fully and vitally experience and question, where the mattering of things matters to me, the only fitting reply to the account of epistemological experience is: "Who cares?" The only appropriate response is to leave the standpoint of epistemology and the question concerning the reality of the world alone, as matters of exceptional indifference.

But to leave impoverished and unworldly accounts of experience alone is just to leap back into the world. If epistemological reflection gets stranded in an experience that borders on unintelligibility, it makes sense to ask about the world from which the epistemologist detaches himself. More strongly: the return to "world" appears to be the only way out. Heidegger invites his students to throw themselves into and consider another experience, one that resides squarely in the world and evokes the structure, density, and movement of a finely wrought narrative: "*You come as usual into this lecture-hall at the customary hour and go to your usual place. Focus on this experience of 'seeing your place.'*"¹⁸ Each of the words stressed is significant and indicates a phenomenon that will be taken up, articulated more fully and "formalized" in the ensuing years as a structural moment of being-in-the-world. (1) *You*: not an impersonal center or "I-pole" of an impersonal flow of experience, but precisely someone with a meaningful past concerned about his future, someone, in short, with a history. (2) *As usual*: as you, in the context of university life, working on a degree, with certain interests, motives, and aims, are accustomed to do, have grown into the habit of doing. (3) *This* lecture-hall: not a region of homogeneous or empty (physical or phenomenal) space where objects devoid of significance just as a matter of sheer fact happen to be placed, but a place where something might be learned, where so and

¹⁷ GA 56/7:69.

¹⁸ GA 56/7:70. With the exception of the final "your" the emphases are mine.

so gave a stirring lecture two weeks ago, where some students find it hard to stay awake and other listen attentively, a place, in short, with a communal significance and the object of a rich array of partly overlapping and interweaving stories. (4) The *customary* hour: a time also significant, determined by or embodying the rhythms of a certain (organized and directed) way of life, a pregnant and lived time that fits obscurely into the time of a life. (5) *Your* usual place: again, not a point in indifferent, insignificant space but the place where someone in particular prefers to sit.

The point of this terse argument against indifference and in defense of a significant "world" of vital concern is, of course, not only to persuade those tempted by epistemological pseudo-problems to return to the pregiven soil of concerned life but to reintroduce the very same world from which epistemological reflection has excluded and alienated itself as a philosophical problem.¹⁹ The preobjective world that simply "worlds" and has to be protected from the reifying and unliving tendencies of *Dingverfahung* and scientific theory in KNS 1919 will be divided into *Umwelt*, *Mitwelt*, and *Selbstwelt*, each examined in relative isolation, in WS 1919/20, and the moment of significance inherent in it subjected to more exacting phenomenological analysis. In the ensuing years Heidegger will go on to shape and refine his account of the world as the *Gehaltssinn* of "factual life" without rehearsing the ethical argument of KNS 1919. The note of personalism that resounds throughout KNS 1919 will fade away and be replaced by the more neutral language of *Dasein*. But these growing silences shouldn't blind us to the ethical weight of the concepts of "world" and "personal life" introduced in KNS 1919 and developed more fully along strictly ontological lines in subsequent lecture courses. If anything, the ethical resonances of their earliest appearance should alert us to the dangers of construing ontology as an abstract account of being. The world retains its sense throughout early Heidegger as an ethical category, as the place where everything that directly concerns us happens, where each of us is at home and vitally implicated, and where it makes sense to speak of reliable human character (*ethos*) exposed to

¹⁹ KNS 1919 opens with reflections on philosophy and worldview, and dismisses the formation of worldviews as an unphilosophical task, as "a phenomenon foreign to philosophy." If philosophy has anything to say about worldview, its remarks bear only on the "essence of worldview" as such. See GA 56/7:12.

social and historical vicissitudes. "World" is introduced in the lecture courses of the first Freiburg period not as a mere transcendental condition of human knowledge and *praxis* but as the inescapable site of meaningful personal life; and epistemology is taken to task for eliminating those features of the world that make it possible to live, for presenting before the philosopher's gaze a picture of the world as an object that encourages us to adopt a standpoint that intensifies indifference as it diminishes our capacity to care. "World," as Heidegger concisely remarks in WS 1920/1, "is that in which one can live (one cannot live in an object)."²⁰

The argument against indifference, the argument that encourages a leap into the world of concrete life-experience, however, is really no argument at all, is nothing like a refutation in the usual sense: it takes aim at no definite proposition or thesis, passes no judgment on the alleged coherence of a theory, and establishes no fixed conclusions from which other propositions might happily be derived. The train of thought terminates in factual life and *Umwelterlebnis*; but these can hardly be called conclusions that follow from epistemological premises. KNS 1919 simply invites us to compare two very different accounts of experience, to find one of them culpably remote from anything of real human concern, to redirect our attentive regard to experience, and thoughtfully to consider the world in which life naturally runs its undeflected course. It is, in short, a persuasive invitation to change the subject.

But arguments of this style have their limits. If they are not definitively persuasive, if the epistemological project continues to fascinate and forges ahead, it is precisely because the success or failure of ethical criticism depends upon a certain construal of experience that will always remain questionable; because life and experience are always owned and appropriated in a plurality of distinct ways of life and styles of philosophical thought; and, perhaps most importantly, because detachment from life, intensified in epistemological reflection, is an essential possibility of human life. The epistemologist remains free to deny the fidelity of Heidegger's portrait of epistemological experience, to accuse Heidegger of doing battle against a straw man, to

²⁰ GA 60:11. "How is the world originally given? Not as an object of theoretical knowledge but as an envolving world in which I look around and act, set up something, *care* for it"; *Supplements*, 163.

offer his own, competing account of the basic experience that drives his project, or simply to insist that phenomenological considerations and questionable appeals to life and experience are irrelevant.

III

Against Scientism: Variations on an Enduring Practice in WS 1919/20. KNS 1919 might be the place to search for Heidegger's breakthrough, as Kisiel among others suggests, but it marks only the beginning of a strenuous effort to bring philosophy back to life. Phenomenological criticism continues unabated in the following semesters and swells far beyond the limits of KNS 1919 into a large-scale, powerful assault on the scientistic reification of human life and the hegemony of theory in phenomenology. Epistemological theory now lies behind (some of) us as a philosophical (and personal) dead end, as something that no longer vitally involves us or resonates with our own life and experience, and as an obstacle that no longer inhibits the phenomenological quest for the "absolute *origin* of the spirit in and for itself—'life in and for itself.'"²¹ But the nonphilosophical sciences and the ideal of objectivity that guides concrete scientific inquiry and research are different matters. The earnest pursuit of scientific knowledge emerges unscathed from and progresses unimpeded by the phenomenological criticism deployed against epistemological reflection in KNS 1919. In contrast to epistemology, the sciences are not paralyzed by hyperbolic doubts about the reality of their objects, do not run their course in a vacuum of sterile self-reflection, and grapple concretely, methodically, and securely with a world of things that matter not only to the scientist but to most of us (moderns) in the course of everyday life. If the solution to an epistemological problem strikes some of us as irrelevant and leaves the world of everyday life alone, the appearance of a novel scientific theory deeply interests, inspires, and challenges us and, in its concrete technological application, often visibly alters the contours of the world around us. If epistemology cannot be seriously considered a viable way of life but remains at best something that occupies the mind at leisure, alongside other, more pressing concerns, a passion for science and scientific research can

²¹ GA 58:1.

develop into the integral and productive shape of a life responsive to genuine perplexity in the face of the world around it. The sciences present us with powerful norms of objectivity and rigor that command our respect, shape our own attitudes and convictions about the world in which we live and what it means to know something about it, frequently serve as measures of philosophical insight, and, precisely because of their unclarified but incontestable power, cry out for careful phenomenological scrutiny. It comes as no surprise, then, that Heidegger devotes the bulk of a lecture course on the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, held in the winter semester of 1919/20, to the phenomenon of science and its tangled relation to the world of everyday life.

But the philosophy of science developed in WS 1919/20 is peculiar. Heidegger shows almost no interest in the scientific theories of his contemporaries, has nothing to say about well-established scientific methods, sheds little light on the validity of scientific claims, and offers nothing comparable to a history of scientific problems and solutions. Science is introduced in the first part of the course almost casually, as neither the passion of a concentrated life's work nor a potent and inescapable historical force that transforms nearly every aspect of modern life, but as something we just happen to encounter, with no greater importance and emphasis at first than the tools, works of art, machines, religious artifacts, institutions, political debates, friends, relatives, strangers, and other objects we experience in the course of daily life, as something to be taken up or brushed aside, as just one of many ways in which the needs of life find satisfaction and living intentions find their fulfillment in the familiar world of living concern.²² We encounter science in the same context and in roughly the same way that we experience everything else that commands our attention or leaves us indifferent in the *Lebenswelt*.

But science is obviously more than just an object of passing everyday concern. It insinuates itself into the modern lifeworld more pervasively and enduringly than any object of fleeting interest, and it offers itself not only as a set of objects to be contemplated and admired or ignored but more profoundly and importantly as a global way of disclosing, grasping, and progressively determining the objects we experience in prescientific life. Science shows up for early Heidegger as an *Ausdruckszusammenhang*, as a distinctive way in

²² GA 58:35.

which life discloses and expresses itself, and struggles to make sense of itself and to master an otherwise unruly world. If science is singled out for detailed consideration, it is precisely because it leaves nothing untouched, but "appears to seize . . . all areas of life and world."²³

Heidegger's account of science, developed in sections 15–17 of WS 1919/20, is essentially genetic and experiential, an account from below of the appearance of theoretical science as an exceptional way of life. Although it might superficially resemble a psychological analysis of scientific experience, the phenomenology of scientific comportment has nothing to do with the psychology of science and sheds no light on the personal reasons that account for the choice of subject matter. Heidegger takes it for granted that aspects of our world stimulate an interest in cognition, that we are "motivated" to live in the "tendency" to develop scientific knowledge of the world, and that the choice of a field is largely a matter of individual concern. The account more closely resembles a piece of intentional analysis in Husserl's sense: it explores the sense of intentional comportment, analyzes the content as intended, and considers both in the light of an intelligible nexus (*Zusammenhang*) or neglected soil of experience. It is centrally preoccupied with the initial upsurge of the scientific attitude rather than its more elaborate and subtle development in a sustained way of life. Its questions include: How does science emerge as an expressive context of life on the basis of the *Lebenswelt*? What is the "relational sense" of scientific comportment? How is experience modified in the direction of scientific inquiry? How does science transform the life of the individual who pursues theory? How does science show up as a life-stance? And what does science necessarily leave behind?

The objects of scientific thought, the targets of our explanatory efforts, are just those things we experience and understand effortlessly as we get around in the world of everyday life. A flower-strewn path encountered on a walk in early May can arouse a desire to know and find its way into the expressive context of a botanical monograph. A famous Rembrandt in the Kaiser-Friedrich-Museum can become the subject of art historical research.²⁴ In each case, we meet with the same things, under different descriptions and in different contexts shaped by different aims, in scientific inquiry and the uninterrupted

²³ GA 58:55.

²⁴ The examples are Heidegger's.

course of ordinary life. In a move pregnant with far-reaching implications, Heidegger suggests that scientific thought is somehow made possible by the manners in which things display themselves, are *vorgegeben* to an emerging science in prescientific life. Things can become objects of scientific thought only because they are already somehow there, given in advance and disclosed and expressed in a certain way in the life of prescientific involvement. If life can live in the motivated tendency of scientific comportment, if science can carve out a sector (*Ausschnitt*) of the surrounding world and disclose its objects methodically, it is precisely because things display themselves in the *Lebenswelt* of prescientific life. Every science has "a certain pregiven soil," grows out of the familiarity life has with itself and its world, and draws constantly from a wellspring of experience.²⁵ However vague and elusive and difficult to formulate it might be, the understanding embodied in the comportments of everyday life is highly differentiated and wonderfully discerning: it knows performatively²⁶ the difference between animal and plant, tool and painting, foodstuff and metal, historical artifact, person and mere thing, and distinguishes in its own way among the various domains taken up and developed in the special sciences, without the highly developed and explicit conceptual and methodological resources of scientific thought. To adapt a pregnant expression from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the grounding discernment lies in understanding.

But science takes shape within and to some extent against this diffuse familiarity and dimly expressed experience of the lifeworld. The longest stretch of the account of the "Stages and Moments of the Apriori Genesis of the Expressive Context of Science" is devoted to the scientific reshaping of prescientific experience. As we might expect, experience (*Erfahrung*) is anything but the bloodless *Erlebnis* of mere sense data disengaged from the enviroing world, is nothing like seeing a red object placed somewhere in space or sensing the pressure of the table under my hands, but having insight into the possibilities and realities of social, political, and personal life. Experience is "earning from the journey of life," getting to know something by delving into and appropriating it, becoming skilled.²⁷ Experience

²⁵ GA 58:66.

²⁶ By "performatively" I mean that the understanding works these distinctions spontaneously into its concrete, practical, and reflective dealings with things. On Heidegger's view, the distinctions are in the performance before they develop into clear and exact concepts.

includes knowing what is available, knowing what can and cannot be done and what it would be good to do—forms of knowing that develop over an extended stretch of time out of concrete engagement with unique situations of thoughtful action. A man of experience is someone who knows his way around in the world, is “wise” in human affairs and competent or savvy in practical life. Someone who has political experience in this sense is not only acquainted with the data of political science or conversant with the history of political thought but has spent time *in* politics and is at home in the contemporary world of political life. Political experience is earned by living politically, by running for office, campaigning for a candidate, participating in debates and discussions, interacting with the people, giving statements at Congressional meetings, and so on. Experience in this sense is the primal phenomenon of knowing: to know in the first sense is not to possess information but to have insight that grows in a rich field of encounter, and to know how to do certain things well, to be accomplished. The impoverished residue of epistemological *Erlebnis* comes up woefully short. The subject of experience is no mere surveyor of the landscape but a creature of habit.²⁸

While the competent scientist must be experienced and continues to dwell understandingly in a familiar world, science itself is not experience in this primitive sense. Although the objects of science are the same as the items encountered in daily life, the situations of encounter are not. Scientific thought might be rooted in the rich weave of the carpet of life, but the fruit is not the soil.²⁹ The carpet must be pulled away or, to adopt a better figure, individual strands have to be torn out of their native and vital context and pursued in relative isolation. The

²⁷ GA 58:67–8.

²⁸ There is an ambiguity in the account of experience just sketched, but it is, I think, harmless. Experience is sometimes meant as the process of coming to understand something, of becoming skilled or accomplished, at times as its fruit, as skillfulness. But these are not really two separate things but two sides of a single movement. Skillfulness only shows up in repeated performance. If we stop doing those things that made us skillful, we become rusty and, in some cases, can lose the skill altogether. We are condemned always to delve back into the thick of things and grapple with them anew. Being skilled is no fixed state or property but, in the language of *Sein und Zeit*, a certain ongoing way to be.

²⁹ Heidegger adapts the poet George's *Teppich des Lebens* for his own purposes in an account of the transition from prescientific life and experience to the scientific objectification of a *Sachgebiet* of the lifeworld. See GA 58:69.

diffuse milieu of everyday experience must be concentrated *as* an experiential soil (*Erfahrungsboden*) from which “a unified *Sachcharakter* can be lifted” and posited as a *Sachgebiet* for scientific determination.³⁰ On the noetic side, situated, holistic *Umwelterlebnis* must yield to detached, analytic *Dingerfahrung*.

Fragmentation of the lifeworld and reification of experience are just two sides of the same process, and together they form the basic accomplishment of scientific thought that interests early Heidegger. The growth of scientific thought is a continually advancing synthesis that rests upon a fundamental and decisive and, to some extent, ongoing analysis. To say that science fragments the world of everyday life is just to say that every special science is essentially abstract: its objects are drawn out of the lifeworld, detached from their surroundings, and set up in a *Sachgebiet* as themes for ongoing investigative inquiry. The experiences themselves are equally abstract: only certain experiences matter, and those that have cognitive import are torn out of the context of a personal history, assembled around the theme in question, and directed toward a purely cognitive aim. Although we live in distinct regions of things and perceive a swarm of differences in everyday life, the boundaries are permeable, the differences embedded in a relatively unaccentuated practice, and the situations allowed to interpenetrate and absorb their contents in a vital rhythm of comportment. We move effortlessly from social situations to the privacy of domestic space, distinguish between the car we drive home and the pedestrian to be avoided on the sidewalk, relate differently to a painting on the wall in a gallery, the bench strategically placed in front of the canvas, and the stranger who invites us to comment on the Rembrandt. We do all this without having to dismember the situation and to thematize discrete contents, and in the absence of any theory. Each thing simply displays itself, comes into view, temporarily engages our attention or captives us, is admired or scorned or put directly and competently to use in a tangled flow of living participation. In the context of science, however, the vital unity of the situation, lived in an otherwise uninterrupted advance (*Fortgehen*) that draws its past tacitly along without looking back, is extinguished, its contents externalized, hardened, and scattered in a heap of ruins (*Trümmern*) that serves as building material for scientific construction.³¹ Every nonphilosophical science is essentially decontextualizing: the

³⁰ GA 58:69.

productive work of scientific thought begins where the elusive whole and the sense of being surrounded by and entangled in it end and things fall apart (*fallen auseinander*).³²

The phenomenological account of the genesis of science just outlined is hardly less schematic in the original. Heidegger says nothing about the growth of mathematical thought and its application to *res extensa* comparable to Husserl's discussion of Galilean science in section 9 of the *Crisis*; he offers nothing like Dilthey's detailed hermeneutics of the construction of the historical world in the *Geisteswissenschaften*; and he provides only a laundry list of five structural forms developed in the productive and "concrete logics" of the special sciences. While he often mentions in passing that the account ought to be worked out more fully, and returns to the theme time and again in the ensuing years, Heidegger, unlike Husserl, never really gets around to developing a comprehensive phenomenology of scientific cognition. His interest and intention clearly lie elsewhere.

Both the interest and the intention come clearly to the fore in the terse, culminating account of scientific objectification as another instance of *Entlebung* in section 17; and it becomes equally clear that, on Heidegger's view, science (or at least those sciences with explanatory intentions) constructs something like an iron cage from which phenomenology (and life itself) has to free itself. Although science is a more respectable and vital pursuit than epistemological theory, the scientific life involves roughly the same modification of experience we encountered in the phenomenological criticism of epistemology in KNS 1919. The argument trades upon the familiar antagonism between absorption in and detachment from the life each of us lives both before and, to some degree, after we take up the scientific tendency to disclose the lifeworld methodically, a life that satisfies and expresses itself in a familiar world of interweaving situations, lives out of the rich soil of an incomprehensible past, and enacts or realizes itself concernfully toward an open and uncertain future. If this flowing life comes to a halt and turns back upon itself, if it pauses to consider its own motives and tendencies, perhaps in response to an incipient crisis or simply in order to clarify and reorient itself, it does so in a style that preserves the rhythms and textures of vital experience, in

³¹ GA 58:121. These points are made more forcefully in the Becker transcript of SS 1919 (GA 56/7:208–10).

³² GA 56/7:209.

conversation and narrative or in a sort of dialogue with itself in the chambers of memory.³³ And it is driven by an interest that has at first nothing to do with scientific cognition.

Aspects of the lifeworld are singled out and moments of past life accentuated (both show up under a certain description and are taken as something definite), but what steps out of the background is never an object but shows up precisely as significant, as something that still bears the traces of its prior involvement in a personal *Selbstleben*.

It is just this involvement that scientific comportment puts out of play. The break with spontaneously flowing life that Heidegger places at the threshold of the scientific attitude is far more decisive and estranging than the temporary pause that makes possible reflective efforts to make sense of ourselves and to render our lives coherent. To enter a scientific context of expression is to construct a situation in which the selfworld (roughly: the world of personal concern, the world in which I am at stake in what I care about, do, and suffer) no longer plays a productive role but is bracketed in the name of an impersonal objectivity (*Sachlichkeit*). "All the rich relations to the selfworld are severed [*unterbrochen*]: in the scientific context of expression, living flowing life is 'somehow' hardened [*erstarrt*] or stands in a completely different form of life."³⁴ "Science takes up lifeworlds in a tendency of unliving and in this way factual life is robbed of its authentic living possibility and . . . vital enactment."³⁵

But what more precisely does it mean to say that scientific comportment lives in a tendency of *Entlebung*? What becomes of us when we adopt a scientific attitude and pursue theory? What qualities of experience are left behind as scientific objectification advances? What is the cost of scientific objectivity?

Prescientific life in its undeflected course is a "continual advance of the present" toward the future in active and hopeful expectation of something desired.³⁶ But the object of desire actively pursued is, *as* desired, present in the mode of absence, present as the target of a

³³ "The explication [of life] is the *kenntnisnehmend erzählende* [explication] of the full participation in life, but in the basic style of factual encounter"; GA 58:111.

³⁴ GA 58:77.

³⁵ GA 58:77.

³⁶ For the "continual advance of the present" as a counter-concept to a conception of time as an objective *Ordnungsform*, see Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften* 19:211.

practical intention that can in principle fail to reach its goal. Experience in the robust, vital, and temporally thick sense delineated above is not only "earning from the journey of life" but spontaneity, adventure, and risk; it is not only living out of the past but reaching actively, concernfully, and expectantly toward an open and uncertain future; it is, in short, exposure of human *praxis* to what the ancients called *tuchê*. The urgency and anxiety that attend our plans and encourage us to make calculations and predictions, that haunt every reflective consideration of our own active lives, are deeply rooted in a pervasive and unsettling sense of contingency.

But experience is also trained upon a tangled world of concrete particulars encountered in unique situations of thought and thoughtful action. However superficially similar two or more situations might appear, there is always something incomparable in each. Today's work resembles last week's, is undertaken in the same local café with the same computer, the same books, and the same anxious intensity, but a body of thought and experience intervenes and influences the work of the present. While each particular is taken up and construed in a certain way and invites comparison with other particulars, we deal concretely with and care chiefly about particular things. A close friend is not only or even primarily an instance of *homo sapiens* with a definite anatomical structure, physiology, and natural history but an individual with a uniquely significant past tied in numberless ways to my own life in a shared history of particular interactions and encounters. To care about him is never to care about a species.

Being surprised, taking risks, caring about unique particulars: these and a large array of kindred phenomena are possible only for a being that has a history, that not only occupies a place before, alongside, and after other beings in an abstract order of time but lives in a peculiar and knowing relation to time. A creature thoroughly taken by the pleasures and pains of a dislocated moment or unable to situate the contents of present experience in relation to previous encounters and future prospects could never be taken by surprise, would remain deaf to the rich language of the unexpected, and would be incapable of sympathizing with the plight of others. Like Nietzsche's cattle in the second Untimely Meditation, it would be "neither melancholy nor bored" but simply "contained in the present, like a number without any awkward fraction left over."³⁷ Its experience would lack the

³⁷ *Untimely Meditations*, ed. Daniel Breazeale, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 60–1.

continuity, attentiveness, and engagement that sustain and nourish an active concern for particular things. But more importantly still, its experiences would be not only immune to the unexpected, self-enclosed, carefree, and trivial but meaningless, less even than a dream. Although we (normal socialized adults) can grasp in a fleeting instant an arrangement of meaningful things, things themselves are meaningful not because they occupy a slice of mere awareness or are the targets of isolated acts of consciousness but (in part) because they are woven into the fabric of historical life, because each of us becomes familiar with things and uneasily at home in a significant world. In the absence of historical context, things become, at best, mere clusters of sensible qualities distributed over distinct fields of sensation. The falling snow visible through a window in my study becomes wet, white flecks moving about soundlessly in a multicolored but dimly perceived background. But for a vision entangled in and guided by a history of experience it is also an obstacle to be faced during the morning commute to work; the promise of good skiing; an inhospitable climate to the homeless; a cluster of atoms for the physical chemist; a mystery of God's creation in the mind of the pious. It is each of these things precisely because experiences accumulate in a history of experience. A gaze cleansed of everything past does not see things as they truly are; it sees nothing.

We are now in a position to understand more concretely and precisely the sense in which science lives, in Heidegger's phrase, "in the tendency of unliving." Human experience in its undeflected course is at once open to the unexpected, concerned about particulars, and indebted to the past. In the rich world of human affairs, things take us pleasantly or painfully by surprise, concrete and unique particulars are valued and esteemed at the expense of other equally concrete and unique particulars, and the unruly lives of individuals and communities unfold, interact, and have meaning in the knotted shapes of personal and overlapping histories. This largely unpredictable world of human activity, a world of surprising and meaningful things valued and scorned in work and play, loved and hated in the complex and intertwining lives of unique individuals, leaves no permanent trace in the world of (natural) scientific objectivity. This second world, the world of theoretical objects that explain or account for the world of things experienced naïvely, is one in which the objects of everyday life have been denied their capacity to surprise, particulars show up and matter only as examples of some universal law or property or species, and the past is reduced to an irrational force or (more charita-

bly) as a sequence of partly successful attempts at scientific enlightenment and eventually stripped of its significance. Of course there is surprise, selective concern, and historical significance in the lives of individual scientists. Scientific experience itself (the experience of making and testing theories, striving to know better, more clearly and definitely the particular objects in question, and working with inherited theoretical paradigms and methods) retains the aspects of human experience just sketched as long as the work of science remains unfinished and individuals go on caring deeply and passionately about scientific knowledge of the world. But these phenomena have no strictly scientific (objective) import. The world just is as it is and has come to be; and the scientific aim is just to know it as it is and has come to be and, hopefully, as it will turn out to be. If the scientist is surprised by an unanticipated experimental result or discovery, or cares about the fate of his own theory, or takes an interest in the rich history of scientific thought, that's his (personal, extrascientific) affair. If science is risky business and has a history, if it knows something like the drama of personal life, it remains a human pursuit estranged from a certain conception of its own ideals. To approach the scientific world of rigorously determined objects divorced from uncertain human concern is to leave behind human life as we (perplexed, striving, concerned, needy) human beings know it.

The point of all this is lost on those who construe Heidegger's ethical criticism of scientific thought and experience as the work of an antiscientific mentality, as just another instance of dissatisfied reactionary thought trained upon one of the finest flowers of modern intellectual culture in order to rehabilitate some premodern vision or way of life untainted by the evils of scientific objectification. There are many things that can and should be subjected to rigorous, natural scientific analysis. I might not know what is causing this pain in my back, but however indeterminate and fuzzy my awareness of it is, there is something quite definite going on that deserves to be objectified by someone who knows the structure and function of the human body and how best to treat it as a material object better than I do. To persist in ignorance and to avoid the doctor in fear of an unpleasant diagnosis or to justify the use of tobacco because life cannot and should not be objectified is not to protect the sanctity of prescientific life but to live in what Sartre called "bad faith."³⁸ Phenomenological

³⁸ On this point see Sartre's *Truth and Existence*, trans. Adrian van den Hoven (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 33–43.

criticism of scientific objectification is not rejection of but reflection upon the scope and limits of an essential way of life. The path of objectification and unliving that leads to genuine scientific knowledge of a reified fragment or specialized domain of the lifeworld is hardly an egregious and culpable error of Western civilization. Although it has a history and plays out in a field of contingency, scientific thought is nothing accidental but anchored in a permanent possibility of human life (detachment from contingent circumstances and particular objects, development of the longing to know, cognitive ascent to more general principles and laws, reduction of the multiplicity of phenomena to the unity of scientific concepts). We are the sorts of creatures who can always detach ourselves from the local and particular in search of an impersonal but reliable objectivity, creatures for whom everything experienced is a possible object of scientific thought. "Everything . . . is able to be reified [*hat die Chance der Verdinglichung*]." ³⁹ To deny this is not to win radical independence from scientific thought but to remain blind to an essential dimension of human life, to substitute another abstraction for concrete experience, and to narrow the scope of human potential. In short, it is to deny precisely ourselves.

The real target of Heidegger's criticism in WS 1919/20 is not science *tout court* but an extreme way of life and thought that seriously and (in intention at least) consistently doubts the value of our particular attachments and ruthlessly attacks the understanding embodied in our prescientific concerns, that condemns the knowledge we have of ourselves and our world as engaged agents because they fail to measure up to scientific standards of rigor and evidence. It is not the exact knowledge of, say, the human body in the science of medicine or the psychiatrist armed with a plausible theory of human development and neurosis, but the attitudes of the doctor who only sees statistics and laws rather than persons who care about their own health or the Freudian who sees his patients above all as publishable case studies rather than suffering human beings with a tenuous hold on the world around them and complex personal histories that resist simple analysis and often challenge the official dogmas of the profession. In the language of KNS 1919, the target is the primacy and absolutization of a theoretical attitude that reverses the proper relationship between scientific theory and human life and sees in human experience only a

³⁹ GA 58:127.

path that leads to rigorous scientific knowledge.⁴⁰ We have to distinguish, as Heidegger doesn't (at least not very clearly in sections 15–17 of WS 1919/20), between legitimate and hard-earned scientific knowledge and the pernicious ideal of total scientific objectification, between science as an earnest cognitive pursuit that discloses important aspects of the lifeworld and the set of convictions that coalesce in scientism. Scientism—roughly, the view that physical science knows all there is to know and to care about, that prescientific experience is just bad or incipient science, that the rich language of prescientific life is destined to yield gradually to the precise language of mathematical thought—is guided by an ideal that undermines the conditions of our own active and meaningful lives, fails to do justice to us human knowers, and makes the scientific desire to know unintelligible. At a certain level of detachment from human life, we no longer have ourselves in view, are not really living any longer, and cannot tell ourselves a coherent tale about how we got there or why we ought to go on. Motives, tendencies, and directions of thoughtful scientific engagement with and discourse about the world are in life or nowhere. To the extent that the scientist himself is moved to study something and cares about the fate of scientific knowledge, his own life falls outside the scope of objectification, and the integrity of his experience in the sense articulated above is preserved.

IV

Life against Itself: Categorical Self-Criticism in WS 1921/2. At this point we have a clear sense of the bankruptcy of traditional epistemology and the dangers of self-undermining scientism and a vague sense that something like the personal life bracketed in epistemological and scientific thought is at stake in Heidegger's developing phenomenology and ethical criticism. The critical engagement with epistemology and science as instances of *Entleben* in KNS 1919 and WS 1919/20 leads back to the concerned life already underway before epistemological reflection and scientific thought come on the scene. Philosophy begins (and ends) with the materials of daily life and a concerned relation to a world of significant and unique particulars: the situated, flowing experience of the tables and lecture halls,

⁴⁰ See GA 56/7:59 and sec. 17; also, GA 58:127–8 and 149–50.

bookstores, libraries, gardens, automobiles, friends, relatives, and strangers that constantly surround us is the soil philosophy is given to cultivate. If personal life is the proper object of phenomenology, it must possess a sense. Life is "nothing dark or chaotic" but something that has a meaning that cries out for understanding.⁴¹ Understanding the shape and significance of life cannot be divorced from actually living it.

But simple appeals to personal life and immediate lived experience are too easy and too often guilty of *Kitsch*. Too easy: life itself is vague, the sense of human experience wonderfully diverse, and the philosophical problems embedded in life far from obvious. There is rich diversity in even the most monotonous of personal lives, regardless of time and place and philosophical proclivity. If phenomenology begins with absolute sympathetic immersion in life, we have a right to ask: under what description? If life comes to itself in a variety of expressive contexts and is always somehow making sense, philosophy is called upon to make sense of life's sense-making capacities in a roundabout way. As Heidegger notes in the review of Jaspers's *Psychology of Worldviews*, philosophical problems show up for us because the understanding in which we spontaneously live is loaded with traditional concepts and theories that must be questioned and criticized.⁴² "The path leading to the things themselves is a long one."⁴³ Our sense of the problems, the puzzlement that gives rise to philosophical thought, is awakened not by empty gestures toward personal life and lived experience but by way of reflective engagement with our own experience in dialogue with the tradition underway in it. To talk about life is to choose our conversation partners carefully and to work what significant others have said about it into our own account. *Kitsch*: life is eminently difficult. Finding our way in it is never as easy as surrendering to the mysterious play of *Ereignis*. Although we are occasionally at one with ourselves and at home in some pressing and clearly defined task, we also find ourselves in conflict with ourselves and at sea in an unstable world of human pos-

⁴¹ GA 58:239.

⁴² *Supplements*, 96.

⁴³ *Supplements*, 74. Although Heidegger often speaks of "immediate experience" and "givenness" in KNS 1919 and rejects Hegelian notions of mediation in WS 1919/20, his considered view is that the given is a *task*, that the "things themselves" are not simply there without further ado but concealed beneath the crusts of opinion and inherited preconception.

sibilities. In some cases, the search for dry land is no smoother sailing than the philosophical quest for "the things themselves." Life is not merely passive surrender to unruly events but self-shaping deliberation and choice. The world is not only the place where each of us finds himself comfortably at home and at peace but a field of conflict, misery, and disappointed expectations. Coming to be (uneasily) at home in the world is having and learning how to make difficult choices, caring for some things at the expense of other, equally important things, being painfully divided about what we ought to do, coming to grips with loss, privation, aging, and death. Coming to terms with life might involve something like surrender to what it gives and *Hingabe* to its currents, perhaps even resignation in the face of what it takes away, but these are the ends of life, not its unquestioned beginnings.

Life comes to itself, objectifies itself, for better or for worse, in a variety of shapes and situations; and because some expressions of life more fittingly capture what it means concretely to live, life is called upon to criticize its manifold expressions of itself. The point of doing philosophy is not to recover a lost sense of home or to construct a worldview in which every question finds a fixed and abiding answer but to make life and philosophy difficult. "If it is the case that factual life authentically is what it is in . . . being hard and being difficult, then the genuinely fitting way of gaining access to it and truly safekeeping it can only consist in making itself hard for itself."⁴⁴ If life is set in opposition to epistemology and scientism in KNS 1919 and WS 1919/20, life is finally set against itself and becomes the target of a peculiar sort of ethical criticism in the ensuing lecture courses.

Ethical criticism or evaluation of life is clearly no undivided class of activities but a diverse body of reflective practices shaped by an equally diverse set of interests and undertaken from a variety of philosophical and nonphilosophical perspectives for the sake of a rich diversity of human values. There are profound differences in form, content, and level of generality among the rejection of certain ways of life and the defense of philosophical contemplation in book 9 of Plato's *Republic* and the tenth book of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, on the one hand, and bumpersticker opposition to abortion. All three versions of ethical criticism appear to differ from the skeptical and probing practice of Socratic *elenchos* depicted in Plato's early

⁴⁴ *Supplements*, 113.

dialogues. An ethical critic might assume widespread disagreement among his interlocutors or general consensus about what really matters and shape his speech or conversation accordingly. Not every instance of ethical criticism is moralizing or concerned with moral values in the narrow sense worked out by Kant and his descendants. Some varieties of ethical criticism take aim at particular aspects of human life, others take issue with ways of life as a whole. Some ethical critics offer positive pronouncements, articulate and defend a concept of the good life, while others are content to denounce. Ethical criticism can be transparently partisan and divisive or, like recent legal and philosophical defenses of human rights, undertaken in the name of something held to be universal and in a spirit of reconciliation and mutual tolerance, as direct as a religious tract or as indirect as Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writings, as simple as Rilke's appeal to an archaic torso of Apollo or as complex as Kant's defense of human freedom and dignity in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. In the light of Heidegger's interest in facticity we might expect something like detailed reflection upon the concrete concerns of particular ways of life and comparative analysis of various shapes (*Gestalten*) of life guided by a more-or-less explicit philosophical (or religious) *Weltanschauung*.

The phenomenologist is neither moralist nor prophet nor proponent of a definite worldview. Ethical criticism of life becomes something fundamental and philosophical, something like the task of reconceiving what it means to be a human being. The ontological turn of WS 1921/2 does not preclude ethical reflection for the simple reason that ontology comprehends and grounds ethical life: to rethink what it means to be human is to reconsider what it means to live a human sort of life. A fundamental construal of life is never ethically neutral. If I grasp human life as the life of a pleasure-seeking and pain-despising animal, I will live it differently than I would if I believed that the human being is an immortal soul temporarily imprisoned in a body that corrupts its vision of the good. Both ways of life will differ from a life lived in terms of a Cartesian ontology that takes the soul as the place where knowledge of and power over the world of *res extensa* unfolds. It makes an ethical difference whether I see human life as active or passive, potentially free and self-determining or fruitfully modified and shaped by a world of complex interactions among persons and things and persons and persons. More to the point of Heidegger's phenomenology: it matters whether I see myself as a thing among

things with certain tasks shaped by certain properties and faculties in a relatively fixed world (Aristotle) or as a self-interpreting animal living its life in a world of shifting significance and value shaped by the language it speaks and the stories it hears and tells. An ontology of life is obviously no mere theoretical enterprise: we are at stake in the categorial analysis of human life. Changing the way we understand the being of human life (and being as a whole) is not like discovering that water is hydrogen hydroxide, or that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo, or that a famous painting in the Louvre is a forgery. At a certain level of analysis, a fundamental concept of life and the way of life it expresses are the same.

The ontological and ethical self-criticism of life is, then, deliberate, conceptual, or categorial self-interpretation of life. Categories are not concepts that classify and determine objects but construals of the sense of a phenomenon. They are not imposed upon life from the outside but live in a definite shape of life itself. They are basic ways in which a life comes concernfully to itself and interprets itself, and they express a fundamental and holistic understanding of life and announce a possible way of life.

A hermeneutics of facticity or categorial self-interpretation of life is concerned about fundamentals and oriented toward the whole of human life, but a fundamental and holistic interpretation of life is not necessarily a universal account of every conceivable life. Categorial self-analysis is not simply a matter of making the general sense of life explicit and unifying the diversity of lives in a complex concept that captures the fixed essence of *homo sapiens*. Categories interpret divisively in the light of a certain ontic ideal of human life and are guided by a sense of what life ought to be like and give expression to a certain paradigm. They tell us something about what life is like when it owns up to itself, when it lives in a manner consistent with the sort of being it is. They tell us something about what life is like when it fails to be itself. It is a remarkable fact about us that we can fail to live up to the human condition, that we can fail somehow to be ourselves.⁴⁵ Categorial self-interpretation serves to awaken a sense of what it means to be a human being not merely to record some important information about human life or to develop a theory that holds life at a distance

⁴⁵ In terms Heidegger tends to avoid: human beings can become inhuman. Animals, plants, stones, tables and chairs simply are what they are. We have our being to be, as a task, as something to be appropriated.

from itself but ultimately in order to become, in Gadamer's words, "keenly aware of one's being-there and [to make] it one's own."⁴⁶

WS 1921/2 is a puzzling text: nominally devoted to phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle and officially devoted to philosophy as a philosophical problem, the course offers nothing of interest on Aristotle and no definitive concept of the philosophical enterprise. Although the object of philosophy finally receives the name of *Sein*, Heidegger's first explicit account of the categories of human life comes perilously close to moralizing criticism of worldly life cloaked in the finery of ontological analysis. In many cases it is difficult to distinguish between those structures that are essential to any and every human life and form the neutral ontological keyboard upon which the authentic and inauthentic alike must play, and those categories that capture features of a culpably self-alienating, evasive, and "ruinant" way of life. On the other hand, WS 1921/2 allows us to see more clearly just how closely intertwined ethical criticism and ontological interpretation are, to understand better why phenomenology is essentially critical or destructive and why life itself becomes the target of criticism, and to grasp more directly the sort of life or ontic ideal that underwrites Heidegger's more mature and formal ontological insights.

As Krell fittingly observes, WS 1921/2 offers something like "a genealogy of masquerade and ruinous self-deception."⁴⁷ Heidegger no longer pits detached theories of life against the "facts of life" occluded by theory but sets life against itself. The unliving of total theoretical detachment and "ascetic" denial of life is just one of several ways in which life manages more or less successfully to distort and escape from itself; and it has to be accounted for in terms of motives and tendencies that operate in the life of everyday concern. Life is already avoiding itself, masking, concealing, and reifying itself, before epistemological reflection and scientism come on the scene. If phenomenology becomes destructive criticism of everyday life, it is because life has what we might call architectural tendencies: life tends to build secure shelters for itself that immobilize, protect, reassure, and tranquilize.

⁴⁶ "Martin Heidegger's One Path," in *Reading Heidegger from the Start*, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 25.

⁴⁷ "The 'Factual Life' of Dasein," in *Reading Heidegger from the Start*, 376.

"World" might be the place where significant things happen, interact, and matter, where life is lived for better or worse from birth to death, but it is also the place where significance fades and yields to banality, concern degenerates into indifference (*Unbekümmern*), and life gets set in its ways and entangles itself complacently in trivial pursuits. If WS 1919/20 offered a phenomenological genesis of scientific unliving and a critique of life-denying scientism, WS 1921/2 provides a categorial "snapshot" of the complacency, conformity, and rigor mortis of everyday prescientific life. The danger of unliving receives a variety of names: *Verfestigung*, *Mitgenommenwerden*, *Zerstreuung*, *Verhärtung*, and so on. But we can discern throughout the account a veritable obsession with life's inner propensity to reify itself. As Heidegger will claim repeatedly in *Sein und Zeit*, in the formal language of fundamental ontology and *Seinsverständnis*, Dasein has an almost natural inclination to understand itself in terms of the world of things taken care of and manipulated in everyday life, to interpret and, as a Kantian might say, to use itself as a thing among mere things. In WS 1921/2, however, this insight is conveyed in terms that are more overtly ethical and, some might argue, too patently moralizing. If the world reflects back the light of a caring self that reaches out toward it in its neediness (*Darbung*), it is also the theatre of life's masquerading misadventure: life is relucant and larvant in the world.

This is not the place to work out a detailed interpretation of the account of *Ruinanz* developed in this "verbose, baroque, and turgid" course of lectures composed during a period of transition in Heidegger's rapidly developing conception of philosophy and the life it questioningly serves.⁴⁸ But a cursory glance at the categories of relation (to the world) developed in the first chapter of the third part of the course—*Neigung*, *Abstand*, and *Abriegelung*—is enough to dispel the illusion that we are dealing with ethically neutral concepts of human life comparable to the concepts and principles that structure scientific discussions of life in the nonphilosophical sciences: *Neigung* is not only the primitive thrust of life toward a world but the tendency to become dispersed, fragmented, and smugly self-satisfied with whatever comes out of the blue in daily life. *Abstand* is not the tendency to acknowledge the difference between the trivial and the important but a culpable refusal to see the distance that separates the noble from the

⁴⁸ The assessment is Kisiel's in *The Genesis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time'* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 235.

base, motivated by a pernicious self-preoccupation that blindly elevates at the expense of others and cares chiefly about rank, success, position in life, and worldly advantage, that struggles, in short, to get ahead. *Abriegelung*, finally, is the self-sequestering loss of myself in chance opportunities to live at ease mapped out in advance by the public world. And *Neigung*, *Abstand*, and *Abriegelung* coalesce in a quest for worldly certainty, ease, and *securitas* that brings life to a dogmatic and tranquilizing standstill and fixes the world in a rigidly determined pattern of unquestioned possibilities for mindless work and equally thoughtless recreation.⁴⁹ Together, the categories paint an extremely unflattering portrait of a distinctive way of coming to grips with and caring about the world. Although they might be neutral in the sense that they capture tendencies that live in each of us, the tenor of the account is quite clear; and it is difficult to avoid concluding that these tendencies ought to be vigorously resisted in the name of another, less rigid and unsatisfying way of life.⁵⁰

The ethical criticism of life in WS 1921/2 does not bear on any particular content (*Gehaltssinn*) of worldly concern but targets a global way of being in and toward the world in terms of what Heidegger calls the relational sense (*Bezugssinn*) of human life as it lives in, out, for, with, and against the world of everyday concern. In this way it manages to avoid petty moralizing and partisan support of a particular worldview. But it also raises serious questions about Heidegger's ethical and ontological intentions and the coherence of the ethical criticism of everyday life. If epistemological reflection and scientistic theory were attacked as forms of escapist detachment from a world that matters to and deeply affects each of us, the world itself, under a certain description, provides life with an escape hatch from its own uncertain, insecure, and unsettling being that has to be dismantled with the same dogged and merciless persistence. What the right hand of KNS 1919 and WS 1919/20 offered to the unhappy epistemologist and disaffected scientist as a refuge from the desert of mere theory divorced from life, the left hand of WS 1921/2 seems to be taking away. But what is wrong with caring deeply about the world and building a

⁴⁹ This is essentially what Heidegger means by *das Leicht*, the easy, discussed in a rare nod to Aristotle in connection with the *Nicomachean Ethics* on the difficulty of finding the right course of action (2.6.1106b28 and following).

⁵⁰ Heidegger comes close in WS 1921/2 to a Kantian vision of the ethical life as a perpetual struggle between the best and the worst in each of us.

secure life and playing a clearly defined role within its relatively fixed boundaries? The world appears to be all there is to care about; and our identity seems to be bound up precisely with the roles we play and the tasks we undertake for the sake of ourselves and in and for the sake of the world. Every definite commitment to a project pursued in earnest appears to place us in a definite area of worldly concern and to assign us a definite role in the drama of human life. Philosophy has its place in the university, the religious life finds its home in a church, political life has its reliable institutions and time-worn procedures, the artist who cares about the fate of his work cannot afford to avoid important exhibitions or to ignore the verdict of his more trustworthy critics. Each of these activities is motivated and driven by a rich variety of interests in the world. The cubist painting that disfigures the perceptual world as we know it nonetheless reveals an important truth about perceptual life and the world of perception. A political anarchist detaches himself from this world of social and political life for the sake of what he takes to be a better, less constraining and repressive world in which traditional authority and fixed social and political principles no longer have any legitimate binding force. The neutral earth itself might be just one planet among others in a sea of largely empty space, but it is also our home, where night regularly follows day and day night, plants and animals carve out clearly defined niches and compete for scarce resources and places of shelter, national boundaries are discussed, battled over, and clearly if only temporarily drawn, and the seasons unfold with more or less predictable regularity. To separate ourselves from the world of earthly and embodied human interest is not to win the blessed life in splendid isolation from the unreliable and unruly domain of human, all too human affairs, but to detach ourselves from the soil that nourishes (and infects) our deepest and most abiding thoughts and concerns, to estrange ourselves from the conditions of meaningful individuation, and to deprive ourselves of the only field of (human) thought and action. In terms of Heidegger's own compelling account of life as inescapably worldly, as essentially being-in-a-world and caring for the world, escapist flight from the world and refusal to play a definite role in it are not only culpable but incoherent. Culpable: if this is the only world of life we can know, if life in the world is, in Dilthey's phrase, the "*prius* of thought" and the objective correlate of our cares, we are partly responsible for and should not remain indifferent to what happens and fails to happen in it. Incoherent: every attempt to flee from the world will be just

another way of being (double-mindedly) in it. Is Heidegger trying to force us into the unfortunate and incoherent predicament of having to care about something that in our better and more enlightened moments we can only see as a contemptible shadow that ought to leave us indifferent?⁵¹ Or is he just confused about what he has to say? Is the mood that permeates this early account of a life burdened with possibilities not of its own choosing and subject like the hero of an ancient tragedy to the inscrutable powers of *Schicksal* "dour and even dire," or does it envision another possibility that avoids the extremes of self-forgetful absorption in and ascetic detachment from the world in which each of us unavoidably finds himself uneasily at home?⁵² Is Heidegger's earliest ontic ideal essentially ascetic? What sort of life is under critical scrutiny here?

The short answer to the last (most important and grounding) question is: a life so thoroughly absorbed in and taken by the interpreted world that the sense of alternative possibilities and the capacity to envision another life and another shape of the world have withered to such an extent that the current state of affairs becomes the only one conceivable, and the ways of life it offers the only ones that are allowed to make sense. To live contentedly in the world of the obvious is to know in advance what each thing is and where it has its proper place, what life has to offer, what counts as success or failure, and how best to manage one's public and private affairs. It is to treat life as a business affair and to dismiss every question that touches upon the whole of worldly life as it stands in the present as idle speculation or romantic dissatisfaction. The world of this life is one in which everything is in order and the only task that remains is to find a secure, compartmentalized place in it and, once that is done, to adjust and make one's calculations accordingly. There is very little to criticize because the critical faculties have been put to sleep. There is less risk, to be sure, but the sense of uncertain adventure that grants to life its relish has atrophied. The categories that interpret factual life in WS 1921/2 in relation to the world capture the being of a life on the verge of losing the vital sense of possibility that inhabits everything actual.

⁵¹ Philipse argues along these lines in *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 346–52.

⁵² Krell, "The 'Factual Life' of Dasein," in *Reading Heidegger from the Start*, 368.

But they also articulate or indicate indirectly and by contrast another, less dogmatic, more flexible, and uncertain way of life that finds expression in the final pages of the course. It becomes rather clear in the terse culminating discussion of objectivity and questionability that what has been at issue all along in this dour and sour account of a life too absorbed in the world to pay attention to itself, too caught up in the quest for certainty and security to notice just how strange things can be, and too knowing to be capable of approaching each concrete situation openly and with an eye responsive to the uniqueness of things, is nothing less than the immediacy and obviousness of the nearest world that grips and fascinates everyday life. As Heidegger begins to clarify his train of thought, we begin to see that the categorical self-interpretation of ruinant life is not at all a Gnostic account of some egregious fall into the material world but something like a genealogy of the so-called objectivity of the world of a life on the verge of complacency and stagnation: "we cannot assume, without further discussion, that the immediacy of the world of care, as what is most directly over and against, constitutes the paradigm case of self-giveness."⁵³ In a Hegelian turn of phrase, Heidegger warns his students that the immediacy of the world is "formally speaking" something mediated and as such worthy of being questioned.⁵⁴ The account of *Ruinanz* is a sort of Husserlian *epoché* in reverse, an attempt to explain how we come to be fascinated and taken by the world of the natural attitude in the first place.

But every account of this sort presupposes some sense of what is missing in the natural attitude and must at least indicate a way out of the iron cage of the rigidly interpreted world that stands in the way of a more vigilant and careful philosophical life. It is remarkable that Heidegger offers nothing comparable to the Husserlian reduction to the uncorrupted space of a transcendental subject standing before a field of absolutely certain data. The break (*Bresche*) in the fabric of immediate life is nothing less than the initiation or renewal of life's dialogue with itself in relation to tradition. "Precisely insofar as it is factual, the factically interpretive dialogue [*Zwiesprache*] residing within the factual enactment of life is a breach [*Bresche*] in the coherence of immediate life."⁵⁵ Heidegger says precious little about this dialogue

⁵³ GA 61:150.

⁵⁴ GA 61:149.

⁵⁵ GA 61:151.

that dwells in the heart of human life, but we can detect here an anticipation of what in *Sein und Zeit* he calls "conscience." To be myself is not to sequester myself from the world but simply to participate in an ongoing conversation about my life and the world that surrounds me. WS 1921/2 poses a sharp contrast between a life lived slavishly in relation to the world of public concern and a life that takes responsibility for itself in living and questioning conversation. To be drawn mindlessly into the grey world of everyday life is just to put an end to what Plato in the *Sophist* called a "dialogue of the soul with itself."

Human life comes back to itself, cares properly for itself, and achieves its "genuinely developed self-givenness" not by plunging blindly into the world, "seizing, laying hands on things that appear to be urgent," and not by standing aloof from the world in an attitude of cynical contempt or mystical devotion, but in questioning and "living in the answer[s] . . . in a searching way."⁵⁶ The life that stands on this side of the (interpreted) world (as we know it) is not an unworldly or ascetic life but a skeptical life devoted to questioning what we tend to take for granted; and not in the name of another life on the other side of the world but for the sake of this life in this questionable world. The point of doing philosophy is not, as one American thinker would have it, to leave the world alone but to get back into it and to learn how to care for and cope with it in a fitting way. Philosophizing is learning how to be uneasily at home in the world.

V

Ethical Criticism and Ontology. I have tried to make the case for a reading of Heidegger's early views on phenomenological criticism and ontological interpretation as the embodiments of an ethical interest in human life guided by a certain, if at this stage still somewhat vaguely delineated, ontic ideal of human existence. While I avoided a neat definition of "ethics" and "ethical criticism" in the opening pages, for reasons that are consistent with Heidegger's own views on the limits of isolated propositions and theses, the reader should by now be in a position to understand better than any isolated statement could convey what is meant by these terms. A philosophical claim can be construed as ethical insofar as it bears ultimately

⁵⁶ GA 61:153, 149.

upon the way in which human beings attempt to live and to understand and interpret themselves and their experiences concernfully and for the sake of a better way of life. A species of philosophical criticism deserves to be called "ethical" insofar as it questions and evaluates certain positions, attitudes, and theses in terms that can be tied at some level to an ideal of human life that is ultimately at stake in the critical practice. In short, ethical thought and criticism help to articulate and in some measure to justify a certain way of life.

But the interpretation is still infected by some lingering doubts that ought to be confronted squarely. For one, Heidegger explicitly denies that he is doing ethics, not only in *Sein und Zeit* but in the first Freiburg lecture courses themselves. In WS 1919/20 Heidegger warns his students not to look to philosophy to provide "practical propositions and norms" that might guide ethical life and suggests that every genuine philosophy is born out of a certain "fullness of life, not from any epistemological pseudoproblems or basic ethical question."⁵⁷ Time and again, Heidegger denies that philosophy knows anything like disciplines. But if philosophy knows no disciplines and is not rooted in an ethical *Grundfrage*, any construal of phenomenological criticism as a sort of ethical criticism and every attempt to construe fundamental ontology as ethical interpretation of human life must be perverse. Moreover, the early lecture courses are centrally preoccupied with the problem of method. In the final hours of KNS 1919, Heidegger casually informs his auditors that the course as a whole has "moved around the problem of method."⁵⁸ And in WS 1919/20 "every genuine philosophy in its authentic driving force" is said to be a "circling around the methods" of its own domain of research.⁵⁹ Finally, ontological claims themselves can always be taken as propositions that capture the neutral structure of human life.

I think we can agree with every one of these claims and still insist that phenomenological ontology and criticism are concerned about the ethical or capture something of the primitive sense of ethical life. To say that philosophy knows no disciplinary boundaries is just to say that the object of philosophy is nothing that can be cut into pieces that can, in turn, be analyzed in total isolation from the whole. A phenomenology of the work of art, for example, will have to take a stand on or

⁵⁷ GA 58:149–50.

⁵⁸ GA 56/7:110.

⁵⁹ GA 58:135.

attempt to clarify the nature or being of language, history, human life and experience, scientific thought, human knowledge, and so on. An epistemological project that doesn't ask questions like, "What sort of knowledge comes to language in a poem?", or, "What are the historical conditions of human cognition?", or, "What do I know as an ethical being?", runs the risk of distorting the phenomenon of knowing and leaving behind contexts that fruitfully shape the way the problems themselves show up and help to map out nuanced responses to the question concerning *epistêmê*. If the phenomenology of ethical life offers no concrete norms and practical propositions, it is for the simple reason that it probes the texture of ethical life more deeply and comprehensively than moralizing language and moral philosophy in the narrow sense can reach and moves in a dimension of life in which detached propositions and simple rules of conduct, divorced from concrete situations of thought and action, no longer have a place, not because they capture the ethical so well but because they don't even come close to the data of what Heidegger in WS 1921/2 calls a living morality.⁶⁰

There is an extremely tight connection in the early lecture courses among method, subject matter, and way of life: the method is the way of life that secures access to itself, and the subject matter is the way of life at issue in every search for the method. As Heidegger observes in his own cumbersome way in SS 1923: "The relationship between hermeneutics and facticity [the method and the object of the method] is not a relationship between the grasping of an object and the object grasped, in relation to which the former would simply have to measure itself. Rather, interpreting is itself a possible and distinctive how of the character of being of facticity."⁶¹ Claims about Dasein just don't capture the fixed properties of an object. The linguistic similarity between a claim about some object and a "formal indication" of human life is an accident of grammar that conceals a fundamental ontological difference between the sort of being that can have fixed properties because it is what it is or is determined (by us) to be and the sort of being that has its being before it as a task and interprets itself in an ongoing dialogue with itself and its heritage. If philosophy retains a transcendental dimension in early Heidegger, the transcendental conditions of philosophy are not remote grounding conditions

⁶⁰ GA 61:164.

⁶¹ GA 63:15.

of a certain universe of discourse but features of a certain way of living that make meaningful discussion possible in the first place.

The *Seinsfrage* is not an ethical question, and the ontologist does not ask about ethics because the question concerning the meaning of being already reflects the deepest ethical determination of Dasein because philosophy is a caring way of life and ontological questioning embraces the ethical. Philosophy is not detached inquiry: the philosophical attitude is a life-stance; philosophy itself is a paradigmatic and exceptional way of life.⁶² Ontology is not neutral theory but self-explication of life for the sake of life.⁶³ To become a philosopher in Heidegger's sense is to come to live in a certain way, not merely to think at a distance about certain objects, not to fix life in an abstract system of concepts to be admired, but to own up to what it means to be a human being and to speak out in a manner consistent with what has been discovered along the way. To ask about being is to ask what being must mean in order for a certain way of life to be possible. Some of us who live in order to philosophize, philosophize in order to know better how to live. The sort of ontology one does depends upon the sort of life one aspires to live.⁶⁴

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⁶² "Philosophy is a *Grundwie* of life," as Heidegger observes in WS 1921/2. See GA 61:80.

⁶³ See GA 61:39.

⁶⁴ I would like to thank Charles Larmore for comments on an earlier (and considerably longer) version of this essay. If many of his fruitful suggestions have not found their way into the final version, it is only because (alas) they would have made the paper even longer than it already is.

ESOTERIC VERSUS LATENT TEACHING

FREDERICK J. CROSSON

ONE OF THE IDEAS TO WHICH LEO STRAUSS drew the attention of many readers in the last century is that of a difference between exoteric and esoteric philosophical writing. These terms can refer to different kinds of philosophical teaching, one kind intended for a general and the other kind for a more restricted audience. Indeed, it seems to be the case historically that it was Aristotle who first used (perhaps coined) one of the terms in such a sense, as will be discussed below.

Alternatively, the terms can also be used to describe a single text that incorporates both levels of communication—such a text would have the capacity to address simultaneously two different kinds of readers. In this alternative case, the presence of an esoteric aspect of the text, one intended for a more restricted readership, can be indicated by hints, the structure of the text, allusions, and so forth, that most readers will not pay attention to but which some readers will ponder and assemble into an interpretation, a perspective from which to read and understand the text.

Of course, any kind of text that is written with dimensions of meaning that are not immediately evident might be called “esoteric” in a broader sense, the term here suggesting that the reader does not readily see the connections, the implications of its assertions, even though the author did not intend to hide anything from most readers. I have this experience when I read some literary works: as I reread and ponder them, I come to see new implications in what the author has written. Think of reading Sophocles or *Moby Dick*. Some of what is being said in an undertone, so to speak, slowly becomes evident, as one makes connections.

Of course a less apparent or “esoteric” meaning may also be intended by the writer or speaker to be discovered by as many readers as possible, so that its covert character is a kind of challenge to the

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reader. In a work attributed to the fourth-century Athenian orator, Demetrius, we read,

not all possible points should be punctiliously and tediously elaborated, but some should be left to the comprehension and inference of the hearer, who when he perceives what you have left unsaid becomes not only your hearer but your witness. . . . For he thinks himself intelligent because you have afforded him the means of showing his intelligence. It seems like a slur on your hearer to tell him everything as though he were a simpleton.¹

Great works of literature commonly have a dimension of meaning that appears clearly only when one reflects on the text, connects up different loci, and “puts two and two together.”

But to call these last examples “esoteric” in the present context would be to muddle the sense of the term that we are trying to articulate. Strauss uses the term “esoteric” to refer primarily to a level of meaning that is intended by the philosophical author to remain inaccessible to all but a relatively small number of readers.² In this case of a text with these two levels of meaning intended for different audiences, we can say that for most readers the esoteric meaning is and remains unnoticed.

Why would an author want to speak to two disparate audiences in this way? Well, that difference may depend (as Strauss believed) on two senses of the phrase “political philosophy.” One is its common meaning, philosophizing about the political community, about its *telos* and its matter and form. The other sense of “political philosophy” refers to the “politic” self-presentation of philosophy and philosophers to the political community in which they live. Why do philosophers have to think about that, to be concerned with that?

Because philosophy is the project, the undertaking, to replace opinions about all things and the whole with knowledge of all things and of the whole. As Socrates says in the *Phaedrus* when he is asked a question about what actions are pleasing to the gods,

I can tell you what I've heard from our ancestors. Whether it's true or not, I don't know. But if we could find out the truth for ourselves, should we still bother about human opinions?³

¹ Demetrius, *On Style*, trans. W. R. Roberts. (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1982), bk. 4, sec. 222.

² Strauss qualifies this statement by distinguishing classical from modern philosophers, the latter believing that over time, education and the diminishment of religion will result in a larger number of esoteric readers.

"A ridiculous question!" Phaedrus responds.

But opinion is the foundation-element of our common life, of the political community. As Tocqueville wrote in *Democracy in America*, "[U]nder no circumstances will dogmatical belief cease to exist. . . . [M]en will never cease to entertain some opinions on trust and without discussion. . . . [W]ithout ideas [about what is right and wrong, good and bad] held in common there is no common action, and without common action there may still be men, but there is no social body."⁴ So the endeavor to call into question those foundational beliefs can be perceived as a threat to the existence of a society, as Socrates learned. Philosophers in the classical world learned from his fate to respect those fundamental ideas to which a political community is dedicated,⁵ not just from fear of Socrates' fate but from the recognition that the common life of the community, the good of the community, presupposed those dogmatical beliefs. Paramount among those beliefs are religious doctrines about the divine and what actions are pleasing to God or the gods.

In Strauss's view, the creation of esoteric writing, of esoteric communication, was the philosopher's response to that situation. If such esoteric communication hidden within the published writings is possible, then philosophers can awaken their progeny, the young potential philosophers, to the love of wisdom and to the task of trying to replace common opinion about what is so and what is good with the quest for knowledge of these things. Meanwhile the exoteric dimension of their writings would leave undisturbed the dogmatical (that is, unquestioned) beliefs that the community needed. Indeed, the exoteric dimension could be read as helping to support those beliefs. And, in Strauss's view, prominent among the esoteric teachings of many philosophers was the true nature of religion and the divine (for example, Cicero's *De Natura Deorum* and Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*).⁶

³ *Phaedrus* 274c–d.

⁴ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Mentor, 1984), pt. 2, bk. 1, chap. 1, p. 146.

⁵ To use Lincoln's term from the Gettysburg address.

⁶ For brief delineations of Strauss's position, see the introduction and chapter 2 of his *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1952), and "On a Forgotten Kind of Writing," in *What is Political Philosophy?* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), 221–32. A helpful overview is Paul Bagley's "On the Practice of Esotericism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 53, no. 2 (April–June 1992): 231–47, although after a brief discussion of Aristotle's mention of exoteric discourses, most of his examples are from Renaissance and modern writers.

In order to get a clearer picture of the historical origin of this terminology, we need to go back to the classical Greek and Roman philosophers.

I

The term *exoterikoi logoi* occurs at least eight times in Aristotle's writings.⁷ It is commonly translated as "extraneous discourses" or "popular arguments" because *exoterikos* refers generally to something external, or outside.⁸ It is not clear what the discourses referred to are external to, but the general assumption is that the reference is to discussions or writings external to the Lyceum (where Aristotle's students were taught), or perhaps to writings by Aristotle but for an audience outside the Lyceum. In the latter case, one could distinguish between Aristotle's writings for an external audience—and so *exoterikoi logoi*—and his lectures and writings within the Lyceum, intended for his students.

So, for example, one scholar (Bernays) argued that the term referred to Aristotle's dialogues, praised by Cicero, but of which we possess only fragments. They were written apparently while he was still at the Academy of Plato and, like Plato's dialogues, written with the awareness that they would be available to a wide audience. Others believe that the term refers to some of our extant treatises of Aristotle (such as the *Ethics* and *Politics*) that were written to be accessible to readers who were not students of the Lyceum. Still other scholars (for example, Rackham) think the term refers to arguments or doctrine that were not peculiar to the Peripatetic school but would be known to the generally informed reader.

Unfortunately, in only one of the eight uses which Aristotle makes of the term does he contrast it with any other kind of discourse. This is in the *Eudemian Ethics*:

⁷ Twice in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, twice in the *Eudemian Ethics*, twice in the *Politics*, once in the *Physics*, once in the *Metaphysics*. For a listing of the loci and a discussion see Ross's edition of the *Metaphysics* at 13.1.1076a28.

⁸ So, for example, Aristotle in the *Politics* says that the Cretans do not involve themselves in external rule, or foreign rule—*exoterikes arches* (2.10.1272b20).

to assert the existence of a Form not only of the good but of anything else is a mere idle abstraction (but this has been considered in various ways both in extraneous discourses and in those along philosophical lines (*kata philosophian*).⁹

Although this does not cast much light on the source of the extraneous discourses, it implies that they are less rigorously philosophical than discourses in the Lyceum.

Cicero supplies a similar term of contrast in Latin (though he quotes the term for extraneous works in Greek), three centuries later. In his dialogue *De Finibus*, one of his characters (Marcus Piso), speaking of the Peripatetics, says

Their books on the subject of the highest good fall into two classes, one popular in style, and this class they used to call *exoterikon*, the other *limatius* [a Latin word meaning more carefully worked].¹⁰

But this Latin term seems not to have been used by others to designate the class opposed to the Greek *exoterikon*. About a century and a half later, Plutarch takes the extraneous writings to include the ethical and political treatises of Aristotle, but he contrasts that category with the *aporreton* (that is, secret, not to be spoken about) teachings which he says philosophers designate by the name *akroamatikas* (meaning for hearers, not readers).¹¹

Toward the end of the second century A.D., in one of his satiric dialogues, the Greek writer Lucian uses the term that has become common to contrast with exoteric. Speaking of the Peripatetic philosopher, one of Lucian's characters says

Viewed from the outside, he seems to be one man, and from the inside, another; so if you buy him, be sure to call the one exoteric [*exoterikon*] and the other esoteric [*esoterikon*].¹²

⁹ Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics*, trans. Harris Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 1.8.1217b24.

¹⁰ Cicero, *De Finibus* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), bk. 5, sec. 5, no. 12. He also uses the Greek term *exoterikous* once in a letter to Atticus, to refer to the writings that Aristotle so named. See *Letters to Atticus*, trans. David Bailey (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), vol. 1, no. 89, p. 336.

¹¹ Plutarch's life of Alexander the Great in *Plutarch's Lives* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 7:1-4.

¹² Lucian, *Bion Prasis*, trans. A. M. Harmon (New York: Macmillan, 1915), 2:26. There is no earlier use of "esoteric" to designate a kind of discourse in either Greek or Roman writers.

So there we have the now familiar term of esoteric and its contrast with exoteric. That terminology passes on into the Eastern Greek tradition and is used by Clement of Alexandria, Simplicius, Origen, Iamblichus, and others.

It is a curious fact that those terms do not seem to have been appropriated by the Latin tradition, classical or medieval. As noted above, Cicero cites the term *exoterikon* but does not transliterate it into Latin. Two centuries later, the Latin writer Aulus Gellius mentions (using the Greek words) the tradition that Aristotle had two forms of teachings, *exoterika* and *akroatika*, and he transliterates these into Latin:

He also divided his books on all these subjects into two divisions, calling one set exoteric (*exoterici*), the other acroatic (*acroatici*).¹³

There is also a letter written to St. Augustine which seems to use, in Latin, the word *esotericam*, but there is no responding letter of Augustine.¹⁴

According to the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, these are the only three instances of Roman writers who use forms of the Greek terms. A last instance occurs in the twelfth-century writer John of Salisbury (d. 1180) who, speaking of Aristotle in his *Polycraticus*, says:

He is said to have been the first to have divided the kinds of studies into acroatic (*acroaticum*) and exoteric (*exotericum*).¹⁵

So it seems that for over a thousand years, the Greek terms (and their Latin transliterations) never took root in the Latin of the Western world. (According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, esoteric and its variants first appear in English only once in the seventeenth century, and more general use in the eighteenth.) As a result, the medieval recovery of the writings of some of the classical Greek philosophers presented translation problems, as we shall see.

In the Eastern and then Byzantine Empire and Church, where Greek remained for some time the language of philosophy and theol-

¹³ Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights*, trans. John C. Rolfe (London: Heineman, 1927), 3:433.

¹⁴ Letter 135, in *Letters of St. Augustine*, trans. Wilfrid Parsons (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1954).

¹⁵ John of Salisbury, *Polycraticus*, trans. C. J. Nederman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), bk. 7. The terms are probably derived from Aulus Gellius.

ogy and, for another thousand years, the official language of Church and Empire, the distinction of doctrines that are termed *exoterikoi* or *esoterikoi* continued. Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and their successors apply the distinction to their discussions of both philosophers and Christian doctrine. However, it is interesting and relevant to note that, for example, Origen vigorously denies that there is any secret (*kruphion*) Christian teaching, that is, teaching passed down orally from the time of the Apostles to some inner circle of followers, as was traditionally asserted of Pythagoras and his students.¹⁶ At the same time, he asserts the presence of an exoteric and esoteric dimension to the Scriptures and the teaching of Jesus.

II

Saint Augustine knows of this distinction, of a philosopher's work being different on the surface from what the author himself thought (though he never uses the terminology of exoteric and esoteric). In the *City of God*, for example, he discusses the writings of Plato, Cicero, Varro, and others as sometimes concealing what they really thought.

Plato makes a point of preserving the manner of his master Socrates. . . . It is well known that Socrates was in the habit of concealing his knowledge or his beliefs: and Plato approved of that habit. The result is that it is not easy to discover his own opinion, even on important matters.¹⁷

Cicero believed that it would not be reasonable for a religion to pray or sacrifice to a God who had no foreknowledge of the future or power over it. Such a being could not respond effectively no matter what our entreaty or offering—indeed in such a case one might deny

¹⁶ What we could call acroatic, using the terminology Plutarch borrows from philosophers. Origen, *Contra Celsum*, trans. Henry Chadwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), bk. 1, secs. 7–8; bk. 3, sec. 46. See the discussion in Henri Crouzel, *Origene et la connaissance mystique* (Brouges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961), 162–5. For a good discussion of the same issue in Clement, compare Ernest Fortin, “Clement of Alexandria and the Esoteric Tradition,” in *Studia Patristica IX* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 41–56.

¹⁷ St. Augustine, *City of God*, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin, 1987), bk. 8, chap. 4, p. 304. On Apuleius compare bk. 9, chap. 8, p. 353: “he made clear, to the thoughtful readers.”

that there is a god (in the sense of a superior being who had such knowledge and power).

Cicero himself realized this, and almost ventured on the denial. . . . But he did not say it in his own person; he knew that such an assertion would disturb people, and incur odium. And so he represents Cotta as arguing this point against the Stoics, in the book *On the Nature of the Gods*.

Cicero himself is a character in (and narrator of) the dialogue of that book, and at the end of it Cicero the character votes against Cotta's atheistic position, but, Augustine continues, that was not the thought of Cicero the author. Indeed, in his book *On Divination*, Cicero comes out openly in his own name in an attack on the notion of fore-knowledge.¹⁸

Augustine says that Varro, a prolific writer on Roman culture and practices, admits to feeling bound to write conventionally about the traditional deities, although if he were founding a city, he would have named deities according to the rule of nature. But in "speaking like this he hints . . . that he is not revealing all that he knows." Augustine adds,

I should rightly be suspected of indulging in conjecture here, if Varro had not openly declared in another place, on the subject of religious rites, that there are many truths which it is not expedient for the general public to know, and further, many falsehoods which it is good for the people to believe true.¹⁹

Similar comments are made about Apuleius and others, but mention will be made here only of Augustine's persistent view about the "Platonists." These "Academics" (as they were called during the late Academy) held the view that the truth about virtue and knowledge and divinity could not be effectively presented to skeptics and men addicted to pleasures, so their energy was spent instead criticizing the Epicureans and Stoics. They acted rightly, in Augustine's view, "in concealing completely the doctrine of the Academy and burying it as gold to be found at some later time."²⁰

But Augustine does not unfold, by commenting on it, the text of any of these writers as possessing both an esoteric and an exoteric

¹⁸ Ibid., bk. 5, chap. 9, p. 190.

¹⁹ Ibid., bk. 4, chap. 31, p. 174. See also bk. 6, chaps. 4–5, pp. 232–6, where Augustine says Varro gives "subtle hints" and leaves things "to be inferred by the intelligent reader."

teaching. Rather, he treats them as exoteric discourses whose teaching is not what the author himself truly thought, as the author indicates by what he hints and by what he says elsewhere. But there is sufficient indication for the thoughtful reader that this is not the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

However, Augustine has learned and knows of a text and a tradition of its interpretation that does rest on a distinction between a manifest and a latent level of meaning. He learned of this the hard way, by first reading the manifest meaning and finding it inferior to Cicero's writing, and turning away from the text. What he turned away from was, of course, the Scriptures, to which he had turned after being inspired by Cicero's exhortation to the pursuit of wisdom in his *Hortensius*. He writes in the *Confessions*:

I [now] see something within them [the Scriptures] that was neither revealed to the proud nor made plain to children, that was lowly on one's entrance but lofty on further advance, and that was veiled over in mysteries. . . . I did not feel towards it then as I am speaking now, but it seemed to me unworthy of comparison with the nobility of Cicero's writings. My swelling pride turned away from its humble style and my sharp gaze did not penetrate into its inner meaning.²¹

But after learning to read the latent meaning of the Scriptures from listening to the sermons of St. Ambrose, his ability to read and to understand is metamorphosed:

[The Scriptures] were easy for everyone to read and yet safeguarded the dignity of their hidden truth within a deeper meaning, by words completely clear and by a lowly style of speech making itself accessible to all men, and drawing the attention of those who are not light of heart. Thus it can receive all men into its generous bosom and by narrow passages lead on to you [God] a small number of them.²²

So for Augustine, the paradigm or prime analogate of this combining of a latent and a manifest meaning in a single text was the way in which the Old Testament discloses a new significance when read from the perspective of the New Testament.

²⁰ St. Augustine, *Against the Academics*, trans. J. J. O'Meara (Westminster, Md: Newman Press, 1950), bk. 3, chap. 17, no. 38. See also Augustine's letter 118 to Dioscuro.

²¹ St. Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. J. K. Ryan (New York: Doubleday, 1960), bk. 3, chap. 5, no. 9.

²² *Ibid.*, bk. 6, chap. 5, no. 8.

This is the sacrament, the hidden meaning, of the Old Testament, where the New Testament lay concealed. In the Old Testament the promises and gifts are of earthly things; but even then men of spiritual perception realized, although they did not yet proclaim the fact for all to hear, that by these temporal goods eternity was signified; they understood also what were the gifts of God which constituted true felicity.²³

One could say that for this tradition of reading and interpretation, the paradigm of the opening up of the latent meaning is the recounting in Luke's Gospel of Jesus revealing the latent meaning of the Hebrew Scriptures for the disciples on the road to Emmaus.²⁴

Of course that distinction regarding Scripture (both Old and New Testaments) of manifest and latent, of overt and hidden, if it is for the good of the different kinds of hearers and readers, will also have to apply to preaching and writing about those things. So in his work *On Christian Doctrine*, Augustine remarks that in the case of speaking to a public audience.

There are some things which with their full implications are not understood or are hardly understood, no matter how eloquently they are spoken. . . . [T]hese things should never, or only rarely on account of some necessity, be set before a public audience.²⁵

In such public speaking where one knows something about the character of the audience, it is easy to pass over or touch lightly on issues which may be misunderstood or disturbing to some.

But as Plato had noted, the situation is different in the case of writing, because one cannot know in advance the character of the (unknown) reading audience. Still, it is possible to write in such a way that those who understand are held by that which they read, while those who do not understand are disinclined to read further. However, Augustine adds, there is a duty, not to be neglected, to bring one's understanding to the knowledge of others, provided they have a desire to learn and the capacity to learn.²⁶

Perhaps an example of such writing would be Boethius' treatise *On the Trinity*. In the proemium to that work, Boethius addresses his father-in-law, a distinguished Roman consul and senator, and says he

²³ St. Augustine, *City of God*, bk. 4, chap. 33.

²⁴ Luke 24:27.

²⁵ St. Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine*, trans. Durant Robertson (New York: Liberal Arts, 1958), bk. 4, chap. 9, no. 23.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

is not writing for everyone. The topic is difficult, the philosophical vocabulary required is technical and unknown to most. So, he writes,

I purposely use brevity and wrap up the issues that I draw from the deep questionings of philosophy in new and unfamiliar words such as speak only to you and to myself. . . . The rest of the world I simply disregard since those who cannot understand them seem unworthy even to read them.²⁷

To judge from the text of the treatise, Boethius (probably rightly) believed that the technical terminology and concepts regarding substance and property, identity and difference, relations, and similar terms would be off-putting to anyone not trained in philosophical sources. But in terms of the language of the categories we have been adumbrating, it would perhaps be more appropriate to designate such a work as simply esoteric, that is, not intended for a broad readership but only a small one. We could then contrast such a work with, say, the *Confessions* of St. Augustine, which not only has but was intended to have both manifest and latent levels of understanding.²⁸

I mention Boethius' work also because it provided the occasion for one of Thomas Aquinas's few discussions of latent teaching. In his commentary on Boethius' treatise, Thomas has an article on the topic, "Whether Divine Things Ought to be Concealed by New and Obscure Words."

After advancing some opinions pro and con, Aquinas begins his own response:

A teacher should so moderate his words that they tend to the benefit and not the detriment of his hearers. Now there are some things that can harm no one when heard, for example the truths that everyone is responsible to know, and these should not be concealed (*occultanda*) but openly (*manifeste*) proposed to all. There are others which if presented openly would be harmful to those hearing them. . . . These matters should be concealed from those to whom they might do harm.

Thomas remarks that in oral face-to-face communication, one can decide how to speak because one can discern the nature of the hearer or

²⁷ Boethius, *De Trinitate*, in *Theological Tractates*, trans. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1928), 5.

²⁸ See, for example, *Confessions*, bk. 2, chap. 31, no. 42, and the present author's "Structure and Meaning in St. Augustine's *Confessions*," in *The Augustinian Tradition*, ed. G. B. Matthews (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

hearers, and one can moderate one's words accordingly. But, he continues,

In writing, this distinction does not apply, because a book once written down can come into the hands of anyone; and therefore such matters should be concealed by obscure words so that they may benefit the wise who will understand them and be hidden (*occultentur*) from the uneducated (*simplicibus*) who will not be able to grasp them.²⁹

So, he comments that teachers of Sacred Scripture are not obliged to propose the same things to both the wise and the unwise, but to tell to each what is accessible to them. His model for this is the way that Scripture and Christ communicated sacred doctrine.

In the very first question of the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas inquires whether sacred doctrine should employ metaphorical language, and his response is yes, it is appropriate because we human beings learn of spiritual things through material images and metaphors. It is also appropriate to Sacred Scripture,

which is proposed to all of us without distinction of persons . . . that spiritual things be taught by means of similitudes taken from corporeal things, so that thereby even the simple (*rudes*) who are unable to grasp intellectual truths by themselves may be able to understand them.³⁰

It is natural for human beings, although they are intellectual creatures, to understand what is hidden within (latent) the sensible appearance of things—for example the substantial nature of the thing—in terms of metaphors taken from the perceptual world: “under similitudes and figures [of speech], there lies latent (*latet*) the truth that is thus figured.”³¹ What is latent is hidden, but in the sense of potentially present, potentially manifest; it can become actually known, manifestly present, if it can be regarded from the right perspective. In contrast to Boethius, who offers his readers no metaphors but rigorous logical and metaphysical analyses, Sacred Scripture latently offers, as Aquinas says in the very next article, figurative as well as literal senses of its words.

In the third part of the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas inquires whether Christ should have taught (*docere*) all things publicly, as he

²⁹ St. Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate*, q. 2, a. 4. Aquinas cites here the text from Augustine's *On Christian Doctrine* quoted above. Compare Plato's *Phaedrus* 275d–277c.

³⁰ St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 9.

³¹ *Ibid.* II-II, q. 8, a. 1.

did. Well, Thomas says, there are three ways in which someone's doctrine might be hidden. One way is by deliberately, intentionally not communicating it to anyone, but this was not the way of Christ. A second way to hide a doctrine is by telling it only to a few, but Christ discoursed to many. In a third way, he says,

doctrine is concealed by the way in which it is taught (*modum docendi*), and thus Christ spoke of certain things in hidden ways to the crowds, by using parables in announcing spiritual mysteries to them which they were either not capable of or not worthy to grasp. Yet it was better for them to hear the expounding of spiritual things in the form of parables than to be deprived of it completely. However, the Lord opened up the parables and explained the unveiled truth of them to the disciples, so that they might present it to others who were ready for it.³²

Note that Aquinas says that Christ taught certain things in hidden ways—because of course he declared many things without parables or metaphors, presented them openly to all. And, Aquinas adds, “whatever things out of his wisdom he judged it right to make known to others, he proclaimed not in secret but openly, although he was not understood by all.”

This manner of teaching something that is beyond the capacity of some persons to understand is similar to, for example, the way in which a scientist might try to explain quantum theory to a readership mathematically and scientifically unprepared to understand it directly. So the scientific writer would imagine various commonsense similitudes to illustrate the uncertainty principle or the particlelike properties of light waves, and so forth. “Is it really like that?” one might ask, and be answered, “Well, no, but it's sort of analogous to that.” It does provide a picture which is not intended to be deceptive, which gives some sense of what it's like. One might add that even if the writer could provide a mathematical physics account of these quantum phenomena for an audience prepared to understand it, still that account would convey neither all there was to be understood about quantum phenomena nor what lay in the future understanding of them. Just so, the explanations that a teacher like Jesus gave to his disciples were not the end of understanding what was being said.³³

³² Ibid. III, q. 42, a. 3.

³³ John Paul II, *Fides et Ratio* (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1999), sec. 11.

III

So Aquinas and Augustine are quite aware of latent teaching, of a discourse having both a hidden dimension and a manifest dimension. They both think that it is sometimes appropriate to write and speak in that way for the good of those receiving the words. Augustine, at least, sometimes writes in that two-level way himself. But their position on latent teaching in the Christian tradition is, in my judgment, quite different from that of Leo Strauss on esoteric writing and the philosophical tradition he tries to trace.

A central difference is that in the Christian tradition the manifest teaching expressed in similitudes and metaphors and parables aims at communicating the truth, at bearing witness to the truth, in a form in which it is able to be understood (at least partially) by all. There is only one doctrine, presented in different depths of meaning to the two audiences. In contrast, the esoteric philosophical tradition that Strauss discusses typically allots to its exoteric dimension the favorable presentation of the socially orthodox views (the dogmatical beliefs) while the esoteric dimension may present a quite different position.³⁴

A second difference is linked with this: in such a context, it would be morally wrong to deceive those who understand only the manifest level because they need to know what is being made known. Aquinas follows Augustine in maintaining that although it is never permissible to conceal the truth by lying, it may be licit to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, by keeping silent. But he also follows (and quotes) Augustine that it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively "because . . . when a thing is said or done figuratively, it means what those who apprehend it understand it to signify."³⁵ No deliberate misrepresentation of what is so, or misrepresentation of the convictions of the speaker or author, is compatible with the responsibility to bear truthful witness. If they were so compatible, then Dostoevski's Grand Inquisitor would be an appropriate model for the Christian teacher—deceiving the many for what the teacher deems to be their good.

³⁴ Compare "On a Forgotten Kind of Writing," in *What is Political Philosophy?*

³⁵ *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 110, a. 3.

That is why, as noted previously, Augustine speaks of the moral responsibility of one who expounds sacred doctrine to go as far as possible in seeking the understanding of those addressed:

[I]n conversations, the duty should not be neglected of bringing the truth which we have perceived, no matter how difficult it may be to comprehend or how much labor may be involved, to the understanding of others, provided that the listener or interlocutor wishes to learn and has the capacity to do so.³⁶

It is not inconsistent with this position to indicate to the audience of the manifest level that there's "more here than meets the eye." So, St. Paul writes back to the new Christians of Corinth about his first proclaiming of the "good news":

I myself was unable to speak to you as people of the spirit, but treated you as carnal-minded, still infants in Christ. What I fed you with was milk, not solid food, for you were not ready for that.³⁷

For Augustine and Aquinas, *some* hearers of the word must learn how the similitudes and parables and metaphors are to be understood (and how not to be understood) and know when and how to go beyond the literal to what is figured by it. Their responsibility would be to preserve and extend a tradition of interpretation and reflective understanding that originates with the apostles and guides the presentation of the scriptural doctrine. Theology and the development of doctrine play an essential role in this process.

The classical conception of esoteric writing is inflected by some later philosophers who, convinced of the possible benefits of enlightenment and consequently of a wider capacity for understanding the truth, desired a gradual replacement of the accepted opinion by the truth or an approximation to the truth.³⁸ Strauss believed that not a few European philosophers in the modern period adopted this standpoint, and while they retained the difference between exoteric and esoteric communication, they desired to reach as many readers as possible who could be made aware of the esoteric teaching.

³⁶ St. Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine*, bk. 4, chap. 9, no. 23. This rule applies to oral teaching of one or a few, not to writing, for reasons already alluded to.

³⁷ I Corinthians 3:1–2.

³⁸ Strauss, *Persecution and the Art of Writing*, 17.

A third difference between the philosophical tradition of esotericism and the religious tradition of latent teaching is their distinct origins, reflected in the absence of and ignorance of esoteric/exoteric terminology in the Latin tradition. As I shall try to show, a thinker like Thomas Aquinas, for example, can know and teach the distinction between overt or manifest communication and hidden or latent communication and not know of the philosophical tradition.³⁹ These are, historically, in origin and practice, distinct traditions.

IV

Although Augustine and Aquinas share common views about manifest and latent teaching and the usefulness of both under certain conditions when communicating Christian doctrine, they seem to differ in regard to the teaching of philosophers. Augustine, as has been noted, thought it was not uncommon for philosophers to conceal what they truly thought about certain things for the sake of not disturbing some of their readers. At the same time they might provide hints, to those able to discern them, that there was a different way of regarding the issues. Augustine himself certainly writes on two levels and does not simply hint that there is another (latent) level in some of his own works,⁴⁰ but he articulates that latent level at some length. But then all of his works that we have were written after he had turned to Christianity, so one might expect that he would feel free to follow the counsel he offers in his work *On Christian Doctrine* about latent and manifest doctrine. Indeed, in the *Confessions* he uses the same language to describe both the text of the Scriptures and of his own writing:

Provided, therefore, that each person tries to ascertain in the holy scriptures the meaning the author intended, what harm is there if a reader holds an opinion which You, the light of all truthful minds, show to be

³⁹ Although Aquinas uses the terminology of latent and exterior (as cited earlier) he also speaks of *occultum*/hidden and *publicum*/open. I have tried to consistently use the latent/manifest language to underline the difference from the philosophical tradition.

⁴⁰ Compare, for example, the present author's article on "The Disclosure of Hidden Providence," in *A Reader's Companion to Augustine's Confessions* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003).

true, even though it is not intended by the [human] author, who himself meant something true, but not exactly that?

A few pages later he adds,

Of this I am certain, and I am not afraid to declare it from my heart, that if I had to write something to which the highest authority would be attributed, I would rather write it in such a way that my words would reinforce for each reader whatever truth he was able to grasp about these matters, provided there was no falsity to offend me.⁴¹

It is not clear to what extent he read philosophers as articulating and unfolding a hidden teaching in addition their hinting or saying elsewhere that there was another perspective on the issues being discussed. The philosopher he was most likely to have been able to learn that from was Plato in his dialogues, but Augustine knew little Greek and it seems clear that, apart from Cicero's translation of the *Ti-maeus*, his knowledge of the dialogues is mostly secondhand, through secondary sources. To judge from his own early dialogues, he certainly could and did develop a latent teaching in the dialogue form.

While he shared with Augustine the acknowledgement of latent and manifest teaching in the same discourse (exemplified in the parables of the Gospels), Thomas Aquinas does not seem to have written in a latent/manifest way. If that is so, the reason may be simply that virtually all that he wrote was (1) intended for theologians and students of theology who would need to know what the simple and uneducated might not need to know; and (2) unlike Augustine and Boethius, for example, he wrote in a language (Latin) restricted, in practice, to those prepared by their studies to learn from it. He wrote, in short, for persons well aware of the niceties of technical and subtle language in discussing such mysteries as the Trinity and the Incarnation, and familiar with apt philosophical distinctions (as did Boethius in his *De Trinitate*).

But there is another aspect to the problem presently being discussed, and that is the status of philosophy in relation to the religious tradition in which it is carried on. Leo Strauss maintained that there was a significant difference in this respect between Judaism and Islam, on one hand, and Christianity on the other. For Judaism and

⁴¹ St. Augustine, *Confessions*, bk. 12, chap. 18, no. 27 and bk. 12, chap. 31, no. 42. So different readers can take away different understandings, as he has said of Scripture before (see above, notes 18 and 19).

Islam, he said, revelation has primarily the character of *nomos*, of law, and so of the constituting of an earthly community governed by that law, while for Christianity, revelation has primarily the character of *logos*, of truth. No political community is established by that *logos*, but at most an *ecclesia*, distinct from the realm governed by Caesar's laws.

Clearly philosophy, as the quest to understand the nature of the whole and its parts, has more in common with revelation as *logos* than with revelation as law. First, with respect to the hearing of what is proposed to faith, philosophy's treasure-trove of reflections on language and meaning and logic and on what there is, is indispensable in unfolding the proper meaning of the words of revelation. Second, with respect to the elaboration of those proper meanings into a coherent and systematic doctrine of theology, philosophy is indispensable. It is no accident that from the early centuries, philosophy in the Christian world came into an ever closer dialogue with revelation.

For Judaism and Islam, in contrast, it is as commentary on divine law, as Talmud and Fiqh (jurisprudence or commentary on the law) that reflection on revelation takes its primary form. Greek philosophy as it became known to the expanding Islamic society was a more precarious, or less necessary, study than jurisprudence. In contrast, as a Christian society and culture developed, the study of philosophy became an essential and required part of the education of theologians. Strauss comments:

This difference explains partly the eventual collapse of philosophical inquiry in the Islamic and in the Jewish world, a collapse which has no parallel in the Western Christian world.⁴²

It is against this background that Ernest Fortin, a careful student of Strauss and of the Christian tradition, wrote that

[t]he canonical status which philosophy enjoyed in the Christian world helps to explain . . . why Aquinas was able to discard as unnecessary or irrelevant the esotericism common to much of the ancient philosophical tradition and purposely affected by many of the Church Fathers with whose works he was acquainted.⁴³

⁴² Strauss, *Persecution and the Art of Writing*, 19.

⁴³ "St. Thomas Aquinas," in *History of Political Philosophy*, ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), 225.

My hesitation about this statement is with the word discard, because I do not think that Aquinas was aware of a practice of esotericism in the ancient philosophical tradition (nor of the role of persecution or the danger of persecution in its development). I do not think that he ever discusses the esoteric writing of philosophers or reads the texts of those ancient philosophers (whose texts he knows) as having a hidden dimension of meaning.

He certainly acknowledged the cryptic character of Boethius' treatise on the Trinity, but then he never called any Christian thinker a "philosopher."⁴⁴ It is generally accepted that he did not know any of the dialogues of Plato at first hand. Robert Henle concluded after a long study that "[i]t is certain that Saint Thomas did not use [of the three works of Plato in Latin translation] either the *Meno* or the *Phaedo* and there is no convincing evidence that he was directly acquainted with either Cicero's or Chalcidius' translations of the *Timaeus*."⁴⁵ Aquinas has only two indirect references (from Augustine and Isidore) to any of the three dialogues of Cicero on the gods and religious practice (*De Natura Deorum*, *De Fato*, *De Divinatione*), and no references to the *De Rerum Natura* of Lucretius. These are mentioned simply to indicate that Aquinas seems to have had little direct encounter with the texts of classical philosophers who are taken by Strauss and others to exemplify esoteric writing.

One might have thought that Aquinas's close study of and commentaries on Aristotle's works could have provided an encounter with the idea, especially since Aristotle refers eight times to exoteric discourses.⁴⁶ Unfortunately, no translation of the *Eudemian Ethics*, the only work in which Aristotle provides a contrasting term for exoteric discourses (namely, more philosophical) was available to Aquinas, and of the other seven occurrences of the term *exoterikoi logoi*, Aquinas has commentaries on only four of them. The translations he worked from are not much help: they translate the Greek by exterior discourses, extraneous arguments, external conversations. Aquinas

⁴⁴ Compare M. D. Jordan, *The Alleged Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas* (Toronto: Medieval Institute, 1992), 5–6.

⁴⁵ Robert Henle, *St. Thomas and Platonism* (The Hague: H. Nijhof, 1956), xxi.

⁴⁶ There are passages in Aristotle that might have offered the opportunity for comment on the topic, but they occur in loci that Aquinas did not comment on. For example, *Politics* 3.13.1284a26–36.

sometimes takes them to mean other discussions of the same subject but in other works of Aristotle, or sometimes arguments given by others, or sophistical arguments, or even texts written for someone living far away.

A striking instance that seems to reinforce the view that Aquinas was unaware of a tradition of philosophical esoteric writing is encountered in some of his comments on Plato's manner of writing. It has been remarked above that in the first question of the *Summa Theologiae* Aquinas commends the use of metaphorical language and similitudes in theological teaching to convey the truth about intellectual things, because under similitudes and figures, there lies latent (*latet*) the truth that is thus figured.⁴⁷ But while commenting on Aristotle's *De Anima*, in a section where Aristotle is criticizing Plato's *Timaeus* for describing the world-soul as a circle divided into parts, Aquinas describes Aristotle as criticizing the literal sense of Plato's language rather than its intention. The problem is not with Aristotle, he says, it is with Plato's use of language:

Plato had a bad way of teaching (*habuit malum modum docendi*) for he says everything by figures of speech (*figurate*) and teaches through symbols, intending something other by his words than their literal sense.⁴⁸

This would seem to imply that philosophers ought to write straightforwardly, avoiding figures and metaphors that could mislead. Any idea of philosophy's being written in such a way in order not to disturb the dogmatical opinions of possible readers seems absent.

Fortin, in a work written a decade after the words quoted from him above, seems to have had some second thoughts. He still believed that Aquinas had a bookish knowledge of secret writing

through certain ancient authors such as Cicero, Boethius and Pseudo-Dionysius, [but he himself] did not deal with it and merely stated that it was no longer in use among his contemporaries: *apud modernos est inconsuetus* [in our time it is not customary]. One can even ask whether he understood it aright. Although he speaks of it a number of times, he seems to have seen in it no more than a pedagogical device used to make the truth more appreciated by making it more difficult to attain and keeping it at a distance from those who would be unworthy of it.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ See footnotes 26 and 27 above.

⁴⁸ St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia super de Anima*, bk. 1, lect. 8. Compare his comments on Socratic dialogues in *In Libros Politicorum Aristotelis Expositio* II, lect. 6.

But Boethius and Pseudo-Dionysius belong to the theological tradition in which, as we have seen, Aquinas justifies latent teaching by reference to the model of the Scriptures and to the way of teaching (*modum docendi*) of Christ who concealed (*in occulto*) some of his teaching in parables. This is not the same as the intention to make the truth more appreciated because one has to work at discerning it—the position that Demetrius was quoted earlier as approving—although that motivation can play a role in some teaching.

There do not appear to be grounds for identifying Aquinas's conception of how and why Christ and the Scriptures concealed a deeper meaning with the conception of a philosophical tradition of esoteric meaning. There do not appear to be grounds for asserting that Aquinas knew of such a tradition.

So our conclusion is that the theological tradition which Aquinas knows, of concealing a latent dimension of meaning, is, in the West at least, historically independent of a tradition of philosophical writing that incorporates both esoteric and exoteric meanings in a single text. It is different in origin since its roots lie in the disclosure by Christ of a latent meaning in the Old Testament and in his own teaching by parables and similitudes. It is different in structure since the same truth is taught in both latent and manifest dimensions—there is only one doctrine, taught in two different modes. It is different in its moral dimension because the philosophical tradition of esotericism not only allows but requires that the socially useful dogmatical opinions of the many be left undisturbed, for their good as well as that of the community, while the theological tradition, since it deals with revealed truths concerning the salvation of each and all, must hand on (*tradere*) what all must know.

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⁴⁹ Ernest Fortin, *Dissent and Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 144. The French original was published in 1981.

WRONGS AND FAULTS

JOHN GARDNER

I

THE ELEMENTARY MORAL DISTINCTION. The ultimate objects of moral assessment are people and their lives. I will call this the “elementary moral distinction.” Many today seem to have lost sight of it. How often are we told that we should show respect for other people, only to discover that what we are actually being asked to show respect for is how those other people live?¹ The equation of the two should be resisted. We do not always respect a person by respecting how he lives. Sometimes quite the reverse. If someone is wasting his life but still deserves to be respected, the default way to show him the respect that he deserves is to do something that improves the way he is living—shake him out of it, block his path, change his incentives, shield him from further exploitation, and so forth. Sometimes, of course, there is no action open to us that will yield any improvement in how he lives, while on other occasions the only things we can do are disproportionate. In such cases we have to tolerate his continuing to live as badly he does. But toleration is one thing, and respect is quite another. Toleration is the moral virtue of those who appropriately curb their wish to eliminate what they do not respect. One cannot respect the way someone is living and tolerate it at the same time.²

In philosophy, the contemporary neglect of the elementary moral distinction owes much to Kant. I am not thinking here of Kant’s much-advertised (and much-misrepresented) doctrine of respect for

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¹ A good example: Ronald M. Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), 272 and following.

² Of course tolerating a person’s unrespectable way of living may involve respecting other things of his, for example, his rights. This was one of the themes of a paper that I wrote with Stephen Shute, “The Wrongness of Rape,” in *Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: Fourth Series*, ed. Jeremy Horder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

persons. Insofar as Kant said anything of note about respect for persons, his views were consistent with those I just sketched.³ Rather, I am thinking of Kant's more distinctive doctrine that a morally perfect person cannot but lead a morally perfect life. This doctrine is now often remembered, thanks to a famous exchange between Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, under the heading of "moral luck." Kant is cited by both Williams and Nagel as the philosopher who most sweepingly rejected the possibility of moral luck.⁴ But on closer inspection Kant did nothing of the kind. He merely argued that morally perfect people cannot be morally unlucky in their lives.⁵ Thanks to the nature of morality, he said, they cannot live lives falling short of the morally perfect lives that they deserve to live. But Kant never denied nor gave us any reason to doubt that morally *imperfect* people can live lives that are morally worse, or indeed morally better, than those that they deserve to live. Nor, for that matter, did he deny or give us any reason to doubt that whether someone is a morally perfect or a morally imperfect person could itself be a matter of luck.

So Kant certainly did not attempt to abolish the elementary moral distinction. But it is true that a decline of philosophical sensitivity to that distinction has been among Kant's most enduring philosophical legacies. Kantian thinking, philosophical and popular, has simplified and radicalized Kant's own views on the subject of moral luck. So much so that even a retreat to Kant's own more modest views is sometimes perceived as a bold anti-Kantian move. Consider, for example, the group of contemporary moral philosophers who march, albeit not in an orderly fashion, under the banner of "virtue ethics." Claiming to revive a pre-Kantian tradition of ethics traceable back to Aristotle, many of them favor "virtuously" as an answer to the question, "How should one live?"⁶ Ironically, this was precisely Kant's answer to the same question, and it was one that Aristotle explicitly rejected.⁷ One

³ Kant reminds us: "The *object* of reverence is the [moral] law alone. . . . All reverence for a person is properly only reverence for the law (of honesty and so on) of which that person gives us an example"; *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, trans. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 69 n.

⁴ Bernard Williams, "Moral Luck," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 50 (1976): 115; Thomas Nagel, "Moral Luck," *Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 50 (1976): 137.

⁵ *Groundwork*, 62 and following.

should of course be a morally virtuous person. That much is analytically true and accepted by Aristotle and Kant alike. But no amount of moral virtue, on Aristotle's view, ensures that one leads a morally perfect life. The morally perfect life, rather, is the life that a morally perfect person would *want* to live. Owing to bad luck, even a morally perfect person may live a morally imperfect life. This is the aspect of the human condition known as tragedy. Any large, undeserved suffering or loss is nowadays casually referred to as tragic. But tragedy, in the stricter classical sense illuminated by Aristotle himself, is not just any large, undeserved suffering or loss. It is undeserved moral downfall. It is moral failure out of proportion to moral failing. It is the fate of all the great heroes from Oedipus to Othello.⁸ Oedipus is an extreme case (ruled out by Kant) of moral failure not owed to moral failing. Othello is a less extreme case (never ruled out by Kant but implicitly ruled out by many Kantians) of moral failure out of proportion to moral failing. Othello is obnoxiously jealous, but Iago exploits this moral failing to drive Othello to murder, a moral downfall more spectacular than he deserves.

Has modern theater, like modern moral philosophy, turned its back on tragedy? Some argue that it has.⁹ But our primary interest here will not be in how the elementary moral distinction has been interpreted and exposed in the arts. We will be concerned, in the main, with how it has been interpreted and exposed in the law. This may strike you as an improbable and unpromising project. For although legal systems are necessarily in the business of moral assessment, a decent legal system rarely makes moral assessments either of people or of their lives. Instead, it mainly makes moral assessments of people's actions taken one at a time. Isn't this a further and different task? Aren't there really three ultimate objects of moral assessment, namely

⁶ See Roger Crisp's introduction, "Modern Moral Philosophy and the Virtues," in *How Should One Live: Essays on the Virtues*, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 5–6.

⁷ Compare Kant, *Groundwork*, 62, with Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.8.1153b16–21. Kant holds that good character is necessary and sufficient for a good life; Aristotle that it is necessary but insufficient.

⁸ *Poetics* 7.1453a1–7. For further discussion see Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 378 and following.

⁹ Arthur Miller, "Tragedy and the Common Man," in *The Theater Essays of Arthur Miller*, ed. Robert Martin (New York: Viking Books, 1978), 3–7.

people, their lives, and their actions taken one at a time? For reasons that I hope will become clearer as we go along, this suggestion should be resisted. The elementary moral distinction is the distinction between people and their lives. Actions have a derivative moral importance on both sides of this distinction. They matter morally because both people and their lives matter morally, and both people and their lives are partly constituted by their actions, but not always at the same time, by the same actions. The two can come apart. In particular, as the great tragedies teach us, some actions morally blemish a life without morally blemishing the person who lives it. This point, I will argue, is very clearly reflected in the law. The law does not need to make moral assessments of either people or their lives in order to mark the elementary moral distinction between people and their lives as objects of moral assessment. It marks the elementary moral distinction by assessing actions, taken one at a time, in two different dimensions or under two different aspects. It assesses actions, taken one at a time, as life-constituting, on the one hand, and as person-constituting, on the other.

II

Lives and Wrongs. My life may go well or badly because of things that happen to me. I may be injured in a train accident or inherit a fortune from a long-lost aunt. With limited exceptions,¹⁰ things that happen to me do not directly affect how well my life goes. They have an indirect effect. They affect how well my life goes by affecting what I do with my life. That I inherit a fortune does not make my life any better unless it means that I *live* better, doing more rewarding

¹⁰ The main exceptions are pleasures and pains. Among pleasures and pains there are raw or sensory pleasures and pains that straightforwardly happen to us. But there are also pleasures and pains reflecting an awareness of value, such as the joy of falling in love and the pain of losing a loved one. Arguably the pleasures and pains in the second class belong (in nonpathological cases) to the active side of our lives and so are not ideally represented as things that happen to us. On the other hand, they are also clearly misrepresented as things that I do. For discussion see Harry Frankfurt, "Identification and Externality," in his *The Importance of What We Care About* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), and Joseph Raz, "When We Are Ourselves: the Active and the Passive," in his *Engaging Reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

things with more interesting people, making better use of my talents, cultivating better tastes, and so forth.

One way to assess how well I live my life is morally. A morally better life is, *ceteris paribus*, a better life. The importance of living a morally better life is typically both exaggerated and underplayed. On the one hand, moral success is often portrayed as the highest kind of success. A morally better life is held up as a better life come what may, not merely a better life *ceteris paribus*. On the other hand, moral success is often portrayed as a self-contained kind of success, such that one can succeed in more ordinary ways (for example, in one's marriage or career) without any moral success. In attempting to correct these two complementary errors one may easily be drawn into a tiresome demarcation dispute. Which successes and failures count as moral ones? This question seems more pivotal the more wedded one is to the two errors just mentioned. As one leaves them behind, the classification of a certain success or failure as moral loses its most dramatic implications and becomes largely a matter of convenience. For present purposes we do not, in any case, need to have a complete picture of what the moral assessment of a life includes. We need only agree on this limited, and I hope ecumenical, proposal. Whenever a life is blemished by the wrongdoing of the person living it, that blemish is a moral one. Notice that this proposal does not entail that all wrongdoing is moral wrongdoing. It only entails that when wrongdoing is not moral wrongdoing (for example, it is wrongdoing only according to an immoral law), it leaves no blemish on the life of the wrongdoer.

The proposal may be ecumenical, but it is also ambiguous. For there are two quite different things we might mean by saying that someone acted wrongly. We might mean that he did something unjustified, or we might mean that he did something in breach of duty (also known as obligation). This is another fundamental distinction that sometimes gets lost in modern thinking. Many modern philosophers, indeed, have tried to establish the coextensiveness of the two classes of wrong actions. Utilitarians from Bentham onward have claimed that if an action is unjustified, it must also be in breach of duty. Indeed one's only duty, on a rigidly Benthamite view, is the duty not to perform unjustified actions. Kant and his followers, meanwhile, had the converse idea: if an action is in breach of duty, it must also be

unjustified. A duty is a reason that can never be defeated by countervailing reasons, not even countervailing duties. Duties, said Kant, are incapable of conflicting with each other.

Both of these views overgeneralize. There can be actions that are in breach of duty partly because they are unjustified and actions that are unjustified partly because they are in breach of duty.¹¹ But breach of duty and absence of justification do not, in general, go hand in hand. Many actions are unjustified even though they are not in breach of duty. (Today I failed to bring my umbrella out with me even though rain was forecast.) Many other actions are justified even though they are in breach of duty. (Yesterday I was late for work because I stopped to assist someone who had just been mugged.) To put it more paradoxically, there are many actions that are wrong without being wrongful, or wrongful without being wrong. The emphatic word "wrongful," and similar terms like "wrongdoing," "wronged," and "a wrong," are normally used to denote a breach of duty, whether or not it is unjustified. Whereas if we simply say that someone did the wrong thing, that normally carries the implication of an unjustified action, whether or not it is in breach of duty. At any rate, this is the linguistic convention that I will be adopting from now on when a linguistic convention is needed.

The distinction between doing the wrong thing and doing something wrongful is of pervasive importance in most developed legal systems. The famous tort case of *Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co* illustrates its importance in the common law.¹² When an unexpectedly violent storm made it too perilous to set sail, a captain kept his ship moored to somebody else's pier without permission. By this action he saved his ship and crew but damaged the pier. The pier owner sued for damages in trespass. The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the captain had not done the wrong thing (he had acted with ample justification), but he had acted wrongfully (he had breached a duty owed to the pier owner not to moor his ship to the pier without permission). Because this ruling sounds paradoxical, many lawyers are reluctant to swallow it whole.¹³ A common reaction to *Vincent* is to explain it away as something other than a genuine tort case. Perhaps the "damages" awarded by the court for the "tort" of "trespass" were really more akin to a reimbursement for services rendered under

¹¹ We will return to cases in the former class in section 4 below.

¹² 124 NW 221 (1910).

the law of unjust enrichment? Perhaps the captain wronged nobody in using the pier without permission in an emergency, so long as he paid for any damage he caused in the process? Perhaps the court was merely enforcing this payment condition? It is easy to see what makes this reinterpretation appealing, but it is unnecessary. *Vincent* can be read unproblematically as a tort case. It isolates a general proposition of central importance to the common law: The mere fact that one was justified (= not wrong) in acting wrongfully does not mean that one did not act wrongfully and does not by itself¹⁴ block one's liability to pay reparative damages to those whom one wronged.

The same proposition is at stake in the long-running debates about "efficient breach" in the law of contract. Some writers, especially in the Benthamite economic analysis tradition, say that since damages for breach of contract are awarded in many cases in which

¹³ For different degrees of indigestion see Ernest Weinrib, *The Idea of Private Law* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 196 and following, and Arthur Ripstein, *Equality, Responsibility and the Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 118–21. The following thought often deepens lawyers' worries about *Vincent*. The captain is justified in keeping his ship trespassorily moored to the pier, but since it remains an actionable trespass, the pier owner is also justified (under the common law's doctrine of self-help) in using the minimum necessary force to cut the trespassory ship adrift. One may therefore imagine a situation in which the pier owner uses minimum necessary force to cut the ship adrift, but the captain responds in like kind by using minimum necessary force to keep the ship moored. The situation escalates, and third parties join in on each side, all claiming justification. Whose side does the law take? Who is the criminal aggressor, and who is the legitimate self-defender? I agree that this is a potential problem for the law, but it is not a philosophical problem. There is no reason to doubt that the two sides could both be justified simultaneously even though the justified action of one impedes or frustrates the justified action of the other. There is only the practical problem of how we are going to prevent such situations proliferating and escalating to the point at which everybody is acting unjustifiably rather than justifiably. This is an ordinary coordination problem to which there are a number of rival solutions, more than one of which is in all probability a justifiable solution. This being so, different legal systems may justifiably choose different solutions. In my view they may also justifiably remain silent on the problem until a relevant case arises and even then only solve it very locally, without anticipating all the possible variations on the scenario.

¹⁴ It may block one's liability when taken in combination with other facts, such as the fact that what justified one in doing as one did was the need to protect or rescue the very person whom one thereby wronged.

the breach was amply justified, we should not persist in thinking of "breach of contract" as the name of a legal wrong.¹⁵ Any "damages" awarded by the court for breach of contract should really be evaluated on some other model, for example, as a reimbursement for services rendered under the law of unjust enrichment. One wrongs nobody by abandoning the contract without the other party's permission so long as one pays for the other party's expenses to date. All the court does in a standard breach of contract case is enforce the payment by which one licenses one's rightful abandonment of the contract. Those who resist this conclusion, especially those with broadly Kantian sympathies, have often answered that the breach only seems to be justified in such cases. Really, when the indomitable moral force of the contract is properly acknowledged, the breach was not justified and hence remained wrongful.¹⁶ The two sides here are driven to their polarized conclusions by a shared error: the failure to see that, barring special cases, wrongfulness (= breach of duty) is one thing and wrongness (= absence of justification) quite another. *Pace* the Kantians, one need not deny that the breach was justified in order to insist that it was a breach of duty. Nor, *pace* the Benthamites, need one deny that it was a breach of duty in order to insist that it was justified. The point recurs throughout the common law of tort and contract. The reason why *Vincent* brings it out more graphically than countless other tort and contract cases, and hence belongs on every student tort syllabus, is that in *Vincent* the captain was not only justified in mooring his ship to the pier but would also have been unjustified in failing to do so. He was therefore in a strictly tragic position: the only justified action open to him was a wrongful action (one that violated the pier owner's rights). We may indeed be reminded of one of Aristotle's own most famous examples of tragedy, in which a sea captain's only justified option is to jettison his cargo.¹⁷

Why do these cases count as tragic cases? How do wrongful actions that cannot justifiably be avoided contribute to lives that are morally less perfect than the people who live them? In the next sec-

¹⁵ For a good sketch see Richard Craswell, "Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises," in *The Theory of Contract Law*, ed. Peter Benson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

¹⁶ For example, Daniel Friedmann, "The Efficient Breach Fallacy," *Journal of Legal Studies* 18 (1989): 1.

¹⁷ *Nichomachean Ethics* 3.1.1110a8.

tion I will explain why justification matters in the assessment of people; but first let me explain why wrongdoing matters in the assessment of lives. Notice that this is not the same as asking why wrongdoing matters *full stop*. Wrongdoing is the breach of a duty, and a duty (to be more exact, the fact that one has a duty) is a reason with a doubly special (categorical and mandatory) force. So, for any rational being—any being to whom reasons apply—wrongdoing is something especially to be avoided. That is why it matters, but that is not the question. The question is why wrongdoing matters *in the assessment of lives*. Why is it the case that when wrongdoing is not avoided, it leaves an imperfection—what I have been calling a “blemish”—on the life of the wrongdoer? Why is my life damaged, in extreme cases destroyed, by my breaches of duty?

To get to the answer, one needs to begin by grasping a general truth about reasons. Reasons await full conformity. If one does not fully conform to a reason—if one does not do exactly what it is a reason to do—the reason does not evaporate. It does not evaporate even though one was justified in not conforming to it. It does not evaporate even though it is now too late fully to conform to it. Instead, it now counts as a reason for doing the next best thing. And failing that, the next best thing again, and so on. To borrow an example from Neil MacCormick, suppose I promised to take my children to the beach today, but because of some emergency I have to cancel the trip.¹⁸ Without further ado, the reason I had to take the children to the beach today—namely the fact that I promised—now becomes a reason for me to take them to the beach tomorrow, or failing that the next day, or failing any of this to provide them with some alternative treat or privilege, and so forth. Of course the details may vary. Perhaps, if it were a birthday treat, a trip to the beach or an alternative treat tomorrow does not really count as second best. Perhaps it only adds insult to injury. Perhaps the best I can do is apologize. Perhaps not even that. Perhaps there is nothing I can now do by way of even minimal conformity. Even then the reason does not evaporate. It still makes

¹⁸ Neil MacCormick, “The Obligation of Reparation,” in his *Legal Right and Social Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). MacCormick gets into a muddle with efficient breach—he imagines that a justified breach of duty cannot be a breach of duty—and so ends up inverting the lesson of the example.

its force felt as a reason for me to regret that I did not do as I promised.¹⁹

Here we have another important truth that was largely expunged from modern moral philosophy. It became the accepted wisdom, most conspicuous in the Benthamite tradition but equally taken for granted among Kantians, that at every moment we start again from *tabula rasa*, rationally speaking. There must always be a new reason for us to take an interest in an old reason. Regret, apology, reparation, remorse, atonement, punishment: all this retrospectivity is irrational unless it now commends itself afresh, as a way of (say) reducing future suffering or expressing renewed respect for oneself or others. But retrospectivity is in fact built into the bricks of rationality. True, there are invariably new reasons both for and against dwelling on the past. These should not be dismissed lightly, but nor should one commit the opposite error. One should not dismiss the old reasons, the unconformed-to reasons that are still hanging around waiting for conformity. These reasons still have their force, and to the extent that they remain unconformed-to, their residual force confers *prima facie* rationality, without further ado, on regretful attitudes toward the path of one's own life.²⁰

This view may strike some as having scary implications. After all, whatever we do, there is always something else we have some reason, however slight, to be doing instead. Doesn't it follow that over time

¹⁹ In "Moral Luck," Bernard Williams introduces the label "agent-regret" to designate regret with (something like) this rational structure. Unlike Williams, I believe that all regret is agent-regret. One does not regret the storm; one regrets setting out in it. One does not regret that one was attacked; one regrets that one went where the attacker attacked one. Some regret is, however, vicarious agent-regret. It is regret on behalf of others, with whom one has some special relationship, reflecting the continuing force of some reason that they did not conform to. Vicarious regret clearly needs some justification beyond the existence of the unconformed-to reason. We need to know why one should ever respond to another's nonconformity to a reason as if it were one's own. I will not give any attention to this question here, nor indeed to any of the closely associated puzzles of vicarious liability in law.

²⁰ See John Gardner and Timothy Macklem, "Reasons," in *The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law*, ed. J. Coleman and S. Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 463–4 and 467–8. I have also recently benefited from reading two unpublished papers, each of which independently defends much the same view in greater detail: Matthew Henken, "No Way Out: Conflict, Regret and Compensation" (2002) and Joseph Raz, "Personal Practical Conflicts" (2002).

the old unconformed-to reasons will tend to pile up and overwhelm the new ones and leave us rationally doomed to a life of little else but regret? Of course it can be so. We have all read books or seen movies about lives consumed by regret, but normally things are not quite so bad. Among the many reasons that we do not conform to, there are many that are noncategorical. We have them by virtue of our personal goals, and we no longer have them when our goals change. Furthermore, many are nonmandatory. They simply weigh in the balance of reasons and do not exclude any countervailing reasons from consideration. When we do not fully conform to a noncategorical and/or nonmandatory reason, the reason that remains to haunt us still noncategorical and/or nonmandatory. Such a reason is therefore permanently vulnerable to the abandonment of old goals and/or to defeat by the new reasons that militate powerfully in favor of getting on with our lives. When things are not so easy is when we are left with old unconformed-to reasons that are both categorical and mandatory, that is, when we had duties that we failed to perform and hence acted wrongfully. In such cases the reason left over and clamoring for conformity does not surrender to a change in our personal goals. It continues to exert mandatory force such that at least some conflicting reasons (some of the otherwise powerful reasons that we have to get on with our lives) are excluded from consideration and cannot suffice to defeat it. Wrongful action, in short, leaves us with regrets that are hard to expunge and the repression of which is hard to justify. That is how my acting wrongfully may damage, and in extreme cases destroy, my life. Of course I am not thinking here of the mere experience of regret, the psychological haunting of the wrongdoer. No doubt one may avoid this by various displacement activities, self-deceptions, and so forth. Rather, I am thinking of the continuing force of the reason which makes the regret rationally appropriate and which it is now too late completely to eradicate. It is the enduring presence of this reason which, to a greater or lesser extent, constitutes the damage to one's life.

Was the captain in *Vincent* doomed to such a damaged life? In some measure, yes. After he had kept his ship moored to the pier without the owner's permission, albeit with full justification, it was too late for him fully to perform his duty not to do so. The pier owner's rights were violated; there was no going back. But a partial conformity, a second best option, was still available. By paying

reparative damages for the violation and its consequences, the captain could still imperfectly perform his duty and leave himself with a less damaged life. You may have been wondering how all my discussion of regrets and blemishes relates to the law, and now you have your answer. In the law we have two duties, a primary duty that we violate when we commit a tort or breach a contract, and a secondary duty to pay reparative damages that are brought into being by the law when and because we breach the primary duty. But part of the case for bringing the secondary duty into (legal) existence is that (morally) it is already there. It is the same primary duty that one violated when one breached the contract or committed the tort. It continues to bind one and to press for second best conformity. When one pays reparative damages, one imperfectly performs the same duty that, earlier, one failed perfectly to perform. That is what is captured in the common lawyer's saying that the purpose of reparative damages, in tort as in contract, is to put the plaintiff, so far as money can do it, back in the position that he would have been in had the wrongful action not been committed against him.

This being so, there is no need to seek an independent rationale for the law's secondary duty. We do not need to build it up rationally from *tabula rasa*. There is no need to argue in Benthamite vein that reparative damages are optimally deterrent or in Kantian vein that they are a way of reestablishing respect for persons. Of course considerations of deterrence and respect for persons may be relevant in assessing whether and when we should go to all the trouble of making the duty to repair enforceable through the law. The point is that they are not needed to explain why we should want to do so. We should want to do so because when a primary duty is breached, a next best performance of the same duty is automatically called for without further ado. Often—often enough to dictate the common law's standard remedies for wrongdoing—the payment of reparative damages counts as such a next best performance.

In these remarks I have explained why the fact that I acted wrongfully matters in the moral assessment of my life, which also affords an explanation of why the fact that I acted wrongfully often matters in the determination of my legal position. Some have thought that this kind of explanation is back-to-front. Remember the moral philosophers who offer "virtuously" as an answer to the question, "How should one live?" Why do these writers fondly imagine that they

are at odds with Kant? Partly because they think (mistakenly) that Kant gave a different answer to their question but also partly because they think that Kant asked a different question. Instead of asking, "How should one live?", they think Kant asked, "Which actions should one perform?", and they want to restore the former question to the primacy which they think it had in Aristotle's work.²¹ For some such writers, restoring the former question to primacy means this. It means that one needs to determine which lives are morally imperfect in order to determine which actions are wrongful.²² The picture I just painted reverses this order of determination. According to my picture, one needs to determine which actions are wrongful in order to determine which lives are morally imperfect. My picture was the one endorsed by Aristotle and Kant alike. Neither believed in the primacy of the question, "How should one live?", over the question, "Which actions should one perform?", if by "primacy" one means that the first question is to be answered first. On the other hand, Aristotle did stress, in a way that Kant did not, the primacy of the question, "How should one live?", over the question, "Which actions should one perform?", if we mean something else by "primacy." For Aristotle stressed, as I have stressed, that the moral importance of my wrongful actions, independently identified, lies primarily in how they affect people's lives for the worse. In the examples that matter for the law, there are always at least two affected lives. There is the life of the wrongdoer and the life of the person wronged. Lawyers are used to thinking of the person wronged as the main person whose life was made worse by the wrong. He can't use his pier, for example, or he can't use his legs. Here I have emphasized instead the moral damage to the life of the wrongdoer. Lawyers may find this idea counterintuitive. But I have tried to suggest that, even if counterintuitive, this is an idea that underlies a great deal of familiar legal doctrine.

III

People and Faults. In casual conversation we might say that the damage to the pier in *Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co* was the

²¹ Crisp, "Modern Moral Philosophy and the Virtues," 1.

²² This seems to be Alasdair MacIntyre's view in *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 204 and following.

captain's fault or that he was to blame for it. We sometimes use these expressions merely to pick out a person who failed in his duty to prevent or not to bring about some eventuality (also sometimes known as "the person responsible"). The captain fits this description. But when we are watching our words more carefully, we should avoid saying that the damage to the pier in *Vincent* was the captain's fault or that he was to blame for it. For the captain was not at fault and should not be blamed. His action, being wrongful, blemished his life. Yet, being justified, it did not reflect badly on him. In particular, it did not show him up as cowardly, imprudent, lazy, mean-spirited, irresponsible, or otherwise morally at fault. People with different moral faults differ in respect of which reasons they overplay and which reasons they underplay and hence in respect of which actions they are over- or under-disposed to perform. Cowardly people overplay the importance of their own safety, mean-spirited people underplay the importance of other people's feelings, imprudent people underplay the importance of longer-run consequences, and so on. But what they all have in common, and what constitutes their moral fault, is that they all end up acting for defeated rather than undefeated reasons. A justified action, meanwhile, is one performed for an undefeated reason. It follows that so long as I do not perform any unjustified actions, I remain a person free of all moral faults.

Here I am already challenging a familiar classificatory scheme used by some writers on criminal law as well as some moral philosophers. It is sometimes said that holding an action to be justified or unjustified is an instance of act-assessment, whereas holding a person to be of good or bad moral character is an instance of agent-assessment.²³ This is misleading. It encourages a distorted view of justification as well as a distorted view of moral character. If we must talk of acts and agents, justification depends on the agent as much as the act, and moral character depends on the act as much as the agent. However, for reasons that will emerge, I would rather not put the point this way at all.

The most distracting and irrelevant thought that the contrast between act-assessment and agent-assessment brings to mind is the

²³ See, for example, Paul Robinson, *Fundamentals of Criminal Law*, 2d ed. (New York: Little, Brown, 1995), 526; Claire Finkelstein, "Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law," *Buffalo Criminal Law Review* 6 (2003): 326.

thought that moral character is something that endures in people while their actions are fleeting. This thought encourages us, in Humean vein, to think of someone's moral character as standing in a contingent relation with his actions: character causes action, action evidences character.²⁴ But this is a blunder. People's moral characters are constituted, and not merely evidenced, by what they do. Someone who has never done anything dishonest in his life is not a dishonest person, even if he is often tempted to act dishonestly. Rather, he would have been a dishonest person if only he had not had so much self-control.²⁵ Conversely, someone who acted dishonestly just once, even though this was the only occasion on which he ever felt tempted, is to that extent a dishonest person. Of course, we might say of such a person that he acted "out of character." In this phrase we juxtapose the fact that he is normally honest with the fact that today he was dishonest. But this does not alter the fact that today he—not just his action, but he—was dishonest. This dishonesty constitutes a blemish on his moral character.

So "out of character" cannot be interpreted to mean "not constitutive of character." The thought that it can comes of the running-together of two questions. One is the question: "What is character?" The other is the question: "How is character formed?" When we think about the formation of character, we cannot but think about the cultivation of lasting dispositions or tendencies. There is no way, even in principle, to cultivate occasional honesty or occasional dishonesty. But it does not follow that there is no such thing as occasional honesty or occasional dishonesty. A discussion of character traits that centers on the question of formation inevitably plays up the idea of character as an enduring condition.²⁶ This explains why the fact that a certain action was "out of character" can be a consideration relevant to the

²⁴ David Hume, *Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals*, 3d ed, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 98.

²⁵ Of course this does not make him a positively honest person. As Aristotle explained it makes him an *enkratic* (self-controlled) person who is to that extent neither honest nor dishonest. See *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.1.1145a15 and following.

²⁶ This is why Aristotle plays up the "settled disposition" aspect of moral virtue in his discussion of moral education in book 2 of *Nicomachean Ethics* but plays it down from book 3 onward, having turned his mind to moral assessment.

aptness of some putatively rehabilitative or reformatory reactions to it. But when we are simply interested in assessing people—as opposed to deciding how we might improve them—we should not similarly sideline their occasional aberrations.²⁷ I don't mean, of course, that we should treat an isolated occasion of dishonesty as somehow obliterating a fine record of honesty. Rather, we should think of it as blemishing that record. The record now reads: normally very honest but on one infamous occasion extremely dishonest. This record is a record of character itself, not a record of conflicting evidence about character, nor (obviously) a record of reformatory plans for character.

This is the main way in which it is misleading to think of the assessment of moral character as an agent-assessment as opposed to an act-assessment. But how is it misleading to think of holding a certain action justified as an act-assessment rather than an agent-assessment? It is misleading in that whether one acts with justification depends not only on what one does but also on why one does it.²⁸ If there is an undefeated reason to *x*, then *x*-ing is *justifiable*. But *x*-ing is *justified* only if the agent *x*-ed *for* that undefeated reason. If one claims that the tyrannical behavior of Saddam Hussein toward his own people justified one's preemptive strike on Iraq, one claims not only that the tyrannical behavior of Saddam Hussein toward his own people was an undefeated reason for a preemptive strike on Iraq but also that this was the reason why one launched the strike. And if one asks whether the risk of attack from a burglar justified the use of lethal force against the burglar by the householder, one asks not only whether the risk of attack was an undefeated reason for the householder to use lethal force against the burglar, but also whether that was the householder's reason for using such force. In justifying an action, in short, it is not enough that there were undefeated reasons for that action unless that actor also acted for at least one of those reasons. Why is this? Why is it not enough, from the point of view of jus-

²⁷ In his proto-utilitarian way, of course, Hume thought that assessing people was mainly a step toward improving them, which helps to explain why he thought that an action's being out of character made it irrelevant to assessment. See *Enquiries*, 97–9.

²⁸ See further my "Justifications and Reasons," in *Harm and Culpability*, ed. Andrew Simester and Anthony Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

tification, that someone conforms to an undefeated reason without also acting for it?

To get the answer straight, one needs to begin by thinking carefully about what justification is for, why justification matters, what is the point of justification. You may think this a strange question. What justification is for is surely to make the world a better place, to fill it with better actions rather than worse ones. But in the only sense in which this proposition is true, it is question-begging. Why are justified actions better actions? Some moral philosophers, mainly in the Benthamite tradition, tried to show that they are better actions quite apart from being justified actions and that their betterness explains why they are justified actions. They are rationally better because they are better *tout court*. But this project foundered as Bentham's heirs, from J. S. Mill onward, gradually rediscovered the deontic aspects of practical thought. Some actions are better actions only in virtue of being justified actions. They are better *tout court* only because they are rationally better, not vice versa. When we ask, "What is justification for?", we want to know how this can be so. Why, when our independent tests of betterness run out, does making the world a rationally better place still continue to make the world a better place? The answer, in brief, is that people are (*inter alia*) rational agents, and rational agents necessarily aspire to excellence in rationality. Excellence in rationality means excellence in seeing reasons, in using them, and in negotiating conflicts among them. To act for a defeated reason is to come unstuck as a negotiator of rational conflicts. Subject to an important proviso to be entered in a moment, this reflects badly upon one (constitutes one's fault) as a rational agent. And that is why justification matters. It matters because, as rational agents, people are the worse for acting without it. A world with worse people in it is, *ceteris paribus*, a worse world.

I have simplified this explanation in various ways. Most significantly, I have bracketed a special class of unjustified actions that do not reflect badly on their agents. Sometimes one lacks an adequate justification for what one does, yet one has an adequate justification for the beliefs or emotions on the strength of which one does it. In such a case one's action is excused. The simplest excuse of all is the justified mistake excuse. Suppose that the captain stays moored to the pier, in a case otherwise akin to *Vincent*, only because a malicious hoaxer broadcast a false storm warning as if it came from the

coastguard. In such a case the captain lacked an undefeated reason to stay moored. Yet he had an undefeated reason to think that he had an undefeated reason to stay moored. (His excuse is, "How was I to know it was hoax?") We would not expect this imaginary storm to relieve the captain of tort liability for trespass any more than the real storm did. On the other hand, we would expect both to be equally available as defenses to any criminal charge against the captain that might arise from the incident. That is because both the justification and the excuse equally extinguish the captain's fault. In this respect an excuse is every bit as good as a justification. True, any rational agent, given the choice, would rather be justified than excused. It is better to act for an undefeated reason than to be drawn, even for an undefeated reason, into acting for a defeated one. One kicks oneself when one realizes that one acted for a defeated reason. One looks back on it with extra regret. But that is because, like a wrongful action, an action on the strength of a mistaken belief leaves a blemish on one's life. It is not because it reflects badly upon one as a rational agent. It reflects badly on one as a rational agent only if (a) the mistaken belief is unjustified or (b) the action would not have been justified even if the mistaken belief had been true. Something very similar, albeit a little more complex, is true of actions performed in anger, fear, frustration, desperation, and so forth. Roughly, they reflect badly upon one as a rational agent only if (a) one's anger, fear, frustration, desperation were itself unjustified or (b) one's anger, fear, frustration, desperation were insufficient to explain one's action, assuming an acceptable level of self-control.²⁹

The thought that rational agents would rather be justified than excused is not the only possible source of doubts about the fault-negating power of excuses. Another is the thought that at least some excuses are available as "concessions to human frailty," in the words favored by some criminal lawyers. The same thought may be conveyed less grandiloquently by saying that people only need excuses because of their limitations. They do not have unlimited reserves of patience, courage, charity, attentiveness, insight, and so on, and that is why they did something unjustified and need to fall back on an excuse. Isn't the display of a limitation also the display of a fault? So doesn't it follow that excuses, or some of them, must perform some function in the assessment of people other than the negation of their fault?³⁰ The

²⁹ See further my "The Gist of Excuses," *Buffalo Criminal Law Review* 1 (1997): 575.

mistake here begins with the misleading suggestion that one's limitations explain why one did something unjustified. This is mistaken if it is taken to mean that one displays no limitations in one's justified actions. Even one's justified actions are not always exemplary. They do not always exhibit the highest measure of virtue. Here is one proof of the point. The highest pinnacle of virtue is often exhibited in supererogatory actions. That I do not perform such actions whenever they are there to perform often (not always) displays one or more of my limitations. Yet it does not follow that I am unjustified in failing to perform supererogatory actions. How could it follow? It is part of the very idea of a supererogatory action that one is permitted not to perform it. This means that any reason not to perform it remains undefeated. Hence one is always justified in not performing it.³¹ Hence one cannot be at fault in failing to perform it. It follows that the mere fact that one does not exhibit perfect virtue in one's action does not entail that one exhibits a fault.

A fault, in the sense that matters here, is not just any shortfall of virtue. A fault is a shortfall of virtue that consists in the performance of actions that are both unjustified and unexcused. Any other shortfall of virtue is a mere limitation. It does not reflect badly upon one as a rational agent. Rather, it reminds us what life is inevitably like for a rational agent. Even undefeated reasons pervasively conflict among themselves. If one is to have a character at all, one cannot but lean toward reasons of some types at the expense of reasons of other types. It follows that it is impossible to have a character that is such that one excels evenhandedly in one's relations with all undefeated reasons. In other words, nobody, not even a saint, can be without his limitations. Every excellence has some limitation as its flip-side. The more perfectly charitable, the less perfectly just; the more perfectly frank, the less perfectly diplomatic; and so on. This is an inevitable feature of the human condition. But all of this is consistent with always acting

³⁰ A recent reassertion of this view is William Wilson, "The Filtering Role of Crisis in the Constitution of Criminal Excuses," *Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence* 17 (2004): 387.

³¹ I am here borrowing some points from Joseph Raz, "Permissions and Supererogation," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 12 (1975): 61. A common mistake, pointed out by Raz, is to think that the permissibility of not performing a supererogatory action constitutes an excuse rather than a justification for its nonperformance. But even if we were to let this mistake stand, the final conclusion still follows: nobody is at fault in failing to act supererogatorily.

for an undefeated reason, or at any rate for a reason that one has undefeated reason to treat as undefeated. It is consistent with always being justified in what one does or at least excused. So it is one thing to think of an excuse as a concession to human frailty in the sense of a recognition that human beings inevitably have limitations (imperfect virtues) as the price of their excellences (more perfect virtues). It is another thing to think of an excuse as a concession to human frailty in the sense of a recognition that human beings inevitably have their share of bad character, that is, their faults or vices. This is just not true. Perhaps all human beings do have their faults or vices, but there is nothing in the human condition that makes this inevitable, and there is no case for "concessionary" extension of justifications or excuses to fault-constituting actions. How could there be? It is the very fact that actions are unjustified and unexcused that makes them fault-constituting.

Here I once again take sides on an issue much discussed by contemporary virtue ethicists. That it is rational to exhibit moral virtue is analytically true and accepted by Aristotle and Kant alike. But are morally virtuous actions rational because they are morally virtuous, or morally virtuous because they are rational? Kant famously defended the idea that they are morally virtuous because rational. Some contemporary writers in the virtue ethics school defend the opposite view and claim thereby to be Aristotelian revivalists.³² But on this point as on so many others Aristotle is widely misunderstood. Aristotle and Kant agreed, rightly, that virtuous actions are virtuous because rational.³³ In the terms I just introduced, it is the fact that actions are justified or excused that entails that they are not fault-constituting, not the other way around. Why is Aristotle mistakenly associated with the opposite view? Perhaps because he repeatedly and rightly emphasized that one's moral virtues—one's qualities as a person—make an intrinsic rather than an instrumental contribution to the quality of one's life.³⁴ If the morally virtuous person lives by that token a rationally better life (a better life for a rational being), surely the moral virtue must be what makes it rational? So how can the fact that

³² "A pure virtue ethics . . . will suggest that the only reasons we ever have for acting or living in a certain way are *grounded* in the virtues"; Crisp, "Modern Moral Philosophy and the Virtues," 7. Crisp rightly points out that a virtue ethics need not be pure, but he wrongly ascribes the pure position to Aristotle.

³³ *Nichomachean Ethics* 3.5.1114b28–9; *Groundwork*, 102–3.

³⁴ For example, *Nichomachean Ethics* 1.7.1098a16–17.

it is rational also be what makes it morally virtuous? Actually, the answer is straightforward. That one is a virtuous person brings *extra* value to one's life above and beyond the ordinary value, the rational pursuit of which constitutes one's virtue. First there is the rationally salient value that one pursues and the successful pursuit of which makes one morally virtuous. Then there is the extra value that lies in one's successfully pursuing the rationally salient value.³⁵ This extra value is not rationally salient. It is the value of rationality itself. *Pace* Kant, pursuing rationality (or indeed morality) itself, for its own sake, is normally self-defeating. One does not exhibit moral virtue in acting with the intention of exhibiting moral virtue. One exhibits moral virtue in acting with other aims, themselves rationally defensible (that is, sufficient to justify or excuse one's action). Thereby one makes one's life better in two ways at once. A life is better for the fact that it was a life of greater conformity with reasons. A person without faults is better equipped, instrumentally, to live this life (even though tragedy may still strike). But being a person without faults also contributes intrinsically to one's quality of life. A life is better for the very fact that it is lived by someone with fewer or lesser faults. Virtue, as they say, is its own reward: one's success in seeing reasons, in using them, and in negotiating conflicts among them is not only an instrument of better living but also a constituent of it. When tragedy strikes, one may still console oneself with the second aspect. One may say: a life blemished, but at least not blemished for having been lived by a blemished person.

IV

Fault-Anticipating Wrongs. So there can be a kind of feedback from the quality of persons to the quality of their lives. Correspondingly, there can be a kind of feedback from the avoidance of fault to the avoidance of wrongdoing. Being at fault sometimes contributes constitutively, and not just instrumentally, to the wrongfulness of one's actions. Some wrongs, as I will put it, are "fault-anticipating." They are wrongs that are committed only in the absence of justification or excuse—in other words, only in the presence of fault.

³⁵ I have defended this explanation in more detail, with the virtue of solidarity as my example, in "Reasons for Teamwork," *Legal Theory* 8 (2002): 495.

The very idea of a fault-anticipating wrong may strike one as paradoxical. The existence of such wrongs has been denied by some.³⁶ If one committed no wrong, surely one has nothing to justify or excuse? If one has nothing to justify or excuse, then surely one neither has nor lacks a justification or excuse? Doesn't it follow that one must commit a wrong to lack a justification or excuse? That being so, how can it ever be that one must lack a justification or excuse to commit a wrong? How are fault-anticipating wrongs possible? The answer is startlingly simple. Fault-anticipating wrongs are always parasitic or secondary wrongs. One commits them only if one lacks justification or excuse for something *else* one does in committing them. In some cases the something else is not a wrong at all—not a breach of duty—but merely a failure to conform to an ordinary reason for action. One has a weighty reason not to take one's children mountaineering, for instance, but one's only duty is not to do so negligently. What is wrongful, because a breach of duty, is faulty (unjustified and unexcused) nonconformity with the weighty reason. In other cases, however, the something else is the commission of another wrong. One violates a duty whenever one spreads gossip about one's colleagues, for example, but one violates an additional and more stringent duty when one spreads the same gossip maliciously or dishonestly. The fault-anticipating wrong, the more heinous wrong, lies in the faulty commission of another less heinous wrong that is not fault-anticipating.

Elsewhere I have argued, against Kant, that the primary or basic type of moral wrong is one to which the endeavors of the wrongdoer

³⁶ The best and best-known defense of the view that there are no fault-anticipating wrongs is W. D. Ross, *The Right and the Good* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930). The conclusion is stated most starkly at p. 45. Ross's argument for it fails, but in the process he makes light work of demolishing the ultra-Kantian view at the opposite extreme that there are no wrongs other than fault-anticipating wrongs. Sadly, Ross's demolition fell mostly on deaf ears. The ultra-Kantian view continues to exert a hold over many nonphilosophers, including many legal scholars. I call the view ultra-Kantian because even in his most hardline moments Kant only claimed that breach of duty is never justifiable. He did not suggest that it is never excusable and therefore always faulty. The idea that he did reflects, like so much else, an exaggeration of his views about moral luck. From the thesis that perfect people cannot but lead perfect lives, it is tempting but fallacious to derive the thesis that an imperfect life can only have been led by someone who is at fault. This line of thought ignores the existence of limitations, that is, imperfections of character that are not vices. Ross himself tends to paint Kant, mistakenly, in ultra-Kantian colors.

make no constitutive difference.³⁷ The basic moral question is what you did or didn't do (Did you kill? Did you cause offense? Did you keep your promise?), never mind what you were trying to do or trying not to do. I argued that wrongs that are constitutively sensitive to what the wrongdoer was trying to do or trying not to do (Did you murder? Did you cheat? Did you conspire?) are wrongs of a secondary or parasitic type, relative to those that are constitutively insensitive to what the wrongdoer was trying to do or trying not to do. To defend this strong conclusion I made a long argument. What I offered just now was a much shorter argument for a much more modest conclusion. The more modest conclusion is that wrongs that are constitutively sensitive to the wrongdoer's fault are wrongs of a secondary or parasitic type, relative to those that are constitutively insensitive to the wrongdoer's fault. This conclusion is more modest because while every fault-anticipating wrong is constitutively sensitive to what the wrongdoer was trying to do (in that it is constitutively sensitive to his reasons for doing as he did), many wrongs that are constitutively sensitive to what the wrongdoer was trying to do are not fault-anticipating. Many wrongs can only be committed intentionally, for example, and yet can still be committed without fault. We know that they can be committed without fault because we can conceive of circumstances in which their commission can be justified or excused. Intentional wounding can sometimes be justified as an action in self-defense or excused as an action under duress. Not so reckless wounding. To conclude that I wounded recklessly (or likewise negligently, stupidly, unjustly, callously, in a cowardly way, and so forth) is already to conclude that I had no justification or excuse. If there is a distinct wrong of reckless wounding or cowardly wounding or callous wounding, it is a fault-anticipating wrong. A distinct wrong of intentional wounding, on the other hand, is not.

Writings about the law, especially the criminal law, often get into a muddle on this front. Consider strict liability. Some criminal lawyers think of (and object to) strict liability as liability irrespective of fault. Meanwhile some criminal lawyers think of (and object to) strict liability as liability for wrongs that have no *mens rea* constituent (that is, wrongs that can be committed without the wrongdoer's intending or being aware of any of the wrong-making features of his action).

³⁷ John Gardner, "Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts," in *Relating to Responsibility: Essays for Tony Honore on his 80th Birthday*, ed. Peter Cane and John Gardner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Some seem to think that these two ideas (and hence the two objections) are interchangeable. But if strict liability is liability irrespective of fault, then there may in principle be strict liability for intentional crimes and other crimes of *mens rea*. A wrong partly constituted by the intention or awareness of the wrongdoer may nevertheless be committed faultlessly, with adequate justification or excuse. If the law does not recognize any such justification or excuse, then it holds the intentional or knowing offender strictly liable, in the sense of liable irrespective of his fault. Conversely, if strict liability is liability for wrongs that have no *mens rea* constituent, then there may in principle be strict liability that is not liability irrespective of fault. For the law may recognize justifications and excuses as defenses to a wrong, and hence allow some of the wrongdoer's reasoning at the time of the wrong to be relevant to his liability, even though the wrong itself has no *mens rea* constituent (and nor for that matter a fault constituent).

This muddle matters because the success of any objection to strict liability depends on the defensibility of the principle that strict liability is said to contravene. There are clearly two different principles that are being advanced here. One, which we could call the "*mens rea* principle," is a principle requiring criminal wrongs to have certain constituents, namely the wrongdoer's intending or being aware of at least some of the (other) wrong-making features of his action. The other, which we could call the "fault principle," is a principle regulating the conditions for the imposition of criminal liability rather than the constituents of criminal wrongdoing. Criminal liability should be imposed only for wrongs that are faultily committed, whether or not the fault in question is a constituent of the wrong (that is, whether or not the wrong in question is fault-anticipating). Sometimes the law may be able to satisfy both principles at once by treating a certain wrong as fault-anticipating—as partly constituted by, say, the dishonesty or the malice of the wrongdoer. But just as often the *mens rea* principle and the fault principle place different demands upon the criminal law and the criminal law needs to satisfy them separately.

Our main interest here will be in the rationale for the fault principle. But for contrastive purchase it is worth saying a few words, first, about the rationale for the *mens rea* principle. There are many wrongs that, even apart from the law, are partly constituted by some intention or awareness on the part of the wrongdoer. When these

wrongs are recognized by law, the relevant intention or awareness naturally carries over into the legal constituents of the wrong. Cheating, lying, manipulating, coercing, torturing: these are wrongs of *mens rea* even before the law gets its hands on them. But as a general principle extending beyond such wrongs, the *mens rea* principle has a largely institutional rationale. According to the ideal known as the Rule of Law, those of us about to commit a criminal wrong should be put on stark notice that that is what we are about to do.³⁸ The criminal law should not ambush us unexpectedly. Of course, to avoid unexpected ambushes, we all need to know what the law requires of us. For that reason, criminal laws should be clear, open, consistent, stable, and prospective. They should also forbid specific actions (not courses of action, activities, ways of life, and so forth). Even all this, however, is not enough to ensure that those of us about to violate the criminal law are put on stark notice that we are about to violate it. For we may know the law and yet have no grasp that what we are about to do might constitute a violation of it. That is because often we have no idea which actions we are about to perform. I make a light-hearted remark, and (surprise, surprise!) I offend one of my guests. I turn on my oven, and (surprise, surprise!) I blow all the fuses. The *mens rea* principle is the principle according to which such actions—the self-surprising ones—should not be criminal wrongs.

More precisely: according to the *mens rea* principle, criminal wrongs should be such that one does not commit them unless one intends or is aware of at least one wrong-making feature of what one is about to do, such that (assuming one knows the law) one is also alerted to the fact that what one is about to do will be of interest to the criminal law. The principle does not extend similarly to wrongs under private law, such as torts and breaches of contract. The main reason is that the *mens rea* principle is a systematically prodefendant principle. It is one thing for the law to be systematically prodefendant in the criminal process and quite another for it to be systematically prodefendant in a civil dispute. Criminal investigators and prosecutors have much more extensive, and potentially oppressive, power than do

³⁸ But they need not have similarly stark notice of their possible justificatory and excusatory defenses. For explanation, see George Fletcher, "The Nature of Justification," in *Action and Value in Criminal Law*, ed. Stephen Shute, John Gardner, and Jeremy Horder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 175.

private-law plaintiffs. The *mens rea* principle is one of several principles by which, inasmuch as we live under the Rule of Law, we are protected against the oppressive use of such power.³⁹

V

Defending the Fault Principle. Like the *mens rea* principle, the fault principle is a principle that extends to criminal law but not, or not generally, to private law. Fault can certainly be relevant to liability in tort and contract, but that is because some torts and breaches of contract are fault-anticipating wrongs. Private law cares about wrongdoing. It cares about the wrongdoer's fault if and only if his fault is a constituent of his wrong. Criminal law, by contrast, cares about fault even when fault is *not* a constituent of the wrongdoer's wrong. It gives independent importance to the wrongdoer's fault. It does this by offering him various possible justificatory and excusatory defenses to non-fault-anticipating criminal wrongs. At any rate, that is what the fault principle would have it do.

H. L. A. Hart famously assimilated the fault principle to the *mens rea* principle in respect of rationale. He argued that the criminal law should admit justifications and excuses for the same reason that it should require *mens rea*: to ensure that wrongdoers have a fair opportunity deliberately to steer clear of criminal liability, in keeping with the ideal of the Rule of Law.⁴⁰ No doubt the criminal law's adherence to the fault principle, like its adherence to the *mens rea* principle, can help with its adherence to the ideal of the Rule of Law. But this does not get to the bottom of the fault principle's rationale. The fault principle is not primarily an institutional principle. It does not apply to the criminal law because the criminal law is part of a legal system and legal systems need to regulate the potentially oppressive power of

³⁹ It has become fashionable across the political spectrum to attack the prodefendant principles of criminal law by reconceptualizing the criminal process on the model of a civil dispute, that is, as wrongdoer v. person wronged rather than wrongdoer versus the law. I criticized this consumerist trend in "Crime: in Proportion and in Perspective," in *Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory*, ed. Andrew Ashworth and Martin Wasik (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

⁴⁰ See "Legal Responsibility and Excuses," in his collection *Punishment and Responsibility* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968).

their own officials. Rather, it applies to the criminal law because the criminal law exacts punishments. Punishments are subject to the fault principle irrespective of whether they are exacted by a legal system and irrespective of whether there is any potential for abuse of official power. If I punish one of my friends for wrongdoing (for example, by not sending him an invitation to my party), it is no cause for complaint on his part that he had no idea and indeed no way of knowing that I might take an interest in his actions. As a friend I am not bound by the Rule of Law, nor (hence) by the *mens rea* principle. It is not my job to put people on notice that they are about to get into trouble with me, but I am bound by the fault principle. My friend does have serious cause for complaint if I punish him for a wrong that he committed faultlessly. This is the same complaint that the captain in *Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co* would have had if, in addition to expecting him to pay reparative damages for his violation of the pier owner's rights, the law went on to punish him for what was, even in the law's eyes, a faultless wrong. Reparation for faultless wrongs is one thing; punishment for them, whether by the criminal law or otherwise, is quite another. The fault principle is a principle governing punishment, and it applies to the criminal law because criminal liability is a liability to be punished.

One should proceed carefully here because while criminal liability is a liability to be punished, it is normally a liability to be punished only at the court's discretion.⁴¹ The criminal court is normally at liberty (at the sentencing stage of the trial) to attach some nonpunitive measure to the wrong, such as probation or hospitalization or conditional discharge, instead of a punitive one, such as imprisonment or community service or a fine. Can't the criminal law deal with fault at this sentencing stage, as a matter to be considered in the exercise of judicial discretion? Not with equanimity. When things go well for the law, the determination of criminal liability is a determination that a punishment for the wrong is deserved, and a punishment for the wrong is deserved only if the wrong was faultily committed. Judicial discretion at the sentencing stage exists primarily to enable consideration of factors relevant to the justification of punishment other than

⁴¹ In our introduction to *Action and Value in Criminal Law*, Stephen Shute, Jeremy Horder, and I exaggerated the importance of this distinction, and hence went too far in disengaging the principles of criminal law from the principles of punishment.

those that bear on whether the punishment is deserved: whether to make an example of the defendant, whether to give him credit for other respects in which he is of good character, whether to pursue his rehabilitation or reform, and so on. So, ideally, the question of fault should not be left to figure in the judge's exercise of discretion. But things do not always go so well for the law. Even with the best will in the world, the law's determination of criminal liability cannot always be a satisfactory determination of the deservedness of criminal punishment. The Rule of Law, by insisting on clarity, stability, prospectivity, and so on, often prevents the law from showing full sensitivity to the differential moral merits of every wrong that is committed and every credible justification or excuse for its commission. Some questions bearing on fault, normally but not always relating to the fine-tuning of fault, are inevitably left over to be dealt with at the sentencing stage. So the fault principle is a principle to be honored at the sentencing stage to the extent that, alas, it was not fully honored in the determination of criminal liability. That is a reason for the law to retain a separate sentencing stage complete with judicial discretion to punish or not to punish. But it is not a reason for the law to disregard the defendant's fault in determining his criminal liability and hence in determining his exposure to that same judicial discretion.⁴²

These remarks already lead us a little closer to the rationale for the fault principle. A punishment, I proposed, is deserved only if the wrong being punished was faultily committed. The proposition is easy to agree to and yet remarkably difficult to vindicate in a satisfying way. Some ascribe the difficulty to the very idea of desert, which they claim to find mysterious. But it is hard to do without the idea of desert. Replacing "deserved" with "justified," for example, falsifies the proposition we are interested in rather than simplifying its vindication. As I just mentioned, various considerations apart from the deservedness of punishment are relevant to the justification of punishment.

⁴² An alternative (more Aristotelian) conceptualization of the main idea in this paragraph: ideally a determination of criminal liability settles that punishment would be just, while questions about whether it would be humane, merciful, efficient, and so on, are dealt with at the sentencing stage. Thanks to the demands of the Rule of Law, however, some considerations of justice (the particularized considerations of justice known by the name of "equity") are inevitably left over to the sentencing stage. See *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.10.1137b12–1138a2.

In any case, there is nothing remotely mysterious about the idea of desert. I used it unremarkably near the start of this essay, in elucidating the classical idea of the tragic. Tragedy, I said, is undeserved moral downfall, moral failure out of all proportion to moral failing. The idea of desert that I invoked in saying this is straightforward. It is a variant on the idea of aptness or fittingness. What I deserve is simply what is apt or fitting for me because of some excellence or deficiency of mine. As the fastest runner, I deserve to come first in the race. As the least beautiful contestant, I deserve to come last in the beauty pageant. These latter examples are, of course, examples of nonmoral deserts, in the sense that the excellences and deficiencies at stake are not moral excellences and deficiencies. Because of the widespread tendency to think of moral success as the highest kind of success, many people nowadays find such examples disquieting. They tend to think that the nonmorally deserving are not really deserving at all.⁴³ The ones who really deserve to win the race are the most dedicated or the most courageous runners, the ones who show the most moral fiber, never mind their short legs and poor coordination. Even the element of skill in athletics makes one a deserving winner, in the view of some, only because and to the extent that the cultivation of skill makes demands on moral character. As for beauty pageants, the thinking continues, they have no plausible connection with desert at all and should be abolished. But all of this is absurdly moralistic. In tests of speed and beauty, the speediest and the most beautiful respectively are those who deserve to succeed. Whether there should be any tests of speed and beauty is another question altogether. To put it another way: one may readily agree that beauty pageants should be abolished without agreeing that truly beautiful people do not (in respect of their beauty) deserve our admiration and recognition.⁴⁴

So the problem is not to understand what it is to deserve something. The problem is not even to understand what it is to deserve

⁴³ The most influential statement of this view is John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 103–4.

⁴⁴ The same point is nicely made by Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 135–47. Sandel focuses on the advantages enjoyed by the (innately) academically talented in university admissions. As Sandel shows, if these advantages of talent are undeserved, it is not because (as Rawls puts it) “the notion of desert seems not to apply to these cases.” One may clearly deserve the rewards of one’s talents, for example, in winning a talent contest. The only question is whether competition for university admissions should be anything like a talent contest, and that depends on the nature and value of universities, not on anything about the concept of desert.

something morally. (There is no harm in thinking of a human life as, in part, a moral test, and in thinking of the morally virtuous person as the person who deserves to pass the test.) The problem, rather, is to understand how punishment can ever be the thing that is deserved, and how faulty wrongdoing comes to be the basis for deserving it. An instructive but fallacious attempt at a solution begins with the observation that there is a conceptual connection between punishment and wrongdoing.⁴⁵ If suffering or deprivation is deliberately inflicted but not as a response to (supposed) wrongdoing, that is not a case of punishment. If the wrongdoing is only supposed, and not real, it is a case of mistaken punishment. This is all true but inconclusive. It does not establish that punishment is ever deserved as a response to wrongdoing, because it does not establish that punishment is ever deserved. It only establishes that punishment can sometimes be mistaken. More importantly, it does not help to explain why, for punishment to be deserved as a response to wrongdoing, the wrongdoer must also be at fault. For there is no relevant conceptual connection between punishment and fault. Punishing a faultless wrongdoer is punishing undeservedly, but it is still punishing. If it were not punishing, it would not be regulated by the principles that regulate punishing, such as the fault principle. So we could not condemn it for violation of those principles. Those deliberately inflicting suffering or deprivation on the faultless could always say: Since I'm not punishing, why should I care which punishments would be deserved? The conceptual connection between punishment and wrongdoing is certainly important, but for the opposite reason. It is important because those who respond to (supposed) wrongdoing by deliberately inflicting suffering or deprivation are thereby automatically made answerable to the principles that govern the infliction of punishment, such as the fault principle. They cannot avoid such principles by claiming not to be punishers. But nor can the same principles be vindicated—shown to be sound—merely by pointing out that an infliction of suffering or deprivation without a supposition of wrongdoing is not punishment.

Those looking for a better defense of the fault principle may see some hope in what I called the elementary moral distinction and, in particular in the proposal implicit in my characterization of tragedy, that better people deserve better lives. We know that there are tragic

⁴⁵ I am here rehashing Anthony Quinton's "On Punishment," *Analysis* 14 (1954): 512.

cases of lives that are badly damaged through disproportionately little fault of those who live them. Equally, there are converse cases of lucky people whose serious faults inflict disproportionately little damage on their lives. Isn't punishment deserved simply as a way of restoring such people to the lives they deserve? There are two related objections to this hypothesis. First, if someone deserves to be punished, he has committed a wrong. Necessarily his life has already been damaged by his having done so. Indeed he may now have, morally speaking, exactly the life that he deserves. So why should we want his life be further damaged by the deliberately inflicted suffering or deprivation of a punitive measure? As if it were not bad enough that we deliberately bring additional suffering and deprivation into the world, we seem to be doing it by kicking someone who is already down. Herein lies the first mystery of deserved punishment. Why would we want to inflict yet more damage on what is, *ex hypothesi*, an already damaged life? Second, just as there are many wrongful actions that are not faulty, so there are many faulty actions that are not wrongful. If the point of deserved punishment were to give vicious people the lives they deserve, then one would expect punishment to be deserved on the strength of fault alone. One would expect the commission of a wrong to be irrelevant, but it is not. If luckily no wrong was committed in spite of one's fault, then luckily no punishment is deserved. The fault principle captures a necessary but not a sufficient condition for being deserving of punishment. Herein lies the second mystery of deserved punishment. Why isn't fault alone sufficient, never mind wrongdoing?

I believe, although I cannot develop the position in any detail here, that one can tackle both mysteries together by returning to another proposal that I made earlier in this essay. In section 2 I explained how wrongful action leaves us with regrets that are hard to expunge and the repression of which is hard to justify. As I said there, not everyone actually experiences the relevant regrets. My point was that experiencing them is rationally appropriate. Our lives should be blemished subjectively because and to the extent that they are blemished objectively. More generally, our lives should feel as good, but only as good, as they are.⁴⁶ This is not, as it stands, a doctrine of

⁴⁶Of course, how a life feels is itself part of how that life is. A life is damaged by the suffering of regrets, even apt regrets. By my doctrine, such a life is itself to be regretted by the person living it. "I regret that I spent so much time regretting what I did" would be an intelligible, if sad, deathbed utterance.

desert. It is not because of some deficiency on the part of the wrongdoer that he should be burdened with regrets for his wrongs. Many wrongdoers, like the captain in *Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co*, emerge without any stain on their characters. But the doctrine that lives should feel as good, but only as good, as they are is nevertheless a doctrine of aptness or fittingness. It is apt or fitting that people, including those with unblemished characters, should suffer for their wrongs. What they should suffer, in the normal case, is regret for the very fact that they committed a wrong.

But the case of a wrongdoer who was at fault in committing a wrong presents special problems. Such a person has already shown himself insufficiently responsive to the reasons against doing as he did. That he was at fault means that he committed the wrong for defeated reasons. He did not even have undefeated reasons to treat the reasons for which he acted as undefeated. In failing to see that the reasons for which he acted were defeated, he was insufficiently responsive to the force of the reasons on the other side, those that made his action wrongful. This rational underresponsiveness also militates against his experiencing, without intervention, the apt measure of regret. The reasons for his regretting his wrong are, after all, the very same reasons to which he was not, when he committed the wrong, sufficiently responsive. They are reasons the force of which, thanks to his fault, he downplays. So the faulty wrongdoer is prone to live a life that feels better than it is. In fact, doubly so. His life is blemished by his wrong and (as we saw at the end of section 3) further blemished by his fault in committing it. His fault tends to make him oblivious to both blemishes. Punishment, assuming it is successful, serves to correct this oblivious misalignment of the subjective with the objective. It gives people who do not regret their faulty wrong (or do not regret it enough) something extra about their faulty wrong to regret. To the extent that they do not regret committing their faulty wrong qua faulty wrong, they regret it instead qua bearer of unwelcome consequences for them. They regret the (other kinds of) suffering and deprivation that constitute their punishment. Here we have, at last, a relevant principle of desert. It is only because of the wrongdoer's deficiency—the fault he displayed in committing the wrong—that the deliberate infliction of such suffering or deprivation upon him in response to the wrong is apt. Had he been free of fault, the apt measure of suffering (the suffering of apt regret for the wrong) would have

been self-administering and would not have called for deliberate infliction by anyone. No punishment, in other words, would have been deserved.

This line of thought provides, or at any rate promises upon adequate elaboration to provide, an integrated solution to our twin mysteries about deserved punishment. It indicates why one would want to inflict yet more damage on what is, *ex hypothesi*, a life already damaged by wrongdoing. It also indicates why wrongdoing, and not only fault, figures in the equation of deserved punishment. Yet it also creates new puzzles of its own. In particular, we may worry about faulty wrongdoers who act out of character. I do not mean those who possess many virtues (say, kindness, generosity, courage, loyalty) but one vice (say, dishonesty). There may be a case for punishing such people less when they commit a vicious wrong, but the case for punishing them less is not that they deserve less punishment for the vicious wrong. Rather, I am thinking of those who act out of character in the sense identified in section 3: those who are normally honest, say, but who were on this one occasion dishonest. These people are not normally underresponsive to the reasons to which they were, on the occasion of their wrong, underresponsive. So, depending on how out of character their faulty action was, they may well recognize, in the wake of their wrongs, the full force of the reasons that they underestimated in committing those wrongs. They may well see their wrong and their fault in the sharpest relief. If so, they are not prone to suffer less regret than is apt. Do they or do they not deserve to be punished?

I tend to think that they represent an intriguing borderline case. Here, briefly, is why. The apt response to faulty wrongdoing, thanks to its doubly blemishing impact upon the life of a wrongdoer, is not the ordinary regret of the faultless wrongdoer. It is a special kind of self-critical regret known as remorse. The remorseful give themselves a hard time for their wrongs, a hard time which they hold themselves to deserve on the model of punishment. In the wake of their remorse, they deserve to be punished less, or in extreme cases not at all. Suppose, for simplicity's sake, we are looking at a case of remorse in which no punishment is now deserved. How do we explain the fact that no punishment is now deserved? One way to do so is to say that the remorseful person never deserved punishment, because without intervention he reacted entirely fittingly to what he did. The alternative way to explain the same result is to say that he did deserve to be punished, but that he was punished enough by the hard time he

already gave himself. Both explanations are intelligible, and both are sometimes given, because remorse lies at the borderline between regret, suffered spontaneously, and punishment, inflicted deliberately. But whichever explanation we prefer, the consideration of remorse undoubtedly belongs at the sentencing stage of the criminal trial. It is true that being at fault and deserving (further) punishment at the law's hands somewhat come apart in the case of the remorseful wrongdoer. But the quantification of the (further) punishment deserved by such a wrongdoer cannot, consistently with the Rule of Law, be built into the law's determination of criminal liability. To make a deduction from punishment for remorse (or indeed for punishments exacted extrajudicially, such as being abandoned by one's spouse), the court must first determine that a criminal wrong has been committed without a legally recognized justification or excuse. Only then can the law legitimately authorize a *prima facie* quantification of the punishment deserved for the offense to which the relevant remorse deduction (and other adjustments) can be applied.

VI

Beyond Meaning and Consequence. Some say: only those who are at fault (= blameworthy) should be punished for their wrongs because punishment expresses or communicates blame. I agree. I also agree with those who say, as Kant says, that faulty wrongdoers have an interest in being punished for their wrongs because the punishment expresses or communicates the fact of their being responsible agents, meaning agents who are capable of having and offering justifications and excuses for what they do.⁴⁷ But these proposals, sound though they are, leave us hanging in mid-air. We still want to know: *Why* does punishment express or communicate these things? Is it an accident of social history? Doffing one's cap, except when done in irony, expresses or communicates deference, but one can readily imagine a culture in which it is a gesture of contempt. Is punishment similar? Could it imaginably, in some place or at some time, be a communication of forgiveness or exoneration rather than blame, or a de-

⁴⁷ This was the theme of my paper "The Mark of Responsibility," *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 23 (2003): 157.

nial rather than an assertion of responsible agency? I tend to think, and many seem to agree, that the expressive link between punishment and blame (and hence between punishment and responsible agency) is less contingent than that between hat-doffing and deference. It is logically possible to punish those whom one does not blame—to make a scapegoat of an innocent person—but at the same time the social meaning of a punitive act as an act of blaming is not just an accident of social history, an ethnographical curiosity, a symbolism grafted onto the logic of punishment by local convention. Rather, this social meaning is somehow the proper social meaning for punishment, one that could only awkwardly or perversely be defied by a dissident civilization.

Why? This is where the deservedness of punishment, as I have explained it, enters the story. It is not true, as many claim, that the reason why only the blameworthy deserve to be punished is that punishment expresses or communicates blame. The truth is the opposite: the reason why punishment expresses or communicates blame is that only the blameworthy deserve to be punished. Admittedly, the fact that punishment expresses or communicates blame is itself a complete reason not to punish the blameless, and a reason with considerable force. Possibly it is this reason that does most of the hard work in making it the law's duty not to attach criminal liability to faultless wrongdoing. Nevertheless, it is a reason that takes its shape from another reason, namely the reason we have (quite apart from what punishment expresses or communicates) to punish only those who deserve to be punished. So even if you are not seduced by my sketchy and tentative proposals above in defense of the view that faultless wrongdoers do not deserve to be punished, there is still this message to take away with you: some such proposals are needed. We need some relatively independent explanation of the deservedness of punishment to explain why, from the *Iliad* to the Koran and the French Revolution to the Cultural Revolution, punishment expresses or communicates blame.

At least from Kant and Hume onward, modern thinkers across many disciplines lost sight of the need for such proposals and lacked the resources to make them. They lacked the resources to make them because they endorsed as an article of faith the *tabula rasa* view of rationality, thought of as progressive and superstition-busting, according to which one always needs some further (new) reason to dwell on

(old) reasons that were not perfectly conformed to at the right time. The old reasons are water under the bridge, the thinking goes; the time for conforming to them is over; we are no longer interested in them unless there is something else that can now be achieved, expressively or instrumentally, by attending to them. Without this something else we cannot even get started with an argument for regret, reparation, remorse, punishment, and similar retrospective responses. Thus modern thinkers came to blows, mostly, about what the something else in question might be. Reduction of net suffering? Restoration of respect? Reform of bad character? All of these and many other considerations can, of course, be relevant to the justification of regret, reparation, remorse, punishment, and so on, and especially to the costly and difficult institutionalization of such responses in the law. Nevertheless they are all, in one way or another, parasitic considerations. One cannot provide adequate foundations for the expressive or the instrumental significance of any of these responses to wrongdoing unless one first understands how and when they are apt responses to wrongdoing quite apart from their expressive or instrumental significance.⁴⁸ In particular, one cannot make a philosophically satisfying expressive or instrumental case for punishment unless one first makes proposals for explaining how and when punishment is deserved.

As well as lacking the resources to make such proposals, many modern thinkers, taking their cues from Kant and Hume, lost sight of the need to do so. Underestimating or even denying the central place of tragedy in the human condition, they saw little or no space for lives that are morally better or worse than the people who live them. Experientially better, yes. So one may indeed ask whether someone has a better life than he deserves, meaning an experientially better life. But

⁴⁸ By "instrumental" here I mean "based on the consequences of punishment." When punishment is successful (that is, when the person whom we attempt to punish is actually punished), it has a certain result, namely that the person punished suffers or is deprived and thereby has something else to regret apart from his wrong. A result of an action is an outcome that is partly constitutive of that action. A consequence is an outcome that is not. An action's results, to the extent that they bear on its value, bear on its intrinsic (noninstrumental) value. That the deservedness of punishment depends on the result of punishment does not show, therefore, that the case for deserved punishment (or for the principle by which it is deserved) is partly instrumental.

morally better, no. Either lives are not objects of moral assessment at all, but only of experiential assessment (in the Hume–Bentham tradition), or else the moral assessment of lives closely tracks the moral assessment of the people who live them (in the Kantian tradition, to which most contemporary virtue ethicists belong *malgré eux*). Either way, the elementary moral distinction takes a back seat. The idea that a life is often morally blemished through no fault of the person living it becomes philosophically alien. Alienated in the process are the idea that the primary or basic type of wrongdoing is faultless wrongdoing and the associated idea that the primary or basic responses to wrongdoing (regret, apology, reparation) are apt responses irrespective of fault. Faultless wrongdoing and the strict liability to repair that is associated with it come to be thought of, mistakenly, as moral oddities in need of special explanation. Meanwhile fault-anticipating wrongs and liability dependent on fault come, mistakenly, to be thought of as the normal or default case, in need of no special explanation.⁴⁹ Hence the need for a special explanation of the fact that punishment expresses or communicates the blameworthiness of the wrongdoer goes increasingly unnoticed. Since punishment (conceptually) is for wrongdoing, and wrongdoing is by default blameworthy, what else would punishment express or communicate but blame? At this point, the main question left over is about the relative importance of expressing or communicating things. Should we deliberately inflict suffering and deprivation merely to express or communicate something? Or should we be prepared to do it only to reduce other suffering and deprivation? In this debate the claim that punishment for faulty wrongdoing is deserved loses its independent role. The deservedness of punishment becomes the output rather than the input of endless arguments about punishment's meanings and consequences

⁴⁹ Bernard Williams saw the importance of this mistake and made sustained efforts to correct it. See especially his *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 174 and following, and "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," in his *Making Sense of Humanity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Alas, Williams misdiagnoses the mistake and ends up reinforcing it. He traces the blameaholics' emphasis on blame to an emphasis on wrongdoing (breach of obligation), which in turn he criticizes. If he had learned the lesson of his own paper "Moral Luck," he would not have made this connection. Not all blameworthy actions are wrongful and not all wrongful actions are blameworthy. An emphasis on wrongdoing does not naturally carry an emphasis upon blame in its wake.

and the relative justification importance of the two. Moral philosophy has lost sight of the need to rely on the deservedness of punishment to explain punishment's meanings and consequences. In the process it has lost sight of the need to explain, in a way that does not depend on punishment's meanings or consequences, why the only actions that deserve to be punished are both wrongful and blameworthy (two different and only very obliquely related properties).⁵⁰

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⁵⁰ Some parts of this paper, in earlier draft, were delivered as a Brendan Francis Brown Lecture at The Catholic University of America in September 2003. Many thanks to Bill Wagner.

THE COMMON GOOD

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NATURAL LAW ARGUMENTS CONCERNING the political order characteristically appeal, at some point or other, to the common good of the political community. To take the clearest example: Aquinas, perhaps the paradigmatic natural law theorist, appeals to the common good in his accounts of the definition of law, of the need for political authority, of the moral requirement to adhere to the dictates issued by political authority, and of the form political authority should take. But while united on the point that arguments for normative political conclusions must take the common good as a principle, natural law theorists have not been united in their understanding of the nature of the common good. The differences among natural law views on the character of the common good are not trivial: they concern such deep issues as whether the common good should be understood as an intrinsic or an instrumental good, and whether the common good should be understood in relation to the good of individuals of that community or solely in relation to the good of the community as a whole. If one aims to develop a natural law account of the political order, then, one cannot remain neutral with respect to the various natural law understandings of the common good, for these various understandings are almost certain to yield differing conclusions on the source, functions, and limits of political authority.

I

We can, I think, agree on some general formal considerations concerning the nature of the common good without presupposing a particular account of what the common good is; these formal considerations constrain the possible candidate conceptions and will help to determine which of the candidate conceptions is ultimately the most

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plausible. Not surprisingly, these considerations concern two features of the common good: its *goodness* and its *commonness*.

The notion that the common good must be good is meant to stand in place of a couple of theses concerning the way that the concept of the common good functions in governing political deliberation and in underwriting allegiance to the outcomes of that deliberation. Ends advanced by citizens in political deliberation as appropriate aims of state action are in fact such only if they can be brought under the description "necessary or useful to promoting, protecting, or honoring the common good." Given that political action is appropriately regulated by the aim of the common good, it seems that if we are not to disconnect political deliberation from the grounds for adherence to the outcomes of that deliberation, we need to say that the common good is something to which agents have good reasons to adhere. That the common good is the end regulating political deliberation and the source of allegiance to the outcomes of correct political deliberation generates both an epistemological and a practical constraint on theories of the content of the common good. The epistemological constraint is that inasmuch as the common good serves as a starting point for political deliberation, it must be something to which we can have some sort of cognitive access. The practical constraint is that a conception of the common good should be something that the citizen has—I will put it as vaguely as possible here—very strong reasons to pursue and to promote. I will try to be loose about this, noting only that it would be an unfortunate theory of the content of the common good that did not support a view in which citizens should have allegiance to the common good thus understood.

The other desideratum that a conception of the common good must satisfy is that it must be common. Put roughly, the idea is that the common good is common only if it is an end that is shared by reasonable agents within the political community. One might wonder whether this desideratum can serve in any way to differentiate the merits of competing conceptions of the common good: surely any barely plausible conception of the common good will meet this constraint. But it seems to me that the allegedly "common" character of certain conceptions of the common good evaporates upon closer inspection or, at the very least, is attenuated.

What I have in mind is what we might think of as a Hobbesian conception of the common good. Recall the situation that Hobbes describes as the “natural condition of mankind.” In the natural condition of mankind, human agents are predominantly self-interested, roughly equal in mental and physical capacities, in a condition of moderate scarcity, and lacking any coercive political authorities. This condition, says Hobbes, is guaranteed to be a state of war, and the lives of the denizens of the state of nature terrible and short. Hobbes holds, though, that even given the radically disparate aims of those in the state of nature, they must come to realize that peace is good, and they will recognize that the only way to achieve peace is to contract together to institute a nearly absolute political authority, the sovereign, which has the right and power to apprehend and punish all those who engage in behavior that threatens the peace. Now, do we not have adequate grounds to hold that in Hobbes’s natural law view there is a common good—peace—which serves as the central premise for subsequent reasoning about the source, nature, and form of political authority?

There is surely some sense in which peace is a common good for Hobbesian agents, but it is a very weak sense. The reason is that, appearances aside, those in the state of nature do not aim at a common end. What each party in the state of nature wants, given Hobbes’s description of those agents, is not peace as such, or peace for all of us in the state of nature, but rather that he himself be in a state of peace. That is, the state of affairs aimed at by each party has an essential self-reference; it is a wholly agent-relative end. At no point does the Hobbesian agent have a reason to promote the condition in which all agents are in a state of peace; he has a reason only to promote the condition in which he is in a state of peace.¹ If all agents act in this way, Hobbes thinks, general peace will prevail. But there is no robust

¹ Some writers think that Hobbesian agents, either in accepting the laws of nature or in entering the covenant to obey the sovereign, are transformed such that they do share ends in this way. This is at least a plausible reading of Hobbes, though it raises different argumentative difficulties for him. At any rate, “Hobbesian” is meant here to indicate a type of view of the common good, of which Hobbes’s actual view may or may not be an example.

sense in which the general peace is a common good for Hobbesian agents.²

I don't wish here to give the impression that Hobbesian theories of political authority must be wrong just because they fail to offer a robust account of the common good. But—and this will be no surprise, I suppose—the failure to offer such a robust account would both make Hobbes's view a deviant natural law account of political authority and render the task of explaining how reasonable agents would concur on the need to institute and adhere to the dictates of political authority far more difficult. I will, then, treat it as a point in favor of a conception of the common good that it fulfill the "commonness" desideratum more fully than a Hobbesian conception does.

II

I will call the three main candidate conceptions of the common good within the natural law tradition the "instrumentalist," the "distinctive good," and the "aggregative" conceptions of the common good. On the instrumentalist view, the common good consists in the presence of those conditions that are necessary or helpful means for members of that community to realize their own worthwhile ends. On the distinctive good view, the common good consists in the obtaining of some intrinsically good state of affairs that is literally the good of the community as a whole (as opposed to simply the goods of the members of that community). On the aggregative view, the common good consists in the realization of some set of individual intrinsic goods, characteristically the goods of all (and only) those persons that are members of the political community in question.

Given the account of formal considerations concerning theories of the common good, it is clear that the relative success of these various views will depend in large measure on the extent to which they satisfy these formal considerations. I will argue in favor of the aggregative conception in this way: it seems to me that while the aggregative conception can satisfy on its own the goodness and commonness constraints on theories of the common good, the instrumentalist and

²I discuss this Hobbesian case with respect to the good of community in *Natural Law and Practical Rationality* (hereafter, "*Practical Rationality*") (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 126–7.

distinctive good conceptions gain their plausibility only by way of the aggregative conception.

III

The case for the aggregative conception of the common good is a simple and straightforward one. Consider any individual A within a political community, and consider the state of affairs in which A is flourishing—that is, is enjoying the goods that genuinely make human life go well. That state of affairs is a reason for action that members of the political community should acknowledge: in the crafting of law or policy, the effect that the proposed law or policy would have on A's flourishing is relevant with respect to that law or policy. That a law or policy would promote A's good is a reason to adopt it; that a law or policy would thwart A's good is reason to reject it.³ There may be other considerations, of course, that outweigh or in some way exclude the reason to adopt or reject the law or policy that is based on its effect on A's good. But that does not call into question the fundamental relevance of A's good in political matters.

So the state of affairs in which A is flourishing is a fundamental reason for political action within A's political community. Now consider the state of affairs in which A and one other individual B are flourishing. The state of affairs in which A and B are both flourishing is an even stronger reason for political action and in the most straightforward way: the state of affairs *A and B are flourishing* includes all that is of importance in the state of affairs *A is flourishing* and more as well. To construct the normative ideal of the aggregative common good, one merely carries out this process of inclusion to its limit, including all of the goods of the members of a political community in the common good of that political community. The common good aggregatively conceived is that state of affairs in which all of the members of a political community are fully flourishing.

There is nothing epistemologically suspect about the aggregative common good. Given the general human capacity to grasp the fundamental elements of well-being, there can be little objection on such grounds: for, on the aggregative view, the idea of the common good is

³This is of course fully incompatible with the point that a great deal of one's flourishing cannot be directly brought about through law or policy.

built upon the idea of well-being, upon the theory of prudential value. There surely can be no epistemological objection to this conception within natural law thought, since central to natural law thought is the development of an account of the individual's good; and since, as far as I can tell, every normative political theory develops or at least assumes a conception of individual well-being, a conception of the common good construed aggregatively does not on any view add an epistemological burden to political thought that was not already present.

Nor can there be a basis for objection on the grounds that the aggregative common good is insufficiently common. While the common good is built up out of individuals' goods, the common good thus conceived is the same for all citizens: while constituted by individual goods, all reasonable agents should recognize it as an end worth seeking, and under the same description. It is not a Hobbesian common good, which is simply the result of various agents' realizing the necessary conditions for promoting their own ends. When asked why a Hobbesian common good is worth pursuing, reasonable agents will answer differently: A will answer that it serves A's good, B that it serves B's good, and so forth. When asked why the aggregative common good is worth pursuing, reasonable agents will give the same answer: A will answer that it serves A's good and B's good and C's good, and so on, B that it serves A's good and B's good and C's good, and so on, and so forth. That the "material" of the common good is individuals' goods does not make the aggregative common good less than common.⁴

Nor can there be a basis for objection on account of the inability of this conception of the common good to serve the role assigned by the natural law account to conceptions of the common good—that is, to provide a normatively weighty basis from which we can account for the law's authority. It seems clear that if one accepts the point that an individual's good provides all members of the political community with a reason for action, the aggregative common good, which includes the goods of all members of the political community, will be a very strong reason for action indeed.

⁴ Or so I say; but see below the response that a defender of the distinctive good conception might offer.

IV

John Finnis's account of the common good identifies it with a broad obtaining of states of affairs that are instrumentally valuable for the flourishing of the citizens of the political community.⁵ Finnis holds that the common good is constituted by "the whole ensemble of material and other conditions, including forms of collaboration, that tend to favour, facilitate, and foster the realization of each individual [in that community] of his or her personal development."⁶ While on Finnis's view, the common good is good only instrumentally, that is, as a means to the promotion of the genuine goods that citizens can participate in, we should not (as the definition makes clear) confine the common good's character only to material means: the common good also includes the preservation of certain institutions (for example, marriage) as well as a moral environment that is conducive to citizens' flourishing.⁷

Surely the instrumentalist picture meets the epistemological constraint: if we can, as the aggregative conception assumes, say something informative about the content of the human good, we should be able to say something informative about certain sorts of conditions in which citizens are better equipped to pursue their good. But it seems to me that its response to the questions of allegiance and commonness shows that the instrumentalist account is parasitic upon the aggregative conception.

Why should we be interested in promoting the common good instrumentally conceived? There are two answers suggested in Finnis's work. The first is implausible and *ad hoc*. The second indicates that the normative force of the common good instrumentally conceived

⁵ Finnis also ascribes this conception of the common good to Aquinas; for critique, see Michael Pakaluk, "Is the Common Good of Political Society Limited and Instrumental?" *Review of Metaphysics* 55 (2001): 57–94.

⁶ John Finnis, "Natural Law Theory and Limited Government" (hereafter, "Limited Government"), in *Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality*, ed. Robert George (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 5; see also Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (hereafter, "Natural Law") (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 147. In providing such an account he takes himself to be following John XXIII, *Mater et Magistra* (Chicago: Discoveries Press, 1962), §65, in which the common good is said to be "the sum total of those conditions of social living whereby men are enabled more fully and readily to achieve their perfection."

⁷ See also Robert George, *Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

flows from the normative force of the common good aggregatively conceived.

In order to understand one of the answers that Finnis might offer for the reason to promote the common good, we need to say a few words about what he understands the structure of correct practical thinking to be. On his view, the first principles of practical reasoning are a number of basic goods, things that are worth pursuing for their own sakes.⁸ These basic goods are aspects of agents' well-being, ways that agents are made better-off. What governs our choices and commitments with respect to plans of action to respond to these goods are principles of practical reasonableness, which rule out certain possible plans of action or ways of forming plans of action on the basis that acting or choosing in these ways is incompatible with full practical reasonableness.⁹ Now, Finnis holds that one of these principles of practical reasonableness is that agents are bound to favor and foster the common goods of their communities.¹⁰ If, then, the common good of the political community is this complex instrumental good, then we might answer the allegiance question by appealing to the principle of practical reasonableness that agents are bound in reason to foster the common good of their communities, including their political communities.

The immediate question to be asked is, of course, what is the warrant for the principle of practical reasonableness that the good of one's communities is to be fostered. His official view is that the principles of practical reasonableness are self-evident and underivable. I take him to be claiming something like the following: one who understands the nature of the basic goods will immediately recognize that these principles specify (and thereby rule out) inappropriate re-

⁸ Finnis's list in *Natural Law* includes life, knowledge, aesthetic experience, play, practical reasonableness, friendship and community, and religion (86–90). In later writings he has altered his account in a couple of important ways: (i) he has widened play to include the skillful performances involved in work; and (ii) he has included as a distinct form of good the special form of interpersonal communion he calls “the marital good.”

⁹ Finnis's list in *Natural Law* includes requirements to form a coherent life plan, to exhibit appropriate commitment to and detachment from that plan, to exhibit no arbitrary preferences among the basic goods, to exhibit no arbitrary preferences among persons that can participate in these goods, to act efficiently within the constraints set by the other principles, to respect every basic good in every act, to foster the common good of one's communities, and to follow one's conscience (103–26).

¹⁰ Finnis, *Natural Law*, 125.

sponses to these goods. Thus, not every minimally rational agent will affirm these principles: those agents that have a false view of the features of the basic goods will tend to affirm claims that are in tension with the correct principles of practical reasonableness. Thus, in defending these principles, Finnis's main task is to lay bare the features of the basic goods to which these principles specify appropriate responses and to criticize rival conceptions of the basic goods.¹¹ But we get nothing like this sort of defense of the principle requiring the fostering of the common good of one's communities; in fact, we get no defense of it at all. It is simply laid down as a principle of practical reasonableness. Perhaps this manner of proceeding would not be objectionable if the defense of it were obvious or the principle itself so evident that it needed no amplification. But neither of these is the case. First, the characteristic defense of principles of practical reasonableness involves an appeal to the features of basic goods: after all, these are the first principles of practical reasoning, from which all practical warrant flows. But if Finnis means to use this principle to underwrite a rational requirement to promote the common good of the political community, then another line of defense will have to be found for the common good of the political community is by Finnis's lights an instrumental, not a basic, good. This is highly problematic since no practical thought is reasonably governed by reference to instrumental goods alone; it is reasonably governed only by the intrinsic goods, specified or unspecified, to which the instrumental goods can serve as instruments. Second, the principle is far from evident. As a requirement of practical reasonableness, not just a principle stating what is a basic good, it is supposed to say more than that being in community with others is a good thing. This much is given by Finnis's affirming that friendship and community are basic goods.¹² But once we go beyond this weaker claim, we need to know what the strength and scope of the requirement are supposed to be. Again, if it is to include communities where the common good is merely instrumental,

¹¹ To take just a couple of examples: in arguing for a principle of impartiality among those that can enjoy the basic goods, Finnis emphasizes the agent-neutral character of the basic goods; and in arguing for the claim that it is always wrong to intend to destroy an instance of a basic good for the sake of a distinct instance of a basic good, he argues that the rejection of the view is predicated on the commensurability of these instances of basic good, but that in fact distinct instances of basic good are incommensurable. See Finnis, *Natural Law*, 106–9, 118–25.

¹² Finnis, *Natural Law*, 88.

we should want to know a lot more about how and why this principle controls our practical reasoning.

The placement of the principle concerning the fostering of the common good of one's communities strikes me as mysterious within the wider context of Finnis's views on the theory of practical reasonableness, and I thus think that an appeal to this principle is not a helpful way to explain the allegiance that reasonable citizens will have to the common good instrumentally conceived. There is, however, a far more straightforward way to explain the allegiance owed to the common good instrumentally conceived. The extent to which we should be interested in any instrumental good is the extent to which we are interested in the intrinsic good to which it is an instrument. It seems, then, that if we are to understand the allegiance owed to the common good instrumentally conceived, we will have to appeal to the good to which the common good instrumentally conceived is instrumental. Given Finnis's description of the common good as the conditions that the individuals of that community can draw upon in order to flourish, it appears that it is the overall flourishing of citizens in community that provides the normative force of the common good instrumentally conceived. But if that is what provides it, then I do not see the advantage in offering an instrumentalist conception of the common good, for the aggregative conception in the background is doing all of the normative work.

A similar point can be made with respect to the commonness desideratum. Whether or not the common good instrumentally conceived is genuinely common or common only in (for example) a Hobbesian way is going to depend on the end to which that good is instrumental. If the reason that I should be interested in the common good instrumentally conceived is that its realization enables me to promote my own good, and the reason that you should be interested in the common good instrumentally conceived is that its realization enables you to promote your own good, then in promoting the common good thus conceived we do not aim at a common end: what each of us is really aiming at is just that aspect of the common good that is good for each of us individually. Only by seeing the common good instrumentally conceived as for the sake of something like the common good conceived aggregatively can its commonness be validated. But, again, if we can confidently say that the instrumentalist account fulfills the commonness desideratum only by connecting that account to the aggregative conception, there seems to be strong reason to affirm

an aggregative rather than an instrumentalist conception of the common good.

My main line of argument for the superiority of the aggregative to the instrumentalist conception of the common good is, then, that the instrumentalist view is parasitic on the aggregative conception. Now, I am not sure that a defender of the instrumentalist view need deny this. What the defender of such a view would have to go on to say is that there are distinct reasons to keep with the instrumentalist conception. The defender of the instrumentalist conception can admit, that is, that with respect to the issues of normative force and commonness the instrumentalist view leans on the aggregative view, while holding that there are other grounds to identify the common good of the political community in the instrumentalist way.

Let's return to Finnis. In *Natural Law and Natural Rights* he vacillates between an aggregative and an instrumentalist conception of the common good of the political community, while in later work he explicitly adopts the instrumentalist conception. As far as I can tell, he offers two reasons for adopting the instrumentalist view: first, that the common good aggregatively conceived is not a realizable end; and second, that the common good instrumentally conceived is able to provide an account of limited government. But it seems to me that neither of these arguments provides grounds to move from the aggregative to the instrumentalist view.

Here is the realizability argument.

If the object, point, or common good of the political community were indeed a self-sufficient life, and if self-sufficiency (*autarcheia*) were indeed what Aristotle defines it to be—a life lacking in nothing, of complete fulfillment—then we would have to say that the political community has a point it cannot hope to achieve, a common good utterly beyond its reach.¹³

The argument is, as it stands, unsatisfactory. The first thing to be said in response is that the conception of the common good that Finnis offers—that whole set of material conditions, and so forth—is utterly beyond the reach of the political community as well. We might think about it this way. What would it be for the common good in the instrumental sense to be wholly realized? Something like the following: that for every reasonable aim a citizen might have, the only thing that would prevent the citizen from achieving that end would be that

¹³ Finnis, "Limited Government," 7.

citizen's lack of a will to achieve it. This is far beyond the reach of any political community. Now, the response might be: surely it cannot be achieved, but it can be achieved to a greater extent than the aggregative common good can be achieved. I am not sure that this is true—I am not sure that the comparison involved makes much sense—but even if it were, it would not seem to me to be that great an objection. Like the notion of an individual's good, the notion of the common good serves as a kind of regulative ideal—perhaps not something realizable in practice but nevertheless the starting point for deliberation.¹⁴

The other main argument that Finnis puts forward in favor of the instrumentalist conception is that this conception seems better suited to providing a principled rationale for limited government. Finnis seems to understand by “limited government” a government whose actions are constrained not only by the basic principles of natural practical reasonableness, which principles apply to all agents, but also by principles of antipaternalism and subsidiarity. There are a variety of understandings of antipaternalism, some of which Finnis would reject. At the very least, though, antipaternalism is the principle that political authority is not to be exercised solely in order to prevent a competent agent from acting unreasonably. Subsidiarity, the other constraint on government Finnis wishes to defend, is the principle of Catholic social thought that political authority is not to take over the provision of goods that lower-level associations are able to provide for themselves.¹⁵ But if one were to affirm the aggregative conception of the common good, it might be thought that one would find oneself committed to the advocating of (for example) criminalization of self-regarding immoral behavior simply as such—not because of further undesirable social effects, including the deterioration of a moral environment in which vice is discouraged but simply because acting in a practically unreasonable way is bad for the agent that acts in that way and thus damaging to the aggregative common good. Further, the aggregative conception seems to leave inadequate room for subsidiarity, according to which the proper role of govern-

¹⁴ This view of the common good as ideal is also articulated in Clarke E. Cochran, “Yves R. Simon and ‘the Common Good’: A Note on the Concept,” *Ethics* 88 (1978): 229–39 at 236, where Cochran ascribes this conception of the common good to Simon.

¹⁵ For its classic formulation, see Pope Pius XI's *Quadragesimo Anno*, in *Contemporary Catholic Social Teaching* (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1991 [first published 1931]), §79.

ment is that of "assisting individuals and groups to co-ordinate their activities for the objectives and commitments they have chosen, and to do so in ways consistent with the other aspects of the common good of the political community."¹⁶ The instrumentalist view is better suited to a conception of government in which government cannot be simply paternalistic and cannot, even in principle, take over the tasks of lower-level associations. For if the aim of political authority is to promote the common good, and the common good is in principle restricted to instrumental goods, political authority cannot reach beyond the provision of instrumental goods in a way that would justify paternalism or take away the proper tasks of individuals or groups.

All of this strikes me as the wrong way around. The attractiveness of the antipaternalist and subsidiarity principles should be explicable in terms of the good; we should not have to pare down the theory of the good in order to generate an argument against paternalism and for subsidiarity. A theory of the common good should not have to be rigged in order to generate these two results; even if in developing a theory of the common good the direction of our inquiry is shaped by antipaternalist and prosubsidiarity intuitions, our finished account should provide some explanation from the nature of the good to the antipaternalist and prosubsidiarity principles. Indeed, it seems pretty clear that whether or not one should accept antipaternalist and prosubsidiarity principles as the main story about political authority's function will depend on one's theory of intrinsic goods, those goods that constitute the aggregative common good.

Here's an example that might make this clear. Suppose that one is firmly committed to a Benthamite understanding of the good—that all goods are, at root, individual and reducible to pleasure absent pain. The only things worth pursuing on this view are pleasures, and the only things worth avoiding are pains. Now it seems to me that a Benthamite account of the political order would have very little use for the antipaternalism and prosubsidiarity principles. If the only things of value are pleasures and pains, what does it matter whether they are provided through paternalistic measures by the state? If the only things of value are pleasures and pains, what does it matter whether they are provided by political institutions, or by families, or trade unions, or individuals? What difference could it possibly make? A Benthamite could support nonpaternalism or subsidiarity as

¹⁶ Finnis, "Limited Government," 6.

empirical generalizations about the best means to generate pleasures and avoid pains. But for the Benthamite to have an in principle preference for lower-level associations producing pleasures and avoiding pains for themselves would be bizarre. If a Benthamite declared that the common good of the political community should not be understood in terms of pleasure and pain but in terms of the conditions by which individuals can realize for themselves pleasures and avoid for themselves pains, we would have very little idea what this person was up to. The conception of intrinsic good that the Benthamite is working with would make any in principle appeal to nonpaternalism and subsidiarity unintelligible.

What makes the imagined Benthamite's appeal to antipaternalist and prosubsidiarity principles unintelligible is Bentham's theory of intrinsic goods. Similarly, we might say, what would make affirmation of antipaternalism and prosubsidiarity principles intelligible is a different theory of intrinsic goods. Finnis's theory of basic goods is sufficiently rich that—unlike on Bentham's view—many of the goods that he affirms include agent's deliberations, judgments, choices, and actions. One could offer some support for the antipaternalism and prosubsidiarity principles by appeal to one or another of these basic goods. While I cannot of course undertake to provide a satisfactory account here, the following are sketches of the sort of argument that one might offer against paternalism or on behalf of subsidiarity from an account of intrinsic goods. One could offer at least a weak antipaternalist rationale on the basis of there being a *prima facie* reason against any legal restriction on conduct: that there is a good involved in deliberating one's way to a practical conclusion, and the existence of a legal rule cuts off or at the very least restricts the relevant range of deliberation. (A good—though by no means the only—reason for not having legal rules against [for example] all lying is that it is a good thing to reach and act on the deliberative conclusion not to lie without having legal apparatus intruding on one's practical thinking.) One could offer at least a weak prosubsidiarity rationale on the basis of there being a *prima facie* reason against stripping from individuals the tasks that they can fulfill on their own: that there is a good involved in deliberation and judgment, in intelligent, challenging work, and so forth.¹⁷

Now, a defender of the instrumentalist view might say that this is something like what he had in mind all along—that while the common good aggregatively conceived provides for the normative force and

the commonness of the common good, sound practical thinking governed by the features of the aggregative common good indicates that the common good instrumentally conceived is the uniquely appropriate proximate ideal for political deliberation and action. Once we see clearly the nature of the aggregative common good, we will see that promoting and honoring it requires that we restrict ourselves to the instrumental common good as the object of political deliberation and action. If this turns out to be so, then the defender of the aggregative view would have no objection. But it seems to me that we have grounds to doubt that things will turn out so neatly. Surely there will be occasions when the difficult questions of the following sort arise, not just as matters of idle speculation but as serious practical issues: "Even if deliberative freedom is important, aren't some self-regarding actions so evil or debasing that they are the appropriate object of state action, even apart from their effects on specific other-regarding obligations or on the moral environment more generally?" Or: "Even if there are goods realized through letting functions be carried out at lower levels, are there not other goods—perhaps goods of community—that are instantiated or at least fostered by placing citizens 'in the same boat,' as it were?" These are questions that cannot be answered at the level of the instrumental common good; we would have to turn back to the aggregative common good, the good of persons in community, to have a hope of answering them reasonably and assessing their relevance for particular political decisions. No matter how much we can rely on the instrumental conception of the common good in ordinary political thinking, the aggregative conception will retain at least its background influence and almost certainly will on some occasions have to be relied upon more directly in dealing with difficult questions about the appropriate exercise of political authority.

V

The instrumental conception of the common good yields to the aggregative conception. But there is a rival understanding of the

¹⁷ See, for a nice discussion, Christopher Wolfe's "Subsidiarity: The 'Other' Ground of Limited Government," in *Catholicism, Liberalism, and Communitarianism*, ed. Kenneth Grasso, Gerard Bradley, and Robert Hunt (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), 81–96.

common good that, like the aggregative conception, understands the common good in terms of intrinsic rather than instrumental goodness. What distinguishes this rival conception—what I call a “distinctive good” view—is that it holds that the common good is not composed out of the various goods of the members of that community. Rather, the good is the good of the community as a whole, what perfects the political community as such.

I think that Aquinas offers this sort of picture of the common good, though I admit that his remarks on the nature of the common good of the political community are not completely unambiguous. As I understand him, for Aquinas the common good consists of “justice and peace,”¹⁸ where justice and peace are conditions of the community entire. Justice consists in that state of the community by which a proper relation among persons, a certain kind of equality, is preserved.¹⁹ Peace consists both in the absence of discord among citizens and the presence of a proper ordering among them.²⁰ A political community’s being in good condition as a whole consists in its being just and well-ordered.²¹

Now, the common good thus conceived does seem to be sufficiently accessible to be an object of political deliberation. Aquinas does think that we can have access to truths of natural justice and that we can concern ourselves with the most appropriate way to de-

¹⁸ St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (hereafter, “ST”) I-II, q. 96, a. 3. Aquinas also refers to justice as part of the common good at ST I-II, q. 19, a. 10 and II-II, q. 33, a. 6; he refers to peace as “the good of the multitude” at ST I, q. 103, a. 2, obj. 1 (not denied), and calls the peace of the political community good in itself (and presumably a common good) at ST II-II, q. 123, a. 5, ad 3.

¹⁹ ST II-II, q. 57, a. 1.

²⁰ ST II-II, q. 29, a. 1; in holding that peace goes beyond absence of discord to the presence of an ordering within the political community, Aquinas takes himself to be following Augustine, who calls the peace of the community the “tranquility of order.” See St. Augustine, *City of God*, trans. Henry Bettenson (New York: Penguin, 1972), 870.

²¹ For a fuller discussion of Aquinas’s account of the common good, see my “Consent, Custom, and the Common Good in Aquinas’s Account of Political Authority,” *Review of Politics* 59 (1997): 323–50 at 335–43, and John Finnis, “Public Good: The Specifically Political Common Good in Aquinas,” in *Natural Law and Moral Inquiry: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Politics in the Work of Germain Grisez*, ed. Robert George (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998), 174–209.

termine the particulars of these principles of justice for the concrete circumstances of common life in which we find ourselves. These goods might be taken to be common in a strong sense: as perfecting the whole community, they belong to no one in particular but to the community itself. I want to argue, though, that the distinctive good conception runs into difficulty with respect to the allegiance criterion. In order to see how it runs into difficulty, though, we need to get clearer on the different ways that one might understand the distinctive good view.

To get clearer on the different understandings that one might offer of the distinctive good view, let us consider briefly an objection that might be leveled against aggregative conceptions of the common good. There is a straightforward sense in which the aggregative view is individualistic: for on that view the common good is made up of the goods of individuals.²² But such conceptions are deeply flawed, one might argue, because they fail to recognize the importance of irreducibly social goods, goods that involve not one agent but two or many. The aggregative conception, by not including these irreducibly social goods in the common good of the political community, is both at odds with the natural law tradition and implausible in itself. The distinctive good conception, by contrast, affirms the possibility of irreducibly social goods; indeed, its key thesis is just that the common good is one of these irreducibly social goods.

It seems to me important, though, to recognize that there is more than one way that a good can be said to be social; and to get clear on the way that the distinctive good view is supposed to be superior to the aggregative conception, we need to make explicit at least two of these senses. Consider a statement of the form "x is good for y," where x ranges over states of affairs and y ranges over "parties," where a party is a person, a group of persons, or an institution whose

²² It should go without saying that the individualism of the aggregative conception is not egoism. One often finds, though, in accounts of distinctive good conceptions of the common good arguments that seem to be of the form: if one rejects the distinctive good conception of the common good, one must be going in for a conception of the common good as mere means to one's own private good; but this latter conception of the common good is absurd, vicious, a form of egoism; therefore, and so forth. But there is nothing remotely egoistic about the aggregative conception of the common good.

offices are occupied by persons. Now, suppose that one were to claim that *x* is an irreducibly social good. There are at least two ways that this claim could be understood. First, it could mean that the state of affairs *x* is irreducibly social. For *x* to be irreducibly social is, roughly, for *x* to involve more than one person (that is the “social” part), and for *x* not to be divisible into two or more states of affairs that do not include all of the persons involved in *x* (that is the “irreducible” part). Second, it could mean that party *y* is irreducibly social. Again, for *y* to be irreducibly social is, roughly, for *y* to involve more than one person and for *y* not to be divisible into two or more parties that do not include more than one person. To claim that *x* is an irreducibly social good is therefore an ambiguous claim: it can mean either that the good itself is social (this is the first sense) or that the being that is made better off by *x*’s obtaining is a social unity (this is the second sense).

Given these clarifications, it cannot be a point against the aggregative conception of the common good that that conception rejects the existence of goods that are social in the first sense while the distinctive good conception affirms the existence of goods that are social in the first sense. Most natural law theorists, including myself, hold that (for example) friendship and community are basic goods, but these goods are irreducibly social in the first sense of that notion: the goods of friendship and community cannot be broken down into states of affairs that are asocial.²³ The aggregative view, then, would include within its conception of the common good goods that are irreducibly social in the first sense, insofar as these irreducibly social goods are aspects of the fulfillment of individual persons.

Indeed, it seems to me that a number of defenders of the distinctive good view affirm the thesis that while the common good perfects the community as such, the practical force of the common good arises from its role in perfecting individual members of the community. As I mentioned, on Aquinas’s view the common good consists of justice and peace, which perfects the community as a whole. But if I understand his view of the relationship between an individual and the common good of that individual’s political community correctly, the individual’s good includes not just his private good but the broader goods

²³ There would be trouble for the natural law theorist that denied the existence of goods irreducibly social in this sense, though, but defenders of such a position are few and far between.

of family and political community, and Aquinas understands the allegiance claimed by the common good in terms of its place in one's own overall good.²⁴ Recent advocates of distinctive good views like Aquinas's have often asserted that the common good is common through its perfecting the community as a whole while perfecting each individual member of that community. Louis Dupré endorses the "classical definition" of the common good as "a good proper to, and attainable only by, the community, yet individually shared by its members."²⁵ When Ralph McInerny emphasizes the "shareability" of the common good, he is drawing our attention to the fact that the realization of the common good is something that perfects each member of that community.²⁶

Now, if the defenders of the distinctive good view want to say nothing more than that the common good is irreducibly social but worthy of pursuit as a constituent of the good of individual members of that community, then it seems to me that the defender of the aggregative view can affirm this claim as well. One might think, on the basis of the agreement between the aggregative and the distinctive good view on this point, that we have reached an argumentative impasse between these two views. But that does not seem to me to be correct. First: if we affirm that the obtaining of the common good is a constituent of the good of each and every member of the political community, we still have to provide an account of what the defender of the distinctive good view wants to say about the source of allegiance to the common good. Does the defender of the distinctive good view want to say that for each member of the political community it is the contribution to his own good that makes pursuit of the common good worth carrying out? Or does the defender of this view want to say that for each member of the political community it is the contribution not only to his own good but to the good of the other members of the political community as well that makes the common good something to be promoted by him? If the former option is chosen, then it looks like the distinctive good theorist's account of the common good has become

²⁴ For relevant texts see *ST* I-II, q. 19, a. 10; II-II, q. 26, a. 3; II-II, q. 26, a. 4, ad 3; II-II, q. 31, a. 3, ad 2; and II-II, q. 47, a. 10.

²⁵ Louis Dupré, "The Common Good and the Open Society," *Review of Politics* 55 (1993): 687-712 at 687.

²⁶ Ralph McInerny, "The Primacy of the Common Good," in *Art and Prudence: Studies in the Thought of Jacques Maritain* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 77-91 at 90.

Hobbesian. It may be a logical truth that the common good is shared by members of the political community; it would be, on this view, a logical impossibility for me to gain the benefits of the common good's being instantiated without others' gaining them as well. But the end of my actions would be just the promotion of a just, peaceful order for myself; it is at my perfection alone that my actions are aimed. We have thus lost an important element of the commonness of the common good, that it should be shared as an end by reasonable agents within the political community. Further, it is not clear what rationale one is to employ here to show that while one's own good is an appropriate object of political action, the good of other citizens is not.

Suppose, on the other hand, that the defender of this version of the distinctive good view allowed that it is not only insofar as the common good perfects oneself, but also insofar as it perfects the fellow members of one's political community, that this good is a reasonable object of pursuit. On this reading of the distinctive good view, what would separate the defender of the distinctive good view from the defender of the aggregative view would be only the scope of their accounts of the content of the common good: the defender of the distinctive good view would hold that only justice and peace—conceived as perfecting each member of the political community—should be included within the common good, while the defender of the aggregative view would hold that not only justice and peace but also the non-social (and even social but nonpolitical) goods of each and every member of the political community should be included within the common good as well. Given that the difference between these views is only one of scope, there seems to be a powerful argument for preferring the aggregative view to this version of the distinctive good view: since other goods besides the distinctive common good of justice and peace are reasons for action or grounds for the community to make one decision rather than another, the common good aggregatively conceived provides all of the reasons for allegiance that this distinctive good view provides, and more as well. It has a greater claim to guide action than this version of the distinctive good view can offer, and thus it would be an unmotivated watering down of the common good aggregatively conceived to affirm this understanding of the distinctive good position.

When the source of the allegiance to the common good as distinctive good is held to be its status as a constituent of individual members' goods, the distinctive good conception of the common good

places itself into a sort of direct competition with the aggregative conception that the distinctive good view cannot win. It would avoid this sort of direct competition by affirming that it is the common good's status as an irreducible social good of the second type that provides, on its own, the source of members' reasonable allegiance to the common good. On this latter reading, the idea is not that the community's being just and peaceful is a part of each and every member's good and therefore part of the common good; rather, the idea is that the state of justice and peace is good for the community as a whole: it perfects a body of persons organized politically. It is therefore—and without necessary recourse to additional premises—an end that members of the political community have reason to pursue and promote. There is thus a sharp contrast between this view and the aggregative view: the aggregative view understands the common good wholly in terms of what fulfills individual persons, while this version of the distinctive good view understands the common good wholly in terms of what fulfills the political community as a social unit.

One more reconciliation-minded than myself might at this point suggest that the common good consists both in the goods of individual persons and in social goods in this latter sense. If it were agreed that it makes sense to speak of such distinctive goods and that these distinctive goods are as such fundamentally relevant to reasonable action, then one could run an arbitrariness argument against an aggregative view that affirms goods that fulfill persons but not goods that fulfill irreducible social units: it would be arbitrary to allow the former but not the latter into one's conception of the common good if both are fundamentally relevant to deliberation. But it seems to me that we should reject the fundamental relevance to deliberation of this kind of irreducibly social good.

My ground for saying that we should reject the fundamental relevance to deliberation of irreducibly social goods in this sense is *not* that it is not meaningful to ascribe irreducibly social goodness to certain states of affairs. One can speak of a team's good condition, or a university's, or a chess club's, and one can talk about what is good for a team or university or club in ways that can be understood only by appeal to this irreducibly social goodness. Moreover, such statements can be true: it is true (for example) that a university's having intelligent faculty, motivated students, well-designed facilities, and wealthy and nostalgic alumni is good for that institution. So claims about certain states being good for some social units—such as the claim that

the state of justice and peace is good for the political community as a whole—can be intelligible and correct. But this concession to the distinctive good view does not yet offer any grounds for the defender of that view to argue against the aggregative conception. For claims about what is good for some entity do not always have fundamental practical or moral importance, do not always of themselves furnish reasons to choose or act one way rather than another. To take a clear example, whether a vacuum cleaner is in good or bad condition is of no fundamental practical importance: it can only be made practically relevant by appeal to other reasons for action, reasons that are themselves fundamental or appropriately connected to reasons that are fundamental. I want to make the same claim with respect to the distinctive good view: that while it can be meaningful and correct to hold that certain states of affairs are good for the political community as a whole, our reasons to promote these states of affairs are explicable wholly by way of those goods included within the aggregative conception of the common good. Any allegiance that the distinctive good version seems to claim derives from what is involved in reasonably promoting, honoring, and respecting the aggregative common good.

Let us take as a test case Aquinas's conception of the common good as the distinctive good of justice and peace. Start with justice and with a basic distinction between two ways that justice can function in deliberation. Justice can function as a constraint: one's deliberation will be guided such that one does not act unjustly. Justice can function as a goal: one's deliberation will be guided such that one's actions promote the obtaining of justice. Now, whatever the differences may be between the aggregative and distinctive good conceptions, that justice should serve as a constraint on political deliberation is not, or need not, be at issue between them. The defender of the aggregative conception can, that is, affirm that political deliberation must adhere to the constraints of justice in reaching deliberative conclusions.

The difference between the distinctive good and the aggregative conceptions concerns the way that justice should function as a goal in political deliberation. For there to be an important difference between these views, the value of justice as a goal cannot be reducible to the overall good of citizens in community. Here is what I have in mind. Suppose that one affirms the following: that it is a human good for one to respond properly to others' good. This is part of the good of practical reasonableness, or excellence in agency. Part of what

would make me well off is to act in a reasonable way with respect to others. Now, imagine a political community in which I, and everyone else in it, act in a reasonable way with respect to others' good. We are, to speak roughly, honoring everyone's rights, what is due to each of us with respect to our good.²⁷ Clearly, this state of affairs is worth pursuing. But given the claim that to respond reasonably to others' good is an aspect of one's well-being, it seems that (i) the importance of this state of affairs can be understood in the terms provided by the defender of the aggregative conception, (ii) the aggregative conception is superior in that it includes other relevant goods as well, and (iii) the common good of the community as a whole adds little or—I would say—nothing to the point of pursuing justice within a community.

(i) The capacity of the aggregative conception to provide an account of the point of the pursuit of justice as an end is straightforward, given the claim that practical reasonableness is a basic good. If it is a basic good, then the state in which an agent acts reasonably with respect to others is an instance of a basic good, something that makes that agent well off. But if it is something that makes the agent well off, it is part of the agent's individual good and thus part of the common good of that community aggregatively conceived. To the extent that justice can be broken down into proper responses by one agent to another, its value can be captured by the aggregative conception of the common good.

(ii) To the extent that the value of justice can be captured by the aggregative conception of the common good, the aggregative conception is superior to a view that focuses on justice alone. For there are other aspects of well-being besides reasonable response to others' good: it is arbitrary to focus on just relations to the exclusion of other goods. Besides, since justice involves responding properly to others' good, it would be very peculiar to deny the importance of others' good in an account of the common good that makes justice central.

(iii) The extent to which the value of justice can be captured by the aggregative conception is very great. When we consider the choiceworthiness of justice as a goal, we should probably consider the extent to which its choiceworthiness is bound up with making

²⁷ I don't assume here that what counts as responding reasonably to others' goods can be determined atomistically, that is, in isolation from the way that others act. What I am suggesting here is that we can see a *value* in such reasonable response apart from merely as an aspect of a good of the community as a whole.

individuals well off—both intrinsically, to the extent that responding reasonably is a basic good, and instrumentally, to the extent that agents are often made worse off by injustice. Now ask: what is added to the choiceworthiness of justice by noting that “and what’s more, it perfects the community as a whole”? It seems to me that very little normative pull indeed is exerted by this addendum.

We may be briefer with respect to the distinctive good of peace. Its instrumental value in promoting agents’ well-being has always been clear. Further, we might add that there is a genuine intrinsic good in not being in discord with one’s fellows: this is the negative aspect of the good of friendship. The argument follows the same course as the argument against the importance of the distinctive good of justice: that the good of peace can be accounted for in terms offered by the aggregative conception of the common good; that the aggregative conception is less arbitrary by allowing all other aspects of well-being into the picture; and that once the choiceworthiness of peace provided by individuals’ good is bracketed, there seems to be little or nothing left for the distinctive good of peace to account for.

The distinctive good view rightly says that we sometimes speak of there being a good that is of the community as a whole. There are many other things besides political communities of which we may speak of their distinctive good: there is the good of football teams, of universities, of families, of trade unions, and so forth. But while nothing in my treatment of the particular features of Aquinas’s representative distinctive good account commits me to anything more than that the distinctive good account of the common good that he offers takes its reason-giving force from the aggregative view, I am willing to generalize the point not only to other distinctive good theories of the common good but to distinctive good theories of all of these associations and institutions. To whatever extent the distinctive good of a football team, university, and so forth is worth promoting, respecting, honoring, the reasons to act in these ways derive not from the distinctive good of that association but from the good of the persons whose lives that association affects. Inasmuch as a distinctive good view distances itself from the good of persons, its normative hold on us is loosened. It is a virtue of the aggregative conception that it retains its normative hold through being entirely person-regarding.

A final point. I have challenged the distinctive good view practically, holding that it does not seem that the distinctive goods of political community as such provide us with reasons for action and that to

the extent that they appear to provide such reasons it is only because of the way that these distinctive goods enter into the individual well-being of its members. There is, however, a very direct way to challenge the distinctive good view—metaphysically. Consider, for the sake of comparison, one of Parfit's lines of criticism of the self-interest theory of rationality: that personal identity is not some further fact, holding in an all-or-nothing fashion; rather, there are simply more-or-less tight psychological and physical continuities between earlier and later person-stages.²⁸ Parfit wields this thesis about the nature of personal identity against the self-interest view: the self-interest view presupposes that the relationship between my present and later selves is one of strict numerical identity, and inasmuch as it is not strict identity but rather a matter of more-or-less psychological continuity, the self-interest theory is irrational in its absolute insistence on a pattern of concern in which I care as much about my later self as I do about my present self and in which I give entire priority to my later self over any other party.

One could use this sort of metaphysical line of attack against the distinctive good view in a much more direct challenge. There is a difference, one might say, between what exists strictly speaking and what exists only loosely speaking; and human persons fall on the former side of this divide while communities and associations fall on the latter. Since only what exists can have a good, individual human persons can, strictly speaking, have goods; communities and associations can have goods in only a loose sense. Since it also seems to me that what is of fundamental practical importance must be referred to what is good really, and not just to what is good in a manner of speaking, a distinctive good conception of the common good just could not have the normative force that an aggregative conception has.

VI

My argument in favor of the aggregative conception of the common good is that we have strong reasons for allegiance to the common good thus conceived and that the other conceptions of the common good claim our allegiance only through the normative force of the

²⁸ Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 307–47.

common good aggregatively conceived. There are a number of questions about such a conception of the common good that need answering: How does the reason-giving force of the common good interact with one's own personal commitments, aims, projects? And does not the logic of the argument for the aggregative conception, which appeals to nonarbitrariness, push toward the conclusion that concern for the common good is merely a parochial interest that must be subordinated in practical thought to the unqualifiedly overall good, the good of all persons? At present, I have little to say about these matters, except that the status of the common good as "in-between"—not a simply personal end, but not the good impersonally considered either—pretty much guarantees that any theory of the common good is going to have to deal with these difficulties. These questions raise troubles for everyone interested in the normative character of the common good, not just for defenders of the aggregative view.²⁹

I will instead conclude by considering a difficulty that arises especially for the aggregative conception due to the similarity that it bears both in its content and in the sort of defense offered for it to utilitarian theories of practical reasonableness. There is a serious worry that the correspondence between the aggregative conception of the common good and the utilitarian view of morality entails that the discontents of utilitarianism are bound to become the discontents of the aggregative view of the common good. The problem here is subordination—that since the utilitarian view implies, objectionably, that the individual's good must be subordinated in an inappropriate way to the overall good, the aggregative conception too must imply that the citizen's good must be subordinated in the same way to the good of the political community. Rawls puts the point this way in his

²⁹ The proof of this is just that we can raise for the instrumental and distinctive good conceptions analogous questions with analogous force. We can ask the defender of the instrumentalist conception: "What is the relationship between the reasons for me to promote the conditions that can help to make all in my community well-off and the reasons for me to promote the conditions that can help me (and my friends) to be well-off?" And, "Why should I not aim at the conditions that all persons, not just those in my community, can draw on to further their own reasonable ends?" We can ask the defender of the distinctive good conception, "What is the relationship between the reasons for me to promote the distinctive good of my political community and the reasons for me to promote my own individual good (or the distinctive good of my family)?" And, "Why should I not aim at the realization of the distinctive goods of all political communities, not just my own?"

discussion of utilitarianism as a principle governing the distribution of goods by the basic structure of society. On the utilitarian view, "society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it."³⁰ But, as Rawls notes,

The striking feature of the utilitarian view of justice is that it does not matter, except indirectly, how this sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals. . . . The correct distribution . . . is that which yields the maximal fulfillment. . . . Thus there is no reason in principle why the greater gains of some should not compensate for the lesser losses of others; or more importantly, why the violation of the liberty of a few might not be made right by the greater good shared by many. It simply happens that under most conditions, at least in a reasonably advanced stage of civilization, the greatest sum of advantages is not attained in this way. No doubt the strictness of the common sense precepts of justice has a certain usefulness in limiting men's propensities to injustice and socially injurious actions, but the utilitarian believes that to affirm this strictness as a first principle of morals is a mistake.³¹

On Rawls's view, the central mistake of utilitarianism is its failure to "take seriously the distinction between persons"³² by proposing that a sacrifice of one person's good can be simply compensated by a greater good realized by another. Given the similarity between the utilitarian picture of the overall good and the aggregative conception of the common good, the aggregative conception must be prone to this weakness as well.

If we grant that these implications are obnoxious—and I do grant that—then a defense of this objection to the aggregative view will have to fulfill two tasks. It will first have to show that the aggregative conception of the common good does not straightaway commit the defender of that view to endorsing the utilitarian mode of deliberating about how to advance the common good. Second, it will have to show that there is an alternative, more reasonable mode of deliberating about how to advance the common good that is not subject to the criticisms to which utilitarianism is susceptible. I will try to fulfill the first task and offer a tentative suggestion for how the second might be carried out.

³⁰ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, rev. ed. (hereafter, "*Theory*") (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 20.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 23.

³² *Ibid.*, 24.

We find in utilitarianism, I think, the following sensible line of thought. The highest end in (“ideal”) moral deliberation is, on the utilitarian view, overall well-being. But we cannot realize everyone’s well-being to the logical limit. Choices have to be made about whose good to promote and in what ways. Since everyone’s well-being counts, everyone is to “count for one, and only for one.” The only relevant differences are the amount of well-being that we can realize in the various options before us. If these are the only relevant differences, then the most obvious strategy is that of maximization: if the only thing that ultimately matters is agents’ well-being, then what could be as reasonable as a strategy of maximization, of promoting as much well-being as one can? Certainly, in some cases, this may involve sacrificing some agents’ good for the good of others—either letting their good languish, or even in destroying it, for the sake of greater good. But their being sacrificed is, after all, a result of the tough choices that agents have to make rather than their good being discounted in any way in deliberation.

To fulfill the first task—to show that the defender of the aggregative conception of the common good need not be subject to the criticisms leveled against utilitarianism’s willingness to subordinate agents’ good in objectionable ways—all that needs to be done is to show that affirming the overall good as the proper end to promote does not commit one to a maximizing theory of practical reasonableness in deliberation. This seems clear enough: for the defender of a maximizing strategy of deliberation must appeal to at least three other theses to justify the move from the overall good as a starting point in deliberation to the conclusion that maximization is a, let alone the only, reasonable strategy to determine how to go about responding to that good.³³

First: the defense of the maximizing conception of reasonableness presupposes that what is right, or reasonable, is entirely a function of the nature of the good, that is, that the only guidelines to deliberation are those that can be gathered from the intrinsic features of the goods that one has reason to promote. But this can be sensibly denied: one might claim instead that there are side-constraints on reasonable action that are not derivable simply from the character of the

³³ See Murphy, *Practical Rationality*, 142–56.

good.³⁴ These side-constraints may very well limit the areas in which maximization is a reasonable deliberative strategy.

Second: the defense of the maximizing conception presupposes that what is right, or reasonable, is always best understood in terms of promotion of the good. But this can be sensibly denied: one might claim instead that there are other modes of reasonable response to goods besides that of promotion. What I have in mind here is primarily expressive action, that of honoring, respecting, or otherwise expressing one's relationship to them.

Third: the defense of the maximizing conception presupposes that what is right, or reasonable, can be determined by a weighing or summing of goods that are instantiated in different agents' lives; it presupposes, to the extent that it aims to govern deliberation, commensurability. But this can be sensibly denied: one might claim instead that the goods of different lives are incommensurable and as such cannot be placed on a common scale to be weighed off against each other.

The point, then, is that there are a number of claims that one has to affirm in addition to the claim that the common good of the political community is the aggregate of individual members' goods in order to arrive at the concededly objectionable maximizing view of practical reasonableness. One has to affirm the priority of the good to the right; one has to affirm promotionism (the view that the only reasonable response to goods is that of promotion); and one has to affirm the commensurability of different agents' goods. The rejection of any of these blocks the way to a maximizing view of practical reasonableness.

I would not reject the first of these three claims—the natural law view that I adopt shares with utilitarianism the view that the good is prior to the right, or the reasonable³⁵—but I would reject the second and the third. The second of these is the hardest to make out; theories of practical reasonableness along promotionist lines are well developed, while the theory of reasonable expressive action is still quite underdeveloped.³⁶ But let me say a few tentative words about the third. One of the noteworthy, and much criticized, features of the “new

³⁴ One could try to make this claim out as Dworkin does, that the pursuit of goals can be trumped by individual rights. See Ronald Dworkin, “Hard Cases,” in *Taking Rights Seriously* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), 81–130 at 90–4.

³⁵ See Murphy, *Practical Rationality*, 1–3.

³⁶ But see Elizabeth Anderson, *Value in Ethics and Economics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).

natural law theory" of Finnis, Grisez, Boyle, and others is its emphasis on the incommensurability among goods.³⁷ Even if one accepts the incommensurability view, it still leaves deep questions about how we are to deliberate about how to advance the common good. We seem to be left with nothing more than that each of their goods is worth realizing, yet with respect to their value each is unique, nonfungible, irreplaceable. How could we possibly deliberate in a reasonable, non-arbitrary way about how to promote the common good when (a) all individuals' goods are included in that good, (b) not everyone's good can be fully realized, yet (c) none of their goods can be weighed against the others?

One important source of political judgment can be found by noting that even though maximization is ruled out, the requirement of im-

³⁷ Here are the basics of the way that incommensurability arguments have been run in recent natural law thought. (The idea is from Germain Grisez, "Against Consequentialism," *American Journal of Jurisprudence* 23 [1978]: 21-72; I endorse the main lines of this argument in *Practical Rationality*, 182-7.) Say that an agent A confronts a "practically significant choice" if (a) A has a reason to ϕ which is not identical with any reason that A has to ψ ; (b) A has a reason to ψ which is not identical with any reason that A has to ϕ ; (c) it is possible for A to ϕ ; (d) it is possible for A to ψ ; and (e) ϕ -ing is incompatible with ψ -ing. The idea is first to show a connection between practically significant choice and incommensurability. Consider a situation in which an agent A faces a practically significant choice between two plans of action, one of which, the plan of action of ϕ -ing, has reason (or set of reasons) R as its rationale, and the other of which, the plan of action of ψ -ing, has reason (or set of reasons) S as its rationale. According to the "general incommensurability thesis," in all such cases R and S are incommensurable. If they were commensurable, then A would not face a practically significant choice between them: for either it would be the case that every reason that A had to ψ would be a reason that A had to ϕ , and A would have additional reasons to ϕ as well, or it would be the case that every reason that A had to ϕ would be a reason that A had to ψ , and A would have additional reasons to ψ as well. (I ignore ties, where one has every reason to take one option as to take the other; these are choices that are practically insignificant through indifference.) In either case, A does not face a practically significant choice. Thus, in every practically significant choice, the reasons for action involved are incommensurable.

This does not say what the scope of practically significant choice is. But here we might just appeal to the fact that when we choose to promote one agent's good rather than another's, the choice is not like that between taking five dollars and taking one dollar; in the latter choice, everything that is worth pursuing in the latter option is present in the former option, and the former option has more besides. This is decidedly not the case in promoting intrinsic goods in distinct persons. Given the invariable practically significant quality of choosing between agents' goods, all such choices are between incommensurable goods.

partiality remains in force. All of these goods have a place in the common good; none can be dismissed. What we need is something to make the requirements of impartiality more vivid, a way to try to ensure that decisions about how to advance the common good are made in a way that is impartial among the various individuals' goods that make up the common good. Here is an example. The defender of the aggregative conception of the common good looking for such a procedure might turn to a suitably modified Rawlsian account, in which the requirements of impartiality in promoting the common good can be modeled by way of an agreement of parties, each of which represents an agent's good.³⁸ Surely the details of the agreement situation will differ: we might well allow that distributions might be affected by the intrinsic unreasonableness of some agents' ends, as agents in such an original position would be aware that there is such a thing as worthwhile and worthless plans of life, and that there are other principles of practical reasonableness that constrain their agreement. But the agreement situation is a helpful model since we know that rational agents can come to agreements that are nonarbitrary in content even when they do not place their ends on a common scale to be weighed off against each other.³⁹

Of course, there is no reason to think that how the aggregative common good should be determined for the sake of common action must be entirely decided by the demands of practical reasonableness. As an analogy: think of one's own ideal individual good, the condition in which one is enjoying to the logical limit all of the aspects of well-being that make one's life go well. Surely this is an ideal unrealizable in practice, an ideal that will have to be pruned and molded if one is to pursue in a fruitful way a realistically attainable vision of a good life. But even if deliberation will take one some way in deciding how to reshape this ideal for the sake of action, there is no reason to think that deliberation will take one all the way: at some point, choices undetermined by reasons have to be made.

³⁸ Rawls suggests that the original position is appropriate because of persons' equality (*Theory*, 17), but this strikes me as misleading, or at least not dispositive. If they are equal, why shouldn't we treat citizens' systems of ends as equally valuable, and then proceed to trade them off against each other? The separateness of persons point does not seem to help here. After all, each of the one-dollar bills in my wallet is separate from each of the others, but fungible with each of the others; there is nothing unreasonable about trading them off, of sacrificing one in order to gain three, and so forth.

³⁹ See, for example, David Gauthier, *Morals by Agreement* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

So it may well be—indeed, it seems pretty obvious that it must be—that how the unrealistically ideal aggregative common good will yield a realistic, proximate object of common political pursuit will be a matter for free political choice. But even here it is not as if it will be a matter of indifference which political structures are in place that will determine what counts as the community's choice on matters related to the common good. It may be, for example, one of the demands of impartiality that all citizens have an equal share with respect to the making of discretionary choices about the determination of the common good.⁴⁰ So some of the rational constraints with respect to the determination of the common good may concern not how agents are to reason with respect to the question of how to determine it for the sake of common action but what procedures should be in place for deciding such questions once the resources for rational deliberation run out.

The discontents of utilitarianism, then, are not the discontents of an aggregative conception of the common good. We can affirm the aggregative conception of the common good while rejecting a maximizing conception of practical reasonableness; and this combination of views need not lead to mere arbitrariness in deciding how to act in response to the common good.⁴¹

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⁴⁰ For arguments along these lines see Thomas Christiano, *The Rule of the Many* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1996) and Henry S. Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning about the Ends of Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁴¹ I was supported by a fellowship from the Erasmus Institute at Notre Dame during the writing of this essay, for which I am most grateful. I owe thanks to the other scholars in residence there, who gave me useful feedback on the argument of this essay. I also presented an early version of this paper at a summer seminar at Calvin College led by Nick Wolterstorff; I am in debt to my fellow seminar members and to the seminar leader for the forceful criticism they offered.

BOOK REVIEWS

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

ELIZABETH C. SHAW AND STAFF

BAMBACH, Charles. *Heidegger's Roots: Nietzsche, National Socialism, and the Greeks*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. 384 pp. Cloth, \$45.00—Another “reckoning” with Heidegger! Bambach’s main thesis is that “autochthonic rootedness” (*bodenstaendige Verwurzelung*) is a “never abandoned ontological myth” (p. 302), it functions as a leading value, and it grounds Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and history of being. It survives the turns of Heidegger’s philosophical trajectory. Heidegger attributes his principle to the Greeks, but he uses it to legitimate a specifically German rootedness, a major critical tool and antidote to the cultural ills he diagnoses. Heidegger thus asserts German superiority and power in thought, culture, and political mission. Adequate thought and right value need to have chthonic origin. In addition, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and metaphysical history of being are exclusionary: only autochthonously rooted cultures have dignity and are entitled to reign. Heidegger’s “originary thinking” excludes from that dignity Russian Communism, American capitalism, modern democracy, the ideas of 1789, Enlightenment rationality, Latinity, Galilean and Newtonian science, calculative thinking, technology, universalizing ethics, Cartesian subjectivity.

Bambach unfolds his theses in five chapters. “Myth of the Homeland” sets the stage by arguing that “politics can never be severed from philosophy in Heidegger’s sense” (p. 15). Throughout his career his politics has been a geo-politics of the earth, organized around “the place where a people (*Volk*) form a homeland” (p. 14). The declared goal of Heidegger’s politics is to convince humankind to set its ways and goals in accordance with autochthonic rootedness. This, as it were, “cosmo-chthonic” goal relies on specific *national* sources and agents, namely, Greek origins and German autochthonous culture—a claim to German hegemony clothed as Greek revival!

*Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers.

The second chapter reads Heidegger's "Rectorial Address" (1933) as "a condensed and concentrated expression of Heidegger's most enduring philosophical themes" (p. 70). The "Address" unfolds as a hierarchy of claims to leadership: the German University is to lead the national revival initiated by the National Socialist "revolution"; the university needs a leadership that allows remodeling in accordance with Heideggerian philosophy, also meant to fashion the disciplines and sciences. "Rector Heidegger hoped to become the new philosopher-king/*Fuehrer* of a *voelkische polis*" (p. 108). The "Address" is a political manifesto calling for the implementation of Heidegger's autochthonous philosophy in Germany.

Chapter 3, "The Geo-Politics of Heidegger's *Mittleuropa*," expands the horizon to the world. Heidegger "deploy[s] his myth of autochthony in offering his account of Germany's place within 'the historical destiny of the West'" (p. 113). The world persists in "forgetfulness of being." Chthonic autochthony brought to power in Germany by the right kind of National Socialism is to acquire hegemony in the world, reconnecting others with their roots and pulling them out of forgetfulness of being. Germany is to be "the nation called to save Europe and the West from its own metaphysical self-destruction, a destruction that can be averted only if the Germans recover the lost roots of Greek *aletheia*" (p. 138). Violent self-assertion is among the tools Heidegger proposes for the realization of his philosophical and geo-political vision. All the way up to *Stalingrad*, Heidegger's philosophy has the form of a philosophico-political imperialism.

In his fourth chapter, "Heidegger's Greeks and the Myth of Autochthony," Bambach turns to Heidegger's roots. He ties Heidegger's reading of the Greeks to the nationalist German interpretations of Greek culture and opposes the thesis that Heidegger, after initially flirting with the National Socialists, came to adopt an apolitical stance and turned into a critic of National Socialism. Bambach does acknowledge changes in Heidegger's philosophy during the 1930s, but these changes maintain the myth of autochthony. Now Nazi worldview and politics move into the camp of forces held by forgetfulness of being, and Heidegger ontologizes his politics. Importantly, however, the "new" Heidegger continues to defend "autochthonous rootedness," still favoring German autochthony, still assigning to the Germans the unique mission to save the West, still affirming their "singular affinity to the Greek *arche* and their distinctive identity." Ontologized autochthony is merely the concealed form of the old myth of political autochthony (187/188 with 232).

The fifth chapter, "Heidegger's 'Nietzsche,'" analyzes Heidegger's readings of Nietzsche. The Nietzsche texts "offer a textual record of the shifts, turns, deviations, and spirals that take place in Heidegger's thought in the crucial years from 1936 to the end of the war" (p. 249). They make Heidegger appear as what he was not: an anti-Nazi (p. 249) and an apolitical philosopher (p. 253). Bambach wants to show "how deeply implicated in

the specifics of a National Socialist worldview Heidegger's original Nietzsche lectures were" (p. 269). He also highlights the continuity of a political line that amounts to a "Freiburg National Socialism." The only notable absence is the earlier advocacy of power and violence as political means.

Bambach resolutely reduces Heidegger to his intellectual environment, ancestry, and kin. This prevents two Heideggers from appearing: missing, on the one hand, a Heidegger who is ambivalent, changing, opportunistic, looking for an Alexander for his philosophy, reacting to failures, maneuvering in constellations of power; but equally missing a philosophical Heidegger, whose critical potential exceeds its National Socialist affinities. Bambach thinks that the commitment to autochthony undermines the possibilities of reading Heidegger in an anarchic spirit (p. 217). Why that? Is "autochthony" per se a fascist or right-wing value? Rousseau, Whitman, Camus, Neruda, Pasternak, Rossellini, Bergmann, Tarkovski come to mind, all strongly attached to their "earth" and homeland, most of them opponents of totalitarian tendencies, many of them cosmopolitans. Autochthony is a negative value only in its hegemonic and exclusionary forms.—Martin Schwab, *University of California-Irvine*.

BENNETT, Jonathan. *A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. viii + 387 pp. Paper, \$24.95—"If" and "then," wrapped around enough content to form at least two propositions that seem to be conditionally assertible together as antecedent and consequent, are, of course, the key denizens of this very deep work. It's a commonplace among philosophers that what so innocently malingers in indicative language as, "If Bennett didn't write this excellent *Guide*, then someone else did," can rapidly morph by a little fancy into the eyebrow-arching subjunctive/counterfactual, "If Bennett hadn't written this marvelous work, then someone else would have." The hulking literature on the logic and semantics of conditionals is cunning and daunting, and few thinkers on the world stage are equipped to corral and tame the beast as Bennett has. Even given his non-truth-functional stance on indicative conditionals, one might still rightly call Bennett "The Horseshoe Whisperer."

The book is based on Bennett's graduate seminar lecture notes collected over the years. It's not surprising, then, that the work does not just survey the literature, but offers Bennett's take on the issues. His writing is disarmingly casual and witty—quite remarkably so for such dense subject-matter.

After some preliminaries in chapter 1, such as announcing the division of labor of the book—indicatives first, then subjunctives—Bennett devotes chapters 2 and 3 respectively to consid-

ering, but rejecting, H. P. Grice's and Frank Jackson's claims that indicatives are best understood as truth-functional material conditionals (the "horseshoe" analysis). In doing so he refers to the importance of a test first proposed by Frank Ramsey to decide the acceptability or assertibility of a conditional (p. 28). The Ramsey test maintains that such acceptability of an indicative $A \rightarrow C$ is the conditional probability of the consequent C given the antecedent A (in Bennett's notation $\Pi(C/A)$, p. 51). Following Dorothy Edgington, Bennett calls a compressed expression of the Ramsey test "the Equation": $P(A \rightarrow C) = \Pi(C/A)$, where $P(A) > 0$ (p. 58). The latter phrase captures Bennett's claim of "zero-intolerance" of indicatives with false antecedents (p. 55). By chapter 4 (p. 46) it is clear that Bennett installs the Equation as the cornerstone of his theory of indicatives, and that chapter carefully presents the necessary probability calculus for its construction.

Bennett's labor in this regard is not easy going, however. Immediately in chapter 5 he confronts David Lewis's "triviality result," which proves in effect that the Equation is useless in objectively evaluating acceptability of conditional consequents as genuinely dependent on their antecedents. With that, Bennett forges on in chapter 6 (following Ernest Adams) to explore the claim that the use of indicative conditionals never objectively reports conditional probabilities but can only express subjective beliefs about them (in the fashion of metaethical expressivism, p. 106 and following). Then, chapter 7 argues that indicatives are thus not propositions and have no truth-value (the "NTV thesis," p. 94), though that latter claim itself acquires some refining in chapter 8. Chapter 9 then applies Bennett's full theory, cleverly modifying "Venn" (Euler?) diagrams to exhibit relative probabilities, to show that reasoning with indicatives is classically valid because probabilistic validity applies in those cases (p. 131).

Chapters 10–23 constitute, for the most part, detailed elaboration and endorsement of the familiar Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis analysis of subjunctives (counterfactuals) in terms of possible worlds. Of course, this recipe is nonetheless served à la Bennett. Chapter 10 rejects Lewis's extreme realism of possible worlds for an abstract form (p. 157). Bennett as well jettisons Lewis's similarity relation to evaluate possible world resemblance, opting instead for a carefully delineated closeness of possible worlds that depends on precise definitions of forks and ramps that allow for comparing the divergence of possible worlds in a temporally fine-grained way (chapters 11–14; these latter terms are discussed in detail on p. 214 and following; the closeness relation is defined on p. 235). Chapters 15–21 address a wide variety of issues related to subjunctives, including a probabilistic "drop-truth" proposal that parallels NTV for indicatives (chapter 16), backward conditionals (chapter 18), and a rejection of Nelson Goodman's account of subjunctives (chapters 20–

21). Chapters 22 and 23 are devoted to analyzing various attempts to unify the two types of conditionals systematically, but Bennett ultimately concludes that they are unsatisfactory.

Overall, Bennett's achievement is nothing less than monumental. But as with the pyramids, which took sustained and unimaginably tedious work as well, one can appreciate such genius of accomplishment and still ask if the project itself was undertaken for entirely sound reasons. For example, Bennett frequently takes pains to refute this or that claim of William Lycan, but he does not finally force Lycan's opposing linguistic-semantic approach to conditionals into conceptual bankruptcy.

The book opens with a mentioned conditional, and it closes with one in use. Between is a golden treasure of edifying scholarship that, if not perfect, is nearly enough so.—V. Alan White, *University of Wisconsin-Manitowoc*.

D'ORO, Guiseppina. *Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience*. New York: Routledge, 2002. Cloth, \$80.00—In *Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience*, Guiseppina D'Oro gives a compelling case for the position that Collingwood's philosophical project is a form of descriptive metaphysics in the Kantian critical mode. For D'Oro, the unity of Collingwood's thought as a whole is not due to a particular problem Collingwood is treating, or even to the theme of history. Rather, she believes that "there is a fundamental continuity between Collingwood's early and later work, that, in its essentials, and despite substantial terminological changes, Collingwood's account of the nature of philosophical reflection remains constant" (p. 1). It is Collingwood's practice of philosophy in the neo-Kantian critical mode that unifies his early and later work. Under the umbrella of this theme, D'Oro discusses Collingwood's understanding of metaphysics, his attempt to find a *via media* between realism and idealism, his rehabilitation of the ontological argument, his supposed historicism, and his philosophy of history. The central texts that occupy the majority of D'Oro's reflection are Collingwood's *Essay on Philosophical Method* and *Essay on Metaphysics*. This focus is refreshing in that both texts are more subtle and meatier philosophical achievements than the popular *Idea of History*, and the contents of both are largely unknown to the wider philosophical community.

D'Oro argues that there are four main aspects of Collingwood's thought that are influenced by Kant: "Both Kant and Collingwood articulated their project as one of reform rather than mere critique of metaphysics; unlike dogmatic rationalist metaphysicians they both distinguished between epistemological and

existential issues; they shared a critique of psychologism; and they both looked for a notion of 'verification' which was neither empiricist, nor narrowly analytic" (p. 29).

In each of these aspects, D'Oro argues, Collingwood shows his indebtedness to Kant. She contends, however, that Collingwood has in fact "radicalized" Kant's transcendental idealism. While Kant recognized the distinction between the epistemological and the ontological, going so far as to posit an existential residue that exists beyond knowledge (*noumena*), Collingwood argues that it is meaningless to speak of a residue beyond knowledge. He confines his discussion to what is in thought. D'Oro explains: "Outside the conceptual articulation of being, there is not real (that is, epistemically unconditioned) knowledge, but no knowledge at all. In providing a *catalogue raisonné* of the various forms of experience, Collingwood did not assume, like the metaphysicians of the past, that the structure of thought mirrors the nature of reality; yet, unlike the transcendental idealist, he ruled out [the position that] there was any sense in speaking of an unknowable residue beyond the sphere of conscious experience" (p. 36). So for Collingwood there can be no presuppositionless science, no science of pure being, and no meaningful discussions of what is outside of knowledge. The goal of his metaphysics is to uncover the absolute presuppositions that condition our experience of the world.

A second contribution that D'Oro makes to understanding Collingwood's thought is her defense of his thought against the charge of historicism. T. M. Knox, Collingwood's friend and the first editor of his posthumously published works, suggested that because of his poor health the later Collingwood collapsed into a vicious historicism. This is called the "radical conversion hypothesis." By denying the charge of historicism, D'Oro simultaneously denies the radical conversion hypothesis. Her defense centers on rejecting the view that Collingwood is an epistemological naturalist. Collingwood's epistemology, D'Oro argues, is concerned not with the origin of belief (as it would be if he were a naturalist) but with the justification of knowledge. D'Oro argues that the doctrine of absolute presuppositions found in *Essay on Metaphysics* represents a form of transcendental argument. Absolute presuppositions stand as the necessary logical ground of thinking in certain ways. Their necessity is not temporal or causal but logical, as is their priority to thought. As the investigation of the absolute presuppositions of thought, Collingwood's metaphysics "can also overthrow misconceptions about the nature and scope of any given discipline's domain of inquiry. Metaphysical analysis can uncover such misconceptions by unveiling inconsistencies between the declared goals of a science and the kind of explanations it employs in order to achieve those goals" (p. 101). In doing so, Collingwood's metaphysics is fulfilling its normative duty and so is not a form of naturalism or historicism.

D'Oro's reading of Collingwood's work is important in that it highlights the Kantian themes in his thought. She provides a strong case for the unity of his thought based on this theme. In doing so, she puts another nail in the coffin of the radical conversion hypothesis and vigorously defends Collingwood against the charge of historicism. Her presentation of Collingwood's thought captures its central critical aspect while addressing several essential and neglected areas of his thought. It is a formidable contribution to Collingwood scholarship. Several of the chapters consist of previously published material crafted to fit into the larger scheme of the work. This feature does not, however, distract at all from the unity of the text.—Michael J. O'Neill, *Providence College*.

ELSTER, Jon. *Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. iv + 271 pp. Paper, \$21.64—When an autocratic regime is replaced by a democratic or constitutional one, a burning question arises: how shall the state deal with malefactors from the previous regime, and how shall it compensate their victims? That, simply put, is the issue of “transitional justice” to which this book addresses itself through meticulous exploration of manifold regime transitions around the world, ranging in time from 411 B.C. to almost the present. The subject bristles with far-reaching moral questions about retribution and reparation, but this is not a work of moral philosophy. In what is intended as a rigorously “empirical study of justice” (p. 80), Elster eschews normative judgment about what the actors should have done in favor of analytic inquiry about why, given their various circumstances, they did what they did, including the motivations, opinions, politics, and other causal factors operative in their decisions and in the problems encountered. Thus we learn much of the legal (and illegal) actions of victorious Athenian Democrats in 411 and 403 B.C.; of the Germans, French, Dutch, Belgians, Norwegians, and so forth after World War II; of the East-European polities following the Soviet collapse; and of recent Latin American transitions.

As a social scientist, Elster is especially concerned with classification of attitudes and behaviors. For example, the motivations of legal decision-makers are explored under three broad categories: “reason, interest and emotion” (p. 81). Those meting out the punishments and restitutions might be motivated by their economic, political, or career interests; or they might be activated by a passion for revenge, and the passion for revenge can be driven by anger or by hatred. We are said to feel anger on account of wrongful action and hatred when we perceive wrongful action as the result of vicious character (torturers and “denunciators” are hated). The general category of “reason” poses some

problems for this reviewer. Under that heading the author includes retribution—the desire to see justice done—but also, apparently, patriotic motives, ideas of the general good, and considerations of deterrence; at times this seems to be a rather loose catch-all category, encompassing whatever is not a matter of material self-interest or sheer vengeance. Of course the putatively rational purposes are very often intertwined with self-interested and emotive ones; the analysis illuminates this reality, along with the subterfuges by which actors try to make interest and emotion look like justice. Admirably, Elster does not engage in the reductionism which would claim that retributive justice is always at bottom sheer revenge, but the distinction he wants to make between them could use more inquiry. What, more exactly, is rational about the desire to have punitive justice done? An exploration of this question might well require some transcendence of the social science framework he has adopted.

The book has interesting observations to make about the several dilemmas facing would-be doers of transitional justice. Perhaps the largest one is the politically-charged issue of whether to stress retribution or reconciliation. Obviously a heavy emphasis on the former could intensify animosities, thereby disrupting peaceful reconstruction; yet the peace could also be endangered by leaving perpetrators of horrendous evils unmolested. Whether intentionally or not, Elster's presentation renders rather attractive the Athenian democrats' final option for a relatively broad amnesty. Another persistent dilemma is this: we want to punish the worst perpetrators, but we want to accomplish this through due process of law—so as to make clear that "we aren't like them." But a scrupulous commitment to due process can obstruct and frustrate the goal of substantive justice, and an understandably strong desire for substantive justice is often satisfiable only by deviation from the strict ideal of the rule of law. One recurrent theme here is the problem of retroactive legal penalties, a problem virtually unavoidable in many instances. The difficulty is familiar: certain moral wrongs cry out for rectification, though they were quite legal under the vicious state in which they were committed; shall you leave them unpunished or penalize them by what amounts to retroactive legislation (such as deprivation of civil rights for the offense of "national degradation")? Retroactivity is a serious violation of legality for which regimes like the Nazis are notorious. So is it better to finesse this predicament by recourse to some version of Natural Law or candidly to acknowledge retroactivity? A related practical matter needing to be decided is how exactly to determine what shall constitute punishable wrongdoing and how to classify degrees of it. Elster usefully considers three types of putative offenders: "fanatics [or zealots], opportunists and conformists" (p. 137). He also cites arguments which were advanced on both sides of this intriguing question: who is worse and more

guilty—the fanatic whose crimes were motivated by zealotry for the cause or the opportunist who committed them for material gain?

Moral and legal philosophizers among us might wish that Elster had been willing to depart somewhat from his descriptive analytic framework so as to explore the great normative issues more intensively. But what he has done provides plenty of material for reflection about ethical perplexities, both perennial and very timely.—Harry Clor, *Kenyon College*.

GALE, Richard M. *The Philosophy of William James: An Introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. x + 246 pp. Cloth, \$65.00; paper, \$23.99—Philosophy and philosophies are personal—motivating their practitioners and shaping their lives—and impersonal—appealing to general reasons and attempting to formulate comprehensive worldviews. Professor Gale's book addresses both these aspects of William James's philosophy in their mutual tensions.

The book is an abridged, more popular version of Gale's *The Divided Self of William James* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) which, unlike the present volume, includes many references to the extensive literature and more technical discussions on the topic, each primarily of interest to academics. The abridged version is thus closer than its precursor to James's aim of reaching publics beyond the confines of academia. Yet, its subtitle, "An Introduction," is misleading. For the book requires more than beginner-level philosophical ability and acquaintance with James's thought.

Like its predecessor, the abridged version is an excellent contribution to the scholarship on James's philosophy. At times, however, it rushes to conclusions ostensibly unwarranted by James's text. For example, in discussing James's *The Will to Believe*, Gale characterizes a live and a momentous option between propositions in James's terms, but he states that a forced option is one where the person will not believe the proposition unless the person decides to believe it. This is far from James's words: "But if I say 'Either accept this truth or go without it,' I put you on a forced option for there is no standing place outside of the alternative" (William James, *The Will to Believe* [New York: Dover, 1956], p. 3). Why depart so abruptly from James's text? Gale does not say (nor does he in the full version) but should have said it here, where he aims at making James's thought more accessible to all than in his 1999 book.

Instead, Gale proceeds to discuss the *The Will to Believe*'s main thesis: A person is justified in believing a proposition whenever the person faces a genuine (that is, live, momentous, and forced)

option between propositions which cannot be decided on intellectual grounds. Gale argues that some interpreters (cited in the full but not the abridged version) misrepresented James as holding that one's having a genuine option is sufficient for one's being entitled to believe whatever one pleases. He points out that James's text also states the option must be undecidable on intellectual grounds, that is, that, despite one's reasonable efforts, epistemic evidence and proof for the propositions remain mixed or absent. For the next seventeen pages, however, the discussion focuses on additional conditions for the justification of belief (adding up to a total of nine counting the previously mentioned four). These pages, though addressing interesting questions (for example, whether genuine options involve beliefs or working hypotheses), primarily explore twentieth-century interpretations and criticisms of James's views on the subject. Similarly, the next chapter discusses twentieth-century interpretations and criticisms of James's views on truth and how epistemic reasons can be balanced against nonepistemic ones in deciding what to believe. Again, though interesting, this chapter mostly illuminates the literature on the subject and the influence of James's ideas rather than James's actual positions.

Gale explains that he is partly concerned with the applicability of James's views. Yet, as Gale himself makes plain throughout the book, James advocated and sought a deep, intimate, mystical union with the inner life of other persons, both natural and supernatural and, indeed, with the entire universe. The search for this union, as well as advocating it, called for an approach to language and logic more focused on performance and consequences than, as in the said interpretative discussions, on content and precision.

This leads to Gale's sustained—and commendable—focus on James's Prometheism: his pursuit and advocacy of a life in which one fully develops as a scientist, moral person, and religious person in mystical union with other selves and the universe at large. Tensions arise between these aims. Gale insightfully explores James's attempted resolutions—methodological univocalism, ontological relativism, pure experience—and their shortcomings (though perfectionism is never questioned), arguing that to abandon ontological relativism or to restrict it to practical worlds, hence leaving the mystic's world unimpeded, comes closest to success, but ultimately fails because mystics' claims conflict with the beliefs of the practical selves. Yet, Gale had just acknowledged that mystics' claims are not propositions but merely propositional functions. Why would they then conflict with any beliefs? Perhaps James's unification concerns were not primarily about content but, in the spirit of pragmatism, about performance and consequences.

Overall, however, Gale's book offers great insight into James's thought about attention, interest, will, effort, belief, freedom, and their interconnections. I am glad I own a copy.—A. Pablo Iannone, *Central Connecticut State University*.

GERSON, Lloyd P. *Aristotle and Other Platonists*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005. xi + 335 pp. Cloth, \$49.95—*Aristotle and Other Platonists* is a remarkable work in terms of what is established and how its arguments are developed. Gerson's meticulous and sensitive examinations of original texts of Plato and Aristotle, along with their central commentary traditions and more recent interpretations, offer nuanced insights into the intended meanings of each relevant text. Gerson attempts "in part to achieve a richer understanding of Platonism by showing why Neoplatonists took Aristotle to be an authentic collaborator in its development and explication" (p. 23). He also endeavors to confirm that Aristotle was often "actually analyzing the Platonic position and making it more precise, not refuting it," and "criticizing philosophers other than Plato or deviant versions of Platonism" (p. 290).

Gerson begins by determining what Platonism truly is in light of interpretations that approximate positions Plato explicitly rejected in the dialogues. This judicious elimination of unfounded views confirms the bedrock inference that "the core of Platonism negatively defined is the enterprise of drawing out the conclusions of the rejection of nominalism and materialism" (p. 42). Such lends initial support to the further conclusion that to propose plausibly an anti-Platonic or an a-Platonic Aristotle, one must focus almost exclusively on his treatments of formal logic, parts of animals, or rhetoric, and prescind from an examination of Aristotle's global reflections on nature, being, the human person and good. To contract his views on the latter issues in order to present an a-Platonic Aristotle requires that one "do violence to the texts or else start with an assumption about Aristotle's developments that could not be supported by the texts except by the patent circularity of arranging them according to such an assumption" (p. 46).

Chapter 2 scrutinizes the early Aristotle and the exoteric writings. Eschewing any view that advocates a shallow, segmented developmentalism, Gerson subtly presents his case for an Aristotle who, for the most part, refines central notions throughout his career "according to Platonic principles" (pp. 48–9, 100, 253 n. 55). As in each subsequent chapter, detailed analyses of texts and divergent interpretations testify to an exhaustive knowledge of all relevant details in order to support Gerson's insistence upon three convergencies of harmonization between Platonic doctrines and those of Aristotle: (1) "the 'assimilation to the divine' . . . coupled with the characterization of the divine as unchangeable, is not very far removed from Aristotle's characterization of god"; (2) "association of the divine intellect or Demiurge with Forms in *Timaeus* allows for the former to be characterized as an ideal to be emulated in exactly the same way as is the divine final cause for Aristotle"; and (3) the seemingly important differences between Plato's and Aristotle's accounts of

the divine and its relation to the world "can be explained on the basis of the former's incomplete account of first principles" (p. 74).

The next three chapters respectively treat the categories of reality, nature and its principles, and soul and intellects. In regard to the categories, Gerson astutely interfaces interpretations of Dexippus, Simplicius, Plotinus, Porphyry, and Proclus, along with those of important contemporary interpreters to argue that it is "highly implausible, if not impossible" that Aristotle "held the view that what undergoes change, sensible substance, is absolutely fundamental in the universe" (p. 100). Correlatively, the "status" of differentiae only becomes "an unsolvable problem if one supposes that *Categories* is offering up an ontology" (p. 92). Related considerations are proposed when examining nature and its principles: "it is not the case that Plato deduces physics from mathematics," and moreover, "Aristotle, in holding both to the nontemporal order of the universe and to the explanatory subordination of physics to first philosophy, would seem to be committed to the hierarchical top-down approach of Platonism," in conformity with seeming acknowledgement that "nature is not unqualifiedly ultimate in the explanatory order" (pp. 114, 129–30). Chapter 5 seamlessly proceeds to present complex issues concerning an arguably fundamental compatibility of both thinkers' understandings of soul and intellect. Again, Gerson offers finely tuned exegeses of texts and subsequent readings to reveal a profound, ultimate harmony in that: (1) "there must be a separable intellect"; and (2) "given a separable intellect, the account of embodied human cognition will necessarily be in line with Platonism." Since cognition is essentially self-reflexive, the intellect must be incorporeal, and because of this Aristotle's definition "of the soul as an 'actuality' is incomplete" (pp. 139, 150). Thus, "it must not be supposed that by embracing hylomorphism" Aristotle "has immunized himself from considerations that lead to Platonic dualism, principally the incorporeality of thought," and if it seems that "Aristotle's position is incoherent, that incoherence is in harmony with Plato's" (p. 160). However, Aristotle accords with Plato not only in holding that "intellect is available as an instrument for soul because we are able to identify ourselves with intellect's activity," but also in linking discursive thinking with images, while thinking without such "is found at the top of the divided line" (pp. 162, 172).

Chapters 6 and 7 respectively compare doctrines both of master and the disciple who is master of those who know on issues concerning metaphysics and forms. Because these chapters focus on certain vigorous oppositions of Aristotle to various theories of forms and the reduction of forms to first principles, they are critical for Gerson's enterprise. And it is only after a thorough, nuanced examination of texts that seem to conflict strongly with Plato that Gerson insists that "Aristotle nowhere argues for the rejection of real distinctions within intelligible entities," and thus any conclusion that the "general account in

book α , chapter 1 should not be taken as being in harmony with Platonism is based on a view of what Platonism is which the Neoplatonists rejected" (pp. 186–87). Central here is Gerson's basic agreement with Plotinus' argument that while Aristotle recognized the requirement of absolute simplicity of the first principle, he erred in contending that this could be instantiated by activity of a mind which connotes complexity of thought, perhaps because he could not accept the possibility of a complex immaterial principle (pp. 188–200). Thus, "to the extent that we are persuaded that the correct interpretation of book Λ is that the prime unmoved mover's thinking contains content, to the same extent we should be open to the hypothesis that Aristotle's conclusion is in harmony with that of the Platonists" (p. 208). Although Aristotle does not purportedly "recognize explicitly a principle higher than divine thinking, . . . the Aristotelian rejection of Forms as ultimate does not fatally affect their being posited altogether" (p. 218 n. 42). Nonetheless, Aristotle's "insistence on treating 'formal' numbers as a Platonic *substitute* for quantitative numbers is misguided, owing to his infirm grasp of first principles and his failure to recognize incorporeal complexity as a metaphysical truth" (p. 240).

Chapter 8 presents the last heavily documented section of this complexly textured work. Its central aim is to show how *Nicomachean Ethics*, books A and K, which respectively concern virtuous activity and the best life as contemplative, are reconcilable since the practice of ethical virtue is both intrinsically good and instrumental to a higher stage along the path of identification with the divine in us as persons, yielding thus a comprehensive integration that confirms both this-worldly and other-worldly concerns (pp. 242–72). There is a profound bond between virtue as purification, immortalization, self-recognition, and transformation, since "an Aristotelian ethics limited to the discussion of popular and political virtue would be implausibly incomplete" (p. 256). It would be difficult to offer an exposition of the fundamental compatibility of Plato's and Aristotle's understandings of the full range of "orthos logos" that surpasses what Gerson offers in this chapter.

"Is Aristotle *just* a Platonist? Certainly not" (p. 290). Some doctrines are basically identical, such as those concerning superiority of theoretical life to any other, immortality of intellect, and unicity of the first principle; others differ in elucidation yet rest on identical principles, such as the nature of matter, divine providence, relative primacy of sensible substance, immortality of the person, and rejection of separate forms; and certain positions of Aristotle differ from Plato's "because they rest on an imperfect or incomplete grasp by Aristotle of the correct Platonic principles" (p. 5), such as identification of the first principle of all with thinking, incompleteness of the fourfold schema of causal analysis, and identification of the first principle exclusively as a final cause. Yet, no synopsis can do justice to

Gerson's thorough reflections, which not only clarify enduring philosophical problems, but also encourage more exacting comprehension of subsequent renown speculators.—Michael Ewbank, *Logos Institute*.

GERT, Bernard. *Common Morality: Deciding What to Do*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. xxiv + 179 pp. Cloth, \$25.00—This short book divides equally into two parts. In the first half, Gert describes what he calls “common morality”—“the moral system that thoughtful people use, usually implicitly, when they make moral decisions and judgments” (p. v); and in the second part, he justifies it. As set out in the first half of the book, common morality comprises moral ideals, moral rules (ten of them), and a two-step procedure to decide whether one of the rules can be justifiably violated. The idea behind this test is, roughly, that if one is not sure whether some rule can be (morally) broken, one (1) describes the morally relevant features of the proposed act before (2) considering the consequences of all other persons knowing that the violating act is allowed and the consequences of them knowing the act is prohibited. If the former consequences are sufficiently acceptable in comparison to the latter, then violating the rule is justified. In Gert’s words: “morality requires that a person never violates a moral rule unless she would be willing for everyone to know that they are allowed to violate the rule in the same circumstances” (p. 130). For me, the strength of Gert’s description rests on his—in my mind, correct—assertion that there is not a single correct answer to every moral question. There is agreement on many ethical matters but where there is not, this need not reflect poorly on a theory of morality—there may be more than one correct answer to a moral question. Equally rational people will disagree about the outcome of this second step; some will believe a rule can be violated, others not. This difference explains why morality does not provide uniquely correct answers to every moral question.

Allow me a quick point of criticism before I turn to Gert’s justification of morality. Gert appears to present his description of morality as an empirical claim about what moral agents actually do; these are the rules by which persons actually judge, praise, and rebuke each other. Given this, one might expect Gert to provide empirical or anthropological evidence to show that he really has captured normal practice. No such data is given, however, leaving me to wonder whether his claim is valid. My intuitions about common practice do not stretch wide enough for any meaningful assessment.

In the second half of the book, Gert is careful to pull apart rationality and morality. In his view, it is not irrational to act immorally, but it is always rational to act morally. The instances in

which rational persons must endorse morality concern situations in which the beliefs being used are rationally required and the person seeks agreement with others. Rationally required beliefs are those that all rational persons hold. Some rational people hold beliefs (such as religious beliefs) that not everyone holds, and they may not care about agreement with others. Such persons need not endorse morality, but it is not irrational for them to do this. So, if one does something immoral from religious belief, one may not be irrational (though one is certainly liable for moral criticism). Unlike his empirically-based claims about common morality, Gert seeks to make only conceptual claims about rationality. He argues that an action is irrational if (roughly) it will cause or increase harm to oneself or to a significant other and there is no adequate reason to justify the act. However, I am not sure—nor does Gert say—what it is about harm to the agent that makes an action that embodies this (without good reason) irrational. Gert needs to be clearer about the conceptual connection between harm and irrationality.

Gert distinguishes direct and indirect reasons in answer to the question of why to act morally. Indirect reasons to act morally pick out the idea that one is less likely to suffer harm (particularly if one has a moral character) when acting morally. Concerning direct reasons, Gert writes, “it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to show that the reasons for acting morally always have as much force or more force than the reasons for acting immorally” (pp. 135–6). This part of the book also contains an excellent discussion of impartiality in which Gert claims that it is impossible to understand impartiality by itself; one must discuss it in terms of a group to which, and respect in which, the concept is being applied. He also points out that impartiality is neither the same as consistency nor necessary (nor particularly encouraged) when acting on moral ideals.

To finish, it is worth noting that the book is intended to be accessible to non-philosophers. I think the second part, on justification, will be most engaging for philosophers. Indeed, for me, the first half dragged somewhat, but the second part picked up pace and made the book worth reading.—David Palmer, *Austin, Texas*.

GORMAN, Michael and Jonathan J. SANFORD, Editors. *Categories: Historical and Systematic Essays*. Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, vol. 41. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004. xvii + 309 pp. Cloth, \$55.00—Like many collections of essays, this work is a veritable *omnium-gatherum*, both in terms of topics and quality. Structurally, the work is divided into four main sections: (1) The Aristotelian Tradition; (2) Modern Approaches; (3) Normative Considerations;

and finally (4) Epistemological and Metaphysical Considerations. One should be aware, however, that some of the essays could, and perhaps should, be placed in other sections, while one in particular, although good in itself, had virtually nothing to say on the topic of categories. What follows is a brief summary statement about each essay.

Jonathan Sanford (pp. 3–20) starts this volume off with a defense of the harmony between Aristotle's *Categories* and his *Metaphysics*, contending that the science of metaphysics is impossible without categorial being. Helen Lang (pp. 21–32) argues that the traditional translations of the Greek "where" and "when" as "place" and "time" are philosophically misleading and consequently obscure substantive issues. Eleonore Stump (pp. 33–44) explores the compatibility of Aquinas's theory of matter as the principle of individuation with his claim that a human person continues to exist as an individual even when his soul ceases to be united to a body. William McMahon (pp. 45–57) attempts to articulate the genesis of nonstandard views of the categories, that is, those views arising during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries that posited fewer than ten categories. Ending the first section on Aristotle's *Categories* is May Sim (pp. 58–77), who argues, contra Alasdair MacIntyre, that Confucius either implicitly or explicitly employs categories that are in fact commensurate with Aristotle's *Categories*, and hence there is not an incommensurability between Confucian and Aristotelian ethics.

Timothy Sean Quinn (pp. 81–96) begins the second section of the book by comparing the theoretical categories of Kant's first *Critique* with the practical categories of his second *Critique*. Carl R. Hausman (pp. 97–117) demonstrates the way in which Charles Peirce's three categories—the monad, dyad, and triad—are all generated logically and phenomenologically and are also grounded in his ontology. Dagfinn Føllesdal (pp. 118–35) attempts to familiarize readers with the main outlines of Husserl's phenomenology and the role the categories therein play. The second section concludes with a contribution by Newton Garver (pp. 136–47), who contends that Wittgenstein's language-games can be seen as an attempt to restore Aristotle's naturalism in the wake of the devastating criticisms of Hume and Kant.

The book's third section considers normative issues, although with only two articles it comprises the smallest division of the work. The first article is by Michael Gorman (pp. 151–70), who proposes to solve some versions of the unity problem for a category by appealing to the fact that some categories exhibit normative variations. The second is by David Weissman (pp. 171–82), who argues that there are indeed categorial forms in the empirical world, contra Kant, and that such forms are the bridge between ethics and metaphysics.

The final section of essays directs our attention to epistemological and metaphysical issues. Mariam Thalos (pp. 185–203) provides a strategy for understanding the distinction between knowledge and fact in such a way that neither is privileged over

the other. Robert Sokolowski (pp. 204–24) offers a systematic account of categorial intentionality by distinguishing between the basic intentionality involved in perception and the more complex intentionality involved in categorial activity. Barry Smith (pp. 225–37) puts forward an interesting theory to account for the ways in which one partitions, or carves up, reality—a theory which steers a *via media* between the extreme realism of an Aristotle and the abject relativism of Quine. C. Wesley DeMarco (pp. 238–67) explores why human thought and language are, in his words, “category-hungry” (p. 238) and why nature is in itself “category-friendly” (p. 238). Rounding out the collection is a piece by Jorge J. E. Gracia (pp. 268–83), who responds to Foucault by proving that some categories are indeed discovered, even though he concedes that others are, as Foucault would have it, invented. Gracia’s claim that there is a third class of categories, one which consists of partially invented and partially discovered members, represents perhaps the most original aspect of his treatment.

All of the essays in this collection are new, written especially for this volume. Many of them do a wonderful job of showing the similarities and differences between the major thinkers on the nature of categories. Consequently, even in spite of its minor flaws, it will serve as a valuable and informative tool to the specialist and nonspecialist alike.—Lloyd A. Newton, *Benedictine College*.

KHLENTZOS, Drew. *Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005. 408 pp. Paper, \$20.00—Drew Khlentzos’s *Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge* is a meticulous introduction and roadmap to the core arguments of the contemporary realism/antirealism debate. It has several features that I especially admire. The book is carefully argued and for the most part clearly written. Rare among recent writers in Anglo-American philosophy, Khlentzos is a charitable reader of his opponents and earnestly endeavors to present their views as clearly and generously as possible. This generosity and thoroughness are also the book’s main fault, as it is long (weighing in 408 pages) and sometimes plodding. In a few cases Khlentzos’s charity is overly generous. This seems to me to be the case, for example, with some of his contortions on behalf of Dummett, not least of which is a lengthy chapter on how intuitionism drives Dummett’s antirealism that probably should have been an appendix. But these are drawbacks that we can all live with—especially for the purpose of graduate teaching, for which this monograph is well suited.

The work begins (section 1) by setting out the realist/antirealist debate. Khlentzos argues that the kinds of metaphysical realists who have been quickest to shrug off semantic arguments against realism are particularly susceptible to those arguments. Specifically, naturalistic realists—among whom Khlentzos counts himself—cannot dismiss critiques like those from Dummett and Putnam merely by observing that realism is a metaphysical rather than semantic or epistemic doctrine. The trouble is, “If the world is as resolutely mind-independent as the realist makes out, then there is a problem about how we get to know about it in the first place” (p. 4). Khlentzos calls this “the representation problem,” saying, “A main contention of this book is that realism is vulnerable to antirealist attack precisely because the representation problem remains unsolved” (p. 5, *italics removed*).

The standard strategy for converting the representation problem into an argument against realism is familiar. Without solving the representation problem, it is unclear how one can make any true claims about the independently existing world, or perhaps even make any claims that refer to it at all. So the antirealist contends that we have no justification for believing realism, or that the assertion that realism is true is self-defeating. Khlentzos focuses on the antirealist arguments of Dummett (section 2) and Putnam (section 3), and specifically on their “manifestation” and “model theoretic” arguments, respectively. His achievement is to explain very clearly these well-known contemporary versions of the “Hume–Kant gambit” (as he calls the standard strategy), and to show that they are able to survive the usual realist replies and dismissals.

In chapters 5 and 6, Khlentzos concerns himself with a certain H. Putnam (an ancestor of the current H. Putnam) whose flourishing period was about 1975–92. This H. Putnam, according to Khlentzos, has in his anti-realist arsenal the brains in the vat argument, an argument from equivalent descriptions, and three versions of the model theoretic argument. For my part, I am not convinced that Putnam has four distinct and subtle mapping arguments (one equivalence argument, and three model theoretic arguments). This is another case of Khlentzos’s charity, and I suggest we take him as offering us four Putnamian arguments rather than four that are readily identifiable in Putnam. Khlentzos offers no evidence that Putnam regards himself as having four distinct arguments. These are interesting arguments, but some readers will be surprised that the chapter concerning the model theoretic argument(s) is the shortest in the book. And many will wonder whether Khlentzos’s objections apply to the current H. Putnam—the author of the Dewey Lectures and subsequent works who goes so far as to call himself a “natural realist.” Unfortunately, Khlentzos’s treatment of this later philosopher is brief and indirect. This Putnam’s current antirepresentationalism is presented and critiqued at the start of chapter 7, though mainly through the views of John McDowell. While

Putnam claims affinity with McDowell, it is a kinship that McDowell has sometimes disowned. So we cannot be sure that the latest Putnam is given his due.

As chapter 7 develops and through the end of the book, the line of argument begins to tumble. One gets the sense that Khlentzos recognized that this was becoming a lengthy book and tried to pick up the pace. The result is a more compressed argument that too often abandons the clear prose of the early chapters in favor of the artificial clarity of logical formalisms. Chapter 8 includes useful critiques of Kripke's Wittgenstein and of Jackson's new "conceptual analysis," but by this time the reader wants to know what replacement Khlentzos is offering. If he has been successful, and I believe that he has at least made substantial progress, he has shown that the main antirealist arguments fail. How then shall we understand realism? As he puts it, "It is implicit in the arguments against antirealism advanced in this book that truth does indeed require mind-independent links between our truth-bearers and the various things in the world that they represent" (p. 331). That is to say, there must be a realist solution to the representation problem. The solution that Khlentzos offers involves a substantial notion of truth based on "correspondence" (in a sense explained) to "facts," understood as properties of the world. But only a dozen pages are dedicated to the explication and defense of this view, with some objections earning only a paragraph of response. This is surely too brief given the regiment to which he subjects the antirealists.

The last few pages argue that Khlentzos's view is not subject to the same liar paradox objection raised for disquotationalists. Then the book ends. (Besides being sudden, this antidisquotational conclusion raises questions about the legitimacy of the appeals to deflationary truth in defense of realism, in sections 1 and 2.) The result is a book with many wonderful passages and insights that is nevertheless ultimately unsatisfying. One hopes that Khlentzos will write a book in which he gives his own views the same careful and clear treatment that he lends to his opponents in this book.—Thomas W. Polger, *University of Cincinnati*.

MACÉ, Caroline and Gerd VAN RIEL, Editors. *Platonic Ideas and Concept Formation in Ancient and Medieval Thought*. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2004. xvi + 259 pp. Cloth, \$54.00—This tribute to Carlos Steel, director of the De Wulf-Mansion Centre and former Dean of Philosophy at Leuven University, offers a full bibliography of this eminent scholar's research in areas of ancient thought, critical editions of medieval texts, and central issues dealt with by prominent medieval speculators. This is followed by eleven essays arranged in three major groupings: (1)

Problems of the Theory of Forms; (2) Platonic Forms and Concept Formation; and (3) Theological Concepts.

P. d'Hoine opens the first section with an examination of the gradual systematization of four central problems with the theory of ideas as portrayed by Proclus, Syrianus, and other commentators on Plato's *Parmenides*: whether and why they exist; of what they are; how they are participated; and what their nature is (pp. 9–27). J. Opsomer subsequently analyses Syrianus's claim that since "Forms and particulars are homonymous," such eliminates "fatal consequences of the Third Man Argument" by "tackling the Self-Predication assumption" (pp. 31–50, esp. 42). In contrast to these examinations of direct questions about the theory of ideas, G. Griet and G. Guildentops consider Ferrandus Hispanus's post-1277 "semi-Averroist" interpretations of Aristotle. Relying on both Arabo-Latin and Moerbekean translations, Ferrandus occasionally discerned what he considered to be minor flaws in Averroes's exposition of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, and while predictably adhering overall to the former's criticisms of Platonic ideas, he as well remarked criticisms of what he unfortunately believed to be Aquinas's views on essence/existence as depicted by Giles of Rome (pp. 51–80).

Section 2 begins with C. Helmig's presentation of ancient and modern readings of *Phaedrus* 249b–c to determine the place of abstraction and conception in Plato's analyses, which the author initially considers as implied in his doctrine of recollection and the attainment of common features from a manifold of individuals (pp. 83–97). Neoplatonist portrayals of Plato's doctrine by Syrianus, Proclus, Hermias, Damascius, and Olympiodorus, are contrasted with that of Aristotle, the latter granting sensation (*aisthesis*) the capacity to distinguish (*krinein*), while the formers' assent to innate *logoi* precluded any "harmonisation of Plato and Aristotle" (p. 97). The last portion of this conclusion, however, might require qualification, as L. P. Gerson's *Aristotle and Other Platonists* reveals (Cornell University Press, 2005, esp. pp. 133–72).

R. Sorabji next examines Aristotle's perceptual functions as permeated by Platonist reason. Having argued elsewhere that Plato in the *Theaetetus* (186a–187a) made perceptions dependent on supplementation by reason, while Aristotle made them independent, Sorabji remarks that the latter's "balance between empiricism and intellectualism in the account of concept formation has been tilted in the direction of intellectualism" by later Platonists (p. 102). After a remarkable survey of figures, he concludes that "on the whole, the ancient texts were discussing not the *sense* of a unitary self, but the need for a unitary subject of awareness," and in fact, "if there is a unity in one's self-awareness, the unity is supplied by the single owner of that awareness, not by the owner's using a single faculty" (pp. 109; 117).

A. Speer examines "Thomas Aquinas on the Foundation of Knowledge" in this section's third essay. Deutero-Dionysius's utilization of the Neoplatonic "circularity" is emphasized as con-

stitutive within Aquinas's understanding of the attainment of finite wisdom: "The search for truth, which Thomas calls a natural desire of reason, begins with the One, namely, the recognition and acceptance of the first principle" (p. 131). Such implies a twofold "foundation" since "prior to the combining and the dividing acts of the intellect is the simple recognition of that which arrives in the intellect and remains indivisible, namely being. The principle of noncontradiction, which is the principle of the second operation of the mind, is dependent upon that what [*sic*] the intellect grasps first" (p. 128). Ignored, seemingly, is Aquinas's acknowledgement of the implicate operative priority of "esse" within cognition as presupposed *radix* for any putative "principle of noncontradiction," and his qualification of circle and foundation metaphors as "quodam circulo," since cognizing of beings is not performed by reasoning from, but rather in virtue of principles in act.

The penultimate essay in this section is J. Aertsen's superb, comprehensive historical portrayal of the shift from the notion of "transcendens" and "transcendentia" to that of "transcendentalis" by the era of Suárez, a transition likely framed on analogy with "praedicamentalis" (p. 134). Departing from Armandus de Bellovisu's *Declaratio difficultium terminorum* composed in the fourteenth century, Aertsen shows how his explanations of the term connote being's nobility and commonness of predication, and even anticipate Scotus's focus on being as universally transcending, which foreshadows later speculation on "supertranscendentals" (p. 138).

The final essay in this section is by R. van den Berg on Proclus's criticism of Porphyry's semantic theory. Aristotle generally insisted that even in seeking philosophical clarity in discourse one should remain inasmuch as possible close to ordinary language, and this view was in part shared by Porphyry and his followers who "attributed the authority in linguistic matters to the many" (pp. 158, 168). In contrast, Proclus seized upon the fundamental necessity of the philosopher dialectically to seek the proper use of words concerning the nature of things, which requires discourse probably "incomprehensible to the many" (p. 169).

The final section concerning theological concepts is initiated by K. Algra's analysis of two issues: in what sense early Stoics conceived of god as eternal or indestructible, and whether their view of the preconception of god included those two features. While acknowledging that said preconceptions were not universal, due to factors such as cultural corruption, explication of the aetiology of said notions can secure their coherence. Algra gives close attention to the testimonies of Chrysippus, Cicero, and Diogenes, as well as misinterpretations of their views by Plutarch and contemporary scholars, in order to confirm that their intention was to elaborate "a theology which claims that there really is only one immortal god, and that what we are entitled to call the 'other' gods are really partial and perishable manifestations of this one eternal, dynamic and changing god" (p. 183).

Thus, all possessing reason can derive from existing things a pre-conception of god as perfect cause of the cosmos's beauty and order, which implies the notion of eternity (p. 187).

L. Brisson next offers a remarkably nuanced portrayal of *Kronos* as summit of the intellectualive hebdomad in Proclus's interpretation of the *Chaldaean Oracles*. Beginning with Proclus's comments on Plato's etymological considerations of "satiety," "sufficiency," and "pure intellect" in *Cratylus* (396b-c), Brisson methodically illustrates how triads in the *Chaldaean Oracles* correlate with Proclus's elaborations, as well as those in the *Orphic Rhapsodies* (pp. 196-208). His detailed analyses are integrated in an appendix that offers an overview of these three influential sources in terms of the One, Intelligible-Intellect, Soul-Hypostasis, and Souls (pp. 209-10).

M. W. Stone ends this tribute with an examination of the sixteenth-century Domingo de Soto's interpretation of Aquinas's understanding of the natural desire to see God. Stone is sharply critical of interpreters of Aquinas who are "wedded to an *ab initio* reading" that displaces the commentary tradition (p. 214 n. 12). Particularly close attention is given to the fact that Soto's resolution of the issue is conditioned not only by Cajetan's previously established conclusions, but also by "working within the contours of a 'Scotist' system" (pp. 230-1). Central to Stone's thesis is his insistence that Soto presents a novel reading of Aquinas in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 1, which accords with Scotus's view, "according to which we have a perpetual and maximal natural appetite for *beatitudo* in the particular object in which the vision of God resides, although we cannot elicit a desire for beatitude without supernatural knowledge" (p. 221). Nonetheless, Aquinas insisted that reason can only confirm that said vision is possible given the nature of the human intellect, and while this can not be in vain, nonetheless, the "whether" and "how" of such attainment remains enigmatic without assent to revelation. Scotus seems to be close to this understanding by insisting that the desire is natural, though not naturally known in the present state, nor is its object attainable by natural means (*Ordinatio*, prol., 1.1.32).

While a few of these illuminating historical studies might be disputed on certain points, this collection is most valuable and testifies to the continuing tradition of scholarly excellence synonymous with Leuven University Press.—Michael Ewbank, *Logos Institute*.

MCGINN, Colin. *Consciousness and its Objects*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 256 pp. Cloth, \$35.00—Intended as a sequel to *The Problem of Consciousness*, McGinn's new book is largely devoted to developing his mysterian position. The first seven chap-

ters deal with the problematic nature of consciousness and the form any solution to it would have to take, while the remaining three include forays into metaphilosophy, the authority of first-person reports, and intentionality.

In "What Constitutes the Mind-Body Problem?", McGinn deploys Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description to sharpen his analysis of the "cognitive closure" that prevents us from solving the mind-body problem. Any solution would have to close the "explanatory gap" between the mental and the physical via conceptual entailments. Unfortunately, our concepts of mental states are given to us by acquaintance, whereas our concepts of brain states are given by description, "and so the latter can never adequately capture the former" (p. 22). The next essay develops the same point against the background of Smart and Kripke. If the reductive physicalist is offering to produce nontrivial identity statements, he runs into a difficulty presented by the (now familiar) point that the coreferring terms of such statements must have different senses, that is, must connote distinct properties. In the case of the reduction of heat, for example, there is no problem, since we have a single event with distinct properties: causing in us the sensation of heat and molecular motion. But the case of mental reduction is disanalogous, since the identity is supposed to hold between properties; thus the informativeness cannot consist in the distinctness of the properties flanking the identity sign. An adequate solution to the problem, then, cannot take the form of an empirical identity statement, a point that tells equally against the type-identity theory and substance dualism. What is required is not merely further empirical discoveries but a fundamentally new repertoire of concepts that would afford us the necessary *a priori* links between the mental and the physical.

In "Solving the Philosophical Mind-Body Problem," McGinn is at pains to point out the positive side of his mysterian position: while the epistemic problem of understanding the physical basis of consciousness might be permanently intractable, this does not mean that there is anything mysterious in the nature of things themselves. This is an aspect of McGinn's metaphilosophical position, developed in "The Problem of Philosophy" and there dubbed "transcendental naturalism": the ultimate nature of some aspects of reality permanently transcends our cognitive abilities, but there is nothing super- or nonnatural about this ultimate reality. Philosophical perplexity results from our running up against these cognitively closed regions of philosophical space. Such perplexities take on what McGinn calls the "DIME" structure by presenting philosophers with four equally unappealing options: Deflationary reductionism, Irreducibility, Magical solutions, or Elimination.

The next two essays take a novel approach to the mind-body problem by turning on its head the familiar point that materialism distorts the nature of the mental. In "What is it not Like to

be a Brain?", McGinn argues that the symmetry of identity calls into question the objectivity of the physical: if materialism threatens to make mental states implausibly objective by identifying them with brain states, it equally threatens to make brain states implausibly subjective. And in "Consciousness and Space," McGinn argues that the origin of consciousness in physical, spatially extended things is at odds with the nonspatial character of conscious states. Thus the conceptual revolution necessary to dissolve the mind-body problem extends beyond our concepts of brain states to the basic concepts of physics itself.

"Inverted First-Person Authority" argues that it is a purely contingent fact that our access to our mental states is introspective while physical objects are known through perception. This entails that the asymmetry in our modes of awareness, and the resulting dubitability of beliefs about the external world and incorrigibility of beliefs about our own mental states, cannot be exploited in defense of Cartesian dualism. (The importance of this result is not clear, since Descartes himself said often enough that he did not wish to exploit this asymmetry in an argument for dualism.)

More intriguing is McGinn's claim in "The Objects of Intentionality" that, even in veridical cases, we perceive both existing and nonexistent objects. Suppose that objects in themselves, though we perceive them as solid, are in fact "gappy" at the microphysical level. Then, in ordinary perception, there would be two intentional objects: the *de dicto* solid object, and the *de re* "gappy" object, even though only one of these exists. Even when there is not such systematic error, McGinn thinks that we "can be said to be perpetually hallucinating, since there is always a nonexistent object of sight in the offing" (p. 240).—Walter Ott, *East Tennessee State University*.

MUELLER, Ian, Translator. *Simplicius: On Aristotle's "On the Heavens" 2.1–9*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004. ix + 264 pp. Cloth, \$75.00—Utilizing the 1894 edition of Simplicius's commentary by J. L. Heiberg in the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, and P. Moraux's 1965 edition of Aristotle's *De Caelo*, this translation continues a valuable project under the general editorship of R. Sorabji that offers English readers access to works by ancient commentators on Aristotle. By comparing pertinent printed editions and manuscripts, Mueller has maintained the highest standards in weighing variant readings. This is evidenced in the 500 notes, which include not only clarifications of and justifications for particular readings of troublesome passages, but also Simplicius's likely sources along with corrections to misinterpretations of the author by later scholars.

A remarkably clear schematic presentation of the sources upon which his divergent readings of the Heiberg text are based is offered at the text's end, which he nonetheless insists should not be taken as definitive emendations until a better Greek text is available (pp. 3, 129–57, and 163–5). Along with valuable details concerning the state of the text, Mueller also supplies instruments to assist novices, such as a bibliography of relevant primary and secondary sources, an English–Greek glossary and Greek–English index, as well as indices of passages, names, and subjects (pp. 169–224). The consistent translation of terms utilized by the commentators presented is particularly valuable since this tradition has been alleged to have forged meanings that have remained greatly uncharted in standard lexicons.

In another context, Sorabji has insisted that such commentaries represent an ignored link in the history of philosophy since they affected both medieval Arabic and Latin comprehensions of Aristotle. For example, Bonaventure's ingenious dialectical attempts to prove that the universe had a beginning by utilizing the notion of infinity were anticipated by Simplicius's antagonist, Philoponus. Also, the introduction of impetus theory into dynamics arose within the same context and was transmitted through Arabic commentaries to Latin speculations later assimilated by Galileo. Moreover, Simplicius, although like Asclepius and Philoponus in having studied under Proclus's disciple, Ammonius, distinguished himself by arguing for a profound harmony between the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle in order to counter Christian charges that philosophy was rife with contradictions. Yet, his bitterness toward Christianity, in part, was inspired by his perception that its representative thinkers were irreverent toward the divinity of the heavens. Apart from the latter, however, one arguably can detect echoes of Simplicius's efforts to discern a profound complementarity of central doctrines of Plato and Aristotle in developments of Thomas Aquinas, who opposed Bonaventure's advocacy of Philoponus's supposed demonstrations against the notion of an eternal creation.

Simplicius's commentary on *De Caelo* is surmised to have been written between 535–40 A.D., possibly during his residence in Harrân, just beyond the Byzantine frontier and Justinian's intrusive legislations. Thus, an interval of at least five years had passed since the imperial edict of expulsion of the academy from Athens in 529, which coincided with publication in Alexandria of Philoponus's first lengthy critique of pagan Neoplatonism, his *Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World*. As Mueller indicates, a major value of this translated portion of Simplicius's commentary is that it presents his controversy with Alexander of Aphrodisias and conserves in the main the latter's lost comments concerning two central problems of interpretation of Aristotle's explanations of heavenly motion: First, how can heavenly bodies create light and the sun heat, since not only are the different revolving spheres composed of an everlasting fifth element

unaffected by ordinary contrary properties such as heat and cold, but also the preferred directions of rotation of the universe are uniform? Second, do soul and nature move the spheres as two distinct forces or as one?

In regard to the first issue, Simplicius acknowledges distinct orders of causal action and explanation since "light results from the action in the transparent of either fire or the divine body . . . [but] air is moved along with the motion of the heaven and is chafed by itself" (442,10 and 443,22; Mueller, pp. 98–9). Concerning the second issue, particularly aggravated by doctrines of the Pythagoreans, who ignored the most important and fundamental principles of explanation, "one should not say that soul and nature are the same in the case of the heaven, although both do play a role in the same motion, soul as an external cause of motion, nature as an inherent principle of being moved" (387,18–19; Mueller, pp. 33–4).

Even in the midst of controversy, Simplicius acknowledges that Aristotle "speaks entirely accurately when he says that we are more distant [from the heaven] in knowledge than we are spatially" (396,19; Mueller, p. 44). And he often articulates suggestive insights: "It is possible for something to move *ad infinitum* in the same [position] because it moves with the same motion again and again, as we say in the case of circular motion, but it is not possible for something to accelerate *ad infinitum*" (432,34; Mueller, p. 87). The latter succinct observation arguably is implicitly compatible with reflections of Einstein concerning the maximal acceleration of objects in relation to "c" or the limit velocity of light.

Yet the excellence of Mueller's skills not only grants access to Simplicius's text. It also permits one to appreciate better Sorabji's insistence that such commentators evidenced minutely detailed knowledge of Aristotle's corpus of writings, for although they did not approach his texts with the partiality of even some medieval or much less most modern commentators, nonetheless, one may learn far more about Aristotle by pondering their expositions than one likely would on one's own.—Michael Ewbank, *Logos Institute*.

NIEDERBACHER, Bruno. *Glaube als Tugend bei Thomas von Aquin: Erkenntnistheoretische und religionsphilosophische Interpretationen*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2004. 194 pp. Cloth, \$36.00—Echoing much of the neo-Thomistic revival of the twentieth century, *Fides et Ratio* §76 sketches the two main characteristics of a Christian philosophy: it is a type of thinking which simultaneously employs yet always seeks to purify reason and, secondly, it does not close itself off to the concerns and content of revelation. In this way, Pope John Paul II calls for a contemporary understanding of

faith which is seen as a virtue freeing human reason from presumption, "the typical temptation of the philosopher." In his latest, Bruno Niederbacher likewise calls for such learned docility in both the human soul as well as in the modern Academy. Divided into six main sections, this work concentrates on two main arguments. First, he shows why Thomas held that faith enables assent to *what is* and thus proves to be a necessary virtue for correct thinking and action and, secondly, what significance such a claim has for us today.

After a brief introduction (pp. 9–16) defining terms and mapping out this project, chapter 2 (pp. 17–42) takes up the initial question of what Thomas means by *credibile*. Here Niederbacher first dissects the Thomistic concept of goal-oriented action, primarily as it is developed throughout the earlier questions of *ST* I–II and only then takes up the question of absolute happiness and the role of faith in obtaining such beatitude. A nice job is done in juxtaposing the philosophical understanding of the human person's attainment of an uncreated good with the answer given by theologians and their insistence on the need for revelation. Chapter 3 (pp. 43–89) analyzes the act of faith by means of standard epistemological categories, concentrating mainly on Thomas's use of the classical Augustinian *credere Deo*, *credere Deum*, and *credere in Deum*. As Niederbacher progresses he cleverly shows how Thomas maneuvers his understanding of faith between an irrational decision and a necessary rationalism; rather, it emerges as a free and reasonable act of both intellect and will ordered toward the end for which the human person was made *in principio*. More should have been said here of the divinely granted life which begins such a process but Niederbacher has unfortunately, albeit understandably, decided to bracket any detailed discussion of the mechanics of grace.

The fourth chapter (pp. 90–150) treats the virtue of faith and proves to be the most welcomed section. Here both the role of faith in a well-integrated human life as well as why the gifts of the Holy Spirit are an essential part of Thomas's understanding of the *beata vita* are taken up in turn. In many significant ways, Niederbacher mirrors Paul Wadell's *The Primacy of Love* (Paulist, 1992) in showing Thomas's genius in uniting the virtues and all the qualities one desires for himself and finds attractive in another. It was refreshing to read how Niederbacher incorporated two otherwise forgotten aspects of Thomas thought: the human emotions as worthy of philosophical speculation as well as the importance of the community in which one finds himself, as that which models and transmits the virtues. There are also insightful parallels in this section between Alvin Plantinga's recent account of Warranted Christian Belief and Thomas's account.

The fifth (pp. 151–65) and the sixth (pp. 166–75) chapters conclude this work by respectively taking up the questions of epistemological and religious relevance of Niederbacher's analysis thus far. Bringing such virtue epistemology into the contemporary discussion of how one justifies cognitive and religious

convictions (*Rechtfertigung von Überzeugungen*), Niederbacher chooses to focus on two current debates: Foundationalism versus Coherentism and Internalism versus Externalism. Within this discussion, he successfully shows how Thomas's understanding of faith can contribute to modern virtue epistemology, especially as it is developed by Linda Zagzebski. To end this work by treating questions of epistemic justification in today's struggle to understand the human person as both *homo sapiens* as well as *homo adorans* shows how Thomas's confidence in rational assent is able to engage the many concerns left in modernity's wake.

No doubt the past few years have brought an increase in philosophical works on the relationship between faith and reason, but not many in the academy, especially philosophers, have taken up the question of why faith should be considered a virtue. Niederbacher, of the Department of Christian Philosophy at the University of Innsbruck, has thus produced a very welcomed text for those interested in engaging Thomas's account of virtue and knowledge with the modern world. Niederbacher's German prose is accessible, writing clearly and with many examples directed toward those not well-versed in the discussion at hand. This volume is the most recent addition to the celebrated Munich Philosophical Studies series.—David Vincent Meconi, S.J., *University of Oxford*.

PRIEST, Stephen. *Merleau-Ponty*. New York: Routledge, 2003. xiii + 308 pp. Paper, \$27.95—This book originally appeared in 1998 and recently has been reissued in paperback form. It appears in the *Arguments of the Philosophers* series at Routledge.

Owing in part to the wide-ranging nature of Merleau-Ponty's presentation, his complicated dialectical writing style, and the complexity of his positions, there exists a need to provide a general introductory work in English concerning Merleau-Ponty's philosophy as a whole. Some attempts have been made over the years, though few have been more than moderately successful. Two exceptions stand out. Gary B. Madison's brilliant pioneering work, *The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty*, although dated, remains the best general account of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy as a whole. Martin C. Dillon's more specific but equally brilliant and influential work, *Merleau-Ponty's Ontology* stands beside it as a provocative overview of Merleau-Ponty's career. Although these two works were written long ago and do not reflect the most contemporary trends in Merleau-Ponty scholarship (many of which they inspired), they remain the two best general works in English. Unfortunately, Priest's much more recent work does not remedy this need for a current general introduction; he does,

however, better than any other introductory work so far, provide access to Merleau-Ponty's work for analytically trained philosophers who are new to phenomenology.

The book is a series of fifteen short reflections upon important themes related to Merleau-Ponty's thought or career. There seems to be no coherent plan or sustained thought to organize them, though the order of many of the topics reflects cursory attention to the development of Merleau-Ponty's career. There are chapters on the following topics: Life and Works; Phenomenology; Existentialism; The Body; Perception; Space; Time; Subjectivity; Freedom; Language; Other Minds; Things; Art; Being; and Parousia.

The isolation of these topics resulting from such a rigid compartmentalization is itself a problem and may reflect the general problem of the book as a whole. For example, one cannot present Merleau-Ponty's position on the body as an isolated argument as if it were not interrelated with his position on freedom, art, being, and so forth.

Priest's book contains an excellent bibliography but does not itself reflect the most contemporary scholarship in Merleau-Ponty's thought. Readers should be aware that since the publication of this book, several primary and secondary sources on Merleau-Ponty have been published.

The only serious problem with this book is perhaps only the other side of the coin in which it trades. The stated intent of the author is to show respect for Merleau-Ponty's work by arguing for and against what he says, even when he provides no arguments of his own (p. x). So, Priest arduously constructs formal, proper arguments in order to provide philosophical justification for Merleau-Ponty's positions on a variety of problems. There is no small irony here, since Merleau-Ponty's extensive writings on language (natural language) belie this approach altogether. After all, it is not the case that Merleau-Ponty simply forgot to include the arguments in his published works; nor did he omit them in some bedeviling continental scheme that requires correction through emendation. That is, Priest is doing more and less than he says he wants to do here.

On the one hand, he is doing more than rendering a faithful précis of Merleau-Ponty's philosophical positions. He does this by imposing a formal structure onto Merleau-Ponty's works where, as Priest says, there is none at times. (Perhaps it is better to say that there is simply a different kind of structure present in the works foreign to analytic formalism.) What results is not a clarification of Merleau-Ponty's position along with its implicit justifying arguments, but a philosophical account of another kind altogether. It is as if one were to invite a vegetarian friend over for dinner, define "dinner" as necessarily including meat, and supplement the vegetarian's meal with the meat he lacked in order to make it a better meal. (It is also not unlike the well-meaning nun who confides that she slipped just a little

prosciutto into the elderly orthodox Jew's pasta "because he needs to eat better.") Supplying the meaty arguments for Merleau-Ponty's positions is equally unpalatable for some.

On the other hand, Priest is doing less than he implies, since the results he produces are surely less interesting and less profound than the positions Merleau-Ponty eloquently articulated. The rational force of Merleau-Ponty's account is not artificially restricted to the mechanical instrumental reason of the formalized arguments—the only philosophical currency that Priest seems to accept. Merleau-Ponty maintained that all language is allusive. This is not only a theoretical adage; Merleau-Ponty employs it to express his positions, and it pays off in dividends. Though there is no question of the rigor of Merleau-Ponty's work—often demanding familiarity with many areas of literature, psychology, natural sciences, and philosophy—he does not operate under the pretense that philosophical rigor must be attained at the cost of style. For example, Priest addresses Merleau-Ponty's account of the body and embodied sexuality as an existential state. Surely one of Merleau-Ponty's greatest philosophical contributions is his original and influential phenomenology of embodiment. His passages on sexuality are engaging, carefully crafted, and remind us in their very reading that we are engaged in the world of experience as we do philosophy. Compare Priest's account of "Merleau-Ponty's argument" of why sexuality presupposes some central tenets of his phenomenology: "Suppose A desires B sexually, then A stands in an intentional relation to B because it would be incoherent to suppose that A desires B sexually but has no awareness of B. If awareness is an intentional relation, then, so is sexual desire" (pp. 92–3).

Overall, Priest's book can be seen as valuable insofar as it provides a translation of sorts. Every translation is a distorted interpretation that bears the mark of the translator. Those who are comfortable only in the language of analytic philosophy will find this to be the most intelligible work yet published on Merleau-Ponty. Thus, Priest does a fine service for philosophy as a whole in his distortions of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy.—Duane H. Davis, *The University of North Carolina at Asheville*.

RAY, Matthew Alun. *Subjectivity and Irreligion: Atheism and Agnosticism in Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche*. Burlington: Ashgate Press, 2003. xii + 121 pp. Cloth, \$69.95—This book presents a rather interesting thesis: that post-Kantian philosophy of religion is substantially flawed in its approach to religion. More specifically, according to Ray, since Kant's work religious questions have been addressed by philosophers more in the sphere of ethics or social theory than in metaphysics. As Ray sees it, this

leads to a misapprehension by philosophers to interpret religious claims primarily in the light of a prearranged ethical theory rather than on their own terms, leading to the utter marginalization of monotheistic religion in modern thought. To be sure, it is not Ray's claim that Kant does all of this. Ray argues that Kant's ethical "religion within the limits of reason alone" serves both to define an approach to religious claims and to create certain puzzles which, worked out by Schopenhauer and later Nietzsche, result in the marginalization of religion within philosophy. Whence, in Kant's philosophy, religion is merely the precipitate of ethics; in Schopenhauer's work religion is rejected in the name of ethics; and finally in Nietzsche both are rejected as part and parcel of the same moralistic illusion. Structurally, the book is divided into seven chapters but can be approached by dividing the text into thirds: a third on Kant, a third on Schopenhauer, and a third on Nietzsche. Two points worth noting are (1) that this is not a history of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy of religion but an analysis and critique of a series of closely related arguments developed by Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche and (2) that this book is concerned with showing the shortcomings of post-Kantian philosophy of religion and does not attempt to develop an alternative to the Kantian paradigm.

Beginning with the first third of the book, Ray suggests that we understand the marginalization of religious concerns not as a part of modern philosophy per se but as having a specifically Kantian or post-Kantian character. In chapter 2 Ray develops this thesis through a careful and focused, albeit short, discussion of Kant's first *Critique* as background to his later, more developed account of Kant's moral philosophy and the development of a "religion within the limits of reason alone." According to Ray, the upshot of Kant's philosophy is to "withdraw God from the world of experience and from direct revelation through Scripture" (p. 19), thereby limiting philosophical discussion of monotheistic claims to a discussion of morality and discrediting the Biblical claim of divine inspiration.

In the discussion of Schopenhauer the book turns from a discussion of the philosophical origins of the problem diagnosed in the text's beginning to a discussion of the problem itself. Ray begins with a brief and informative discussion of Schopenhauer's theory of the will and then turns toward two arguments for atheism developed by Schopenhauer. The first argument Ray presents as an "argument from exclusion": Schopenhauer's metaphysics is constructed in such a way that there is no room at the ontological inn for God. The second argument is a "moral" argument for atheism. One can note here the Kantian lineage of both points. On the one hand, in Kant's critical philosophy (Ray argues) there is no room for God to appear directly in nature; instead he is relegated to the noumenal realm. On the other hand, the Kantian argument for the existence of God is an entirely moral one. It is not surprising then, that Ray spends more time

and effort in his discussion of Schopenhauer's moral argument for atheism. Ray finds that both Schopenhauer's metaphysical and moral arguments are wanting.

Finally, Ray turns to Nietzsche, focusing on Nietzsche's discussion and criticisms of the moral effects of religion. Ray argues that while "some elements of Nietzsche's psycho-physiological characterization of the Christian religion are . . . surprisingly coherent . . . other elements cannot be sustained in their present form" (p. 71). What cannot be sustained, among other things, is Nietzsche's rejection of Christianity itself: "By his own lights, Nietzsche should accept—as he arguably occasionally does—Christianity as another valuable expression of the will to power" (p. 106) as well as the questionable sociological claims made by both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche about the "demise of Christianity." As Ray dryly points out, looking back with a century or more hindsight, it is far from certain that Christianity was doomed in the nineteenth century.

As a whole this short book is well worth the time it takes to read and is characterized by a crisp, clean, and clear use of the English language. The book will be of interest to philosophers of religion whose work has a historical dimension, but it should not be approached as a history of post-Kantian philosophy.—Brian Harding, *Xavier University*.

ROCKMORE, Tom. *On Foundationalism: A Strategy for Metaphysical Realism*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. 145 pp. Cloth, \$59.00—Metaphysical realism, as Rockmore defines it, is the claim that "under the proper conditions it is possible to know independent objects and the world as it is" (p. 1). Its canonical version is Platonic realism, which includes the ontological claim that this objective reality is a "permanent ahistorical matrix or framework" (p. 29). Foundationalism is an epistemological strategy for validating the realist claim by identifying something as absolutely true, true "beyond skepticism, hence beyond doubt of any kind" (p. 20), then deducing from it objective "knowledge of the mind-independent real as it is" (p. 4).

The primary modern form of foundationalism is Cartesian. The *cogito* is known absolutely and the character of the external world deduced from the thinking self's ideas. The mode of this deduction is "representationalist": a backward argument from an effect—an idea in the mind—to its cause, a mind-independent object. But Descartes cannot show that the cause can have only one effect, therefore the idea can say nothing certain about the character of its cause, and consequently Cartesian foundationalism "does not defeat, but rather succumbs to, skepticism" (p. 98).

Rockmore argues that Kant's critical philosophy is also foundationalist in a representationalist manner. Kant's achievement is to develop a secular version of the Cartesian theory, one that does not need God to assure that the move from idea to object is warranted, because it locates that warrant in the conditions for the possibility of objects of experience and knowledge. But this means any object can be known only if we construct it; the mediation of the categories blocks any inference from our perceptions to the nature of the world as it is independent of how we transform it in perceiving it. Hence Kantian foundationalism, like its Cartesian parent, ends in "epistemological skepticism" (p. 104).

Twentieth-century European thought, Rockmore argues, has for the most part continued to presume Platonic realism and to pursue a foundationalist strategy. He discusses the Vienna Circle's search for "protocol sentences," Chisholm's "self-justifying, unfalsifiable beliefs," Apel's (and Habermas's) "ethical foundationalism," and Bonjour's and Haak's attempts to reconcile coherentism and foundationalism. He also discusses, but less fully, various analytic "retreats" from epistemology—Devitt, Davidson, Putnam, Brandom, McDowell. Rockmore sees these views as failed attempts to hang onto "Kant's empirical realism while silently dropping his transcendental realism" (p. 129), confusing an object of knowledge with a mind-independent object.

Rockmore touches on Husserl and post-Husserlian forms of foundationalism and their collapse into the antifoundationalism of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, and others, including Rorty. They are all "disappointed Cartesians" (p. 81), "neoskeptics" who embrace a variant of skepticism that bases its doubts on "the prior acceptance of a Cartesian foundationalist model that consists of denying knowledge in the absence of an epistemological foundation" (p. 80).

So, although Rockmore thinks that "new forms of foundationalism are likely to continue to emerge as long as the concern for knowledge endures" (p. 110), he concludes that "there is no longer any reason to defend foundationalism or to anticipate that at some future time it will be formulated in convincing form. And [therefore] there is also no reason to defend metaphysical realism" (p. 131).

Rockmore mentions frequently, but does not explicate, what he thinks is the only viable alternative to foundationalism: "epistemology understood as a theory of knowledge that acknowledges the historical limits of human cognition" (p. 11), that accepts the circularity of interpretive knowledge in place of the linearity of foundationalism—in short, that is fallibilistic and abandons the claim to know the way the world really is.

Rockmore's pellucid style presents the complex history of a theory in a usefully understated manner. It is a style that cuts through the technical and historical details to expose the basic key positions, yet does so without oversimplifying them. A

reader deeply familiar with the issues can fill in the omitted details, a reader less familiar with them can appreciate the intellectual forest unobscured by too many confusing trees. Some 500 footnotes point to those trees for anyone wondering about Rockmore's grounds for what he claims or wishing to become more familiar with the unspecified details—George Allan, *Dickinson College*.

SALLIS, John. *Platonic Legacies*. SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. 164 pp. Cloth, \$40.00—Viewable as either a development or an introduction to Dr. Sallis's earlier work, *Chorology: On Beginning in Plato's Timaeus* (Indiana University Press, 1999), the present volume exhibits the continuing relevance of the thought of the Platonic dialogues from Plotinus and Augustine to Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Arendt, along with the writings of more recent philosophers and scholars, including Reiner Schuermann, Charles Scott, and Dennis J. Schmidt. These eight carefully crafted essays are superb dialogues with these writers and their thinking on Platonism, developing, enlarging, and supplementing those thoughts in relation to Platonic texts. These essays anticipate, reflect, and recollect one another; it would require more than a simple review to reveal the riches of even one of them. The work also contains a general index, which includes reference to thirty-nine German words or phrases and a separate Greek index of ninety-seven words and phrases.

"Nietzsche's Platonism" traces the four connections that Nietzsche makes of Platonism: viewing his own thought as a kind of Platonism, displaying Platonism after Plato, the Platonism of the dialogues found in Nietzsche's lectures, and a Plato contra Socratism, this last area revealing a Plato profoundly sharing with Nietzsche an artistic preference for appearance. "The Politics of the Chora" begins with Arendt's contention that utopianism has its source in the Platonic position that action be understood as making, especially in the making or remaking of the polis in the image of a paradigm. Sallis trenchantly deals with passages in Plato's *Timaeus* and the *Republic* that present three limits to political making: erotic activity, interaction among cities, and dependence on resources not available within a city, all three of which are linked with the presentation of *chora* in the *Timaeus*. The limits of political making or of the politics of the chora in Plato's dialogues thus undercut any utopianism. "Daydream" is a meditation on *Timaeus* 52b–c and *Republic* 509b, both texts which figure prominently in "Tense," an essay written by Jacques Derrida. Sallis's essay recollects as in daylight that other time of the precondition of differentiation, what Plato's character, Timaeus, calls the *chora*. The essay immediately fol-

lowing, "Platonism at the Limit of Metaphysics," takes up the reading of Plotinus which Reiner Schuermann undertook in *Broken Hegemonies*. While Dr. Schuermann approached the issue of the temporality of the Plotinian one in juxtaposition to certain Heideggerian texts, Professor Sallis approaches the account Plotinus gives of the one by juxtaposition with certain Platonic texts to reveal a similar strategy by both Plotinus and Plato on characterization of the ultimate principles of metaphysics. "Grounders of the Abyss" owes its paradoxical title to that phrase in Heidegger's *Contributions to Philosophy (Beitraege zur Philosophie)*, a work in which Heidegger envisaged a deeper beginning to metaphysics than that of its founding in the Platonic "idea." Heidegger's quest for the ground that was overlooked, existing before the Platonic legacy that has become metaphysics, indeed, a ground that was coeval with the initial movement and which now humanity necessarily needs to recognize is placed in juxtaposition by Sallis with the Platonic text, the *Timaeus*, in which the distinction of idea and image, of being and beings, is called into question. As Sallis expresses it: "The Platonic chorology is rather something held back from the legacy, something not passed along, except for the traces remaining in the text of the *Timaeus*" (p. 93). Sallis's essay recollects this forgotten legacy and restores it as in the questioning and abysmal thought of Plato's character, Timaeus. Sallis quotes Heidegger: "Those who question have set aside all curiosity: their seeking loves the abyss, in which they know the oldest ground" (*Beitraege*, section 5; Sallis, p. 94).

"Uranic Time" links Augustine's understanding of time as displayed in the soul (a move broached by Augustine's familiarity with the Platonic legacy through Plotinus) with Heidegger's final sections of *Being and Time* in which a natural time is located in the heavens (a repetition of a largely forgotten Platonic legacy, *Timaeus* 38c, 42d). "What's the Matter with 'Nature'?" takes off from Charles Scott's *The Lives of Things*, in which the second chapter has this question as its title, here used by Sallis as his penultimate chapter heading. For Scott "nature" replaces the singularity of natural things but in this attempt to get an origin or a stabilizing condition, one loses or bypasses that which first intruded naturally. Sallis offers both a brief reading of Plato's *Phaedo* pointing up the danger of treating singularity as selfsameness and the possibility of an alternative principle of "nature," an *arche*, the *chora* of the *Timaeus*, that affirms singularity without the need of a transcendence to a fullness of being. Finally, the last essay, "Tragedy from Afar," begins with *Republic* 10, in which art, paintings and tragedies, are described as far removed, doubly distanced, from nature; and oblique references are made to a distancing from pain, from death, as well as a return to laughter on the part of those who have resisted such a propensity. In the middle section of this ultimate essay, Sallis turns to Dennis J. Schmidt's *On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life*, a work which begins with Plato and Aristotle

but soon rests with the complex retelling of the troubled rethinking that characterized German philosophy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Sallis recounts Schmidt's retelling Nietzsche's opposing of Socratism to tragedy and Nietzsche's pointing to the Socrates of the *Phaedo* to signal a return to tragedy in the image of the music-practicing Socrates. It is with the *Phaedo* that Dr. Sallis concludes this final essay. But the theme of distancing prevails in his account of the dialogue as Socrates distances himself from things and *Phaedo*'s narration distances itself in time and space from event. Such double distancing obliquely presented measures out the singularity of tragedy without being a tragedy and generates an awareness of the comic without being such. Sallis's work ends as it had begun—with a double reference to Nietzsche and Plato.—Donald C. Lindenmuth, *The Pennsylvania State University*.

SALWÉN, Håkan. *Hume's Law: An Essay on Moral Reasoning*. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 2003. 154 pp. Paper, \$62.50—Hume's law, that is, that moral claims cannot be inferred from exclusively nonmoral claims, is widely accepted by recent and contemporary philosophers, some exceptions being John Searle and A. N. Prior. Chapter 1 distinguishes three versions of the law: the formal version (HL(F)), the conceptual version (HL(C)), and the epistemic version (HL(E)), all of which, according to Salwén, are true. When "valid inference" means "a sentence is a logical consequence of a set of sentences K iff there is no interpretation under which all the sentences of K are true and x false" (p. 15), then the law is, HL(F): "For all valid arguments, $K \supset X$, and all moral expressions \bar{O} , if \bar{O} occurs nonvacuously in X, then \bar{O} appears in K" (p. 17). When "valid inference" means an inference "such that the truth of the premise conceptually guarantees the truth of the conclusion" (p. 18), and when a bridge premise is a conditional sentence whose antecedent is a nonmoral sentence and whose consequence is a categorial norm or moral sentence (pp. 18–19), then the law reads, HL(C): "There are no analytic bridge sentences" (p. 19). Thus, HL(C) implies, as against Searle, that the bridge premise, "If Jones has promised to pay Smith five dollars, then Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars," is false. Unlike either HL(F) or HL(C), HL(E) is about nonmoral reasons for holding moral beliefs. Thus, "HL(E) implies that, say, the acceptance of 'Jones has promised to pay Smith five dollars' is a reason to accept 'Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars' only if it is accepted that promises ought to be kept" (p. 19).

Chapter 2 reviews some arguments both for and against HL(C). Though these have drawbacks of their own, they all share the problem, along with HL(C), of relying on the idea of

analyticity. Discussing the tenability of HL(C) is therefore futile unless this idea is clear and justified, unless it is shown to have an explanatory role to play, and unless there are in fact analytic sentences (p. 23). For analytic truths have been called into question by Quine.

Accordingly, chapter 3 considers analytic sentences and Quine's denial of them (p. 46–51). For Quine, that denial follows from indeterminacy about the meaning of theoretical sentences. To counter this, Salwén proffers an account of “analyticity” that avoids Quine's criticism and then uses that account in formulating HL(C). That account is: (A) “A conditional belief held by P is analytic only if it is the case that if P were to reject it, then P's belief would cohere very badly with the rest of P's beliefs” (p. 64). Under (A), and when by “bridge commitment” is meant a belief in a conditional that has a nonmoral antecedent and atomic moral consequent, HL(C) becomes: “For all persons, P, bridge commitments and times *t*, it is false that if P were to reject the bridge commitment at *t*, then P's rejection would cohere very badly with the rest of P's beliefs held at *t*” (p. 63). In other words, no bridge commitment is analytic.

Salwén then supports this restatement of HL(C) by the following indirect argument: assume (i) that P believes or has the bridge commitment that if a certain action *n* causes pain then *n* is wrong. Then, assuming holism and the principle of charity (that is, that there is extensive moral agreement among persons), it is safe to assume (ii) that P holds a set of moral beliefs which include believing it right to obey the laws, to do what God wants, to promote the interests of P's nation, and so forth, and that in some circumstances, at least, P holds these things even when the action in question causes pain. Assume, finally (iii), that P's bridge commitment in (i) is analytic. It is evident that (i), (ii), and (iii) are in conflict. For if (iii) is true, then we could not rationalize P to disbelieve that *n* causes pain but is not wrong. But then it follows that P does not hold to the set of moral beliefs referred to in (ii). For holding those beliefs is sufficient to rationalize P's rejection of her bridge commitment, *n*. So, since the assumption of the falsity of HL(C)—that is, (iii) above—conflicts with the requirements of holism and charity, it follows that HL(C) is true (pp. 64–7). In short, assuming holism and the principle of charity, then (A) above is plausible, and (A), coupled with the same two assumptions, implies that HL(C) is true.

Chapter 4 formulates and defends HL(E). HL(E) reads: “A nonmoral belief constitutes an epistemic reason for a person, P, at a certain time, *t*, to hold an atomic moral belief only if P at *t* accepts a moral principle connecting the two beliefs” (p. 76). It is argued that HL(E) gains support from a coherentist approach to epistemic justification.

Chapter 5 shows that, being a formal thesis, HL(F) is irrelevant to any metaethical theory. Salwén also argues that even if

G. Schurz is right in *The Is-Ought Problem* in arguing that Hume's law implies that ethical theories cannot be scientifically justified, he has not shown that the law implies moral skepticism (pp. 99–106). He argues further that HL(C) supports the metaethical theory that gives the best explanation of HL(C). Since that theory is neither analytic naturalism, which is incompatible with HL(C) (p.113), nor synthetic naturalism (pp. 116–17), it is implied that HL(C) supports nonnaturalism. Finally, he shows that HL(E) has significance in regard to the attribution of moral beliefs (pp.117–23).—John Peterson, *University of Rhode Island*.

SCHINDLER, D. C. *Hans Urs von Balthasar and the Dramatic Structure of Truth: A Philosophical Investigation*. Perspectives in Continental Philosophy Series, No. 34. New York: Fordham University Press, 2004. xiv + 455 pp. Cloth, \$65.00—In Hans Urs von Balthasar's 1947 *Wahrheit*, later republished as *Theo-Logic I*, he attempted to retrieve the notion that "truth is not just a property of knowledge but a transcendental quality of being as such" (*Theo-Logic I*, 23). Villanova's D. C. Schindler enlists this retrieval in order to overcome "a metaphysics of presence," while also providing readers with an indispensable guide for navigating philosophical aspects of Balthasar's *Werke*. Although Schindler's text deals with notoriously dense subject matter, an undercurrent of pedagogical sense controls his style and grants readers rewarding assimilation of a logic affirming both identity and difference within the concept of truth.

The phrase "dramatic structure of truth" unifies the Balthasarian terms "Gestalt" and "drama," where drama "refers to the moving, event-like character of structure or order, while Gestalt refers to the *structurality* or order of event" (p. 25). Chapter 1, "The Gift of Being Given," outlines Schindler's metaphysics of being-in-motion. Lest truth become a reductive ossification or a frustrating anticipation, truth must have its true order in the creative event of ecstatic motion between existents, which is a positive addition to being: human "decision works within God's decision ultimately to help bring *Being* to decision, that is, to realize actuality. This is the essence of all creativity . . . it also lies at the heart of the event of truth" (p. 94). We are most actual, and thus creative, in free acts of self-gift prompted by being's mediation of a divine call.

Chapter 2, "The Birth of Consciousness," extends this narrative of self-gift to the mother-child relationship, which "turns on the *gift* character of the encounter [between mother and child in the mother's smile], self-gift responding to self-gift" (p. 120). Consciousness is "borne" in a dramatic totality that cannot be reduced to component parts since the event of encounter "is fundamentally a moving in being moved" (p. 159). As chapter 3,

"Truth as Gestalt," argues, we ought to view the subjective "aspect of the mutual self-gift in the Gestalt as the subject's being 'enraptured' by the object . . . this movement *is not merely or even primarily a subjective movement*, but rather a movement that occurs reciprocally between the subject and the object; that is . . . a *mutual gift of self*" (p. 208). Balthasar's metaphysics therefore can be called a meta-anthropology (chapter 4), which "implies that by virtue of a special relationship between man and being, essentially *human* structures are able to illuminate the meaning of being in itself, particularly in its truth aspect" (p. 259-60). The *Urgestalt* of this relationship is represented best by the taking of vows, whether by the consecrated religious or by the bride and groom (p. 326-7). The significance of a vow lies in its ability to embrace the mystery of a life's *telos* at the beginning and to live out its surprises despite what is inchoately anticipated. Schindler therefore argues that "we can affirm the need for a foundation in the question of truth, without falling into the modern association of foundation with 'system,' because there is no essential contradiction between determinateness and openness" (p. 342). The dramatic "event" of truth is a life lived into a gestalt greater than itself. Meta-anthropology then leads to ontology since this "more" directs one beyond the person to being itself.

Perhaps the most complex part of Schindler's work is chapter 5, "The Transcendentals." Jan Aertsen's question about beauty sets the agenda: "Does beauty, as beauty 'add' anything to being that is not already added by truth or goodness, or by the relation between them that is already implied in convertibility?" (p. 375) Schindler argues that truth cannot have a dramatic structure unless beauty adds to being in the mode of reciprocal causality: "the unity of parts . . . remain really distinct . . . a unity in difference and difference in unity is an entry into the ontological difference" (p. 417). The ontological evacuation of beauty identifies finitude and its "play" of appearances with imperfection, a "fall" from being's original unity. The affirmation of beauty's ontological depth, on the other hand, leads to the recovery of created forms' positivity since the free act of self-gift adds difference to mutual relation and makes possible such events as "being surprised" or "being desired" by another. Truth itself is thus positively constituted by difference when viewed as the mutual disclosure of the "whole" depth-dimension of being, that is, when the event of encounter expresses the circumincession of the transcendentals in dramatic *Gestalten*.

Scholars interested in Balthasar cannot ignore Schindler's latest volume, for no other English-language study of Balthasar has reached its depth, range, and perspicacity. The bibliography is replete with important German texts, and it references secondary literature from six languages. Yet Schindler's audience is much wider than Balthasar enthusiasts. He offers a late-modern metaphysics which is not unlike Blondel's "reciprocal intussusception" of the practical with the speculative: *tolle, lege*.—Cyrus P. Olsen III, *Oxford, United Kingdom*.

SHAFFER-LANDAU, Russ. *Moral Realism: A Defence*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. vii + 322 pp. Cloth, \$76.50; paper, \$32.50—Shafer-Landau's *Moral Realism* provides a carefully developed defense of a nonnaturalistic moral realism. Shafer-Landau covers a wide range of material, presenting an impressive array of arguments (many original, others important contributions drawn from contemporary discussion) both in providing positive support for his position and in undermining opposing views. In particular, he draws upon influential recent work in analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology to develop a nonnaturalistic moral realism that can avoid or respond to various charges of mysteriousness that have plagued such approaches in the past.

The book is divided into five parts. In the first, Realism and its Critics, Shafer-Landau considers rival, nonrealist metaethics. He discusses familiar worries with various forms of noncognitivism. In his second chapter he presents a powerful dilemma—a variation of the *Euthyphro* dilemma—for constructivist theories (which he construes as cognitivist, but nonrealist): either the initial conditions under which the construction takes place are moralized or they are not. For example, consider an ideal observer theory. If ideal observers are taken to have traits like benevolence, honesty and so on, then we seem to be appealing to prior (realist?) moral standards in choosing such traits. On the other hand, if ideal observers lack such traits, then their attitudes seem arbitrary and inadequate as a foundation for morality.

Part two, Moral Metaphysics, is devoted to defending moral properties as nonnatural and supervenient upon natural properties. Shafer-Landau argues that such a position should be seen as akin to nonreductivist theories in philosophy of mind, where mental properties are realized by physical properties but are not identical to them. Such a view captures our belief that like situations will possess like moral properties, while allowing that moral properties seem to be of a different kind than physical properties. That moral properties cannot be reduced to physical properties should not strike us as any more troubling than similar claims about the properties of various special sciences (economics, biology, and so on), though Shafer-Landau adds that morality is unlike the special sciences in that it is in part a domain knowable a priori and, as such, it is not entirely naturalistic.

In Moral Motivation Shafer-Landau argues against both motivational Humeanism (that is, the claim that beliefs alone—without desires—are insufficient to motivate action) and various forms of internalism with respect to motivation and sincere moral judgment. In particular, with respect to Humeanism, Shafer-Landau presents several cases in which it appears that evaluative beliefs are sufficient to motivate, and he responds to a set of five arguments that he believes might undermine such claims (and lead us to Humeanism). With respect to motivational internalism, Shafer-Landau presents cases of amorality (or at least agents who make a genuine moral judgment, but who

are not motivated to act on it), and he responds to common worries about externalism (noting, for example, that several stories are available to externalists to explain the widespread connection between moral judgments and being motivated to act).

Moral Reasons, the fourth section of the book, includes three chapters in which Shafer-Landau argues that moral obligations entail genuine reasons for action, even if such reasons are quite unrelated to a given agent's actual commitments. Also in this section, Shafer-Landau responds to the argument from disagreement that is often raised against moral realism; here he makes familiar realist moves but also suggests that arguments from disagreement, if correct, would undermine realism in most all areas of philosophy (given the wide range of disagreement). Shafer-Landau finds this result implausible and, thus, he views it as providing additional reason to reject the argument from disagreement. Finally, Shafer-Landau argues that moral facts are intrinsically reason-giving. While this might seem mysterious, he notes that we seem to find such brute normativity elsewhere; for example, he argues that we have reason to form true beliefs beyond any pragmatic concerns. The very fact that two and two equal four gives us a reason to believe it.

The final part, Moral Knowledge, provides Shafer-Landau's moral epistemology. He argues that there are certain self-evident moral principles—for example, it is wrong to cause another pain simply for one's own pleasure. Not all agents will recognize such self-evident propositions, and we can also mistakenly take propositions to be self-evident when they are not; thus, Shafer-Landau allows for moral disagreement, even regarding self-evident moral principles. With respect to particular, verdictive moral judgments (that a particular action is wrong, for example), he turns to a broadly reliabilist account of justification and knowledge.

Shafer-Landau does much to motivate and to defend a moral realism that is importantly different from familiar Cornell (Boyd, Brink, and so on) and British (Dancy, McNaughton, and so on) forms; it seems likely that this book will be the focus of much attention in metaethical discussion. More broadly, *Moral Realism* is a lucid work covering a great deal of terrain in contemporary metaethics and could—perhaps in conjunction with recent primary source papers—be used very effectively in an advanced undergraduate or graduate-level course.—Jason Kawall, *Colgate University*.

VAUGHT, Carl. *Encounters with God in Augustine's Confessions: Books VII–IX*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. xii + 175 pp. Cloth, \$35.00—This volume picks up where Vaught's *Journey toward God in Augustine's Confessions: Books I–VI* (2003)

concluded. The three chapters of this present work follow the *Confessions'* three central books, looking at Augustine's Neoplatonic moment of ecstasy, his conversion to Christianity in the Milanese garden, and the shared vision with his mother Monica in the house at Ostia. Very much appreciated in Vaught's approach here is his insistence that Augustine never intended to present these experiences as exclusively his own, but rather as "archetypal expressions" (p. 1) of what occurs whenever any human soul comes upon the divine. The method employed throughout helpfully analyzes these major events within the *Confessions* in terms of chronological development (what Vaught refers to throughout as the "temporal"), how Augustine engages or is engaged by those around him (the "spatial"), and those encounters with God which shape a soul's story (the "eternal").

Chapter 1 (pp. 25–65) analyzes book 7 and Augustine's relatively early understanding of God, his struggle to understand evil, as well as what the new Christian saw as the strengths and limitations of Neoplatonism. Vaught argues that what Augustine needs at this stage is "inner vision" (p. 37), an honest receptivity to what is, understood as a docile ordering of soul which translates into an appreciation for immaterial reality, the goodness of all being, the need for a mediator between the infinite and the finite, and, most importantly, the fittingness of a humble God who deigns to participate in our fallen condition. Within this second section, Vaught fittingly takes up basic questions of soteriology (pp. 62–3) and accordingly maps out, albeit too briefly, the ransom and sacrifice theories which find their origin in Augustine.

Book 8 is treated in chapter 2 (pp. 67–103) and is an excellent look at Augustine's Christian conversion and especially the role friendship and the stories of other Christians' *metanoia* plays in his spiritual odyssey. Vaught spends many pages on Augustine's self-admitted sexual struggles and his enslavement to worldly allures—just two of the moral, political, and religious slaveries experienced at one time or another by Augustine. When he makes "the transition from aesthetic circularity to religious transformation" (p. 83), however, he is able to begin to orient his life through finite creation and to an eternal God.

"A Mother and Son: A Shared Mystical Experience" is the title of the final chapter (pp. 105–38). Book 9 opens with the birth of Augustine into Christianity and closes with the death of his mother, and Vaught perspicaciously sees how Augustine "is just beginning to live when his mother dies, and it suggests that the death of the person who has smothered him for so long might be necessary if he is ever to embrace a life of his own" (p. 105). Given such shrewdness, it is curious that Monica as representing *mater ecclesia* is nowhere addressed. Vaught sees her playing many roles: a symbol of all God does *ex nihilo* (p. 120), the epitome of how the grace of God defeats the power of man, or more to the point at hand, an abusive husband like Patricius (p. 121); she symbolizes the communal peacemaker (p. 122) as well as God's handmaid and servant (p. 123). What Monica does, how-

ever—and this is the main thrust of book 9's communal ecstasy—is to bring her son into his true mother, the Catholic Church, where the possibility of genuine community exists, and not, say, into local sects like the Donatists which have provincially cut themselves off from the true Body of Christ.

Carl G. Vaught is Professor of Philosophy at Baylor University. As was the case with volume one, this is a fine work containing many precious insights into the content and structure of the *Confessions*. When volume three, presumably of books 10–13, appears, this trilogy will prove to be among the more helpful commentaries in both understanding and teaching Augustine.—David Vincent Meconi, S.J., *University of Oxford*

WATKINS, Eric. *Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. xi + 451 pp. Cloth, \$75.00; paper, \$32.99—In *Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality* Eric Watkins embarks upon a revision of the standard anti-Humean interpretation of Kant's theory of causality. Like Caesar's Gaul the book is divided into three parts, each consisting of two chapters. The overarching thesis of the book, as fleshed out in part two, is that Kant's Critical treatment of causality, which emerges by a close reading of both the second and third analogies of experience within the Transcendental Logic's Analytic of Principles, should be understood in terms of mutually interacting substances endowed with causal powers.

In part one Watkins lays the groundwork for his later analysis of Kantian causality in the *Critique of Pure Reason* by means of an intensive survey of the Leibnizian and post-Leibnizian philosophical literature dealing with causality in the early and middle decades of the eighteenth century, up to and including various pre-Critical writings of Kant. The two leading candidate theories of causality in circulation at the time were those of Preestablished Harmony and Physical Influx. Kant's eventual Critical position will result from a transcendental adaptation of the highly rationalist slant on efficient causality presented in various versions of the latter theory. In the third and final part of the book Watkins applies his conclusions regarding the metaphysical apparatus of Kantian causality to several problem areas. Among them are: (1) Kant's understanding of freedom in the Third Antinomy; (2) several contemporary philosophical concerns to which a revised conception of Kantian causality might make a significant contribution—such as the freedom versus determinism debate and the status of the laws of nature; and, most importantly, (3) the proper way to understand Kant's reply to Hume.

As a corollary to his main thesis, Watkins contends that Kant's Critical treatment of causality was not the result of a rude Humean awakening in which he was shocked into the need for a

direct refutation of Hume's skeptical position on necessary connection. Rather, Kant's metaphysical model of causality is said to be incommensurable with the event-based epistemology of Hume; hence, a direct refutation was not in order. Watkins sees Kant's model as in direct competition with that of Hume, as an alternative account that successfully resolved the outstanding philosophical problems of dogmatic rationalism. Some readers might disagree that incommensurability between the positions of Kant and Hume, even if true, provides an insufficient basis for claiming that Kant was not attempting to refute Hume, and that the traditional anti-Humean way of describing Kantian causality is mistaken. Watkins makes a good case for his position, but it is unclear to me that a refutation requires a common framework or language. These are familiar Quinean and Kuhnian questions that have not yet been laid to rest.

According to Watkins, Kant's view of causality in general, and his alternative solution to that of Hume in particular, are captured in the phrase "the causality of the cause," although Kant never quite proves the existence of latent powers within substances (p. 232). In several of his pre-Critical works, such as the *Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy* (1763), Kant had argued in favor of the need to distinguish between real and merely logical grounds in order to establish how the successive states of one substance could be determined by another. Watkins holds that this distinction is carried over into the *First Critique*. Interestingly, Watkins argues that Kant's invocation of a real force within substances is reminiscent of his analysis of self-consciousness, an activity whereby we do have an awareness of our own synthetic activity.

Watkins points out that Kant agrees with Hume that no logical necessary connection can be discerned in factual relationships between events. Moreover, in his Third Analogy Kant is clear that an event-based model of causality won't work since mutual interactions between substances are a prerequisite for our knowledge of coexistence. In his Second Analogy Kant maintains that any temporal determination of events presupposes causal laws, unlike Hume who takes such temporal relations as unproblematic. Thus real grounds must exist in order to exert the substantial activity necessary to bring about changes in the states of passive substances. Also, real causal grounds are not changed in exerting causal influence, for this would bring up the specter of an infinite regress as all changes require an explanation. One obvious problem for Kant's view concerning real causal grounds is that it threatens to push past his noumenal threshold. Whether you agree with Watkins's reconstruction of Kantian causality or not, he defends the prospects of realistic causal analysis in a quantum world that would relegate causation to nothing less than an antiquarian curiosity.—Glenn Statile, *St. John's University*.

WIRTH, Jason M. *The Conspiracy of Life: Meditations on Schelling and His Time*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003. 290 pp. Cloth, \$71.50; paper, \$23.95—Jason Wirth aims to resurrect interest in Schelling's philosophy in order to effect a transformation of our relationship to nature. Wirth believes that we do violence to nature because we mistakenly understand it mechanistically. He would thus like to overcome the mechanistic conception of nature in the hopes that this will transform our instrumental violence into a love of all beings. His book is intended to contribute to this revolution by offering "eight meditations on different ways of entering into the thinking of Schelling" (p. 2).

The first meditation emphasizes the priority that Schelling accords to the good over the true. This priority entails avoiding the mistake of attempting "to make too much sense of the Good," and instead allowing "reason [to grow] silent before the mystery of its origin" (p. 15). Attempting to make sense of the good would be a mistake, Wirth contends, because "positive existents are nonsubstitutable events, not just concrete instantiations of abstract positions. Their concretude . . . defies the abstraction that would sublimate them" (p. 21). Consequently, a rational science of beings should be forsaken and replaced by the recognition that "there is no proper result, only the various potencies of the conspiracy of life" (p. 18).

Schelling's conclusion that thinking must attend to the becoming of the whole of nature is traced in the second and third meditations to his appropriation of Spinoza, which was stimulated by the Pantheism Controversy and, in particular, by "Jacobi's insistence . . . that thinking begin with that which it could not know" (p. 49). Schelling, Wirth claims, took the step for which Jacobi's skepticism paved the way by calling for a "conscientiousness [that] is something like what the Buddhists called *bodhicitta*, enlightened consciousness, which is, at the same time, the falling away of the ego and the commencement of the Great Compassion, the *maha karuna*, the love of all beings" (p. 28).

The dissolution of the ego and the emergence of love are made possible, according to the fourth meditation, by intellectual intuition. This is "the intuition of the nothing that grants things and that dwells within them, complicating their status as things" (p. 123). Because the task of philosophy is to think this "inexpressible root" (p. 121) of all being and language, philosophy must be "a negative dialectic that results finally in nothing, in a growing silent" (p. 102). This philosophical silence, Wirth concludes, is the necessary precondition of transforming our relationship to nature: "Life itself, the very life of life, depends on the release of life from within the word" (p. 113).

The fifth meditation explores Schelling's contention that art can present the inexhaustible freedom of nature that philosophy cannot comprehend or articulate. The sixth examines Schelling's account of evil as freedom's paradoxical propensity to resist its

own infinite play of differences in favor of allowing the formation and persistence of static identities. The seventh meditation considers the manifestation of Schelling's thinking in his dialogue, *Clara*, and the eighth analyzes Schelling's reading of the *Bhagavad-Gita* as "an early revelation of [his own] doctrine of potencies" (p. 221). Schelling realized, according to Wirth, that "yoga [is] the becoming inward and sharing in the creative movement of the wheel of being. . . . The aim of thinking is finally, a kind of Nirvana, found—if rarely—even in philosophy. . . . God's creatures, having passed the test of the separation of forces, seek to unite with it in original nothingness and emptiness" (pp. 232–3).

Wirth is sensitive to the fact that the position he attributes to Schelling, and which he himself enthusiastically endorses, is easy to dismiss as a kind of mysticism claiming privileged epistemic access for its adherents: "is not this Great Death the night when all Buddhas are black, the night when everything melts into the mystical one?" (p. 102). But his denial is unpersuasive. It is difficult to interpret Wirth's characterization of intellectual intuition as "an epiphany that alters fundamentally the experience of things . . . an experience of the animation of nature itself" (p. 157) as anything other than mystical. Moreover, his response to anyone who fails to agree with his position, or who asks for clarification, is simply that they have not yet been privileged to have the required epiphany. Schelling himself claimed that "whoever does not have intellectual intuition cannot understand what is said of it, and hence it cannot be taught to them at all" (p. 115), and Wirth adds that "those who demand sharp distinction and exact definitions . . . should, from the outset, abandon Schelling. Of course, there is little chance that they can recognize anything other than themselves anyway" (p. 160). The reader of this book must decide which is more tyrannical, Wirth's *ad hominem* dismissal of rational disagreement, or the attempt to comprehend nature that he pleads for us to abandon.—Will Dudley, *Williams College*.

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CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES*

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 79, No. 1, Winter 2005

On the Rehabilitation of Virtue, MAX SCHELER

Max Scheler's essay on virtue, first published under a pseudonym in 1913, begins with some reflection upon the decline in his era of a concern for virtue. Its central theme is a phenomenological exhibition of the Christian experience of humility, reverence, and related concepts, together with an exploration of their historical and social embodiments in Western culture. The core of humility is a spiritual readiness to serve, related to love, that produces in its possessor a liberation from the ego. The core of reverence is its sense of what surpasses our vision. It has the power to reveal to us the deeper value and being in all things. The paper contains elements of a polemic directed against scientific naturalism.

A Postscript to Max Scheler's "On the Rehabilitation of Virtue,"
EUGENE KELLY

The translator of Scheler's essay "On the Rehabilitation of Virtue" presents an account of the context of this essay in Scheler's work and of its relevance to his concept of the *ordo amoris* and to his critique of Kant. The translator discusses the intended audience of the essay, its moral purpose, and the method of its procedure. The postscript further reflects on the essay's central themes of humility and reverence, suggesting avenues for a critical assessment of Scheler's conclusions. It ends with some reflections on the contemporary value of Scheler's contributions in this essay to a historical and philosophical understanding of the conflict between science and religion.

*Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review*. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed.

The Personality of Max Scheler, DIETRICH VON HILDEBRAND

Dietrich von Hildebrand, a close friend of Max Scheler since 1907, wrote this assessment of Scheler's personality and philosophical style in 1928, just months after Scheler's death. He explores the extraordinarily rich lived contact with being out of which Scheler philosophized. At the same time he acknowledges the lack of philosophical rigor in many of Scheler's analyses. He brings out the restlessness of Scheler's mind and person that resulted from a one-sided passion for coming to know things; Scheler was not able to dwell with things or persons once he had come to know them. Von Hildebrand also explores the relation of Scheler's thought to Catholicism and offers an interpretation of Scheler's abandonment of Catholicism in his last years.

Exemplary Persons and Ethics: The Significance of St. Francis for the Philosophy of Max Scheler, JOHN R. WHITE

For Max Scheler, St. Francis represented perhaps the highest ideal of the moral life, an ideal he felt compelled to articulate throughout his philosophical work. This paper examines the significance of the person of St. Francis for Scheler's philosophy. It begins by developing Scheler's notion of "exemplary person," the idea that persons act as influences on moral life and thought. Then the hypothesis is advanced that St. Francis functioned as an exemplary person for Scheler. Finally, an attempt is offered to justify that hypothesis by examining Scheler's discussion of Francis in *Sympathy* and by comparing Scheler's philosophy to elements of the thought of Bonaventure and of Scotus. The paper concludes with a discussion of the significance of using exemplary persons for understanding the history of philosophy.

Person and Obligation: Critical Reflections on the Anti-Authoritarian Strain in Scheler's Personalism, JOHN F. CROSBY

In the course of his polemic against Kant's moral philosophy, Scheler was led to depreciate moral obligation and its place in the existence of persons. This depreciation is part of a larger antiauthoritarian strain in his personalism. This essay attempts to retrieve certain truths about moral obligation that tend to get lost in Scheler: moral obligation is not merely "medicinal" but has a place at the highest levels of moral life; the freedom of persons is lived in an incompable way in responding to moral obligation; obligation and obedience even have an indispensable place in the existence of Christians. Drawing on the studies of Scheler by Rudolf Otto, Karol Wojtyla, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and Dietrich von Hildebrand, this paper shows how Scheler's personalism is corrected and enhanced once we distance ourselves from his antiauthoritarian animus against obligation and restore obligation to its place in the existence of persons.

The "Cape Horn" of Scheler's Ethics, PHILIP BLOSSER

This paper disputes Scheler's view that good and evil cannot be willed as such; that moral value is always an inevitable and indirect by-product of willing other ends; that every act of willing yields a moral value; and that moral value attaches only to persons. In this paper it is argued that moral value attaches to a variety of objects of willing (including one's own moral worth) and that, although all acts have moral implications, not all acts are typologically moral. Those that are, it is suggested, typically involve a transactional categoriality where we take another's good or bad as our own. Those that are not may yield various values of personal willing whose positive or negative value is typologically nonmoral. Also, it is denied that obligation is diminished by value-insight or that all norms are categorially moral.

Scheler versus Scheler: The Case for a Better Ontology of the Person, JONATHAN J. SANFORD

Scheler's theory of the person is at the center of his philosophy and one of the most celebrated of his achievements. It is somewhat surprising, then, that a straightforward and sufficient account of the person is missing from his works, an omission felt most keenly in that work which is in large measure dedicated to forging a new personalism, *The Formalism in Ethics and nonFormal Ethics of Values*. In his explicit accounts of what a person is, Scheler stresses its spirituality and claims that it lives and has its being wholly in the execution of its acts. But in forging his personalism, Scheler makes a number of claims which require an account of the person that reaches deeper than its executed acts. This essay focuses on the accounts of the person given in the *Formalism* and uses Scheler to improve Scheler's theory of the person.

Scheler on the Twofold Source of Personal Uniqueness, JOSHUA MILLER

In Scheler's middle-period philosophical anthropology there is a latent distinction between personal uniqueness as divinely determined and as self-determined. The first dimension is more explicit; the second, a logical conclusion from Scheler's notion of person as pure spirit. The following study first thematizes these two aspects of personal uniqueness. Then, it explores Scheler's idea that one gains knowledge of these aspects of a person through love. Here Scheler's differentiation between love as intuitive and love as participative serves to justify and further explain the above distinction in personal uniqueness. Through intuitive love one is especially able to grasp the divinely determined dimension of another, his ideal and individual value essence. Through participative love one is especially able to grasp that dimension of another's uniqueness which he himself forms through his own freedom.

Scheler on Repentance, JOSEF SEIFERT

The author studies Scheler's essay, "Repentance and Rebirth," gathering together and interpreting all the insights of Scheler on repentance, and often reading them in the light of Dietrich von Hildebrand's work in the philosophy of religion. The author examines Scheler's critique of the reductionist accounts of repentance as well as Scheler's own account. He gives particular attention to one basic problem in Scheler's account of repentance, namely, a tendency to let forgiveness arise in the repentant person simply by the force of the act of repenting and not to give due weight to the divine initiative without which there is no forgiveness.

Personalism and the Metaphysical: Comments on "Max Scheler's Acting Persons," JOHN J. DRUMMOND

This article is a review of the recently published book *Max Scheler's Acting Persons*, edited by Stephen Schneek. It considers some issues regarding the relation between Scheler's phenomenological personalism and his later metaphysics by way of a discussion of the articles contained in this volume. The review explores the various and varied discussions of the relation between Scheler's phenomenological notions of person and spirit. It suggests that Scheler's turn from a phenomenological anthropology to metaphysics has its roots not only in this notion of spirit, which is distinguished both from Husserl's absolute consciousness and from Heidegger's Dasein, but also in the ontology of values that is embedded in Scheler's phenomenological axiology.

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 79, No. 2, Spring 2005

Storytelling and Philosophy in Plato's "Republic," JACOB HOWLAND

Scholarly convention holds that in Plato's mind *logos* and *muthos* are fundamentally opposed, the former being the medium of philosophy and the latter of poetry. The author of this article argues that *muthos* in the broad sense of story or narrative in fact plays an indispensable philosophical role in the *Republic*. In particular, any account of the nature and power of justice and injustice must begin with powers of the soul that can come to light only through the telling and interpretation of stories. This is implicit in Glaucon's Gygean tale. Read in connection with the earlier tale of Gyges in Herodotus, Glaucon's *muthos* shows itself to be a story about storytelling and interpretation, knowledge of self and others, and the discovery of the roots of justice and injustice.

Catholic Cartesian Dualism: A Reply to Freddoso, CHRISTOPHER GILBERT

Alfred Freddoso has argued that Cartesian dualism cannot serve as the model for a philosophical anthropology that will be consistent with the plain sense of Church teachings. The author of this paper disagrees. Although the interpretation of Cartesian dualism to which Freddoso objects is not unwarranted by the Cartesian texts, a close reading of those texts suggests a different interpretation. This paper defends a reading of Cartesian dualism that departs from the one which Freddoso discusses. It is then demonstrated that this alternative reading is consonant with the teachings of the Church.

Malebranche's Occasionalism: A Strategic Reinterpretation, ALAN BAKER

The core thesis of Malebranche's doctrine of occasionalism is that God is the sole true cause, where a true cause is one that has the power to initiate change and for which the mind perceives a necessary connection between it and its effects. Malebranche gives two separate arguments for his core thesis, T, based on necessary connection and on divine power respectively. The standard view is that these two arguments are necessary to establish T. The author of this article argues for a reinterpretation of Malebranche's strategy, according to which the Necessary Connection Argument alone is sufficient to establish T. The Divine Power Argument, which is anyway weaker, is needed not to support T but to bridge the gap between T and full-fledged occasionalism. Specifically, it is needed to rule out the existence of causal powers in nature, a scenario which is consistent with T but inconsistent with occasionalism.

The Facticity of Being God-forsaken: The Young Heidegger and Luther's Theology of the Cross, SEAN J. McGRATH

The early Freiburg lectures have shown us the degree to which Heidegger is influenced by Luther. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger designs a philosophy that can coexist with a radical Lutheran theology of revelation. Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity constitutes a polemic with the Scholastic idea of a natural desire for God and an accommodation of a theology of revelation. However, Heidegger's implicit assent to the Lutheran concept of God-forsakenness is philosophically problematic. To be God-forsaken is not to be ignorant of God; it is to be abandoned by God, to have a history of dealing with God that has resulted in a decisive rupture and distance. But if this is a theological position, as Luther would be the first to argue, it can be justified only theologically.

Hauntological Hermeneutics and the Interpretation of Christian Faith: On Being Dead Equal Before God, JOHN D. CAPUTO

Using Kierkegaard's *Works of Love*, the author of this essay advocates a theory of interpretation as a conversation with the dead, of the same sort Kierkegaard was practicing in the last discourse of his book. This does not mean reading the works of dead, white, European males, but looking at things from the perspective of the grave where, as Kierkegaard says, we are all equal before God. This paper maintains that the creative conflict of interpretations arises from the ambiguity of this conversation, from the difficulty we have in making out just what the dead are saying, which the author relates to what Derrida calls the absolute "secret." Whence the Derridean idea that only as "hauntology" is hermeneutics possible. The interpretation of religious faith is inserted within this hauntological hermeneutical framework.

Against God's Moral Goodness, JOSEPH L. LOMBARDI, S.J.

While denying that God has moral obligations, William Alston defends divine moral goodness based on God's performance of supererogatory acts. The present article argues that an agent without obligations cannot perform supererogatory acts. Hence, divine moral goodness cannot be established on that basis. Defenses of divine moral obligation by Eleonore Stump and Nicholas Wolterstorff are also questioned. Against Stump, it is argued (among other things) that the temptations of Jesus do not establish the existence of a tendency to sin in a divine being. Hence, Stump's Christological objection to Alston's denial of divine moral obligation fails. Some counterexamples to that denial offered by Wolterstorff also fail. It is concluded that claims of divine moral goodness remain problematic.

Sincerity and Vulnerability, A. T. NUYEN

The aim of this paper is to explore the perplexity of the notion of sincerity, chiefly by examining Lionel Thrilling's account in his *Sincerity and Authenticity*. The author of this article shows that his account is problematic if interpreted as a "truthfulness account." However, it is also shown that his basic insight can be preserved in the author's own account of sincerity as a kind of congruence between the agent's avowal and those beliefs, feelings, and dispositions that constitute the agent's "true self." The latter include a set of minimally morally acceptable beliefs, feelings, and dispositions that constitute the agent's moral integrity. Further, the context of sincerity is one in which the agent realizes that his integrity, particularly the moral part, is vulnerable.

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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Vagueness as Closeness, NICHOLAS J. J. SMITH

This paper presents and defends a definition of vagueness, compares it favorably with alternative definitions, and draws out some consequences of accepting this definition for the project of offering a substantive theory of vagueness. The definition is roughly this: a predicate "*F*" is vague just in case for any objects *a* and *b*, if *a* and *b* are very close in respects relevant to the possession of *F*, then "*Fa*" and "*Fb*" are very close in respect of truth. The definition is extended to cover vagueness of many-place predicates, of properties and relations, and of objects. Some of the most important advantages of the definition are that it captures the intuitions which motivate the thought that vague predicates are tolerant, without leading to contradiction, and that it yields a clear understanding of the relationships between higher-order vagueness, sorites susceptibility, blurred boundaries, and borderline cases. The most notable consequence of the definition is that the correct theory of vagueness must countenance degrees of truth.

Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Angst, DUNCAN PRITCHARD

A commonly expressed worry in the contemporary literature on the problem of epistemological skepticism is that there is something deeply intellectually unsatisfying about the dominant antiskeptical theories. In this paper the main approaches to skepticism are outlined, and it is argued that they each fail to capture what is essential to the skeptical challenge because they fail to understand fully the role that the problem of epistemic luck plays in that challenge. Further, it is argued that skepticism is best thought of not as a quandary directed at our possession of knowledge *simpliciter*, but rather as concerned with a specific kind of knowledge that is epistemically desirable. On this view, the source of skepticism lies in a peculiarly epistemic form of *angst*.

Resurrecting the Tracking Theories, FRED ADAMS and MURRAY CLARKE

Much of contemporary epistemology proceeds on the assumption that tracking theories of knowledge, such as those of Dretske and Nozick are dead. The word on the street is that Kripke and others

killed these theories with their counterexamples, and that epistemology must move in a new direction as a result. In this paper the authors defend the tracking theories against purportedly deadly objections. Life is detected in the tracking theories, despite what is perceived to be a premature burial.

Presentism and Ontological Symmetry, JOSEPH DIEKEMPER

In this paper the author argues that there is an inconsistency between two presentist doctrines: that of ontological symmetry and asymmetry of fixity. The former refers to the presentist belief that the past and future are equally unreal. The latter refers to the A-Theoretic intuition that the past is closed or actual, and the future is open or potential. The position of this paper is that the presentist is unable to account for the temporal asymmetry that is so fundamentally a part of his theory. Section 1 briefly outlines a recent defense of presentism according to Craig and argues that a flaw in this defense highlights the tension between the presentist's doctrines of ontological symmetry and asymmetry of fixity. Section 2 undertakes an investigation, on the presentist's behalf, in order to determine whether he is capable of reconciling these two doctrines. In the course of the investigation, different asymmetries are considered, other than that of ontology, which might be said fundamentally to constitute temporal asymmetry, and the asymmetry of fixity in particular. Section 3 considers whether the presentist is able to avail himself of some of the standard B-Theoretic accounts of the asymmetry of fixity and argues that he cannot. Finally, the paper concludes that temporal asymmetry cannot be accounted for (or explained) other than through the postulation of an ontological asymmetry.

In Defence of Sceptical Theism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy,
MICHAEL BERGMANN and MICHAEL REA

Some evidential arguments from evil rely on an inference of the following sort: "If, after thinking hard, we can't think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some horrific evil, then it is likely that there is no such reason." Sceptical theists, including the authors of this article, say that this inference is not a good one and that evidential arguments from evil that depend on it are, as a result, unsound. Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy have argued (in a previous issue of this journal) that Michael Bergmann's way of developing the sceptical theist response to such arguments fails because it commits those who endorse it to a sort of skepticism that undermines ordinary moral practice. In this paper Bergmann's sceptical theist response is defended against this charge.

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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Nietzsche on Truth, Illusion, and Redemption, R. LANIER
ANDERSON

Nietzsche's views on truth have provoked controversy: some commentators emphasize texts attacking the possibility and/or desirability of truth, while others highlight Nietzsche's praise for honesty, truth, and science. The paper reconciles tensions between these two strands within Nietzsche by showing (1) how apparently conflicting claims about the existence of truth can be understood within a consistent epistemology, and (2) how Nietzsche's remarks (pro and con) about truth's value arise because the best sort of life requires both rigorous honesty and "saving illusions." The paper explains Nietzsche's conception of the good life by appeal to eternal recurrence, and argues that both honesty and illusion, as merely regulative ideals, can consistently play roles in affirming recurrence. For Nietzsche, we need "saving illusions" to achieve redemption in his sense, which is sharply distinguished from Christian redemption, and the result illuminates Nietzsche's doctrine of "creation of values."

Foucault, Butler and the Body, DAVID DUDRICK

Kant and Nonconceptual Content, ROBERT HANNA

Perhaps the most famous and widely quoted—but perhaps also the most generally misunderstood—line in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is this pithy slogan: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (CPR A51/B76). Leaving aside empty thoughts, is Kant saying that intuitions without concepts simply do not exist, or exist but are meaningless? Or, is he saying that intuitions without concepts do exist and are meaningful, but in a way that is sharply different from that of concepts? The aim of this paper is to relate Kant's distinction between intuitions and concepts to the contemporary debate about nonconceptual mental content. The main thesis of the paper is that Kant not only defends the existence and meaningfulness of nonconceptual content, but also offers a fundamental explanation of nonconceptual content that can be directly transferred to the contemporary debate and significantly advance it.

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 45, No. 3, September 2005

Modernity and Postmodernity: A False Dichotomy, AVERY FOUTS

This article is the third in a series. In the first, the author argues that existence is a property. In the second, based on the fact that existence is a property, he contends that Descartes's dream and malicious demon arguments are constituted by a fallacy with the result that he creates an illicit rift between thought and the external world that characterizes modernity. In this essay, it is shown that postmodernists overlook this fallacy and are forced to operate within the parameters set by it. Consequently, modernity and postmodernity form a false dichotomy with realism as the appropriate alternative. Descartes is taken as the representative of modernity and Caputo of postmodernity. The paper closes by showing that Caputo's intuition that the traditional notion of truth must be rejected in order to eliminate dogmatism stems from this false dichotomy.

Spinoza's Response to Maimonides: A Practical Strategy for Resolving the Tension between Reason and Revelation,
STEVEN FRANKEL

Spinoza resolves the tension between reason and revelation by granting reason complete authority and autonomy in all philosophical and natural matters and by denying revelation any claims to knowledge. Despite this dramatic partisanship, he attempts to make this solution attractive to believers by creating a hermeneutic that allows a limited claim to knowledge for revelation. This article attempts to explain how he arrived at this strategy and why he believed it would succeed.

The Place of Reason in Advaita Vedanta, BINA GUPTA

It is commonly taken for granted that in Vedānta, as also in Indian philosophy in general, *yukti*, *anumāna*, and *tarka* translate into "reason" (of Western thought) while *œrutī* is rendered as "revelation." The author of this article rejects this translation-interpretation; it is a good example of the way in which Sanskrit philosophical discourse is often misconstrued. The term *œrutī* does not refer to revelation, nor do *yukti*, *anumāna*, or *tarka* to reason. Reason, the author argues, comprehends all the *pramanas*; these are all means of legitimizing beliefs. The paper distinguishes between different levels of the application of "reason," and it maintains that the mere reasoner (*tārkika*) has not grasped the true nature of "reason." In ef-

fect, it is maintained that *œabda*, both *lawika* and *ahukika*, is a component of reason, and so is perception. There is no concept of "revelation" in Indian philosophy, and no opposition between reason and experience.

The Rest of Cajetan's Analogy Theory: De Nominum Analogia, Chapters 4–11, JOSHUA P. HOCHSCHILD

The influence of Cajetan's *De Nominum Analogia* is due largely to its first three chapters, which introduce Cajetan's three modes of analogy: analogy of inequality, analogy of attribution, and analogy of proportionality. Interpreters typically ignore the final eight chapters, which describe further features of analogy of proportionality. This article explains this neglect as a symptom of a failure to appreciate Cajetan's particular semantic concerns, taken independently from the question of systematizing the thought of Aquinas. After an exegesis of the neglected chapters, which describe the semantics of analogy through the three levels of cognition (simple apprehension, composition and division, and discursive reasoning), the article concludes with observations about the relationship between Cajetan and Aquinas and the philosophical and historical significance of Cajetan's approach to the semantics of analogy.

A Natural Response to Boonin, ANDREW J. PEACH

In his *A Defense of Abortion* David Boonin largely misreads one of the oldest and most defensible arguments against abortion, the argument based on the fetus's rational nature. In this paper it will be shown that Boonin's characterization of this argument is inaccurate, that his criticisms of it are therefore ineffective, and that his own criterion—the possession of a "present, dispositional, ideal desire for a future like ours"—is insufficient to ground a human being's right to life. Boonin's misread of this classic argument is largely the result of his focus on the "properties" of a fetus, as opposed to its nature, and his failure to consider the notion of a rational nature as ordered to rational activities. In addition, his argument for abortion rights fails on its own terms because it ultimately licenses infanticide. Infants have desires, and they possess a future like ours, but they do not have any desire for a future like ours.

Following Nature with Mengzi or Zhuangzi, FRANCIS PERKINS

This paper examines the idea of "following nature" in two classical Chinese thinkers, Mengzi and Zhuangzi. The goal is to complicate appeals to "following nature" in Asian thought and to problematize the very imposition of the concept "nature" on Zhuangzi and Mengzi. The paper begins by establishing some common ground between Mengzi and Zhuangzi based on two points—both view harmony with *tian* (heaven/nature) as a primary aspect of living well, and both

require a process of self-transformation to reach this harmony. The second part of the paper argues that Mengzi and Zhuangzi give different answers to a similar question. That question is: what does it mean to follow or be in harmony with *tian*? The essay concludes with some reflections on how "following nature" in Zhuangzi and Mengzi might apply to environmental ethics.

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Evaluating Social Reasons: Hobbes vs. Hegel, ANTHONY SIMON
LADEN

The paper develops a Hegelian approach to the evaluation of social reasons, reasons whose authority derives from norms of a plural subject. The Hegelian approach is contrasted along two dimensions with a Hobbesian approach, familiar from the work of David Gauthier. Where the Hobbesian requires that all social reasons are ultimately evaluated from an individual standpoint, the Hegelian approach allows social standpoints to play the fundamental evaluative role. Where the Hobbesian builds reasons out of ingredients to be found in an individual psyche that are thus essentially private, the Hegelian builds reasons out of principles of the will, which are essentially public and sharable. After drawing the contrasts, the author of this paper defends the Hegelian approach against some Hobbesian objections and points to further work that needs to be done in order fully to develop the Hegelian approach.

Toward a Projectivist Account of Color, EDWARD WILSON
AVERILL

Color objectivism holds that the colors we visually attribute to objects are vision-independent properties (color realism) and that our perceptual representations of objects as colored are, in many cases, not only veridical but caused in a way that justifies the perceiver in believing that his visual representations are veridical. Using color variation arguments, this essay begins with a criticism of the objectivist theory of Alex Byrne and David Hilbert and goes on to set out a projectivist account that gives up their perceptual, but not their realist, assumption. The projectivism developed here explains how colors like red and green enter the visual system, and how the role they play in that system makes the objects we see, which are not colored, look colored. Surprisingly, the color properties we linguistically attribute to objects are not those we visually attribute to objects.

The Dif, KADRI VIHVELIN and TERRANCE TOMKOW

Common sense tells us that there is a moral difference between doing harm and merely allowing it, that killing is morally worse than letting die. But philosophers have found it hard to say what the difference is or why it matters morally. We offer an account of the difference and argue for its moral significance in the context of debates about euthanasia, abortion, and "Bad Samaritan" laws. Common sense moral theory emerges from this analysis as coherent, subtle, and inherently deontological. Understanding the difference between doing and allowing makes it possible to formulate a coherent alternative to consequentialism in ethics.

Wisdom and Perspective, VALERIE TIBERIUS

There are many experiences that can cause us to see life in a different way, to change our priorities or our values, even if only temporarily. A brush with death, for example, can make us take the perspective of "living for the moment," from which simple pleasures seem much more important than career success or other long term achievements. Even those who have not been in such a threatening situation are likely to recognize the experience of a perspective shift. Major life events trigger shifts in perspective and minor shifts in our attention to values happen frequently. This paper argues that shifts in evaluative perspective are vital for living a prudentially good life and that this fact has important implications for how we conceive of practical wisdom.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
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Peculiar Perfection: Peter Abelard on Propositional Attitudes,
MARTIN LENZ

In the course of the debates on Priscian's notion of the perfect sentence, the philosopher Peter Abelard developed a theory that closely resembles modern accounts of propositional attitudes and that goes far beyond the established Aristotelian conceptions of the sentence. According to Abelard, the perfection of a sentence does not depend on the content that it expresses but on the fact that the content is stated along with the propositional attitude toward the content. This paper tries to provide an analysis and a consistent interpretation of Abelard's arguments within the framework of the mediaeval models of language and mind.

Descartes and Malebranche on Thought, Sensation and the Nature of the Mind, ANTONIA LOLORDO

Malebranche famously objects to Descartes's argument that the nature of the mind is better known than the nature of body as follows: if we had an idea of the mind's nature we would know the possible range of modes of the mind, including the sensory modes, but we do not know those modes and thus cannot have an idea of the mind's nature. This paper argues that Malebranche's objections are readily answerable from within the Cartesian system. This argument involves examining the status of sensations in Descartes, innate ideas, and Malebranche's occasionalism.

Condillac's Paradox, LORNE FALKENSTEIN

This article argues that Condillac was committed to four mutually inconsistent propositions: that the mind is unextended, that sensations are modifications of the mind, that colors are sensations, and that colors are extended. The paper argues that this inconsistency was not just the blunder of a second-rate philosopher but the consequence of a deep-seated tension in the views of early modern philosophers on the nature of the mind, sensation, and secondary qualities, and that more widely studied figures, notably Condillac's contemporaries, Hume and Reid, were not ultimately any more successful at developing an account of vision that unproblematically avoids the paradox. In passing, the author takes issue with Nicholas Pastore's account of how Condillac's *Treatise on Sensations* deals with the visual perception of form (in *A Selective History of Theories of Visual Perception*).

Brentano's Intentionality Thesis: Beyond the Analytic and Phenomenological Readings, P. J. BARTOK

Philosophers in the analytic and phenomenological traditions have interpreted Brentano's intentionality thesis, and his empirical psychology more generally, in significantly different ways. Disregarding Brentano's distinctive psychological method, analytic philosophers have typically read him as a philosopher of mind, and his intentionality thesis as a contribution to the Cartesian project of clarifying the distinction between the mental and the physical. Phenomenologists, while more attentive to his method, tended to read Brentano as merely "on the way" to a truly phenomenological approach. This paper offers a third reading of Brentano's thesis, one that attends to both the motivating concerns and the distinctive methodological features of his psychological project.

Getting the Quasi-Picture: Twardowskian Representationalism and Husserl's Argument Against It, RYAN HICKERSON

This paper advances an account of Twardowski as a representationalist. In particular, Twardowskian representationalism is a blend of what the author of this article calls resemblance representationalism and mediator-content representationalism. It was not, this paper argues, proxy-percept representationalism. Twardowski treated mental contents as "signs" or "quasi-pictures." Husserl was a well known critic of this view. Additionally, it is argued that Husserl's criticism is grounded in the claim that Twardowski conflated representational content with sensations. The distinction on which this Husserlian criticism rests is between the psychological and ideal contents of consciousness, the cornerstone of the early Husserlian phenomenology.

MIND

Vol. 114, No. 455, July 2005

Noise and Perceptual Indiscriminability, BENJ HELLIE

Perception represents colors inexactly. This inexactness results from phenomenally manifest noise and results in apparent violations of the transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. Whether these violations are genuine depends on what is meant by "transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability."

Why Be Rational? NIKO KOLODNY

Normativity involves two kinds of relation. On the one hand, there is the relation of being a reason for. This is a relation between a fact and an attitude. On the other hand, there are relations specified by requirements of rationality. These are relations among a person's attitudes, viewed in abstraction from the reasons for them. The author of this article asks how the normativity of rationality—the sense in which we "ought" to comply with requirements of rationality—is related to the normativity of reasons—the sense in which we "ought" to have the attitudes that we have conclusive reason to have. The normativity of rationality is not straightforwardly that of reasons, the author argues; there are no reasons to comply with rational requirements in general. First, this would lead to "bootstrapping" because, contrary to the claims of John Broome, not all rational requirements have "wide scope." Second, it is unclear what such reasons to be rational might be. Finally, we typically do not, and in many cases could not, treat rational requirements as reasons. Instead, this paper suggests, rationality is only apparently normative, and the normativity that it appears to have is that of reasons. According to this

"Transparency Account," rational requirements govern our responses to our beliefs about reasons. The normative pressure that we feel, when rational requirements apply to us, derives from these beliefs: from the reasons that, as it seems to us, we have.

The Particular–Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics?
FRASER MACBRIDE

Is the assumption of a fundamental distinction between particulars and universals another unsupported dogma of metaphysics? F. P. Ramsey famously rejected the particular–universal distinction but neglected to consider the many different conceptions of the distinction that have been advanced. As a contribution to the (inevitably) piecemeal investigation of this issue, three interrelated conceptions of the particular–universal distinction are examined: (1) universals, by contrast to particulars, are unigraic; (2) particulars are related to universals by an asymmetric tie of exemplification; (3) universals are incomplete, whereas particulars are complete. It is argued that these conceptions are wanting in several respects. Sometimes they fail to mark a significant division among entities. Sometimes they make substantial demands upon the shape of reality; once these demands are understood aright it is no longer obvious that the distinction merits our acceptance. The case is made via a discussion of the possibility of multigraic universals.

Composition and Vagueness, TRENTON MERRICKS

"Restricted composition" says that there are some composite objects and that some objects jointly compose nothing at all. The main threat to restricted composition is the influential and widely defended Vagueness Argument. This paper shows that the Vagueness Argument fails. In seeing how this argument fails, a new focus for the debate over composition's extent is discovered.

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Qualitative Unity and the Bundle Theory, DAVID ROBB

This is an articulation and defense of a trope-bundle theory of material objects. The paper answers a charge frequently made against the bundle theory, namely, that it commits a conceptual error in saying that properties are parts of objects. But there is, it is argued, a general and intuitive sense of "part" in which properties are in fact parts of objects. This leads to the question of qualitative

unity: in virtue of what are certain properties unified as parts of an object? First, an account of unity for complex material objects is given. It turns on the thesis that all the properties of complex objects are structural properties. But such an account will not subsume simple objects, since they do not have structural properties. For simples, a more radical account is proposed: a simple object just is a simple property, so that identity delivers the desired unity.

Ordinary Objects, Ordinary Language and Identity, MICHAEL AYERS

The paper concerns the fundamental role of "ordinary objects" with respect to the structure of natural language. It ascribes their role as basic objects of reference to their being natural, given individuals. Section 1 summarizes that idea. Further argument is offered in section 2. An objection appealing to physical theory is answered in section 3. Sections 4–6 consider the implications of the thesis for current theories of the identity of "ordinary objects" over time. Section 4 criticizes some traditional, paradoxical, but still crucially influential arguments. Section 5 focuses on four-dimensionalism and the ontology of possible worlds. Section 6 criticizes the theory of David Wiggins, who recognizes that biological individuals, at least, are both natural and given, but who retains a form of conceptualism. Consideration is given throughout the paper to the wider philosophical motivations of different theories of identity, and to the nature and purposes of philosophical "analysis."

Real Tables, JOHN HEIL

Tables exist. Not all philosophers agree. Some argue that tables, along with rocks, trees, planets, and galaxies are no more than useful fictions. This paper offers a defense of tables against those who would contend that, on the basis of the analysis of the table-concept together with a plausible conception of reality, we can ascertain their nonexistence.

THE MONIST
Vol. 89, No. 1, January 2006

Semantic Regularity and the Liar Paradox, NICHOLAS J. J. SMITH

This paper argues that the Liar paradox forces us to abandon the principle of Semantic Regularity, which says that there are perfectly reliable, principled relationships between our behavior, mental states, and physical environment, on the one hand, and what we mean

by our utterances, on the other hand. Relinquishing Semantic Regularity opens the way to a solution to the Liar which is one hundred percent classical, and which does not generate a strengthened Liar paradox or revenge problem; it also yields solutions to semantic indeterminacy arguments such as those of Quine, Davidson, Putnam, and Kripkenstein, to the problem of empty names, and to a recalcitrant problem in the literature on vagueness, the problem of false precision.

Tarski, the Liar, and Inconsistent Languages, DOUGLAS PATTERSON

Beginning from an interpretive dispute between Greg Ray and Scott Soames, the author discusses Tarski's views on the semantic paradoxes and the languages Tarski called "semantically closed," most importantly natural or "colloquial" languages. It is argued that Tarski's view is quite different from the views usually attributed to him as well as from those standardly on offer in response to the semantic paradoxes. Rather than maintaining that such languages have a set of all and only true sentences of which certain problematic sentences are not members, Tarski denies that they can coherently be taken to have a set of all and only true sentences at all. The consequences of this for the interpretation of Tarski and for the understanding of the semantic paradoxes are discussed.

Compositional Principles versus Schematic Reasoning, HARTRY FIELD

It is often observed that one of the main purposes of the notion of truth is to allow us to formulate generalizations that would otherwise be inexpressible. Among these are generalizations in metalogic, such as that all instances of the deMorgan laws are true. As is also frequently noted, such generalizations cannot be proved from the Tarski truth schema, viewed as the totality of its instances; we need compositional principles. This paper lays out an alternative conception of the Tarskian truth schema (and related schemas of satisfaction and denotation) as more than the totality of its instances, a conception on which the compositional principles and other metalogical generalizations follow. This somewhat demotes the compositional principle from the central role philosophers often assign to them, and the paper discusses some philosophical consequences of this.

There Are nonCircular Paradoxes (But Yablo's Isn't One Of Them!), ROY COOK

The paper begins with a distinction between two different sorts of referential circularity which are often blurred. First, a sentence might refer directly to itself. Second, a sentence might (for example, via Gödelian diagonalization) be equivalent to a second sentence

which refers to the first (a similar distinction is developed for predicates, relations, and so forth). Although logically distinct, it is suggested that both phenomena deserve to the label "circular," along with any philosophical objections such a label might carry with it. All semantic paradoxes appearing in the literature thus far are shown to be circular in one or the other of these senses, but the paper concludes with the construction of a new version of Yablo's paradox which (unlike Yablo's original construction) avoids both sorts of circularity altogether.

What Can the Problem of Mixed Inferences Teach Us About Alethic Pluralism? NIKOLAJ JANG PEDERSEN

Alethic pluralism is the view that truth is many rather than one. Christine Tappolet has argued that the validity of certain inferences—mixed inferences—causes trouble for the view. The paper aims to do three things. First, a distinction is drawn between linguistic and metaphysical alethic pluralism. According to linguistic pluralism, there is no generic truth predicate while, according to metaphysical pluralism, there is no generic truth property. It is granted that Tappolet has presented a compelling case against linguistic pluralism. However, it is argued that linguistic pluralism was never a real contender, and that metaphysical pluralism—the more interesting view—remains untouched. The sparse conception of properties plays a crucial role in the argument. Second, it is suggested that the (metaphysical) pluralist can endorse a statement which, on a standard reading, would commit him to the existence of a generic truth property, and yet can stay true to his view that there is no such property by adopting an alternative reading. This is argued for by appeal to Boolos's work on plurals. Third, three versions of alethic pluralism are sketched which differ significantly in terms of their metaphysical assumptions. The first version countenances only properties, the second rejects properties and admits only pluralities, while the third accommodates both.

Representation, Truth, and Realism, FRANK JACKSON

Many have noted the attractions of representationalist approaches in the philosophy of mind and in the philosophy of language. This essay is concerned with how some central issues in the debate over truth look when one sees them through representationalist eyes. One result is that some kind of correspondence theory is correct for truth for belief and for truth for sentences, but that the situation is very different in the case of propositions.

Russell, Multiple Relations, and the Correspondence Theory of Truth, ALEX MILLER

The most famous of the so-called robust theories of truth is the correspondence theory, and of correspondence theories, perhaps the

most famous is the version developed by Bertrand Russell early in the twentieth century. Russell attempts to yoke the correspondence theory of truth to what he calls the "multiple relations" theory of belief or judgment. Although Russell's view has been extensively discussed and criticized in the literature (by Bradley, Wittgenstein, and Ramsey, among others), the author of this article believes that there is a more compelling and more devastating objection to Russell's view than any yet published. His aim in this paper is to sketch that objection.

Rewrighting Pluralism, MICHAEL P. LYNCH

Alethic pluralism is the idea that propositions, sentences, beliefs and the like can be true in more than one way. Moral propositions, for example, might be true by being part of a coherent moral theory, while propositions about physical objects might be true by corresponding to the facts about those objects. The view's most important advocate is unquestionably Crispin Wright, who first introduced it over a decade ago. This paper has two main parts. The first part charts some recent changes to Wright's views, arguing that, surprisingly, his current position ends up unstably sharing a central tenet of deflationism. The second part argues that the pluralist spirit of Wright is better captured by alethic functionalism, or the view that truth is a supervenient, multiply realizable property of propositions.

Truth as Mediated Correspondence, ROBERT BARNARD and
TERENCE HORGAN

This paper outlines a metaphysically neutral, robust, and unitary conception of truth as correspondence, wherein correspondence in general is a matter of semantic correctness under the contextually operative semantic standards. The basic correspondence relation is understood to obtain in two basic forms: direct and mediated. Truth under direct correspondence standards is a matter of (1) the terms of a thought/sentence denoting objects and relations in the correct ontology and (2) the objects instantiating the relations in the ways required by the given thought/sentence. Mediated correspondence truth obtains when there is correspondence between thought/language and the world that is mediated by one's conceptual scheme. The paper argues that, whatever the ultimate ontology, ontological theorizing is governed by standards of direct correspondence, while philosophical problems, such as those related to vagueness paradoxes, can be profitably addressed by applying mediated correspondence standards.

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Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and Prospects,
MICHAEL BRADY and DUNCAN PRITCHARD

Epistemological contextualism has become one of the most important and widely discussed new proposals in the theory of knowledge. This special issue contributes to the debate by bringing together some of the main participants to provide a state-of-the-art discussion of the proposal. Here these authors offer a brief overview of the contextualist position, describe some of the main lines of criticism that have been leveled against the view, and present a summary of each of the contributions to this collection.

The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism, and the New Invariantism, KEITH DEROSE

The author of this article presents the features of the ordinary use of "knows" that make a compelling case for the contextualist account of that verb, and he outlines and defends the methodology that takes us from the data to a contextualist conclusion. Along the way, the superiority of contextualism over subject-sensitive invariantism is defended, and, in the final section, some objections to contextualism are answered.

Knowledge, Speaker and Subject, STEWART COHEN

The author of this paper contrasts two solutions to the lottery paradox concerning knowledge, contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism. He defends contextualism against an objection that it cannot explain how "knows" and its cognates function inside propositional attitude reports. It is then argued that subject-sensitive invariantism fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the paradox.

Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge, TIMOTHY WILLIMSON

This article schematizes the evidence for an understanding of "know" and of other terms of epistemic appraisal that embody contextualism or subject-sensitive invariantism, and distinguishes between those two approaches. Section 2 argues that although the cases for contextualism and sensitive invariantism rely on a principle of charity in the interpretation of epistemic claims, neither approach satisfies charity fully, since both attribute metalinguistic errors to

speakers. Section 3 provides an equally charitable antiskeptical insensitive invariantist explanation of much of the same evidence as the result of psychological bias caused by salience effects. Section 4 suggests that the explanation appears to have implausible consequences about practical reasoning, but also that applications of contextualism or sensitive invariantism to the problem of skepticism have such consequences. Section 5 argues that the inevitable difference between appropriateness and knowledge of appropriateness in practical reasoning, closely related to the difference between knowledge and knowledge of knowledge, explains the apparent implausibility.

Contextualism and Scepticism: Even-Handedness, Factivity, and Surreptitiously Raising Standards, CRISPIN WRIGHT

The central contentions of this paper are two: first, that contextualism about knowledge cannot fulfill the eirenic promise which, for those who are drawn to it, constitutes its main attraction; second, that the basic diagnosis of epistemological skepticism as somehow entrapping us, by diverting attention from a surreptitious shift to a special rarefied intellectual context, rests on inattention to the details of the principal skeptical paradoxes. These contentions are consistent with knowledge-contextualism, of some stripe or other, being true. What follows will not bear directly on that.

Adapt or Die: The Death of Invariantism? JESSICA BROWN

Contextualists support their view by appeal to cases which show that whether an attribution of knowledge seems correct depends on attributor factors. Contextualists conclude that the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on the attributor's context. Invariantists respond that these cases show only that the warranted assertability-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on the attributor's context. The author of this article examines DeRose's recent argument against the possibility of such an invariantist response, an argument which appeals to the knowledge account of assertion and the context-sensitivity of assertion. She argues that DeRose's new argument does not rule out either of the two forms of invariantism, classic and subject-sensitive invariantism. Further, against DeRose it is argued that an invariantist can explain the context-sensitivity of assertion.

A Sense of Occasion, CHARLES TRAVIS

A continuous Oxford tradition on knowledge runs from John Cook Wilson to John McDowell. A central idea is that knowledge is not a species of belief or that, in McDowell's terms, it is not a hybrid state—that, moreover, it is a kind of taking in of what is there that precludes one's being wrong, for all one can see. Cook Wilson and McDowell differ on what this means as to the scope of knowledge. J.

L. Austin set out the requisite foundations for McDowell to be right. McDowell has shown why the tradition, and his version of it, need to be right. But he does not accept Austin's innovation. That is a shame. For, despite McDowell's very great insightfulness, precisely that much separates him from a very powerful and correct view of what knowledge is.

Contextualism, Hawthorne's Invariantism and Third-Person Cases,
ANTHONY BRUECKNER

Keith DeRose discusses "third-person cases," which appear to raise problems for John Hawthorne's invariantist approach to knowledge-attributions. This paper argues that there is a *prima facie* problem for invariantism stemming from third-person cases that is even worse than DeRose's. Then it is shown that in the end, contrary to appearances, third-person cases do not threaten invariantism.

Williamson on Luminosity and Contextualism, JESSICA BROWN

According to contextualism, the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on features of the attributor's context. Contextualists take their view to be supported by cases in which the intuitive correctness of knowledge attributions depends on the attributor's context. Williamson offers a complex invariantist account of such cases which appeals to two elements, psychological bias and a failure of luminosity. He provides independent reasons for thinking that contextualist cases are characterized by psychological bias and a failure of luminosity, and he argues that some of our intuitions about the cases are explained by the former factor and some by the latter. The author of this paper argues that psychological bias is the more fundamental of these elements. She shows how, by itself, psychological bias can explain all the intuitions concerning contextualist cases. Further, it gives the best account of why contextualist cases are characterized by a failure of luminosity.

Classic Invariantism, Relevance and Warranted Assertability Maneuvers, TIM BLACK

Jessica Brown contends that Keith DeRose's latest argument for contextualism fails to rule out contextualism's chief rival, namely, classic invariantism. Still, even if that position has not been ruled out, classic invariantists must offer considerations in favor of their position if they are to show that it is superior to contextualism. Brown defends classic invariantism with a warranted assertability maneuver that utilizes a linguistic pragmatic principle of relevance. The author of this paper argues, however, that this maneuver is not as effective as it might be. He proposes a different warranted assertability maneuver, which utilizes a pragmatic principle of strength, affords a more successful defense of classic invariantism, and helps to establish that classic invariantism is superior to contextualism.

Travis's Sense of Occasion, ALAN MILLAR

Charles Travis promotes a conception of knowledge on which knowledge is unmistakable. This article raises some issues about what he means by this conception. Though sympathetic to his project, the author of this article gives reasons for doubting that Travis has shown that all knowledge depends on having proof.

Williams on Truthfulness, CATHERINE ELGIN

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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Poverty and Rights, JAMES W. NICKEL

The author of this paper defends economic and social rights as human rights and as a feasible approach to addressing world poverty. He proposes a modest conception of economic and social rights that includes rights to subsistence, basic health care, and basic education. The second part of the paper defends these three rights. It begins by sketching a pluralistic justificatory framework that starts with abstract norms pertaining to life, leading a life, avoiding severely cruel treatment, and avoiding severe unfairness. It is then argued that economic and social rights are not excessively burdensome on their addressees and that they are feasible worldwide in the appropriate sense. Severe poverty violates economic and social rights and accordingly generates high-priority duties of many parties to work toward its elimination.

Demons and the Isolation Argument, SCOTT HENDRIGKS

Justifying a belief gives reason to think that the belief is true. So our concept of justification contains a "truth connection." This paper canvasses a number of proposals for analyzing this. In the end, two competing conceptions of the truth connection remain: the first, that justifying a belief makes the belief objectively probable; the second, that justifying a belief makes the belief probable in a world which would make true our other beliefs. The author of this article discusses reasons for embracing and rejecting these two versions of the truth connection. Ultimately, the two versions appear to represent distinct but equally plausible conceptions of justification. The paper concludes by rejecting the proposal that these truth connections respectively capture internalist and externalist conceptions of justification.

Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirement, MICHAEL BERGMANN

Internalists tend to impose on justification higher-level requirements, according to which a belief is justified only if the subject has a higher-level belief (that is, a belief about the epistemic credentials of a belief). This article offers an error theory that explains the appeal of this requirement: analytically, a belief is not justified if we have a defeater for it, but contingently it is often the case that to avoid having defeaters our belief must satisfy a higher-level requirement. The author of this essay responds to the objection that externalists who endorse this error theory will be forced to accept a radical form of skepticism.

Explanatory Epiphenomenalism, NEIL CAMPBELL

The author of this paper proposes a new form of epiphenomenalism, "explanatory epiphenomenalism," the view that the identification of A's mental properties does not provide a causal explanation of A's behavior. This view is arrived at by showing that although anomalous monism does not entail type epiphenomenalism (despite what many of Davidson's critics have suggested), it does (when coupled with some additional claims) lead to the conclusion that the identification of A's reasons does not causally explain A's behavior. The author of this article then formalizes this view and shows that it is an attractive position because it captures the insights of existing forms of epiphenomenalism without their onerous metaphysical commitments.

Armstrong and the Modal Inversion of Dispositions, TOBY HANDFIELD

D. M. Armstrong has objected that the dispositionalist theory of laws and properties is modally inverted, for it entails that properties are constituted by relations to nonactual possibilities. This article contends that if this objection succeeds against dispositionalism, then Armstrong's nomic necessitation relation is also modally inverted. This shows that at least one of Armstrong's reasons for preferring a nomic necessitation theory is specious.

Sententialism and Berkeley's Master Argument, ZOLTÁN GENDLER SZABÓ

Sententialism is the view that intensional positions in natural languages occur within clausal complements only. According to proponents of this view, intensional transitive verbs such as "want," "seek," or "resemble" are actually propositional attitude verbs in disguise. The author of this paper argues that "conceive" (and a few other verbs) cannot fit this mold: conceiving-of is not reducible to conceiving-that. A new diagnosis of where Berkeley's "master argument" goes astray is offered, analyzing what is odd about saying that Hylas conceives a tree which is not conceived. A sententialist

semantics cannot account for the absurdity in attitude ascriptions of this type: we need to acknowledge irreducibly nonpropositional (but none the less *de dicto*) conceiving.

Moral Discourse and Descriptive Properties, BRAD MAJORS

The author of this essay discusses a strategy for grounding ethical naturalism propounded by Frank Jackson and more recently by Allan Gibbard: that the undisputed supervenience of the moral upon the natural (or descriptive) entails that moral properties are natural (or descriptive) properties. The author then shows that this strategy falls foul of certain indubitable constraints governing natural kinds, and he then rebuts some objections. The upshot is that no viable strategy for supporting ethical naturalism is to be found along these lines. This result has additional consequences, both for Jackson's attempt to accommodate ethical discourse into the natural world and for Gibbard's purported metaethical synthesis.

Do Categorical Ascriptions Entail Counterfactual Conditionals?
SUNGHO CHOI

Stephen Mumford, in his book on dispositions, argues that we can distinguish between dispositional and categorical properties in terms of entailing his "conditional conditionals," which involve the concept of ideal conditions. This paper aims at defending Mumford's criterion for distinguishing between dispositional and categorical properties. To be specific, no categorical ascriptions entail Mumford's "conditional conditionals."

PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 80, No. 2, April 2005

Thought and Action: A Tribute to Stuart Hampshire, P. M. S.
HACKER

The paper is a tribute to the late Stuart Hampshire's investigations of the ramifying role of intention in our conceptual scheme. It surveys the central argument of *Thought and Action* and the third chapter of *Freedom of the Individual*. Emphasis is placed upon Hampshire's constructive account of human agency and consequent description of the manner in which perception and action are interwoven. His analysis of the character of intentional action, self-knowledge, and autonomy is described. Various lacunae in Hampshire's account are identified, and an attempt is made to fill them in in a manner consistent with Hampshire's insights.

Minority Rights and the Preservation of Languages, ANTHONY ELLIS

Do minority groups have a right to the preservation of their language? The author of this article argues that the rights of groups are always reducible to the rights of individuals. In that case, the question whether minorities have a right to the preservation of their language is a question of whether individuals have a right to it. This paper argues that, in the only relevant sense of "right," they do not. They may have an interest in the preservation of their language, but, if so, that interest must be weighed against the costs of satisfying it, and, normally at least, we should expect that the costs will be quite out of proportion to the weight of the interests involved.

A Contextualized Approach to Biological Explanation, GIOVANNI BONIOLO

In the paper, starting from a slightly modified version of van Fraassen's pragmatic approach to explanation, the author proposes a pragmatic meta-model for the different biological explanatory models. That is, a pragmatic point of view is offered to rule different explanatory models in function of the biological context from which the given biologist explains.

Deference, Degree and Selfhood, STEPHEN R. L. CLARK

The world we lost, and now barely understand, was one where everyone knew his place and his attendant duties. Civilized groups were the likeliest to insist on a diversity of role and rule. Primitive societies are ones where there are rather fewer such distinctions. Slaves and merchants offered a way of being outside the orders, and from the older point of view, the life of slaves and merchants is exactly what the "liberal" ideal entails. No one can count on his connections; everything is up for sale; no one is dishonored by the acts of friends or family; only animal passions keep us all together. Even in societies that profess egalitarian theories, castes and classes re-emerge. If there is another option it may lie in drawing, as the ancients did, a clear division between selfhood and nature: even in a traditionally hierarchical society it is possible to recall the mere selves that play their various parts. In a would-be egalitarian society that hopes for something more than the hedonic or agonistic bonds that may bind small-scale communities together, recalling and reconstructing that distinction may be even more important.

On Not Being Sorry about the Morally Bad, SAUL SMILANSKY

Bad things often happen, and morally good people ought to be sorry that they happen. What could be more obvious to a good person than that one ought to be sorry about the occurrence of bad things? And even more so, it would seem to be, if the bad things occur in

one's vicinity, or one is involved with them. This essay argues that sometimes it is morally permissible not to be sorry when bad things happen. Perhaps it is even permissible to be happy about it.

Reason and Violence: Arguments from Force, J. D. G. EVANS

There are good grounds for seeing a deep opposition between reason and violence. Yet some forms of argument appear to link the two, and a prominent example is the *argumentum ad baculum*, where the premise contains a threat. Consideration of the connection between premise and conclusion in such an argument can, it seems, yield some cases where the status of the author of the threat renders the argument not only valid but also sound. Examples of such arguments cluster in the areas near Pascal's Wager and Rawls's argument for justice. However, even these arguments fail to effect reconciliation between reason and violence.

The Marriage Commitment-Reply to Landau, DAN MOLLER

This article is a reply to Landau's objections to the author's earlier "An Argument against Marriage" (*Philosophy* 78 [2003]: 79–91). In particular it is argued that "working" at a relationship is valid only when there is a relationship to be worked at; it cannot, as Landau urges, be a reason for maintaining a relationship which has ceased.

PHRONESIS

Vol. 50, No. 2, April 2005

Logic and Music in Plato's Phaedo, D. T. J. BAILEY

Aristotle on the Best Good: Is Nicomachean Ethics 1094a18–22 Fallacious? PETER B. M. VRANAS

The first sentence of *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.2 has roughly the form: "If A [there is a universal end] and B (because, if not-B, then C), then D [this end will be the best good]." According to some commentators, Aristotle uses B to infer A; but then the sentence is fallacious. According to other commentators, Aristotle does not use B (until later on); but then the sentence is bizarre. Contrary to both sets of commentators (but following Wedin 1981), this paper suggests that Aristotle uses B together with A to infer validly that there is a noninstrumental—and thus unique—universal end (hence D). On this interpretation the above two problems disappear, but a subtler problem emerges: not-B does not entail C.

*L'authenticité de Métaphysique «Alpha» (meizon ou elatton)
d'Aristote, un faux problème?* MYRIAM HECQUET-
DEVIENCE

Perpetuity, Eternity, and Time in Proclus's Cosmos, HELEN S.
LANG

Proclus composed eighteen arguments for the eternity of the world, and they survive only because Philoponus, intending to refute Proclus's arguments one by one, quotes each; one copy of Philoponus's work—and so Proclus's arguments too—survives. Because of their odd history, these arguments have received little attention either in themselves or in relation to Proclus's other works, even though they are intrinsically interesting and reflect his larger philosophical enterprise. The author of this article first examines argument 18, in which Proclus calls on “perpetuity,” “eternity,” and “time” to argue that the cosmos must be eternal. This argument leaves unanswered two important questions. The cosmos is caused by god and is itself a god; how can a cause and its effect both be gods? Proclus concludes that the cosmos is “a copy of the perpetuity of the eternal”; but what does this phrase—and the conclusion that it expresses—mean? To answer these questions, the author of this paper turns to *The Elements of Theology*, a systematic progression of 211 propositions disclosing the causal structure of all reality. “Eternity” and “time,” along with “being perpetual,” also appear here, particularly in propositions 40–55, which are considered in the second part of this paper. They are conjoined with what Proclus calls “the Self-Constituted.” This article argues that by understanding the relation of the Self-Constituted as a cause to its effect, what depends upon another, we can also understand the causal relation between god and the cosmos. The cosmos can be called divine because, via the cause/effect relation between them, god and the cosmos are both eternal; the cosmos is “a copy of the perpetuity of the eternal” because via its relation to god, the cosmos becomes what its cause is, and in this precise sense an effect “imitates” its cause.

Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, CHRISTOPHER GILL

RATIO

Vol. 18, No. 2, June 2005

Life and Meaning, DAVID E. COOPER

This paper addresses an apparent tension between a familiar claim about meaning in general, to the effect that the meaning of

anything owes to its place, ultimately, within a "form of life," and a claim, also familiar, about the meaning of human life itself, to the effect that this must be something "beyond the human." How can life itself be meaningful if meaning is a matter of a relationship to life? After elaborating and briefly defending these two claims, two ways of amending and thereby reconciling them are considered and rejected. These ways involve either spiriting away the issue of life's meaning or encouraging unwelcome metaphysical views. The author then argues that, rather than removing the tension between the two claims, one should view each as expressing an aspect of a delicate metaphysical position. This position is distinguished from ones like transcendental idealism and constructivism with which it might be confused and is then related to Daoist and Zen thought and to the later philosophy of Heidegger. Crucial to the position is the proposal that the "beyond the human" which enables life to be meaningful is both ineffable and "intimate" with life itself.

I Can't Make You Worship Me, CAMPBELL BROWN and YUJIN NAGASAWA

This paper argues that Divine Command Theory is inconsistent with the view, held by many theists, that we have a moral obligation to worship God.

Systems of Measurement, STEPHEN LAW

Wittgenstein and Kripke disagree about the status of the proposition: the Standard Meter is one meter long. Wittgenstein believes it is necessary. Kripke argues that it is contingent. Kripke's argument depends crucially on a certain sort of thought-experiment with which we are invited to test our intuitions about what is and isn't necessary. In this paper it is argued that, while Kripke's conclusion is strictly correct, nevertheless similar Kripke-style thought-experiments indicate that the metric system of measurement is after all relative in something like the way Wittgenstein seems to think. Central to this paper is a thought-experiment the author calls the Smedium Case.

On Williamson's Arguments that Knowledge is a Mental State, ADAM LEITE

In *Knowledge and Its Limits*, Timothy Williamson argues that knowledge is a purely mental state, that is, that it is never a complex state or condition comprising mental factors and nonmental, environmental factors. Three of his arguments are evaluated: arguments from (1) the nonanalyzability of the concept of knowledge, (2) the "primeness" of knowledge, and (3) the (alleged) inability to satisfactorily specify the "internal" element involved in knowledge. None of these arguments succeeds. Moreover, consideration of the third argument points the way to a cogent argument that knowledge is not a purely mental state.

Downshifting and Meaning in Life, NEIL LEVY

So-called downshifters seek more meaningful lives by decreasing the amount of time they devote to work, leaving more time for the valuable goods of friendship, family, and personal development. But though these are indeed meaning-conferring activities, they do not have the right structure to count as superlatively meaningful. Only in work—of a certain kind—can superlative meaning be found. It is by active engagements in projects, which are activities of the right structure, dedicated to the achievement of goods beyond ourselves, that we make our lives superlatively meaningful.

Expressivism, Supervenience and Logic, MARK ROOJEN

Expressivist analyses of evaluative discourse characterize unembedded moral claims as functioning primarily to express noncognitive attitudes. The most thorny problem for this project has been explaining the logical relations between such evaluative judgments and other judgments expressed using evaluative terms in unasserted contexts, such as when moral judgments are embedded in conditionals. One strategy for solving the problem derives logical relations among moral judgments from relations of "consistency" and "inconsistency" which hold between the attitudes they express. This approach has been accused of conflating inconsistency with mere pragmatic incoherence. In reaction to such criticisms several recent theorists have attempted to use alternative resources. The most sophisticated noncognitivists have postulated secondary descriptive meanings dependent on moral judgment's primary expressive meanings. Recent independent suggestions by Frank Jackson and Stephen Barker attempt to solve the embedding problem by utilizing such descriptive components of moral utterances. Unfortunately, this strategy fails to handle a certain sort of example using just the descriptive resources available to noncognitivists. It must rule valid arguments invalid in virtue of equivocation in the secondary descriptive meanings. The present paper explains the problem and suggests a moral for expressivist theories.

Warranted Assertibility and the Norms of Assertoric Practice: Why Truth and Warranted Assertibility Are Not Coincident Norms, DEBORAH C. SMITH

Crispin Wright has argued that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident but noncoextensive norms of assertoric practice and that this fact inflates deflationary theories of truth. Wright's inflationary argument has generated much discussion in the literature. By contrast, relatively little has been said about the coincidence claim that is the focus of this paper. Wright's argument for the claim that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident norms is first presented. It is then suggested that the argument trades on an ambiguity in "justified" and "warrantedly assertible." Finally, it is argued

that, once the ambiguity is removed, there is reason to reject the claim that truth and epistemic warrant are coincident norms of assertoric practice. One important result is that no epistemic theory of truth can satisfy what Wright takes to be a key platitude about assertion.

The Mystique of Moral Dilemmas, N. VERBIN

The paper is concerned with the question of the existence of moral dilemmas, conceived of as situations involving a subject in a conflict of nonoverridden moral obligations. The author of this article rejects some of the presuppositions underlying discussions of this question and argues that certain morally relevant choices cannot be evaluated in relation to an all-things-considered moral obligation as permissible or impermissible, right or wrong. In arguing for the inadequacy of our ordinary moral predicates for fully capturing the nature of such choices, the author argues that they are, in certain respects, inexpressible.

Kantian Punishment and Retributivism: A Reply to Clark, THOM BROOKS

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(37) (32) (15)

University of Arizona

(42) (42) (20)

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RACHAEL POULSEN, "A Foundationalist Defense of the Given." Adviser: John Pollock. (Awarded in 2004)

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HUSSAIN H. A. H. ESMAIL, "The Possibility of Philosophical Discourse in Plato's *Timaeus*." Advisers: Gary Gurtler and Marina McCoy.

ALICIA JARAMILLO, "The Total Transcendence of the Infinite in Thomas Aquinas: A Systematic Inquiry into the Problem of the Finite and the Infinite as a Way of Resolving an Impasse in Modern Philosophy of Religion." Advisers: Oliva Blanchette and Frederick Lawrence.

SIMON J. MAKURU, "Violence and Liberation: Fanon's Political Philosophy of Humanization in the Historical Context of Racism and Colonialism." Advisers: Oliva Blanchette and Richard Cobb-Stevens.

*The three figures below each institution's name refer to (1) the number of graduate students enrolled in its philosophy department, (2) the number of "full-time" graduate students as the term is understood by the institution, and (3) the number of faculty members

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REGINALD WILLIAMS, "Berkeley's Master Argument: Its Form and Implications." Adviser: Robert McKim.

University of Iowa
(26) (26) (11)

- ERNANI MAGALHAES, "When are Universals? The Relationship between Universals and Time." Adviser: Richard Fumerton.
MICHAEL MULNIX, "Mill's Liberty Principle and the Conditions of Happiness." Adviser: Richard Fumerton.

THOMAS A. SANDBERG, "Thomas Reid's Providentialist Epistemology." Adviser: Phillip Cummins.

University of Kansas
(39) (28) (10)

ERIC B. BERG, "A Philosophical Introduction to Norman Maclean by Way of Kierkegaard's Distinction between Fear and Anxiety." Adviser: James Woelfel.

YANCY HUGHES DOMINICK, "*En Eikosi Skopein*, Studying Images: Plato's *Phaedo* and the Role of Images in Philosophy." Adviser: Thomas M. Tuozzo.

CURRAN F. DOUGLASS, "On Freedom and Rationality." Adviser: John J. Bricke. (Awarded in 2004)

STEPHEN CLIFFORD FERGUSON II, "Racial Contract Theory: A Critical Introduction." Adviser: Ann E. Cudd.

SAMUEL EVANS KREIDER, "John Stuart Mill: 'Utility, Liberty, and *Eudaimonia*.'" Adviser: J. Ben Eggleston.

University of Kentucky
(35) (30) (15)

ERIC BUCK, "Making Sense of Architecture: For Wholeness in the Built Environment." Advisers: Theodore Schatzki and Ronald Bruzina.

SEAN LEICHTLE, "Quod Implicat: A Semantic Approach to Husserl's Logic." Adviser: Ronald Bruzina.

Loyola University Chicago
(99) (65) (29)

SHANNON A. SHEA, "Between Intervention and Indifference: Ethics, Humanity, and the United Nations."

ABRAHAM SCHWAB, "Modeling Effective Autonomy: Trust and Bounded Cognition in Medicine."

Marquette University
(63) (49) (28)

DAVID KERN, "New Waves in Metaethics: Naturalist Realism, Naturalist Antirealism and Divine Commands." Adviser: William Starr.

RYAN McBRIDE, "*Eikos Logos* and *Eikos Muthos*: A Study of the Nature of the Likely Story in Plato's *Timaeus*." Adviser: Owen Goldin.

JOHN MUENZBERG, "Reason in Hume's Moral System." Adviser: Thomas Prendergast.

RUSSELL SNELL, "Through a Glass Darkly: Bernard Lonergan and Richard Rorty on the Possibility of Knowing without a God's-Eye-View." Adviser: Andrew Tallon.

TIMOTHY YODER, "Hume's Conclusions on the Existence and Nature of God." Adviser: William Starr.

University of Maryland
(64) (41) (21)

University of Massachusetts
(41) (36) (12)

MARK LUKAS, "Well-Being and Actual Desires." Adviser: Fred Feldman.

KRIS McDANIEL, "Simples and Gunk." Adviser: Phillip Bricker.

JULIE PETTY, "Brains and Barns: The Role of Context in Epistemic Attribution." Adviser: Fred Feldman.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(26) (26) (9)

TYLER C. DOGGETT, "Moral Properties and Moral Imagination." Adviser: Alex Byrne. (Awarded in 2004)

JAMES JOHN, "Consciousness and Intentionality." Adviser: Alex Byrne. (Awarded in 2004)

ADINA ROSKIES, "Enzo and Me: Essays Concerning the Mental Lives of Humans and Other Animals." Adviser: Edward Hall. (Awarded in 2004)

ASTA SVEINSDOTTIR, "Siding with Euthyphro: Response-Dependence, Essentiality, and the Individuation of Ordinary Objects." Adviser: Sally Haslanger. (Awarded in 2004)

McGill University
(26) (26) (18)

GERRY BEAULIEU, "Moral Experience and the Moral Problem." Advisers: Sarah Stroud and David Davies. (Awarded in 2004)

MARIE D. MARTEL, "L'oeuvre comme interaction: anti-textualisme, actionalisme et ontology écologique." Advisers: R. Philip Buckley and David Davies.

MAX JARVIE, "Acceptance, Belief and Cognition." Advisers: David Davies and James McGilvray.

McMaster University

(31) (29) (13)

BRIAN BURGE-HENDRIX, "Epistemic Uncertainty and Legal Theory."

Adviser: W. Waluchow.

DAVID GODDEN, "Psychologism, Semantics and the Subject Matter of Logic." Adviser: N. Griffin.

University of Memphis

(45) (41) (14)

STEVE A. TAMMELLEO, "Constructing a Social Ontology of Ethnic Identity." Adviser: John L. Tienson.

MARDA L. KAISER, "Apertures of Language in Derrida and Foucault: The *Aporia* and Archive as Passage to Thinking Otherwise." Adviser: Leonard Lawlor.*University of Miami*

(26) (25) (8)

CORINA VAIDA, "How Kant Needs to Interpret Free Will."

University of Michigan

(36) (36) (19)

STEVEN J. DASKAL, "Rebuilding Society from the Ground Up: Contextual Justice, Fellow Citizenship, and U. S. Welfare." Advisers: Stephen L. Darwall and Allan F. Gibbard.

CHRISTIE J. HARTLEY, "Justice for All: Constructing an Inclusive Contractualism." Adviser: Elizabeth S. Anderson.

ROBIN BRADLEY KAR, "Legal Parallelism: How to Understand the Relationships and Distinctions between Law and Morality, As Well As Their Respective Authorities." Advisers: Elizabeth S. Anderson and Peter A. Railton.

BRUCE E. LACEY, "Cognitive Content and Communication." Adviser: Richmond Thomason.

GERHARD F. NUFFER, "Information, Belief, and Possibility." Adviser: James Joyce.

Michigan State University

(35) (29) (23)

CHRISTY A. RENTMEESTER, "Jaded: Institutional Oppression and Moral Damage in Healthcare." Adviser: Hilde Lindemann.

University of Minnesota
(47) (41) (21)

- DAVID BROKKEN, "The Hidden Weakness in Informed Consent." Adviser: Jasper Hopkins.
- CHRISTOPHER H. ELIOT, "Exceptions Make the Rules: The Role of Disturbing Conditions in Ecological Theorizing." Adviser: C. Kenneth Waters.
- SCOTT E. FORSCHLER, "A Defense of Justificatory Rule Theory: Deriving Consequentialist Ethics from Practical Reason." Advisers: Norman Bowie and Valerie Tiberius.
- NANCY E. WALSH, "A Business Ethics Approach to Hazard Communication and Employee Right to Know." Adviser: Norman Bowie.

Université de Montréal
(162) (97) (23)

- MARTIN BLANCHARD, "Inclusion et différence: Vers une critique constructive de la reconnaissance chez Habermas." Advisers: Michel Seymour and Alain Renaut.
- JOANNE DOWNS, "Intentionality and Concepts: The Search for Mental States in the Animal Kingdom." Adviser: Daniel Laurier.
- LOUIS GODBOUT, "Nietzsche et la probité." Adviser: Jean Grondin.
- DANIEL MAZILU, "Raison et mystique dans le néoplatonisme: antagonisme ou convergence?" Adviser: Richard Bodéus.
- FRANZ E. SCHURCH, "Le problème de la vérité dans l'oeuvre de Martin Heidegger." Adviser: Jean Grodin.
- MICHEL SEGUIN, "Le coopératisme: réalisation de l'esprit de la philosophie libérale en économie?" Adviser: Maurice Lagueux.
- RICARDO SILVESTRE, "La logique du raisonnement scientifique." Adviser: Yvon Gauthier.
- MARTIN THIBODEAU, "Hegel, l'idéalisme allemande et la tragédie grecque: le conflit, la spéculation et le destin politique." Adviser: Daniel Dumouchel.

University of Nebraska
(21) (18) (11)

University of New Mexico
(24) (24) (11)

- JESSICA POSNIAK, "Seven Spears in My Heart: Passion and Renunciation in the Philosophy of Bhāṭṛhari." Adviser: John A. Taber. (Awarded in 2004)

New School for Social Research
(187) (148) (10)

- MARK BALTO, "Friedrich Nietzsche's Kinship to Heraclitus of Ephesus." Adviser: Claudia Baracchi.
- EMMANUELA BIANCHI, "Teleology and its Symptoms: Sexual Difference in the Aristotelian Cosmos." Adviser: Richard J. Brennan.
- VERA KARAM DE CHUEIRI, "Before the Law: Philosophy and Literature (The Experience of That Which One Cannot Experience)." Adviser: Dmitri Nikulin.
- JULIANE EBERLAND, "Recognizing Justice: A Study of the Connections between Human Recognition, Realization and Restorative Justice." Adviser: Dmitri Nikulin.
- CYNTHIA FORLAND, "On the Relationship between Thought and Action in the Work of Hannah Arendt." Adviser: Richard J. Bernstein.
- JOSH GOODYEAR, "The Tragic Sense of Pragmatism." Adviser: Richard J. Bernstein.
- JOSH HAYES, "The Desire of Dasein: Heidegger's Interpretation of Aristotelian Oresis." Adviser: Claudia Baracchi.
- BRENDAN HOGAN, "The Reconstruction of Inquiry, Criticism, and Normativity in John Dewey's Philosophy." Adviser: Richard J. Bernstein.
- JONATHAN KIM-REUTER, "Merleau-Ponty's Reading of Montaigne. The Evolution of a Phenomenological Questioning." Adviser: James Dodd.
- STEVEN LEVINE, "Naturalism and Normativity: Sellars and McDowell on Mind, Perception, and World." Adviser: Richard J. Bernstein.
- MORGAN MEIS, "Walter Benjamin: Through the Arcades." Adviser: Richard J. Bernstein.
- HOWARD PONZER, "The Law of Non-Contradiction in Hegel's Dialectic." Adviser: Y. Yovel.
- MATTHEW ROBB, "Temporality, Authenticity, Democracy: Heidegger and Dewey on the Meaning of Time." Adviser: Richard J. Bernstein.
- ROSSEN ROUSSEV, "The Cognizing Subject, as Disembodied, Unconscious, and Deconstructed—A Genealogy of its Signification." Adviser: Agnes Heller.
- JENNIFER SCURO, "The Phenomenon of Bearing Witness: History, Testimony and the Face of the Other." Adviser: Richard J. Bernstein.
- CHUNG-SHIG SHIN, "The Living Present and Otherness: A Study of the Living Present in Edmund Husserl's Transcendental Philosophy." Adviser: James Dodd.
- VASILLOS STERTSIOS, "Preparing for the Promise." Adviser: Agnes Heller.
- SONJA TANNER, "A Yelping Bitch Screaming at Her Master: Philosophy and Poetry in the Platonic Imagination." Adviser: Claudia Baracchi.

JEAN-MARIE VIVALDI, "The Relationship of Historical Knowledge and Eternal Happiness in Kierkegaard's *Fragments* and *Post-script*." Adviser: Alice Crary.

MICHAEL WEINMAN, "Pleasure, Desire and the Good: Aristotle on Ethics and Embodiment." Adviser: Claudia Barrachi.

New York University
(39) (24) (17)

WINSTON CHIONG, "A Principled Partiality: A Kantian Account of Special Obligation." Adviser: Thomas Nagel.

BRADFORD SKOW, "Once Upon a Space Time." Adviser: Hartry Field.

MASAHIRO YAMADA, "The Value of Rationality and the Aim of Truth." Adviser: Paul Bogossian.

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
(44) (44) (22)

MACALESTER C. BELL, "The Importance of Contempt: Contempt in Moral and Political Life." Adviser: Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

YAACOV BEN-SHEMES, "State Neutrality and Collective Self Government." Adviser: Gerald J. Postema.

SAMANTHA CORTE, "The Ethics of Religious Commitment." Adviser: William G. Lycan.

TAMRA FREI, "The Hypothetical Imperative." Adviser: Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

PATRICK LEE MILLER, "Purity of Thought: Dualism and Divinization in Greek Philosophy." Adviser: C. D. C. Reeve.

SUSANNE JUDITH SREEDHAR, "Hobbes on the Right of Self-Defense." Adviser: Gerald J. Postema.

University of Notre Dame
(68) (68) (45)

MICHAEL JOSEPH BOWLER, "The Philosophical Context of Heidegger's Reappropriation of Aristotle." Adviser: Stephen Watson.

JAMES KENNETH KREUGER, "On the Relationship between Biology and Medicine." Advisers: Alasdair MacIntyre and Lenny Moss.

CHRISTIAN B. MILLER, "Agency and Moral Relativism." Adviser: Michael DePaul.

LIAM MURPHY MONAHAN, "Meeting Anscombe's Demand: Toward a Moral Psychology of Character." Adviser: David Solomon.

JOHN THOLFSEN MULLEN, "Design Arguments within a Reidian Epistemology." Adviser: Alvin Plantinga.

Ohio State University
(34) (34) (19)

- ANDREW ARLIG, "A Study in Early Medieval Mereology: Boethius, Abelard, and Pseudo-Joscelin." Adviser: Tamar Rudavsky.
YIMIN KUI, "The Reference and Content of Proper Names: A Social and Pragmatic Approach." Adviser: Joseph Levine.
HENRY PRATT, "Comparing Artworks." Adviser: Lee Brown.

University of Oregon
(47) (47) (10)

University of Ottawa
(71) (58) (25)

- STEPHANE BASTIEN, "De l'expérience esthétique à la visée éthique: Variations sur l'identité, l'art et la vie bonne. Ricoeur, Dewey, Emerson." Adviser: Vance W. Mendenhall.
GERARD DELAHOUSSE, "The Moderating Will in John Duns Scotus." Adviser: Antoine Côté. (Awarded in 2004)
GREG KENNEDY, "An Ontology of Trash: The Disposable and its Problematic Nature." Adviser: Sonia Sikka. (Awarded in 2004)

University of Pennsylvania
(30) (28) (14)

- MELINA BELL, "Socializing Children for Autonomy." Adviser: Samuel Freeman.
MYRNA GABBE, "Aristotle's Theory of Cognition: The Agent Intellect Revisited." Adviser: Susan Meyer.
RORY GOGGINS, "Stoic Theology." Adviser: Susan Meyer.
ELISABETH HERSCHBACH, "Staying Alive: Personal Identity without Psychological Continuity." Adviser: James Ross.
YUMIKO INUKAI, "The Bundling of the Self: The Empirical Basis for the Unity of the Self in Hume and James." Adviser: Gary Hatfield.

The Pennsylvania State University
(37) (37) (15)

- DAVID CIAVATTA, "Hegel and the Phenomenology of the Family." Adviser: John Russon.
ERIC SANDAY, "Dialectic and the Turn toward Logos in Plato's *Parmenides*." Adviser: John Sallis.

Princeton University
(42) (42) (20)

- ANTONY TOBERT EAGLE, "On Some Scientific Modalities: Propensities, Randomness, and Causation." Adviser: Bas van Fraassen.
DAVID JAMES HILLS, "The Pleasures of Ulteriority: Four Essays on Verbal Metaphor." Advisers: Alexander Nehamas and Gideon Rosen.
ZENA HITZ, "Plato and Aristotle on the Failure of Democracy." Adviser: John Cooper.
GILLIAN KAY RUSSELL, "Analyticity, Meaning and Paradox." Adviser: Scott Soames.
MARK ANDREW SCHROEDER, "Slaves of the Passions." Adviser: Gideon Rosen.
KEVIN ZARAGOZA, "A Moral Psychology of Blame." Adviser: Gideon Rosen.

Purdue University
(46) (36) (20)

- MARY ESCOFFERY, "A Philosophical Examination of Peter Singer's Ethical Theory." Adviser: Leonard Harris.
ADA JAARSMA, "Troubling the Normal: Contemporary Encounters with Kierkegaard." Adviser: Martin Matustik.
JOSEPH LONG, "Existential Epistemologies." Adviser: Charlene Haddock Seigfried.
MANGO MEIR, "Philosophy and Politics: Xenophon's Teaching on Tyranny." Adviser: William L. McBride.

Queen's University
(32) (29) (18)

- LESLIE ELLIOTT, "Cognition, Consciousness, and Felt Experience." Adviser: Carlos G. Prado.

Rice University
(21) (16) (12)

University of Rochester
(27) (24) (11)

- ANDREI A. BUCKAREFF, "An Essay on Doxastic Agency." Adviser: Richard Feldman.
DAVID LEVY, "Distinguishing Socratic Philosophy from Gorgianic Rhetoric." Adviser: Deborah K. Modrak.

NATHAN NOBIS, "A Truth in Ethics and Epistemology: A Defense of Normative Realism." Adviser: Richard Feldman.

Rutgers University

(54) (54) (30)

DAVID MANLEY, "Essays on Meaning and the A Priori." Adviser: John Hawthorn.

JILL NORTH, "Time and Probability in an Asymmetric Universe." Adviser: Barry Loewer. (Awarded in 2004)

MATTHEW PHILLIPS, "Intentional States and Intentional State Ascriptions: An Integrated Linguistic/Psychological Account." Adviser: Robert Matthews. (Awarded in 2004)

CHANDRA SRIPADA, "Conceptual Foundations for the Psychology of Evolution of Morality." Adviser: Stephen Stich.

MIKHAIL VALDMAN, "Autonomous Preferences, Autonomous Persons." Adviser: Larry Temkin. (Awarded in 2004)

RYAN WASSERMAN, "The Problem of Change." Adviser: Ted Sider.

Saint Louis University

(36) (14) (22)

ROBERT ARP, "An Evolutionary Account of Vision-Related Creative Problem Solving." Adviser: George Terzis.

FRANK CHRISTMANN, "Motivation Factors in Discourse Ethics: Conscience Formulation and Moral Action in the Resolution of Local Gender Conflicts." Adviser: William Rehg.

DARIN DAVIS, "Rules and Vision: Particularism in Contemporary Ethics." Adviser: William Rehg.

KEVIN DECKER, "Naturalistic and Aesthetic Individuality in John Dewey's Political Philosophy." Adviser: Vincent Punzo.

DONNA WERNER, "Masters of Our Passions: Descartes' Ethics and Elizabeth's Challenge." Adviser: Richard Dees.

University of South Carolina

(27) (19) (14)

MATTHEW MILLER, "Hegel's Ladder and Symbolic Forms." Adviser: Martin Donougho.

ERIC MULLIS, "Toward an Embodied Aesthetic." Adviser: Tom Burke.

University of South Florida
(62) (37) (19)

SUDARSAN PADMANABHAN, "Two Models of Consensus." Adviser: Stephen P. Turner.

ELENI TSALLA, "Socrates' Political *Sophia* in Epictetus." Adviser: John P. Anton.

Southern Illinois University
(46) (45) (13)

GARY HERSTEIN, "Whitehead and the Measurement Problem of Cosmology." Adviser: Randall Auxier.

Stanford University
(50) (40) (30)

University of Southern California
(39) (39) (18)

WALTER HOPP, "Rehabilitating the Given." Adviser: Dallas Willard.

VICTORIA ROGERS, "Absences as Causes: The Problem of Non-Persistence Causation." Adviser: Kadri Vihvelin. (Awarded in 2004)

Stony Brook University
(47) (47) (21)

BENJAMIN HALE, "The Roots of Moral Considerability: Ecological Responsibility in Deontological Ethics." Adviser: Kenneth Baynes. (Awarded in 2004)

TIMOTHY A. D. HYDE, "Negativity in Hegel and Breakdown in Heidegger: An Investigation into the Structures of Finitude in *The Science of Logic* and *Being and Time*." Adviser: Edward S. Casey. (Awarded in 2004)

EMILY S. LEE, "Meaning Creativity and the Visible Differences of the Body: A Phenomenological Reading of Race." Advisers: Lorenzo Simpson and Linda Alcoff.

MICHAEL SANDERS, "The Ethical Instant: Continuity, Corporeity, and the Ground of Ethics." Adviser: Hugh Silverman.

KEN YEE YIP, "The Hermeneutics of Technics." Adviser: Don Ihde. (Awarded in 2004)

Syracuse University
(45) (44) (20)

- JOHN DRAEGER, "Caring for Others: A Theory of Moral Reasons." Adviser: Michael Stocker.
 SETH SHABO, "Holding Responsible without Ultimate Responsibility: Towards a Communitarian Defense of Compatibilism." Adviser: Michael Stocker.

University of Tennessee
(35) (30) (10)

- MATTHEW MASSEY, "Sartre and the Nothingness of Consciousness." Adviser: Richard Aquila.
 JAMES OKAPAL, "Pluralism and Practical Reason: The Problem of Decisiveness." Adviser: Betsey Postow.

University of Texas, Austin
(68) (61) (30)

- JOHN BOWIN, "Essence and Potentiality: Aristotelian Strategies of Addressing Problems of Change and Persistence." Adviser: A. P. D. Mourelatos.
 NEAL JUDISCH, "Mechanism, Purpose and Agency: The Metaphysics of Mental Causation and Free Will." Advisers: Robert Kane and Robert Koons.
 JOEL MANN, "Sophists without Borders: The Pseudo-Hippocratic *On art* in Its Philosophical Context." Advisers: R. J. Hankinson and Leslie Dean-Jones.
 LINTON KIKI WANG, "Dynamics of Plurality in Quantification and Anaphora." Adviser: Nicholas Asher.
 MARKUS WEIDLER, "Heidegger's Theft of Faith: A Campaign of Suspending Radical Theology." Advisers: Kathleen Higgins and Katie Arens.
 HOYOUNG YOUN, "Objective Values and Moral Relativism." Adviser: Thomas Seung.

University of Toronto
(93) (90) (59)

- LAWRENCE BURNS, "The Ethics of Corporeality: A Study of Phenomenological and Pragmatic Significance of the Human Body." Adviser: Robert Gibbs.
 MARGARET CAMERON, "What's in a Name? William of Champeaux and Early Twelfth-Century Dialectic." Adviser: John Magee.

- CHERYL ANN CLINE, "Beyond Ethics: Animals, Law and Politics." Adviser: L. Wayne Sumner.
- JULIE CUSTEAU, "The Sense of Injustice and Its Pervasiveness: An Inquiry into Human Misery." Adviser: Robert Gibbs.
- JULIE KIRSCH, "What's So Great about Reality?" Adviser: André Gombay.
- JACK KWONG, "Conceptual Atomism: Towards a Plausible Theory of Concepts." Adviser: William E. Seager.
- MARC OZON, "The Emergence of Theories of Mental Language in Early Fourteenth-Century Philosophy as Explanations of Complex Cognition." Adviser: Calvin Normore.
- ANTHONY SKELTON, "Reasoning Towards Utilitarianism: Learning from Sidgwick." Adviser: L. Wayne Sumner.

University of Utah
(38) (35) (17)

- AARON HOLLAND, "Hume, Natural Belief, and the 'Dialogues'." Adviser: Lex Newman.
- PHYLLIS VANDENBERG, "Human Relationships and Observations in the Development of Humanity and Moral Sentiments in Hutchinson, Hume, and Smith." Adviser: Leslie P. Francis.

Vanderbilt University
(68) (40) (19)

- STEPHEN DENTON CARDEN, "The Growth of Virtues: MacIntyre and Dewey on Ethics." Adviser: John Lachs.
- JOHN CALEB CANTON, "The Problem of Religion in the American Public Square: Toward and Open Socratic Model." Adviser: John Lachs.
- SARAH CUNNINGHAM, "The Compass of Reason: Intellectual Interest in the Beautiful as a Mode of Orientation." Adviser: Gregg Horowitz.
- APPLE ZEFELIUS IGREK, "Virile Expenditure: A Study of Transgressive Erotics in Twentieth Century French Philosophy." Adviser: David Wood.
- JEFFREY MARTIN JACKSON, "Confronting Necessity: Thinking Crisis in Husserl, Freud, and Heidegger." Adviser: David Wood.
- JENNIFER KAY THOMPSON, "John Dewey and Pragmatic Economics." Adviser: John Lachs.

University of Virginia
(37) (22) (13)

- CHARLES KIRBY ARINDER, "Impractical Naturalism." Adviser: Harold Langsam.

EDWARD HOKEUN KIM SONG, "The Bounds of Justice: Rawls on Global Justice and International Obligation." Adviser: A. John Simmons.

JONATHAN EDWARD STOLTZ, "Belief, Truth and Indicative Conditional Propositions." Adviser: James Cargile.

PATRICK JAMES TONER, "Existence and Emergence." Adviser: Trenton Merricks.

University of Waterloo

(24) (21) (10)

CHRISTINE FREEMAN-ROTH, "Emotivating Justice: The Role of Reason in Moral Theory and Practice." Adviser: Jan Narveson.

HENDRIK VAN DER BREGGEN, "Miracle Reports, Moral Philosophy, and Contemporary Science." Adviser: Joseph A. Novak.

Wayne State University

(27) (27) (11)

FRANCIS GRABOWSKI, "Why Plato is not a Platonist: A Reassessment of Plato's Theory of Forms." Adviser: Herbert Granger.

University of Western Ontario

(61) (60) (30)

CATHERINE CAMPBELL, "Getting Clear on Descartes' Theories of Visual Depth Perceptions." Adviser: John Nicholas.

MELANIE FRAPPIER, "Heisenberg's Notion of Interpretation." Advisers: William Demopoulos and Robert DiSalle.

DAVID LAVERTY, "Logicism and Conceptual Analysis in Frege, Carnap, and Wright." Adviser: William Demopoulos.

DARIN PEAKER, "Locke's Direct Realism." Adviser: Robert Muehlmann.

University of Wisconsin

(65) (65) (18)

JOHN FIELDS, "Perception, Testimony, and the Argument from Religious Experience." Adviser: Keith Yandell.

KEN HOCHSTETTER, "Modality, Reductionism, and Material Adequacy: A Rejection of Reductionism." Adviser: Keith Yandell.

RIMAS UZGIRIS, "Desire, Meaning, and Virtue: The Socratic Account of Poetry." Adviser: Terry Penner.

Yale University
(26) (26) (18)

- DESMOND HOGAN, "Rationalism and Causal Realism in Kant's Metaphysics." Advisers: Robert M. Adams and Allen Wood.
YITSHAK MELAMED, "The Metaphysics of Substance and the Metaphysics of Thought in Spinoza." Adviser: Michael Della Rocca.

York University
(68) (47) (29)

- IAN GERRIE, "Situating Knowledge Phenomenologically." Adviser: Lorraine Code.
JOSEPH KEEPING, "Emotions in the Flesh: A Phenomenology of Emotion in the Lived Body." Adviser: Sam Mallin.
FRANCES LATCHFORD, "Family Intravenous: The Modern Western Bio-Genealogical Imperative and the Production of 'Family' Experience." Adviser: Susan Dimock.
DARLENE RIGO, "The Second Sex as a Phenomenological Study." Adviser: Lorraine Code.

VISITING PROFESSORS FROM ABROAD, 2005–2006

Arun Balasubramaniam
National University of
Singapore

University of Toronto
Fall 2005–Spring 2006

Lian Chang
Beijing University

University of Notre Dame
Fall 2005–Spring 2006

P'aat'a Chkheidze
Gori State University

The Catholic University of
America
Fall 2005–Spring 2006

Carlo Godliati
University of Cambridge

University of Notre Dame
Fall 2005–Spring 2006

Yuval Dolev
Bar-Ilan University

University of British Columbia
Fall 2005–Spring 2006

Boris Hennig
Saarland University

University at Buffalo
Fall 2005

Axel Honneth
Goethe University

Boston College
Fall 2005

Heather Jacklin
University of Cape Town

University of Kentucky
Fall 2005

Muhammed Ali Khalidi
American University in
Beirut

University of Minnesota
Fall 2005–Spring 2006

Seung Chong Lee
Yonsei University, South
Korea

University of California, Irvine
Fall 2005–Spring 2006

Shengquian Li Sichuan Normal University, China	University of Alberta Fall 2005–Spring 2006
Ruth Lorand University of Haifa	Marquette University Fall 2005–Spring 2006
Matthias Lutz-Bachmann University of Frankfurt	Saint Louis University Fall 2005
Plotr Mazur Catholic University in Lublin	The Catholic University of America Fall 2005–Spring 2006
Thierry Meynard Peking University	Fordham University Fall 2005–Spring 2006
Dermot Moran University College Dublin	Stony Brook University Spring 2006
Kazunobu Narita Keio University	University of Minnesota Fall 2005–Spring 2006
Fabian Neuhaus Saarland University	University at Buffalo Fall 2005
Albert Newen University of Tübingen	University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Spring 2006
Francesco Orilla University of Macerata, Italy	University of Iowa Spring 2006
Adriano Palma University of Durban at Westville, South Africa	Duke University Fall 2005–Spring 2006
Destree Pierre College Mercier	The Catholic University of America Fall 2005–Spring 2006

Luke Russell University of Sydney	Princeton University Fall 2005
Jean-Luc Solere Catholic University of Louvain	Boston College Fall 2005–Spring 2006
Jan Szaif Bonn University, Germany	University of California, Davis Fall 2005–Spring 2006
Harold Tarrant University of Newcastle, Australia	University of Toronto Fall 2005–Spring 2006
Yoshihisa Yamamoto Chiba University, South Korea	The Catholic University of America Spring 2006
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IN MEMORIAM

PAUL RICOEUR (1913–2005)

27 February 1913, in Valence, France, Paul Ricoeur was inscribed into the spatial, temporal, and social register by his birth certificate, son of Jules and Florentine (Favre) Ricoeur. In several of his works, Ricoeur reflects on our birth certificates and says that our births and deaths are not events for us, but for others. His mother died before he was one year old, and his father was killed a year later in the Battle of the Marne. Paul and his sister, Anne, were raised by their paternal grandparents in Rennes. Paul took his *Licence des lettres* at the University of Rennes and then went to Paris to study for the *agrégation*, the competitive exam for a teaching post at a lycée or a university. He was second in the competition and taught in several lycées before being mobilized in the 47th Infantry Regiment at St. Malo in 1939. He was captured by the Germans in 1940 and spent five years in a POW camp in Pomerania. His wife, Simone, remained in Rennes with their three children.

His teaching career began in 1945 at College Cevanol in Chambon-sur-lignon, a village made famous by their protection of Jewish children during the war. He then was called to the University of Strasbourg, where he taught the history of philosophy for eight years. His first major work, *Freedom and Nature*, was published while he was in Strasbourg. In 1956, he was called to the Sorbonne where his next two works, *The Symbolism of Evil* and *Fallible Man*, were published, along with a collection of his essays, *History and Truth*. In the early 1960s, he became interested in Freud and read his complete works and wrote his book on *Freud and Philosophy*. His main argument is that Freud can be read like any other philosopher and that it was not necessary to have been analyzed to understand him. He also claimed that psychoanalysis was a hermeneutic science and that Freud's mixing the discourse of force with the discourse of meaning was not a category mistake but precisely the way the phenomena of psychic experiences had to be described. Finally, his book made scant mention of Jacques Lacan, the leading structuralist psychoanalyst and interpreter of the day. The Lacanians unleashed a torrent of vitriolic attacks on Ricoeur. But this was only the beginning: In 1965, Ricoeur and two other colleagues left the Sorbonne for a new branch of the University of Paris at Nanterre, in the west suburbs. He was quickly elected Doyen (Dean or Chancellor) by his colleagues and had to confront the violent student demonstrations which began and ended at Nanterre after the so-called Events of 1968. Unable to quell the violence and after having been betrayed by the Minister of Interior, Ricoeur resigned as Doyen and took a three-year leave from the French university.

He taught at the University of Louvain and at the University of Chicago. He had taught at both universities before, but now he divided his time between them. By 1970, he was called to the John Nuveen Chair in the Divinity School at the University of Chicago, a chair previously held by Paul Tillich. During a long exile, he published *The Rule of Metaphor*, *Conflict of Interpretations*, and his three-volume masterpiece, *Time and Narrative*. He retired from the University of Chicago in 1992.

During the 1990s, Ricoeur was especially prolific, writing *Oneself as Another*, *The Just*, and *Autobiography*. He continued his practice of giving lectures at many European universities and participating in many round table discussions on television and giving lectures on the philosophical accounts of justice at the Advanced School for Judges in Paris. He joined Pope Jean Paul II several times at his summer home for intellectual and philosophical discussions. He poured his energy into writing *Memory, History, Forgetting*, which became his "working through" of his grief after the death of his beloved wife, Simone. For many years, Ricoeur had been interested in the concept of "recognition" and fascinated by its many meanings and the differences in meaning in various languages. This interest became his last book, *The Course of Recognition*, published a year before his death. Paul Ricoeur was the recipient of many honorary doctorates and prizes during his long and active career. None pleased him more than the Kluge Prize awarded by the Library of Congress in December 2004. He shared the \$1-million prize with Jaroslav Pelican, a Yale University philosopher of religion.

Even in his last days, Paul remained in his home and continued to receive visitors, read the latest books, and vigorously discuss current events. He died in his sleep in his own bed on 20 May 2005, at Chatenay-Malabry, France.—Charles Reagan, *Kansas State University*

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
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Explanations of Apperception in the
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*Phronesis as Poetic: Moral Creativity
in Contemporary Aristotelianism*

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THE PERILS OF SELF-PERCEPTION: EXPLANATIONS OF APPERCEPTION IN THE GREEK COMMENTARIES ON ARISTOTLE

J. NOEL HUBLER

ARISTOTLE'S BRIEF CONSIDERATIONS concerning how we perceive that we perceive¹ led to a long and wide-ranging discussion of the problem by his commentators, one that extended over several centuries. From the second century to the sixth, Aristotle's ancient Greek commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Pseudo-Simplicius, and Pseudo-Philoponus, offered various interpretations of apperception.² The discussion of the problem is historically revealing, for the com-

Correspondence to: Department of Philosophy, Lebanon Valley College, 100 North College Avenue, Annville, PA 17003.

¹ *De Anima* 3.2.425b1126 and *De Somno et Vigilia* 2.455a216-22.

² See: Alexander, *De Anima*, ed. Ivo Bruns, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, supplement 2.1 (Berlin: Reimer, 1887), 65; Themistius, *Paraphrase of Aristotle's De Anima*, ed. Richard Heinze, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, 5.3 (Berlin: Reimer, 1899), 83 (In his *Commentary on the Short Natural Treatises*, Themistius repeats Aristotle's brief comment about apperception in the *De Somno et Vigilia*, but without expanding it at all or giving any commentary.); Pseudo-Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima*, ed. Michael Hayduck, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, 11 (Berlin: Reimer, 1882), 187-90; Pseudo-Philoponus, *Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima*, ed. Michael Hayduck, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, 15 (Berlin: Reimer, 1897), 462-8. Later Greek commentaries that discuss apperception include: Michael (11-12th century C.E.), *Commentary on Books 9 & 10 of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. Gustav Heylbut, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, 20 (Berlin: Reimer, 1892), 517-18; Sophonias (13-14th century C.E.), *Paraphrase of Aristotle's De Anima*, ed. Michael Hayduck, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, 23.1 (Berlin: Reimer, 1883), 109-10. Aristotle's discussions of apperception also split his Latin commentators. Albert the Great assigns apperception to the common sense; see *De Anima, Opera Omnia*, vol. 7.1, ed. Clemens Stroick (Monasterii Nestfalorum: Aschendarff, 1968), lib. 2, tra. 4, c. 8, p. 159. Aquinas splits the apperceptive powers, assigning the awareness of the senses to the senses themselves (*Sentencia Libri de Anima*, bk. 2, chap. 26 [Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1984], vol. 45.1, pp. 178-81) and the power to distinguish the senses and to perceive one's own life to the common sense (*Sentencia Libri de Anima*, bk. 2, chap. 13.1, p. 120 and chap. 27, pp. 182-6). Giles of Rome attributes apperception to the particular senses, *On the Books of De Anima* (1500; reprint, Frankfurt

mentators did not so much attempt to write historically accurate interpretations of the texts upon which they commented; rather, they used the text as an occasion for their own active philosophical reflection.³ They sought to extract the truth from a revered text. Hence, their commentaries are very helpful in reconstructing the development of philosophical views representative of their own times. Their discussions of self-awareness in perception are of particular interest, because in them we can witness changes in the broader questions of the nature of the self and truth.⁴

But in addition to their historical interest, their extended debate about the nature of self-awareness in perception raises questions about modern philosophical attempts to privilege self-awareness in

am Main: Minerva, 1982), folio 55v–56v. Francis of Toledo, *Commentary on Aristotle's de Anima, with Questions* (1615; reprint, Hildesheim: Olms, 1985), bk. 3, chap. 2, q. 3, also assigns apperception to the common sense. Most modern commentators argue that in the *De Anima* discussion, Aristotle took apperception as an activity of the particular senses. Charles Kahn is an exception. In "Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle's psychology," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 48 (1966): 43–81, Kahn takes the analysis of the *De Anima* to be "fully compatible" with the analysis of the *De Somno* which attributes apperception to the common sense, although the terminology differs. So also in Kahn, "Aristotle on Thinking," in *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amélie Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 359–79, esp. 364–5. L. A. Kosman, "Perceiving that we perceive: On the Soul III.3," *Philosophical Review* 84 (1975): 499–519, takes the apperceptive awareness that Aristotle is discussing to be normal prereflective awareness that necessarily accompanies all perception, rather than a special, reflective self-awareness. Therefore, he takes it to be part of the normal operation of the sense itself and not the operation of the common sense. Catherine Osborne, "Aristotle, *De Anima* 3.2: How do we perceive that we see and hear?" *Classical Quarterly* 33 (1983): 401–11, takes apperception to be an "entirely transparent" act, inherent in perception and requiring no assistance from the common sense. H. J. Blumenthal, *Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity: Interpretations of the De anima* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 139, also attributes apperception to the individual senses. Horst Seidl, "Zur sinnlichen Selbstwahrnehmung in Aristoteles' *De anima* III.2," *Philosophische Rundschau* 48 (2001): 88–91, also attributes self-perception to the particular sense itself.

³ Regarding the methods of the Neoplatonist commentators, see Blumenthal, *Aristotle and Neoplatonism*, 21–34. Blumenthal notes that the Neoplatonist commentators used "their commentaries as a vehicle for their own philosophies" (34), because they "regarded the production of commentaries as a kind of service to the divine" (71). Writing commentaries was a quest for the truth.

discussions of the nature of consciousness and the mind.⁵ The ancient commentators, serious and reflective philosophers, came to widely divergent conclusions about the nature of self-awareness found in perception. They had no direct or privileged notion concerning the nature of the self or of consciousness. They came to different conceptions of the self because each modeled his explanation of self-awareness in perception on a more basic understanding of the nature of knowledge in general.⁶ Ultimately, their explanation of knowledge

⁴ Because I take it that their commentaries were meant to be constructive acts of philosophizing, I will not discuss them in relation to various possible interpretations of what Aristotle had to say on any given point; rather, I will discuss them as taking their own positions and having their own justifications for the claims that they make.

⁵ Privileging self-awareness as absolutely authoritative traces its roots back to Descartes, who famously employed the methods of radical doubt and introspection to isolate what he could know for sure. In his *Meditations in First Philosophy*, he argued that only through an examination of his own ideas alone could he be certain that he, God, and an external, material world existed. Søren Kierkegaard also privileged self-awareness over logical systems. He chides the Hegelians for taking the opposite tack: "In the confessional a Hegelian can say with all solemnity: I do not know whether I am a human being—but I have understood the system. I prefer to say: I know that I am a human being, and I know that I have not understood the system"; *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 311. In more contemporary discussions, Frank Jackson has argued that the thinking first-person subject has direct, privileged access to his thoughts that no physicalist theory can ever capture. See, "Epiphenomenal Qualia," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 32 (1982): 127–36. Recent discussions in the philosophy of mind have raised questions as to just how authoritative self-awareness and description are. For example, any eliminative position takes it that the subjective feel of consciousness is not really what it feels like at all. See Paul Churchland, who argues that "emotions, qualia, and 'raw feels'" are all part of a false theory that will be replaced by a completed neuroscience, in "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes," *Journal of Philosophy* 78, no. 2 (February 1981): 67–90.

⁶ Kahn, "Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle's Psychology," 61, claims that Aristotle's discussion of perception serves as a model for his discussion of the intellect. Although Aristotle does use the effects of light to illustrate the operation of the active intellect, such an analogy does not really get to the heart of his argument. Far more important to Aristotle's argument is the equation of the intellect and its object (*Metaphysics* 11.7). But whatever the case for Aristotle, the commentators discussed here explicitly ground their arguments about the nature of apperception in the nature of the intellect, which in turn they ground in the nature of truth.

rested on their notion of what the core meaning of truth was.⁷

Each argues in the following logical order from (1) as the ultimate premise to (3) as the conclusion regarding self-awareness in perception:⁸

- (1) They posit a core meaning of truth;
- (2) They determine the nature of the intellect that is able to apprehend such truth;
- (3) They compare the self-awareness in sensation to the self-awareness in intellection.

Each commentator's explanation of self-awareness in perception begins with a stand on what the truth is at the most abstract level. None of them has a transparent understanding of the nature of self-awareness. Self-awareness itself may be immediate, but to understand self-awareness, each mediates his explanations of consciousness through more basic notions of the nature of truth and of understanding in general.

The attempts by so many serious and reflective ancient philosophers to understand self-awareness, and the diversity of their answers, should serve to dampen the hopes and pretensions of modern theorists to take self-awareness as a primitive, privileged, and unassailable basis for understanding the mind. It should also caution against dismissing the notion of truth as unattainable or insignificant, because it has such significant implications for so many other questions. Once the notion of the self is involved, many other epistemic, ethical, and political questions follow as well.

One may wish to dismiss the ancient commentators as mistakenly trapped in an overly rationalistic viewpoint from which modern theorists have escaped, but such a summary dismissal neglects the premonitory lessons that their efforts provide. Any explanation of awareness and consciousness faces the same difficulties that the an-

⁷ By core meaning of truth, I mean the meaning of truth that explains and defines other uses of the term "truth." Each commentator recognized Aristotle's theory of *pros hen* analogy and its importance for definitions. By the theory, a term could have different but related meanings. In a *pros hen* analogy, the meanings are all related to a core meaning that is used to define the others.

⁸ The actual order of the argument as they are laid out in the texts follows Aristotle's. It begins with the most proximate to us, self-awareness, and proceeds to the most abstract, the core notion of truth.

cient commentators faced. Every explanation of consciousness must be mediated through notions of what qualifies as an adequate theory or explanation. To explain consciousness, a theorist must rely on some sort of prior standard for validity of explanations. He must have at least a tacit notion of what sort of explanation will count as valid before he can attempt to construct an explanation that can hope to succeed. Hence he will need to invoke or at least presuppose some notion of what truth and understanding are, even if he shies away from using the term "truth."

For, if self-awareness is a specific kind of knowledge, a theorist must have some sort of over-arching view of what knowledge is in general, of which self-awareness is one specific sort. He must generalize to what knowledge is per se before he can differentiate what self-knowledge is specifically.

Further, once a theorist takes the self to be immediate, then to explain self-knowledge the only notion he has to work with is the notion of knowledge itself, and therefore the notion of truth. If the self is immediate, it has no explanatory power in itself, for every explanation is mediated. To rely on any other notion outside of the self and knowledge would force him to explain the self through something other than itself, which would then deny the immediacy of the self. So to explain the immediacy of self-knowledge, a theorist can only rely upon the notion of knowledge and hence of the truth.

Therefore, an examination of modern explanations of consciousness reveals the same pattern as does the examination of the ancient theories. Modern theorists accept an explanation of consciousness that accords with their commitments to what truth is and what counts as a valid scientific explanation.⁹ Hence, although the views of truth may have changed, the centrality of the notion of truth for explaining consciousness has not. The understanding of self-awareness is no

⁹ Modern theorists have developed theories as to the nature of consciousness that run contrary to all conscious experience, because each theory seeks to reveal the true nature of consciousness below the surface of appearances. To do so they each rely on a theory of truth or of success in investigation. Descartes claimed to be arguing on the basis of introspection, but only after he established "clear and distinct perceptions" as the criteria of certitude and truth. In his *Discourse on Method* he set forth his four rules for discovery of the truth, of which the first reads, "Le Premier était de ne recevoir jamais aucune chose pour vraie, que je ne la connusse évidemment être telle: c'est-à-dire, d'éviter soigneusement la précipitation et la prévention; et de ne comprendre rien de plus en mes jugements, que ce qui se

more immediate now than it was in the past. Thus, a study of the ancient discussions of self-awareness still provides important lessons about the priority of the notion of truth for explanations of self-awareness.

The first of the ancient commentators of whom extensive texts are preserved is Alexander of Aphrodisias (2d–3d century C.E.). His commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* is lost, but his own treatise, also

présenterait si clairement et si distinctement à mon esprit, que je n'eusse aucune occasion de le mettre en doute"; *Oeuvres de Descartes*, rev. ed., ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Vrin, 1964–76), 6:18. Thus, Descartes believed that only that which was clearly and distinctly perceived could be known to be true. The criteria led him to distinguish the soul as thinking thing from the body as extended thing, since he could clearly and distinctly regard them as distinct (*Meditations*, in *Oeuvres* 7:78, and *Principles of Philosophy*, in *Oeuvres* 8A:30–1). Thus, his criteria of truth led him to his apprehension of himself as a thinking thing distinct from the body. No immediate experience could ever have convinced him of this, since all of his experiences occurred to him while in his body. Kant insisted that the highest forms of truth were universal and necessary. They were the pure, a priori truths (see *Critique of Pure Reason*, B3–4). Such truths he characterized as laws. Human experience was governed by two distinct sets of universal and necessary truths, natural law and moral law (see "Preface," *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Werke*, ed. Ernst Cassirer [Berlin: Cassirer, 1922], 4:243–8). Thus, Kant claimed that rational beings exist in two realms simultaneously, a noetic realm governed by the moral law and a phenomenal realm governed by physical law. According to Kant, a rational being needed to view itself in two respects: "Einmal sofern es zur Sinnenwelt gehört, unter Naturgesetzen (Heteronomie), zweitens als zur intelligibelen Welt gehörig unter Gesetzen, die, von der Natur unabhängig, nicht empirisch, sondern bloß in der Vernunft gegründet sind"; *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 312. The later laws are the laws of morals. Thus, Kant bifurcated the self in a way that no one ever really experiences, but he did so on the basis of his convictions regarding the twofold nature of truth. Hegel began his long examination of the logical and historical development of self-awareness in the *Phenomenology* with the recognition that his new theory of the human spirit "entirely depended" on a new theory of truth, one that was subjective rather than substantive: "Es kommt nach meiner Einsicht, welche sich durch die Darstellung des Systems selbst rechtfertigen muß, alles darauf an, das Wahre nicht als *Substanz*, sondern ebensosehr als *Subjekt* aufzufassen und auszudrücken"; *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. Hans-Friedrich Wessels and Heinrich Clairmont (Hamburg: Meiner, 1988), 13–4. Hegel maintained that truth had to be realized in a subjective consciousness, rather than as an universal, abstract substance. To advance to more contemporary times, many recent theorists including Skinner, *About Behaviorism* (New York: Knopf, 1974), 14–20, and Churchland, "Eliminative Materialism," have sought to deny the actual existence of conscious experience at all. Clearly they can have no experiential argument that can support such a claim; rather, it rests on a thoroughgoing commitment to intersubjective experimental science as the ultimate criterion of truth, meaning that private subjective experiences simply do not measure up. So, contrary to all experience, consciousness does not actually exist, since all that actually exists is scientifically verifiable.

entitled *De Anima*, contains a discussion of self-awareness in perception that expands Aristotle's own very brief discussion of apperception from *De Somno et Vigilia*.¹⁰ Even though it is not a commentary per se, Alexander closely follows Aristotle's discussion of self-awareness. Alexander explains,

For neither do we see that we see, nor do we hear that we hear, for neither is sight visible nor is hearing audible. Rather it is the activity of the first and highest sense that is called the common sense by which the perceiver perceives apperception.¹¹

Alexander's comments are also very brief, but he supplements Aristotle's discussion with two concise and cryptic arguments, one negative and one positive. On the negative side, he claims that vision is not visible and hearing is not audible, hence neither the power of sight nor the power of hearing can perceive itself. On the positive side, he claims that apperception attends perception as the activity of the primary and highest sense—the common sense. His arguments are so compressed, however, that they are not comprehensible without comparison to his more general doctrines concerning perception, the intellect, and truth.

¹⁰ *De Somno et Vigilia* 2.455a16–18. For a discussion of the writings attributed to Alexander, see Robert Sharples, "Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation", *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt*, vol. 2.36.2, ed. Wolfgang Haase (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), 1176–243. Also, Sharples, "The School of Alexander?" in *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence*, ed. Richard Sorabji (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 83–111. Sharples (97–102) notes that it is improbable that Alexander wrote all the treatises in the *Quaestiones* due to doctrinal and stylistic differences among them. *Quaestio* 3.6 (ed. Ivo Bruns, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, suppl. 2.2 [Berlin: Reimer, 1892], 91.26–93.24), which discusses apperception, is inconsistent with Alexander's conclusion in his *De Anima* where he attributes apperception to the power of common sense. *Quaestio* 3.6 attributes the power of apperception to each sense (92.18–20). Thus, it is unlikely to be by Alexander himself. Since we have no certainty regarding the authorship of the *Quaestiones* both as a whole and individually, we cannot subject the *Quaestiones* to the same sort of analysis as we do with the other commentators from whom we have additional materials that discuss the nature of truth and the intellect.

¹¹ *De Anima*, 65.6–10 (translations here and throughout are by the author): "οὐ γὰρ ὁρῶμεν ὅτι ὁρῶμεν οὐδὲ ἀκούομεν ὅτι ἀκούομεν. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὁρᾶν ὁρατὸν οὔτε τὸ ἀκούειν ἀκουστόν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς πρώτης τε καὶ κυρίας αἰσθήσεως καὶ κοινῆς λεγομένης, καθ' ἣν γίνεται συναίσθησις τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι."

To begin with perception, Alexander understands perception as the apprehension of the form of an object without its matter.¹² Perception receives the form of its object, but in a way that lies midway between the way material things receive forms and the completely immaterial way that forms are apprehended by the intellect.¹³ Perception and intellection both occur through the apprehension of a form without matter, but the intellect goes further in stripping the form from its matter. Perception does not receive the form materially, but it still receives the form as it exists in matter mixed with common sensibles.

Just as perception is actualized by means of the reception of the forms of its objects without matter, so also intellection is the reception of forms without matter.¹⁴ But intellection differs from perceptual apprehension in that even though sense does not receive the perceived forms as matter, it still apprehends them as they exist in matter. For the fact that the common sensibles are combined with the apprehension of the proper sensibles shows that sense apprehends its objects as they exist in matter. For as sight perceives colors, it also receives size, shape, movement, and rest along with it. They show that color belongs to some subject. On the other hand, intellect neither receives forms as matter, nor as they exist in matter, nor with matter.¹⁵

¹² *De Anima*, 39.13–14.

¹³ Alexander holds a middle position with respect to the current debate between the materialists and immaterialists concerning Aristotle's theory of perception. The immaterialists argue that sense receives the form of its object immaterially as a cognitive awareness, while materialists argue that the eye physically receives color—for example, red—and becomes red in the process. Alexander stakes out a middle position. Sense does not receive matter materially; but it is not fully immaterial either. The bibliography on the debate is enormous, but Miles Burnyeat and Richard Sorabji give excellent statements of their respective arguments. See *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*. Burnyeat argues for the immaterialist position in "Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? A Draft," 15–26. Sorabji replies in "Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of Sense Perception," 195–225.

¹⁴ At first sight Alexander appears to be taking perception as a model for the intellect. Perception does serve to illustrate the reception of form without matter, but his argument presupposes a distinction between form and matter that is only cognizable by the intellect. Perception has no power to apprehend the distinction between form and matter on its own. Therefore, logically his argument establishes an intellectual distinction between form and matter that then serves to explain the nature of perception, even though perception can serve to illustrate the intellect. So also a drawing of a triangle may serve to illustrate a theorem, although the drawing itself is not the proof.

The material, perceptual, and intellectual reception of forms are all distinguished by the degree to which their reception is more or less particular or universal. The intellect receives the forms of its objects universally. It can abstract the form of a human being that is common to any human being without regard to any particular characteristics of any one human being. A material thing can only receive a form by taking on the form itself as a materially distinct form not shared with anything else. The material reception of forms is merely individual. In Alexander's terms, a material thing only receives a form by itself "suffering" from the form.¹⁶ In other words, it must take on the form as its own. A material thing receives the form of heat by itself becoming hot within its own matter.¹⁷ Once water becomes hot, the heat is proper to the water and is no longer the heat of the fire. Water possesses its own materially distinct form of heat, so once the fire is removed, the water retains its own heat.

Perceptual reception of forms lies in between the universal reception of the intellect and particular, material reception. Perception receives the form of its object universally to the extent that it shares the sensible form with its object. The form that the sense receives is common to the sense and its object. However, the sense does not attain to the same level of universality that the intellect achieves. Its form is still attended by all the common sensibles, such as size, shape, and so on.

Because sensation is universal to the extent that it receives a form that is common with its object and does not receive its own materially distinct form, sight does not become colored when it perceives the form of a color.¹⁸ Sight does not have its own form of red that is

¹⁵ *De Anima*, 83.13–24: "ὡςπερ δὲ ἡ αἴσθησις ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διὰ τῆς τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν λήψεως ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης γίνεται, οὕτως δὲ καὶ ἡ νόησις λήψις τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστὶ χωρὶς ὕλης, ταύτῃ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἀντιλήψεως διαφέρουσα, ἥ ἢ μὲν αἴσθησις, εἰ καὶ μὴ ὡς ὕλη τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶδη λαμβάνει, ἀλλ' οὕτως γε αὐτῶν ποιεῖται τὴν ἀντίληψιν ὡς ὄντων ἐν ὕλῃ (τὰ γὰρ κοινὰ αἰσθητὰ συμπεπλεγμένα τῇ τῶν ἰδίων αἰσθητῶν ἀντιλήψει μαρτύρια τοῦ ὡς ἐνύλων αὐτῶν ὄντων τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· ἅμα γὰρ χρωμάτων ὅψις αἰσθανομένη σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ μεγέθους καὶ σχήματος καὶ κινήσεως ἢ ἡρεμίας αἰσθησιν λαμβάνει, ἃ μαρτύρια τοῦ περὶ τι ὑποκείμενον εἶναι τὸ χρῶμα), ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὔτε ὡς ὕλη τὰ εἶδη λαμβάνει, οὔτε ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ ὄντα καὶ μεθ' ὕλης."

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 84.2–3.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 84.2–4.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 83.24–84.6.

materially distinct from the fire it perceives. It possesses the form of the color from the fire, and it shares the form with the fire, hence it perceives the form as it belongs to the fire and not proper to itself. Once the fire is removed from view, sight no longer retains the form of fire, because it never possessed a form of red that was materially distinct from the fire.

The manner in which sense receives forms is also distinct from intellectual reception. In contrast to the intellect, sight only perceives color, its proper sensible, as it exists together with the common sensibles. Thus sight can perceive a white patch only if it also receives the shape and size of the patch. We cannot see a color without also seeing some sort of shape along with it. Intellect can abstract further and understand white more universally—not as found in any particular shape or size. The intellect receives a form that is universal and common to all its particulars. Matter makes the particulars distinct, so by stripping away the form from its material conditions, the intellect is left with a universal form.¹⁹

To return to Alexander's discussion of apperception, it now becomes clear why he denies apperception to the senses themselves. For he says that seeing is not visible, and hearing not audible. Sight is not visible because it does not materially receive the form of its object. Sight does not become red when it sees red. If it did, it would be visible. Since it is not colored, it cannot be the object of its own power, for the proper object of vision is color. Hence the power of sight cannot perceive its own operation. So much for the negative side of Alexander's argument. For the positive side, one needs to consider further his teachings concerning the intellect.

To understand Alexander's teachings concerning the intellect, one must first understand that he sets a very high standard for truth. For true understanding, Alexander requires the complete identity of the intellect and its object,

When the intellect understands, it becomes that which it understands. Before the intellect understands in actuality, the understanding and its object stand in relation to one another and are opposed to each other as related things, but when they are operating, they become one and the opposition ceases.²⁰

¹⁹ *De Anima*, 85.14–20.

Only by becoming its object can an intellect be said to grasp its object. It must take on the form of its object and make it its own immaterial form. Because it has fully taken on the form of its object, it no longer can be formally distinguished from its object.

Therefore, if the intellect is to understand a material object, it must first separate its form from its matter and its other material conditions.

The intellect makes the essences and forms of composite beings intelligible for itself by separating them from the things with which they have their being.²¹

By composite beings, Alexander means substances that are composed of form and matter. The matter exists along with the form, but it must be removed in order for the form to become intelligible, for the matter of a thing individuates it and makes it distinct from all others. Hence, as long as it is still material, it cannot be understood, for it can never be the same as the knower. Matter makes the composite numerically distinct and therefore the material object cannot be the same as the knower. So to be known, the form must be separated from its matter. Likewise, the knower must also be immaterial, for its own matter individuates it and keeps it distinct from its object.

Hence, Alexander argues that an immaterial form is the highest level of intellect. It both understands and is intelligible by its very nature; it has no matter that prevents it from being understood or from understanding.

If there are certain forms that exist per se, both without matter and without a substrate, they are the highest objects of the intellect, for they are intelligible by their very nature. They do not become such through the assistance of an intellect that apprehends them. But objects that are intellectual by their own nature are the actual objects of the intellect, for material objects are only potentially objects of the intellect. But the actual object is the same as the actual intellect, if the knower is the same

²⁰ Ibid., 86.22–6: “ὅταν νοῦν, γίνεσθαι ἐκεῖνο, ὃ νοεῖ. πρὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν τὸν νοῦν νοεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλά ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν τε καὶ τὸ νοούμενον καὶ ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις ὥς τὰ πρὸς τι, ὅταν δὲ ἐνεργῶσιν, ἐν γινόμενα παύεται τῆς ἀντιθέσεως.”

²¹ Ibid., 87.24–5: “Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν συνθέτων τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τε καὶ τὰ τούτων εἶδη ὁ νοῦς αὐτῷ νοητὰ ποιεῖ χωρίζων αὐτὰ τῶν σὺν οἷς αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι.”

as the known. Therefore the immaterial form is the highest and actual intellect.²²

Enmattered forms are not understandable in their own right. They depend on an intellect to make them understandable by stripping them from their matter. Hence Alexander claims that they depend on an intellect for their existence. For there are no objects of the intellect without an intellect that grasps them. Neither is there an intellect that does not have at least some object that it grasps. Thus, the intellect and its object both depend on each other for their existence.²³ According to Alexander, the same is true for mathematical objects. They do not exist on their own right but depend on an intellect to create them through "separation." Without an intellect to think them, mathematical objects would not exist. Hence neither the mathematical objects nor the intellect that comprehends them exist on their own. They are dependent and perishable entities.²⁴ An immaterial form is not so. It is comprehensible in own right because it contains no matter that prevents it from being understood. Because it is understood in its own right, it exists on its own and is not dependent on anything else for its existence.

In all, Alexander distinguishes four levels of intellect, the potential, habitual, actual, and agent. The human intellect proceeds from the potential intellect of a child that does not yet understand the forms and progresses to a habitual intellect that possesses the forms.²⁵ Once a person has come to know a form, he possesses the habitual ability to understand it, even while he is not actually engaged in thought concerning it. Thus, a geometer retains a habitual understanding of geometry, even while actively engaged in thoughts about his finances. When a human is actually thinking, he possesses an actual intellect.

²² *De Anima*, 87.25–88.3: "εἰ δέ τινα ἔστιν εἶδη, ὡς τὰ καθ' αὐτά, χωρὶς ὕλης τε καὶ ὑποκειμένου τινός, ταῦτα κυρίως ἐστὶ νοητά, ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ φύσει τὸ εἶναι τοιαῦτα ἔχοντα, ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ τῆς τοῦ νοοῦντος αὐτὰ βοηθείας λαμβάνοντα. τὰ δὲ τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει νοητά κατ' ἐνέργειαν νοητά, δυνάμει γὰρ νοητά τὰ ἔνυλα. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν νοητὸν ταῦτόν τῳ κατ' ἐνέργειαν νῶ, εἴ γε ταῦτόν τὸ νοούμενον τῳ νοοῦντι. τὸ ἄρα αὐλον εἶδος νοῦς ὁ κυρίως τε καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν."

²³ *Ibid.*, 90.2–4.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 90.9–11.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 81.22–82.3.

The fourth and highest intellect is the agent intellect. It is also the highest object of the intellect that was discussed above. It is the cause of all the other intellects and even of their objects.²⁶ It is independent, unaffected by matter and change, and imperishable.²⁷ It is a pure self-understanding form.²⁸ Because it exists on its own, it is the cause of all the other intellects and their objects, which exist dependently and secondarily.²⁹ Alexander claims that the highest and primary example of a kind is the cause of all the others in the kind.³⁰ He bolsters this argument with a claim that because it is intelligible by nature, the agent intellect must be the cause of the others that are not intelligible by nature.³¹ Because it is intelligible and understands by its very nature, it does not depend on anything else for its existence. By contrast, other intellects do not understand by their very nature and must rely on something else to make them understand. So it is the agent intellect that transforms the potential intellect into an actual intellect, as the potential intellect does not have it in its nature to understand on its own, its own nature being merely potential. With the help of the agent intellect, the potential intellect removes forms from matter and makes them intelligible. The agent intellect is thereby the cause of both other intellects and their objects, as it causes the forms to be immaterial and hence understandable. As it comes to understand, the actual intellect then "somehow" becomes the agent intellect,³² presumably because it comes to be formally identical with its object, as is the agent intellect. Further, it is no longer distinct from its object, "the actualized intellect having become one with its object is reasonably said to know itself."³³ To know its object is to know itself, for they are one and the same.

To return to the positive side of Alexander's discussion of apperception, Alexander argues in parallel fashion that the common sense is the primary and highest sense and so must also provide the self-awareness that is found in perception. For just as the highest intellect is responsible for all understanding, including self-understanding, so also the highest sense must be ultimately responsible for all

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 89.4–5.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 89.11–16.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 88.24–5.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 89.7–11.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 88.26–89.1.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 89.6–7.

³² *Ibid.*, 89.21–2.

³³ *Ibid.*, 86.27–8.

perception, including self-perception. It provides apperception to the senses, as Alexander has already demonstrated that the senses themselves are incapable of apperception. So apperception must be provided by the primary sense, which is the common sense, in a manner similar to the agent intellect's provision of understanding to potential intellects that are incapable of it on their own.

Alexander's brief and cryptic teaching concerning apperception is structured in direct parallel to his discussion of the intellect and its self-awareness. In fact, his teaching concerning apperception is not really comprehensible without examining its parallels in the intellect. His teaching regarding the intellect in turn rests on an identification of the highest form of the intellect and intelligible objects. The highest intellect explains all the other forms of understanding. Ultimately his teaching regarding apperception rests on his understanding of the highest level of truth in the identity of intellect and form.

Alexander's efforts to understand Aristotle's comments on self-awareness in perception were followed a century later by another Peripatetic commentator, Themistius (317–88 C.E.).³⁴ Although Themistius follows Alexander in many respects, he departs from him regarding the core meaning of truth. As a result, Themistius' explanations of the intellect, and hence his explanation of self-awareness in perception, also depart from what Alexander lays out.

Themistius rejects Alexander's claim that truth ultimately lies in the simple apprehension of an immaterial form. He argues instead that truth arises only in the composition of intelligibles in a predication that can be true or false. As a result, the intellect is also composite, as truth is attributed only to composites. Thus, he understands self-awareness in perception to be composite in a way analogous to the composition of the intellect. As already seen with Alexander, Themistius' understanding of truth dictates the workings of the intellect that in turn provide the logical framework for understanding self-awareness in perception.

³⁴ For background on Themistius, see Themistius, *On Aristotle's On the Soul*, trans. Robert Todd (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Frederic Schroeder and Robert Todd, *Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990); Blumenthal, *Aristotle and Neoplatonism*, 22–3. On Themistius as a Peripatetic, see Blumenthal, "Themistius: The Last Peripatetic Commentator on Aristotle?" in *Aristotle Transformed*, 113–23.

In direct contrast to Alexander, Themistius claims that truth does not yet occur in simple apprehension.

First the potential intellect understands those which are signified simply and indivisibly, those that are divided into the categories. In them there is not yet truth or falsehood. Advancing, it combines them with each other, as "Socrates" and "walks," in which now there is truth and falsehood.³⁵

The simple terms that the intellect understands are neither true nor false. It is only in the composition of terms that truth or falsity arises. Hence, since the truth which is the primary object of the intellect arises only in composites, Themistius understands the intellect that apprehends truth to be composite as well.

Whereas Alexander takes the equation of the intellect and its object to be the highest level of truth, Themistius does not understand the same equation of the intellect and its object as basic and fundamental; rather, he explains the same equation in terms of a more basic composition of the potential and active intellects:

And as I have often said, the intellect (νοῦς) and its object are the same just as actual knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and its object, but not in the same respect. But as it comprehends the potential intellect, it is the object, and as it is actual, it is the intellect.³⁶

Themistius understands the intellect as composed from active and potential intellect. The intellect begins as merely potential, in that it can understand things even though it does not yet do so in actuality. Through apprehension of the forms of things, the intellect comes to understand in actuality. He takes the actually understanding intellect to be a composite of form and matter.

³⁵ Themistius, *Paraphrase of Aristotle's De Anima*, 109.5–8: "πρῶτον μὲν νοεῖ τὰ ἀπλά και ἀδιαίρετα σημαίνόμενα, ὅσα ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις διώρισται, ἐν οἷς οὐπω τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ τὸ ψεῦδός ἐστι· προϋόν δὲ και συντίθησιν αὐτὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα, οἷον τὸ Σωκράτης και τὸ βαδίζει, ἐν οἷς ἤδη τὸ ἀληθὲς και τὸ ψεῦδος."

³⁶ Ibid., 99.27–30: "ὥσπερ ἔφην πολλάκις, ὁ αὐτὸς νοῦς και νοητός, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν αὐτό ἐστι τὸ ἐπιστητόν, οὐ μὴν κατὰ ταῦτόν, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν συνείληφε τὸν δυνάμει νοῦν, νοητός· ἢ δὲ ἐστιν αὐτὸς κατ' ἐνέργειαν, νοῦς."

Thus, when the actualized intellect is added to the potential intellect, it also becomes one with it. For that which is from form and matter is one thing.³⁷

The active intellect is a form, while the potential intellect is matter.³⁸ Just as bronze can at once be matter for a statue and can itself be formed from prior elements, so also the potential intellect, while being matter for the active intellect, is itself formed from something prior. It is formed from the imagination as its matter. The imagination is in turn formed from the sensible soul.³⁹ Thus the sensible soul is matter for the imagination that in turn is matter for the potential intellect. Finally, the potential intellect is the matter for the active intellect. The final result is the composite intellect that is the person.

For I am the composite intellect from the intellect in potential and the intellect in act.⁴⁰

Thus, to understand what a person is, one must understand it as composed of form and matter, just as material things are composed of form and matter. Physical things are understood as composed of form and matter on an analogy with the primary truth-bearers, propositions that are composed of subjects and the forms predicated of them.

When Themistius approaches Aristotle's question concerning apperception, he applies the same sort of composition of active and passive elements to perception in order to explain how vision perceives both color and its own act of perception. Contrary to Alexander, Themistius argues that by the same sense we both perceive and perceive that we are perceiving. For just as Themistius takes the intellect to be a composite of passive and active elements, so also perception is composite. In perception, sense both passively receives the form of the object it observes and actively makes a judg-

³⁷ Themistius, *Paraphrase of Aristotle's De Anima*, 99.17–18: "οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν νοῦς τῷ δυνάμει νῷ προσγενόμενος εἰς τε γίνεται μετ' αὐτοῦ· ἐν γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ὅλης καὶ εἰδούς."

³⁸ Ibid., 100.29–37.

³⁹ Ibid., 100.29–31.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 100.18–19: "καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ συγκεῖμενος νοῦς ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ."

ment concerning the form it observes.⁴¹ Because it is composite, vision observes both color and its act of observing color.

But both [perceiving and perceiving that we perceive] are not in the same vision in the same way. For we say that it is yellow because of being affected by it, but we say that we see by the additional apprehension of the affection.⁴²

Thus, vision is composed of both a passive element that is affected by the color of its object and an active element that is able to apprehend the affection. Sight passively receives color and therefore perceives its object. Actively, however, sight makes a judgment concerning its affectionation by color and thereby perceives that it perceives. Themistius' composite theory of perception thereby allows him to handle very efficiently the problems Aristotle had raised regarding self-awareness in perception, because it allows him both passive and active elements in perception.

After Themistius, commentary on Aristotle passed from the Peripatetics to the Neoplatonists.⁴³ From late antiquity, we possess two Greek Neoplatonist commentaries on Aristotle's *De Anima*, one attributed to Simplicius and one to Philoponus. In a Latin translation from a damaged manuscript, we also possess part of a commentary on the third book of Aristotle's *De Anima*, likewise attributed to Philoponus.⁴⁴ The authorship of the three commentaries remains in

⁴¹ Ibid., 83.19.

⁴² Ibid., 83.32–4: "ἀλλ' ἄμφω μὲν τῇ αὐτῇ ὄψει οὐχ ὡσαύτως δέ. λέγομεν γὰρ ξανθὸν τῷ πάσχειν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὁρῶμεν τῷ πάθους ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι."

⁴³ Blumenthal, *Aristotle and Neoplatonism*, 22, calls Themistius "the last Peripatetic commentator on Aristotle." On the attention paid to apperception among the Neoplatonic commentators, and hence its increasing importance, see Sara Rappe, *Reading Neoplatonism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 52–5.

⁴⁴ Philoponus' commentary on the third book is partially preserved in the 1268 Latin translation by William de Moerbeke. See Philoponus, *On Aristotle on the Intellect (de Anima 3.4–8)* (hereafter, "*Aristotle on Intellect*"), trans. William Charlton (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 1. Numerous quotations from Philoponus' commentary on the third book of *De Anima* are preserved in Sophonias' paraphrase from the late thirteenth century or early fourteenth century. See also, "Philoponus," in *On Aristotle's 'On the Soul' 3.6–13* with Stephanus, *On Aristotle's 'On Interpretation'* (hereafter, "*Aristotle on Soul*"), trans. William Charlton (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

dispute, but most scholars remain highly doubtful about the received attributions to Simplicius and Philoponus, at least in parts.⁴⁵

The authorship of the Greek commentary attributed to Philoponus is complicated by the fact that it appears to be a composite of commentaries by two different authors. The Greek commentary on the third book of Aristotle's *De Anima* appears to be by an author different from the author of the commentary on the first two books. The Greek commentary on the first two books is consistent both with what we know from the rest of Philoponus' writings, and with the remains of the commentary on the third book preserved in Latin. Therefore, it seems best to take the Greek commentary on the third book as being by someone other than Philoponus.⁴⁶ Typically the Greek commentary on the third book is referred to as Pseudo-Philoponus. Likewise, the commentary attributed to Simplicius is referred to as Pseudo-Simplicius.

Both Pseudo-Simplicius⁴⁷ and Pseudo-Philoponus⁴⁸ take truth to be an identity between intellect and its object. Their formulations bear some similarity to Alexander's understanding of the truth, but each with his own differences. Unlike Alexander, they do not understand intelligible forms to be immanent in the world. Rather, they are transcendent forms that exist only immaterially. The immanent forms that exist in material things are mere images of the transcendent, immaterial forms that exist in the intellect. Consistent with the Neoplatonist tradition and with Platonism more broadly, both commentators

⁴⁵ For the authorship of the "Simplicius" commentary see Blumenthal, *Aristotle and Neoplatonism*, 65–71; Richard Sorabji, "Introduction," in Simplicius, *On Aristotle's On the Soul 1.1–2.4*, trans. J. O. Urmson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 1; Blumenthal, "Simplicius (?) on the First Book of *de Anima*," in *Simplicius: Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie*, ed. Isidore Hadot (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), 91–112. For the authorship of the "Philoponus" commentary, see Blumenthal, *Aristotle and Neoplatonism*, 61–5.

⁴⁶ Blumenthal, *Aristotle and Neoplatonism*, 62. Charlton, *Aristotle on Intellect*, 6–12, makes the case that authors of Greek and Latin commentaries on book 3 are distinct. Charlton, *Aristotle on Soul*, 1–10, argues that the author of the Greek commentary on book 3 is Stephanus of Alexandria who also wrote a commentary on Aristotle's *On Interpretation*.

⁴⁷ Pseudo-Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima* (hereafter, "*In de Anima*"), 237.5–7.

⁴⁸ Pseudo-Philoponus, *Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, Book Three* (hereafter, "*In de Anima III*"), 534.12–14.

retain a strict division between the immaterial, intelligible realm of the forms and the material realm of appearance and change.

Another difference is that each prioritizes a different aspect of the identity of the intellect and its object. Pseudo-Simplicius prioritizes the composite nature of rational thought and uses it as a model for understanding the simple apprehension of forms by the intellect, while Pseudo-Philoponus works in the opposite direction and takes the simple apprehension of the form to be the highest level and primary sense of truth. As a result, each comes to different conclusion regarding the nature of apperception.

To begin with the briefer account by Pseudo-Simplicius, he distinguishes two activities in all knowledge. He states, "In every apprehension, knowledge is divided in two."⁴⁹ There is the both the apprehension of the content of knowledge and the recognition that the content is true. At the level of the intellect, the two acts of knowledge are united.

For the rational judgment as to the truth of the matter accompanies the awareness of it. For even the intellect knows that its content is true, but both acts are undivided and of one form. But rational knowledge and the awareness judging whether it is true are composed in the following way. The knowledge is completely confirmed by reason, either as necessary or as plausible, or the speaker has a trustworthy face, and so it judges the statement in some way.⁵⁰

The composition of rational knowledge is used as the model to understand the composition that must also accompany intellectual apprehension. For just as rational knowledge assesses the truth of its content, so also Pseudo-Simplicius claims the intellect assesses the truth of its own content. However, the assessment in intellectual apprehension is "undivided and of one form" with its content, hence one cannot observe the composition in intellectual apprehension in the same way one can in rational knowledge. Nevertheless, Pseudo-Simplicius assumes composition is present, based on an analogy with rational knowledge. He therefore takes the compositional nature of rational knowledge as more basic and uses it to introduce composition into

⁴⁹ *In de Anima*, 210.29–30.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 210.15–20: "ἡ γὰρ ὡς ἀληθοῦς τοῦ πράγματος κρίσις μετὰ τὴν σύνεσιν λογική. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ὅτι ἀληθές, ἀλλὰ ἀμερίστως καὶ ἐνοειδῶς ἄμφω· ἡ δὲ λογοικὴ γνώσις καὶ εἰ ἀληθὴς ἡ σύνεσις κρίνουσα οὕτω συγκατατίθεται, λόγῳ πάντως ἐπερειδομένη ἢ ἀναγκαίῳ ἢ πιθανῶ, ἢ τῷ λέγοντι ὡς ἀξιοπίστῳ προσώπῳ, καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ τινὰ κρίνουσα λόγον."

the intellect. Even though Pseudo-Simplicius follows Alexander in claiming that when the forms are truly understood, the intellect and the forms it understands are identical,⁵¹ he introduces into the identity a composition between the content of the intellection and the assessment that it is true.

Nevertheless, since truth is found in the identity of the intellect with itself, truth is inherently reflexive.⁵² Truth is found within the intellect as it turns into itself.

Knowledge that reflects into itself also apprehends that it absolutely knows that what it knows is either true or false, for it knows itself. Every irrational animal is set only on exterior things, since it desires only exterior things and knows only them. And neither do they desire exterior things because they are good, but only as pleasures, nor does it know them as true but only as sensibles.⁵³

Irrational animals (that is, all but humans) that operate through desire and sensation experience only the sensible realm of external things. External things and the pleasures they afford are the objects of the physical desires of irrational animals. They know them only through their apparent, sensible forms and not by their true nature.

Since an irrational animal is constantly seeking that which is exterior to it, it can never come to knowledge of the truth, which is found in the identity of the knower and object. Therefore, self-knowledge is proper to humans, who possess a rational soul,⁵⁴ as only the intellect finds truth within itself. Truth is found only in the realm of intelligible forms, and that can only be discovered within the intellect itself, since the true objects of intellection are identical with the intellect itself.⁵⁵

⁵¹ *In de Anima*, 237.5–7.

⁵² For a discussion of reflexion and its relation to apperception in Pseudo-Simplicius, see Peter Lauthner, "Rival Theories of Self-Awareness in Late Neoplatonism," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 39 (1994): 107–16.

⁵³ *In de Anima*, 211.5–10: "ἐπιστρεπτικῆς γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὴν γνώσεως τῆς ὅτι αὐτὸ τοῦτο γινώσκει ὅπως ἢ ὅτι ἀληθῶς ἢ ψευδῶς ἀντιληψομένης· αὕτη γὰρ ἑαυτὴν γινώσκει· πρὸς δὲ μόνον τὸ ἔξω πάσα ἢ ἄλογος τέταται ζωή, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁρέγεται μόνων τῶν ἐκτός καὶ γινώσκει μόνα ταῦτα· καὶ οὔτε ἡ ὁρεξις αὐτῶν ὡς ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τῶν ἐκτός, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡδέων μόνον, οὔτε ἡ γνῶσις ὡς ἀληθῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς αἰσθητῶν μόνων."

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 236.33–4.

⁵⁵ Here Pseudo-Simplicius is not contradicting other statements that sense can also be true, but merely saying more properly that it is the intellect that is primarily true. Sense is true only in a secondary and derivative way.

Pseudo-Simplicius retains a strict division between the operations of the rational and irrational soul. Knowledge is proper to the rational soul. Only the rational soul knows the operations of the senses in the irrational soul. Because to perceive that we are perceiving is reflexive, this activity must belong to the rational soul.

To perceive that we are perceiving seems to me to be proper to humans alone. For it is the action of the rational animal to be able to reflect into itself. And thereby it is shown that the rational soul extends itself as far as our perception, if indeed human perception apprehends itself.⁵⁶

The work of the rational soul extends as far as perception. Only the rational soul brings its operations to consciousness, because only the rational soul can be truly self-reflective. Hence, because it involves self-awareness, Pseudo-Simplicius says that perception is a rational activity, even though it is one that uses the body as its tool.⁵⁷ He claims that the term perception is used equivocally when applied to humans and animals,⁵⁸ for human perception is accomplished by the rational soul as it brings perception to rational consciousness through its judgments. Animals lack a rational soul, and so their perception lacks reflective self-awareness.

According to Pseudo-Simplicius, after the sense organ is affected by its object, the rational soul makes sense out of the affect by supplying its own rational account (λόγος) to what affects the sense organ. He explains the mechanics of conscious perception in the case of vision. Because it is self-conscious, vision is an activity of the rational soul.

Therefore, perception does not receive its object from the outside as something placed into it, rather, it establishes itself by means of a projection of accounts, as it provides its own account to the object and it examines the sense organ that has first been affected by its object.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Ibid., 187.27–31: “το δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἀνθρώπου μοι μόνον ἴδιον εἶναι δοκεῖ· λογικῆς γὰρ ζωῆς ἔργον τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἐπιστρεπτικόν. καὶ δείκνυται διὰ τοῦδε καὶ μέχρι τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡμῶν τὸ λογικὸν διήκον, εἴ γε καὶ αἰσθησις ἢ ἀνθρωπεία ἑαυτῆς ἀντιληπτική.”

⁵⁷ Ibid., 187.35–6.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 187.36–7.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 189.35–8: “διὸ οὐδὲ ἔξωθεν ἐντιθέμενον αὐτῇ τὸ γνωστὸν δέχεται ἢ αἰσθησις, ἀλλ’ αὕτη μὲν κατὰ προβολὴν τῶν λόγων ἵσταται, τὸν οἰκτεῖον προχειρισαμένη τῷ γνωστῷ λόγον, προχειρίζεται δὲ παθόντος τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου πρότερον ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ.”

The rational soul is entirely active and impassive in the process of vision. It supplies its own account to the affections of the sense organ. It makes rational sense out of them, while the irrational soul remains passive and unreflectively ignorant in the process. Hence consciousness is ascribed only to the rational soul. For Pseudo-Simplicius, self-awareness, like all true knowledge, is an activity of the rational soul alone. Therefore, when Aristotle attributed self-awareness to perception, he did so only to rational perception that involves the rational soul, not to the irrational aspect of perception that occurs in the sense organ.

Pseudo-Philoponus takes a different tack in dealing with the difficulties of self-awareness in perception, for he denies that perception involves any self-awareness at all, even self-awareness supplied by the rational soul. Rather, awareness comes to perception from the outside, from a new part of the rational soul that he calls the attentive part. Perception, unlike the intellect, is incapable of knowing its own operation.

Perception does not know its own operation, but intellect knows its own operation and that of others. For it is clear that the intellect operates with universals and has the objects of sense within, while perception deals with the particular and external.⁶⁰

True understanding arises only through the identity of intellect and its object.⁶¹ Thus, in knowing its object, the intellect knows itself, for its true object is identical with it. Perception, which does not grasp universal and immaterial forms, cannot aspire to self-knowledge, for its objects are necessarily distinct from it. Only an immaterial form is identical with the intellect, but perception perceives only things that are material⁶²; hence, perception is distinct from its object.

The pure knowledge of the forms in the intellect is, according to Pseudo-Philoponus, "substantive truth." It is the truth that exists only in the intellect. Substantive truth includes the knowledge of the

⁶⁰ *In de Anima III*, 498.8–11: "ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις οὐκ οἶδεν τὴν οἰκείαν ἐνέργειαν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς οἶδεν καὶ τὴν οἰκείαν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων. τὸ δὲ εἰπεῖν ὅτι ὁ μὲν νοῦς περὶ τὰ καθόλου ἐνεργεῖ καὶ ἐντὸς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητόν, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις περὶ μερικόν καὶ ἔξω δῆλόν ἐστιν."

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 534.12–14.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 510.17–19.

forms and their definitions. It is an overarching truth that has no opposite, for the definitions are simple and cannot be false.⁶³ The composite truths of discursive reason (διάνοια) that are derived from the first principles enter into opposition with falsity.⁶⁴ Derivations—none of which is achieved directly through the intellect but only through a process of reasoning—can be false or true. Substantive truth belongs to the intellect, while truth that is opposed to falsity belongs to discursive reason.⁶⁵ Substantive truth is the highest and purest kind of truth because it possesses the simplest unity with its object.

In contrast, perception remains distinct from its object, and thus it cannot attain to the self-knowledge that the intellect possesses. Therefore, Pseudo-Philoponus follows so-called recent but unnamed commentators who add an additional power of the rational soul to explain how we perceive that we perceive.⁶⁶ They call the additional part the “attentive” (προσεκτικώω) part.⁶⁷ By the attentive part we are aware of various operations of the soul.

For they say that it belongs to the attentive part of the rational soul to apprehend perceptual activities. For according to them, the rational soul has not only five powers—intellect, discursive reason, opinion, deliberation, and choice, but they add a sixth part to the rational soul that they call the attentive part. The attentive part, they say, knows what happens in a human being and says “I understood, I reasoned, I thought, I was angry, I desired.” And the attentive part of the rational soul goes

⁶³ Ibid., 569.17–18.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 445.6–12.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 545.14–17, compare 553.29–30.

⁶⁶ Wolfgang Bernard, “Philoponus on Self-Awareness,” in Richard Sorabji, *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 157, denies that Pseudo-Philoponus accepts that there is an attentive part of the rational soul, despite two explicit endorsements of the theory by Pseudo-Philoponus at 465.25–6 and 466.28–9. Bernard claims that the attentive part is an ability rather than a faculty, but he does not explain what he takes the difference between an ability and faculty to be.

⁶⁷ Damascius and Simplicius both make brief references to the attentive part of the soul, but with very little explanation as to how it functions with regard to self-awareness. For Damascius, see *Commentary on Plato's Phaedo*, version 1, ed. Leendert G. Westerink (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1977), 269.5; 271.3. See also Damascius, *Commentary on Plato's Phaedo*, version 2, ed. L. G. Westerink (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1977), 19.5; 21.3. For Simplicius, see *Commentary on Epictetus' Enchiridion*, ed. Friedrich Dübner, *Theophrasti Characteres* (Paris: Didot, 1842), 112.25; 114.52.

unrestricted through all the powers, the rational, the irrational, and the vegetative.⁶⁸

Pseudo-Philoponus proceeds to argue that the attentive part must be one, because the human being is one.⁶⁹ Thus, there is one center that attends to all the powers of the soul, rational, sensitive, and vegetative.

Pseudo-Philoponus achieved the same general result as Pseudo-Simplicius. He completely divorced self-awareness from the irrational soul. Pseudo-Simplicius did so by introducing two types of perception, self-aware perception proper to the rational soul and a type of unaware perception proper to irrational beings. Pseudo-Philoponus left perception entirely within the irrational power and explained awareness of it through a new power of the rational soul that oversees all the powers of the soul.

Pseudo-Philoponus' solution left him with a final problem not faced by Pseudo-Simplicius. In the *De Anima*, Aristotle seemed to suggest that perception was aware of itself, but Pseudo-Philoponus denies that perception can be reflectively self-aware. He dismisses the problem as a misreading of Aristotle. He argues that when Aristotle says that perception is self-aware, he is actually speaking of the instrument of self-awareness. Much as one may say that an ax carved a throne, when actually a carpenter formed the throne using an ax, so also we say that perception is aware, when actually the rational soul is aware while using perception as its tool.⁷⁰ Thus, Pseudo-Philoponus upholds his Neoplatonist understanding of self-awareness and the authority of Aristotle at the same time.

Throughout, the commentators all rehearse one formula: the intellect and its object are identical. Alexander and Pseudo-Philoponus take the formula to be the expression of the highest truth, which is

⁶⁸ *In de Anima III*, 464.32–465.3: “φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι τοῦ προσεκτικοῦ μέρους τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶ τὸ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων. ἡ γὰρ λογικὴ ψυχὴ οὐ μόνον πέντε δυνάμεις ἔχει, νοῦν, διάνοιαν, δόξαν, βούλησιν καὶ προαίρεσιν κατ’ αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλην ἑκτὴν τινὰ δύναμιν προστιθέασι τῇ λογικῇ ψυχῇ, ἣν καλοῦσι προσεκτικὴν, ὃ προσεκτικόν, φασίν, ἐφιστάνει τοῖς γινομένοις ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ λέγει ἐγὼ ἐνόησα, ἐγὼ διανοήθην, ἐγὼ ἐδόξασα, ἐγὼ ἐθυμώθην, ἐγὼ ἐπεθύμησα, καὶ ἀπλῶς τοῦτο τὸ προσεκτικόν μέρος τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς διὰ πασῶν τῶν δυνάμεων δίδεισιν, τῶν τε λογικῶν καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ τῶν φυτικῶν.”

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 465.8.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 467.3–12.

simple. Hence they take apperception to be the product of a higher and more simple power, for the former the common sense and for the latter the attentive power of the soul. They attribute apperception to different powers because Alexander leaves room for the existence of intelligible forms within matter, while Pseudo-Philoponus denies it. Hence Alexander can find reflective self-awareness in the material realm, whereas Pseudo-Philoponus can find it only in the immaterial, rational soul.

Themistius and Pseudo-Simplicius both introduce composition into the identity of the intellect and its object, and each understands apperception through composition as well. But once again the Peripatetic and Neoplatonist part company when it comes to the existence of intelligible forms in matter. Since Themistius takes it that intelligible forms can exist in the material forms in composite beings, he grants apperception to material perception as well. Since Pseudo-Simplicius thinks intelligible forms transcend the material realm, he also takes self-awareness in perception to be an act that is proper to the immaterial, rational soul alone.

As we have seen throughout, self-awareness inhabited no privileged position in the order of explanation. Nor was it something to which the commentators had direct and immediate access. They had to employ very abstract theories regarding the nature of truth and knowledge in general in their investigations of the nature of self-awareness. That they had no direct access to the nature of consciousness should serve as a warning to contemporary theorists who believe that they do. Contemporary theorists also need to examine the standards that they apply for truth and knowledge to determine if they genuinely have direct access to an understanding of the nature of consciousness, or if they merely rely on prior notions of truth and valid explanations that predetermine what sort of thing they take self-knowledge to be.

PHRONESIS AS POETIC: MORAL CREATIVITY IN CONTEMPORARY ARISTOTELIANISM

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IN BOOK 6 OF HIS *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS*, Aristotle distinguishes *phronesis* or “practical wisdom” from *poiesis* or “art,” “production.” Neither deals with the universals of pure science or theoretical wisdom but rather with “things which admit of being other than they are,” “the realm of coming-to-be.” But *phronesis* “is itself an end,” namely “acting well” (*eupraxia*), whereas *poiesis* “has an end other than itself” (*heteron to telos*), namely a work of art or a product.¹ *Phronesis* is realized insofar as it is practiced well in itself, and it involves right deliberation about goods internal to human action such as courage and justice. *Poiesis* is realized insofar as it produces something good beyond itself, in the making of noninternal goods such as crafts or goods imitative of action such as stories. Aristotle is here modifying Plato’s limitation of the role of the poets in his moral republic, but in a milder form that does not see the poets as actively distorting morality but rather performing a different kind of activity. Practical wisdom and poetics are both teleological practices—that is, practices aimed at some end—but the first finds its end within the practice itself, the second finally beyond it.

Such a distinction between ethics and poetics has had an enormous influence over Western moral thought. Augustine’s *Confessions* condemns rhetoric and public amusements as morally corrupting to the soul. Thomas Aquinas’s *Summa Theologica* repeats Aristotle’s distinction almost word for word. Immanuel Kant’s second and third critiques draw a sharp line between the objectivity of the moral law and the subjectivity of aesthetic taste. The Romantics and Friedrich Nietzsche turn the opposition on its head, contrasting the stultifying laws of morality with a more authentic inner creativity “beyond good

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¹ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Martin Ostwald (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 6.5.1140b5–6.

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and evil.”² Today, Jürgen Habermas, for example, can uncontroversially divide moral intersubjective “normativity” from poetic innersubjective “expression.”³ We hold artists, storytellers, craftspeople, and scientists accountable to moral criteria governing the uses of their creative products (as in limits on pornographic viewership or the employment of nuclear weapons); and artists may deal with moral subjects. But the activity itself of making or creating that defines “poetics” is generally assumed to be different in kind from the activity of living an ethically good life.

This paper explores a range of contemporary Aristotelian perspectives on ethics to suggest new ways in which, beyond Aristotle himself, *phronesis* or practical wisdom does in fact involve a necessary element of poetics, making, or creativity. After examining ethics and poetics in the rather different appropriations of Aristotle made by Alasdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum, I then go farther afield to the more innovative and postmodern use of Aristotle made by Paul Ricoeur. Each of these contemporary ethicists takes us a step deeper into the relation of moral *phronesis* and poetics. On these bases, I then challenge this ancient quarrel between the philosophers and the poets and argue that *phronesis* holds promise as a vital moral category today precisely insofar as it is conceived of as creative at its core.

I

Let us start by asking why the distinction between *phronesis* and poetics is important to Aristotle himself. It has been noted that the *Nicomachean Ethics* has two related but different definitions of *phronesis*.⁴ The first definition concerns the human good or end. *Phronesis* here is “the capacity of deliberating well about what is good and advantageous for oneself.”⁵ It is the “intellectual virtue” specifically

² Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, in *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 304, 309.

³ Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), 325–37.

⁴ See Gaëlle Fiasse, “Aristotle’s *Phronêsis*: A True Grasp of Ends as Well as Means?” *The Review of Metaphysics* 55 (December 2001): 323–37.

⁵ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.5.1140a26–8.


concerned with understanding the moral good. One deliberates through phronesis not just “in a partial sense” but regarding “what sort of thing contributes to the good life in general.” Thus, the *phronimos*, or practically wise person, is good at grasping the nature of the good as such. He understands, for example, what it means to be courageous or just, and uses this understanding to act courageously or justly in actual situations.

A second definition suggests, somewhat differently, deliberation about the means to the good rather than about the good end itself. As Aristotle says, “[moral] virtue makes us aim at the right target, and practical wisdom [*phronêsis*] makes us use the right means.”⁶ This second definition is made in response to the question of why the intellectual virtue of phronesis would be necessary at all if one were already directed toward the good by morally virtuous habits. If one were already a courageous person, why would one need to deliberate well about courage? The answer is that true moral virtue involves hitting the right target not just accidentally or for some other reason but for the right reasons, so that it involves deliberating well about the “right means” for hitting that target. There is a certain circularity in this logic that is by no means a vicious one. As Aristotle himself admits, “it is impossible to be good in the full sense of the word without practical wisdom or to be a man of practical wisdom without moral excellence or virtue.”⁷ The point is that a good life, for human beings, is not just habitual and conditioned, as say for a horse or a dog, but also thoughtful and deliberate, as befitting the unique nature of the human intellect.

It is largely because of this circularity, however, that phronesis is not poetics. Why does phronesis deal with “things which admit of being other than they are” but does not thereby produce something new? Why is being courageous a choice of one course of action over another but not the creation of anything previously unimagined in the world? It is because phronesis operates within the orbit of human virtues—whether in discerning their ends or finding right means—which themselves are relatively unchanging. The virtues of courage, generosity, friendship, and so on are not mutable but written into the fabric of human nature. One can perceive or realize the human good more or

⁶ Ibid. 6.12.1144a8.

⁷ Ibid. 6.13.1144b31–2.



less deliberately, but the good itself—in general, happiness or *eudaimonia*—is final, perfect, self-sufficient. Human nature does not change; what changes is only how perfectly it is realized.

Poiesis, on the other hand, produces goods that are altogether new. Creating a play, a work of art, a chair, or a building does express a fixed human capability for poetics or “making” (as we may translate the word most generally). But this capability is perfected, not in the activity of making itself, but in the quality, pathos, or usefulness of its product. Since poetics is defined by its external products, it inherently changes with circumstance, depends on available materials, and can play freely with the imagination. For the Greeks, poetics can refer generally to all making activities or more specifically to the arts; but in both cases, it is judged as good or not ultimately by the object produced, not by the activity itself of production. Even moral tragedies, which Aristotle claims in his *Poetics* constitute the highest expressions of poiesis, merely imitate moral action. As he says: “the [literary] poet . . . is a poet by virtue of the imitative element in his work, and it is actions that he imitates.”⁸ Great poetry may produce a cathartic moral effect, but this effect only returns us to what was morally right to do all along. No poet invents moral rightness.

II

This distinction between ethics and poetics has been interpreted and employed in various ways in contemporary Aristotelian ethics. The simplest of these is to oppose moral wisdom to the product-oriented rationality of contemporary individualism, utilitarianism, and consumerism. For example, the Irish writer Joseph Dunne’s *Back to the Rough Ground*—one of the most extensive recent discussions of phronesis in the English language, and part of a revival of interest in phronesis in Aristotle⁹—contrasts practical wisdom with poiesis understood as a species of *technê* or technical skill in making a product. The postmodern world, in Dunne’s view, embraces a thin poetic morality of “self-generating and self-justifying inventiveness to produce for each moment something better—or, nihilistically, just to *pro-*

⁸ Aristotle, *Poetics*, trans. Ingram Bywater, in *Introduction to Aristotle*, 2d rev. ed., ed. Richard McKeon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 9.1451b28–9.

duce.”¹⁰ Phronesis, on the other hand, is the practice of living and acting well by a substantive and common moral compass. Dunne compares this poetic-phronetic distinction to Hannah Arendt’s division of “making” from “action” and Habermas’s separation of the bureaucratic “system” from the substantive moral “lifeworld.” Phronesis, for Dunne, demarcates “the kind of reasonableness fitted to our *finite* mode of being”—as opposed to the infinite deconstructive productivity of mere self-expression.¹¹ It calls us back to the “rough ground” of the realization of our concrete human nature.

Dunne’s argument is persuasive insofar as it takes on moral individualism and consumerism, but it is less persuasive in linking such problems to poiesis. Postmodernist inventiveness and openness to difference may involve more than just nihilistic self-gain and the production of new values merely for the sake of their newness. Poetics is not necessarily a dimension of utilitarian technique. Indeed, Dunne downplays the sense in Aristotle himself in which phronesis too can be concerned not only with right human ends but also with the means to achieve them. By associating phronesis exclusively with the perception of the human good itself, Dunne and others like him exaggerate the distinction from poetics found in Aristotle, and in the process, they rob phronesis of something of its intellectual and deliberative dynamism. If phronesis avoids a nihilistic inventiveness for the sake of invention itself, this does not necessarily exclude the possibility that it involves an inventive dimension.

Such a dimension can be found in the more complex view of the relation of phronesis and poetics in the Scottish communitarian ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre. For MacIntyre, phronesis does not exhaust

⁹ Apart from the authors discussed in this paper, others writing recently on phronesis include Jeffrey Stout, *Ethics After Babel: The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988); Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 1992); Johannes A. Van der Ven, *Formation of the Moral Self* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998); Jana Noel, “On the Varieties of ‘Phronesis,’” *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 31, no. 3 (October 1999): 273–89; and Richard Smith, “Paths of Judgment: The Revival of Practical Wisdom,” *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 31, no. 3 (October 1999): 327–40.

¹⁰ Joseph Dunne, *Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 381.

¹¹ *Ibid.* (my emphasis)

the whole field of ethical practice, but rather it has the more modest role of ethical application. Phronesis applies historically constituted moral virtues to the particularities of the contemporary situation. Interestingly, in fact, phronesis for MacIntyre is primarily focused on deliberation about right moral means. Social ends themselves are here arguably even more deeply preconditioned than in Aristotle, for they are not just written into human nature but constituted in the very historical languages available to us for interpreting human nature in the first place. As MacIntyre says, "there is no standing ground, no place for enquiry, no way to engage in the practices of advancing, evaluating, accepting, and rejecting reasoned argument apart from that which is provided by some particular tradition or other."¹² Phronesis for MacIntyre is then "the exercise of a capacity to *apply* truths about what it is good for such and such a type of person or for persons as such to do generally and in certain types of situation *to oneself on particular occasions*."¹³ Phronesis is the means by which the already constituted "truths" of moral traditions are interpreted into practice for individual circumstances.

What, then, becomes of poiesis? MacIntyre has clearly absorbed the postmodern "linguistic turn" and views the use of moral language as more than mere personal self-inventiveness. While MacIntyre does not, to my knowledge, discuss poetics as an intellectual virtue as such, he does describe the moral good as transmitted through history in the form of narratives and calling persons to a "narrative unity of life." Poetics enters moral life, for MacIntyre, in a sense directly opposed to Dunne, precisely in the constitution of right human ends. While phronesis deliberates about the means for applying tradition-constituted virtues, these virtues or ends themselves are in fact somewhat plastic and changeable. They transform and are constantly re-transformed over the course of historical debate, both within and between traditions. As MacIntyre puts it, "a living tradition then is a historically extended, socially embodied *argument*, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition."¹⁴ Common goods are not only constitutive of moral life but also, at least in part, constituted by an active and creative process of ongoing his-

¹² Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 350.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 115–16 (my emphasis).

¹⁴ Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2d ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 222.

torical dialogue and narration. MacIntyre's writings themselves are meant to illustrate precisely this practice of the self-conscious shaping and production of traditional norms.

Such a poetics—if we may call it that—is possible within this largely Aristotelian framework because it is less modern than Greek. Making and inventing is less a question of subjective expression than of the production of shared public values. Indeed, when traditions undergo what MacIntyre calls an “epistemological crisis”—a fundamental breakdown of inner self-understanding—then, he says, moral life “requires the invention or discovery of new concepts and the framing of some new type or types of theory.”¹⁵ Thus, although MacIntyre does not explicitly put it this way, a community's interpretation of the good itself is formed by a kind of tradition-constituting poetics, which phronesis, after this constituting work has been performed, has the task of applying to the contemporary situation.

MacIntyre, however, runs into a different kind of difficulty than that found in Dunne. Phronesis is not sharply opposed to poetics, but it is still sharply separated. Phronesis takes on a significantly more modest role than in Aristotle, a role oriented primarily around the means for moral application rather than the understanding of the moral good itself as well. There is even a sense in which phronesis is reduced to a moral instrument, an instrument of preconstituted traditional ends. It can handle the conflicts and ambiguities of the present situation only insofar as it places itself in the service of an already substantively formed historical framework. Indeed, MacIntyre suggests at the beginning of *After Virtue* that lacking such a framework in the contemporary world, phronesis can hardly be practiced today at all. While MacIntyre introduces a more robust possible relation of phronesis to poetics, therefore, he does so at the price of a robust phronesis itself.

A third and even more complex interpretation of the relation of phronesis to poetics exists, however, in the contemporary American Aristotelian ethicist Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum is not only explicit in her use of the notion of poetics in understanding morality, but she views phronesis itself as dependent upon the specifically poetic practice of reading fictional literature. Novels and tragic poems and plays—which for Nussbaum epitomize poesis—provide a unique and necessary education in practical wisdom. Through their fine-grained

¹⁵ MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* 362.

explorations of human moral dilemmas and conflicts, various forms of poetic literature help to develop in their reader a greater phronetic capacity for what Nussbaum calls "moral attention."¹⁶ That is, stories train us to attend to the rich and concrete particularities of the actual persons and situations around us. The chief purpose of practical wisdom is not to apply moral traditions to the present, but to overcome individuals' natural "moral obtuseness" and "simplification" of one another's actual lives through sharpened capabilities for "moral perception," "moral imagination," and "moral sensibility."¹⁷ As Nussbaum puts it, "Stories cultivate our ability to see and care for particulars, not as representatives of a law, but as what they themselves are: to respond vigorously with senses and emotions before the new . . . to wait and float and be actively passive."¹⁸

As in Aristotle, in Nussbaum the height of poetics is the literature of tragedy. But for Nussbaum this is not because tragedy deals with the weightiest moral subjects, but because tragedy provides the most powerful education in practical wisdom itself. Nussbaum follows a German line of thought, from Hegel to Hölderlin and Nietzsche, that sees moral life as tragic, not just accidentally or occasionally, but implicitly and inherently.¹⁹ Tragedy is not just a literary genre but also a dimension of the human moral condition. Nussbaum argues that while Plato dreamed of an ordered republic of "goodness without fragility," in which the tragic poets are censored, Aristotle more perceptively sensed the tragic "fragility of goodness." Implicit in Aristotle can be found the need to pay attention not only to shared social goods but also to the vulnerability, fortune, and luck of particular others.²⁰ According to Nussbaum, "we find, then, in Aristotle's thought about the civilized city, an idea we first encountered in the [tragic play] *Antigone*: the idea that the value of certain constituents of the good

¹⁶ Martha Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 162.

¹⁷ Ibid., 164, 164, 183–5. See also Martha Nussbaum, *Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995).

¹⁸ Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge*, 184.

¹⁹ See Dennis J. Schmidt, *On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001); and Peter Szondi, *An Essay on the Tragic*, trans. Paul Fleming (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).

²⁰ Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*, rev. ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 5, 138.

human life is inseparable from the risk of opposition, therefore of conflict."²¹ Deepening Aristotle in this rather contemporary way, Nussbaum argues that poetics trains one to think more deeply and concretely about moral difference.

Nussbaum's view, however, also has its drawbacks. In a sense exactly opposed to MacIntyre, in Nussbaum poetics becomes an instrument for phronesis. Phronesis becomes an end in itself and poetics becomes the literary and narrative means for bringing it about. Phronesis describes the fixed and universal human moral end of attending to others in their singular particularity. Poetics is then a necessary means for training in humanity toward this goal. Nussbaum's account is more complex than MacIntyre's in the sense that this end and means are analogous to one another: to attend concretely to others is the same kind of activity as to attend concretely to literary narratives. But these activities also remain separate in their functions in moral life. Practical wisdom is good in and of itself; it simply describes our human moral responsibility to one another. Poetics is good (in the moral sense) only insofar as it nurtures and advances this otherwise self-sufficient moral aim. Related to this difference is the fact that poetics itself in Nussbaum contains less of the active Greek sense of making or forming something new that is still present in MacIntyre. Poetics has to do primarily with a Kantian perception of objects, an aesthetic openness to beauty and the sublime: in this case, in the particularities of persons and situations in literature. Hence, poetics may be useful for practical wisdom, but practical wisdom is still not itself a poetic activity.

III

Our investigation can be pressed still one step further by turning to the very different, and indeed rather unique, conception of phronesis in the French hermeneutical phenomenologist Paul Ricoeur. Without leaving Aristotle behind, yet recognizing Aristotle's distinct limitations, Ricoeur situates practical wisdom within what he calls a "poetics of the will." This he does in *Oneself as Another* under the concept of "critical phronesis" (*la phronèsis critique*). What makes phronesis "critical" for Ricoeur is the introduction into ethical life of a

²¹ Ibid., 353.

radically open-ended responsibility toward the other, the other not just as different from oneself (as in Nussbaum) but also in its absolute moral irreducibility, alterity, nonsubstitutability. Ricoeur uses the notion of critical phronesis to incorporate the widely used French post-modern category of "the other" into a partly Aristotelian practical ethical framework. Practical wisdom becomes poetic in the sense that it destabilizes and decenters the self's moral will and hence demands its ongoing self-transformation.

This dynamic and transformative function of critical phronesis is explained by Ricoeur as a cycle of moral capabilities that includes both an Aristotelian good and a Kantian right. The Aristotelian moment of this cycle involves, somewhat as in MacIntyre, "the desire to live well with and for others in just institutions."²² Ricoeur sees here what he calls a "naïve phronesis," a preliminary phronesis, of forming one's existing social contexts into one's own "narrative unity of life."²³ This capability should not overshadow, however, a further capability for deontological respect for others in their "genuine otherness" as also capable of moral self-narration. Somewhat like Emmanuel Levinas, Ricoeur views the ethics of the other as a negative interdiction against the moral violence that is inherent in all efforts by selves to narrate others.²⁴ Unlike in Levinas, however, this obligation to others does not exhaust moral responsibility but is rather a destabilizing moment within the self's larger realization of practical wisdom.²⁵ According to Ricoeur, "if there is anything to deconstruct in 'moral phi-

²² Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 158–9, 239.

²³ Ibid., 290. This phrase "narrative unity of life" Ricoeur borrows explicitly from MacIntyre, but he gives it a somewhat different meaning.

²⁴ Ibid., 219–21, 225. See also Paul Ricoeur, "Guilt, Ethics, and Religion," trans. Robert Sweeney, in *The Conflict of Interpretations*, ed. Don Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974); "Violence and Language," in *Political and Social Essays*, ed. David Stewart and Joseph Bien (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974); "The Teleological and Deontological Structures of Action: Aristotle and/or Kant?" in *Contemporary French Philosophy*, ed. A. Phillips Griffiths (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 106; and "The Human Being as the Subject Matter of Philosophy," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 14 (1988): 203–215, esp. 213–14. Ricoeur's concept of "otherness" is of course also quite different from that of Levinas, who understands moral poetics as radical disruption; however, we need not enter into this debate here.

²⁵ Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 203.

losophy,' it is precisely [the] quickly stated opposition between the deontological and the teleological."²⁶

Critical phronesis is the human capability for negotiating this unstable cycle or tension between self-narration and responsibility toward others. What Ricoeur calls "judgment in situation" involves re-narrating one's own teleological practices in new ways that are ever more radically nonviolent toward others. This activity is poetic in the sense that it involves "inventing conduct that will best satisfy the exception required by solicitude . . . the exception on behalf of others."²⁷ Others ultimately demand not just negation of the self but the self's responsive self-transformation. Critical phronesis does not resolve the alterity of self and other, for this would be impossible. Rather, it risks the act of refiguring or reinventing the self's own narrative aims in ever more other-inclusive ways. Ricoeur describes this unstable tensional possibility in the phenomenological language of "ethical intentionality": moral narration is not just an expression of the self's inner subjectivity but an intentionally or outwardly directed movement toward what is other.²⁸

The reason why critical phronesis is an element of the "poetics of the will" is most sharply illustrated in Ricoeur, somewhat as in Nussbaum, in the unique moral wisdom produced by tragedy. Aristotle himself, according to Ricoeur, presupposes an unacknowledged "tragic source" for his conception of phronesis in a Homeric and Sophoclean "wisdom of limits."²⁹ Sophocles' *Antigone*, for example, reveals the inherent disproportionality and violence contained in all efforts to live well with one another in common, no matter how well-intentioned.³⁰ *Antigone* is fully justified from her own narrative point of view in burying her dead brother Polyneices, but so also is the king Creon in banning the burial, since Polyneices died fighting as a traitor to the city. According to Ricoeur, "the source of the conflict

²⁶ Paul Ricoeur, "Ethics and Human Capability: A Response," in *Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought*, ed. John Wall, William Schweiker, and David Hall (New York: Routledge, 2002), 287.

²⁷ Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 269.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 290.

²⁹ Paul Ricoeur, "À la gloire de la phronèsis (*Éthique à nicomaque*, livre VI)," in J. Y. Chateau, *La vérité pratique. Aristote. Éthique à nicomaque, livre VI* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1997), 13, 22 (my translation).

³⁰ Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 241–9.

[here] lies not only in the one-sidedness of the characters but also in the one-sidedness of the moral *principles* which themselves are confronted with the complexity of life."³¹ The moral will is not just accidentally but inherently tragic because it can never fully escape its own narrative limitations.

This means that Ricoeur moves beyond Nussbaum's still rather Hegelian reading of moral tragedy as the overcoming of narrowness of moral perspective. He joins Continental thinkers like Martin Heidegger, Gabriel Marcel, Luce Irigaray, Judith Butler, and Pamela Sue Anderson in interpreting tragedy as a description of the ontological human condition of violence toward otherness.³² The purpose of critical phronesis is not to resolve or sublate moral difference in some third ethical totality. Rather, it is to engage in the unending task of responding to others through an ever more radically inclusive moral narration. No amount of Nussbaumian attentiveness to others' stories can finally make their alterity part of my own story. The tragedy of human moral life is that moral wisdom requires a self-critical awareness of an always inconclusive and self-excessive kind.

The "poetics of the will" becomes ethical, therefore, in the self's capability, not just for moral perceptiveness, but for actively responding to others in a morally self-transforming way. Poetics is a matter of the human will's ability for the genuine "semantic innovation" of its own world of moral understanding.³³ As Richard Kearney describes it, "Ricoeur's ultimate wager remains a hermeneutics of the creative imagination . . . [involving the] ability to say one thing in terms of another, or to say several things at the same time, thereby creating something new."³⁴ Critical phronesis is the specifically moral poetic

³¹ Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 249. See also Paul Ricoeur, "Practical Reason" trans. Kathleen Blaney and John B. Thompson, in Ricoeur, *From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991); and Ricoeur, "The Act of Judging," in *The Just*, trans. David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

³² I am aware that Ricoeur is open to legitimate criticism from Irigaray, Butler, and Anderson on this score. He is less cognizant of how Antigone as "the other" is marginalized by the very language and culture available to her for overcoming it. However, this debate takes us beyond our focus here on the connection of moral poetics to phronesis.

³³ Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative, Volume 1*, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), ix.

capability for responding to the tragedy of otherness by refiguring one's own present narrative existence.³⁵ In this sense, according to Ricoeur, "narrative identity continues to make and remake itself."³⁶ Critical phronesis is the inherently poetic capability for remaking one's conception of the good to become ever more radically inclusive of otherness.

IV

While Ricoeur thereby places poetics even closer to the heart of phronesis than any of the above Aristotelians, he also loses what I would like to call their sense of poetic moral realism. By "realism" I mean attention to the concrete particularities of the existing historical situation, prior to and shaping of the self's creative transformation of them. In his effort to describe the self's narration of its relation to the

³⁴ Richard Kearney, "Paul Ricoeur and the Hermeneutical Imagination," in *The Narrative Path: The Later Works of Paul Ricoeur*, ed. T. Peter Kemp and David Rasmussen (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1989), 1–31, esp. 2. Similarly "poetic" readings of Ricoeur are made by Mary Schaldenbrand, "Metaphoric Imagination: Kinship through Conflict," in *Studies in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*, ed. Charles Reagan (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1979), 57–81; Olivier Mongin, "Face à l'éclipse du récit," *Traversées du XXe siècle. Revue esprit* (1988): 225–43; T. Peter Kemp, "Toward a Narrative Ethics: A Bridge Between Ethics and the Narrative Reflection of Ricoeur," in *The Narrative Path: The Later Works of Paul Ricoeur*, ed. T. Peter Kemp and David Rasmussen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989); Jean Greisch, "Paul Ricoeur," in *Encyclopédie philosophique universelle. Les oeuvres philosophiques* 2 (1992): 3669–76; Hans Kellner, "As Real as It Gets: Ricoeur and Narrativity," in *Meanings in Texts and Actions: Questioning Paul Ricoeur*, ed. David Klemm and William Schweiker (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 55; Jean Grondin, "L'herméneutique positive de Paul Ricoeur: du temps au récit," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, no. 3 (1993): 413–27; and Robert Sweeney, "Ricoeur on Ethics and Narrative," in *Paul Ricoeur and Narrative: Context and Contestation*, ed. Morny Joy (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1997).

³⁵ Domenico Jervolino has called narrative identity the "poetic . . . culmination of [Ricoeur's] philosophical discourse on the will"; Domenico Jervolino, *The Cogito and Hermeneutics: The Question of the Subject in Paul Ricoeur*, trans. Gordon Poole (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), 135.

³⁶ Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative, Volume 3*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 248–9.

other, Ricoeur (like many contemporary Continental ethicists) overrides the important senses described by MacIntyre and Nussbaum in which the self is already poetically narrated by communities and others themselves.³⁷ The other in particular cannot ultimately decenter selfhood except in its own concrete narrative particularity. My own conception of phronesis will remain essentially Ricoeurian but argue that moral life's fullest poetic tensions involve embracing this kind of deeper ethical realism.

In MacIntyre we discovered a sense in which practical wisdom relies on a prior capability for forming and inhabiting moral tradition. Although Ricoeur has an extensive theory of moral tradition that we cannot go into here,³⁸ he still views this past, especially in his moral theory, as proposing relatively intact moral worlds of meaning that selves may directly appropriate for refiguring their narrative present. MacIntyre's quasi-poetics of moral traditions insists that a fundamental dimension of any narrative moral meaning involves addressing traditions' linguistic and epistemological incoherencies. The very term "phronesis," for example, cannot just be taken for granted as a moral capability but also needs to be examined for its concrete development of meaning through figures like Homer, Sophocles, Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas. Ironically, in this case MacIntyre himself could benefit from greater historical contextuality, as his own notion of phronesis is rather one-sided, as I have argued. My own account has at least begun such a historical inquiry into the term by tracing Aristotle's changing influence over the meaning of the term today. MacIntyre is right, however, that there is an important creative role—however preliminary, and however much MacIntyre may exaggerate its importance—in shaping the narratives of the very histories themselves, on the basis of which each of us may then be able to narrate our moral worlds.

In Nussbaum, we found an even more important phronetic realism around concern for the concrete narrative world of the other.

³⁷ A similar critique of Ricoeur's need for "realism" has been made by William Schweiker in "Hermeneutics, Ethics, and the Theology of Culture: Concluding Reflections," in *Meanings in Texts and Actions: Questioning Paul Ricoeur*, ed. David Klemm and William Schweiker (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 292–313; and by Don Browning in "Ricoeur and Practical Theology" in *Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought*, ed. John Wall, William Schweiker, and David Hall (New York: Routledge, 2002), 251–63.

³⁸ Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, 219–27, and Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Both Ricoeur and Continental poststructuralism in general focus less on the other's concrete particularity than on its alterior absence, its irreducibility to any form of narration by the self whatsoever. True though this may be, one must also take care not thereby to reduce otherness to an empty and blanket abstraction. Too often in phenomenological ethics, including in Ricoeur, the other is covered by Levinas's mantra of "strangers, widows, and orphans," with little thought for the genuine concreteness of others as uniquely storied members of a world. A genuinely self-transforming response to others involves the hard, creative work of careful perceptual attention to others' subtle and singular narrative complexities. What is needed for a full conception of poetics in moral life is a combined sense for others as resisting narratives of the self yet narratively particular in themselves. The full creative element here has to do not with one side or the other but with the ongoing poetic tension between the two: other-narration and others' narratives, the other's disruptiveness and its real particularity.

This particular element of the poetic moral problem may be illustrated again by Sophocles' *Antigone*. Judith Butler has helpfully described the moral tragedy here as Antigone's struggle for the "performance" of her otherness, in which "the less than human speaks as human."³⁹ The play arguably proposes that while Antigone and Creon are tragically fated to an unremitting blindness to one another, we the audience are nevertheless—indeed thereby—opened up to new self-transforming moral catharsis. Poetics here is reducible to neither Ricoeur's sense for Antigone's disruptiveness nor Nussbaum's perception of Antigone's particular narrative. Rather, it combines the two in our own openness to renarrating our own moral worlds, as we leave the theater, precisely in response to the narrative world of Antigone. A play that flatly exhorted its audience to respond to the otherness of others would fail to generate such a catharsis. This practically wise self-transformation arises only insofar as we enter into the particularities of Antigone's narrative. Likewise, in all human relations to one another, a poetic element of tension and possibly new self-narration rests of necessity on the degree of realism imparted by the concreteness of others' stories. Others become exceptions, and phronesis becomes thereby critical, only insofar as their marginalized humanity finds narration.

³⁹ Judith Butler, *Antigone's Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 82.

V

Allow me to conclude by developing, therefore, the outlines of a more realist Ricoeurian conception of phronesis, an Aristotelian–Ricoeurian phronesis that takes into account these deeper forms of poetic moral tension. To indicate this shift, I replace Ricoeur’s language of critical phronesis with the more direct language of poetic phronesis. The central element of this poetic phronesis is the reality of human moral tension: tension between broken historical language and self-narration, between accountability to others and others’ narratives, and ultimately between being narrated by one’s moral world and taking part in narrating it creatively anew. In each of these ways, phronesis is the self’s endless poetic moral capability for cathartic self-transformation by creating new self-narratives in response to others.

The word “tension” comes from the Greek *teinein* meaning, most of all, “to stretch.” We have encountered this term in a number of ways. Ricoeur speaks of the will’s ethical *intentionality*: its capability literally for “stretching out” its narrative world in response to the irreducible demands of the other. Nussbaum describes phronesis as *attention*: “stretching toward” others in their concrete narrative particularity. While MacIntyre does not explicitly use any cognates of *teinein* in his moral thought, we could say he underlines the need for a certain moral *retension*: a “stretching back” of selfhood into a more meaningful and coherent inhabitation of a moral tradition. These moral tensions collectively suggest what Augustine long ago called the human capability for *distensio animi*: the “stretching apart” of the soul beyond its simple and immediate experience and into the rich and complex fullness of narrative time.⁴⁰ If MacIntyre emphasizes stretching into the past, Nussbaum toward others in the here and now, and Ricoeur toward the new, what they hold in common as essential to phronesis is the practice of constituting moral tensions into larger possibilities for narrative meaning.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (New York: Penguin, 1961), bk. 11, chap. 20.

⁴¹ This parallel with Augustine could be taken further with respect to Nussbaum in that both describe this tension under the aegis of “perception”: Augustine’s narrative perception of the unfolding “present of the present” and Nussbaum’s perception of the presence of others. Ricoeur explicitly takes up Augustine on this point through his three volumes of *Time and Narrative*.

Let us not hesitate to add that tension is fundamental to the poetic moral problem of tragedy and Aristotle's observation in the *Poetics* that tragedy induces catharsis. Freud was clearly pointing in such a direction in his psychological reading of the story of Antigone's father, Oedipus, who symbolizes the primal libidinal moral tensions of children with their parents. As Irigaray has pointed out, in fact, Antigone's need to bury her brother Polyneices could be said to reenact an unconscious cathartic need properly to bury Oedipus, who through incest is not only Antigone's father but also her brother too.⁴² The tragedy, from this angle, is that Antigone needs to put to rest once and for all, even if at the cost of her own blood, the dark and tragic tensions at the heart of her family story. What kind of practical wisdom, as exhorted by the play's chorus, can bring catharsis out of such primal human tensions?

Phronesis is faced, most profoundly, with the task of narrating the self's own moral world within the situation of its already having been narrated. It is best described as a strange and powerful capability for weaving together the hidden and unhidden multitude of already given dimensions of one's moral condition into an ever more radically inclusive narrative meaning. Like art and literature, phronesis begins with a diversity of always already constituted "materials"—personal, historical, and intersubjective—and rather than simply reordering these materials themselves, or reducing them to abstract generalities, it creates on their basis something new and hitherto unimagined. It is because the self's moral realities exist in tension both with one another and with one's own moral self-understanding that the self is called poetically to produce its own moral meaning ever anew.

In this case, we may return to Aristotle and say that phronesis is in the end both "an end in itself" and, poetically, "an end other than itself." These teleological ends are joined by the activity of moral narration. Poetic phronesis pursues at once a narrative already told—a narrative whose realism makes it an ongoing end in itself—and a narrative still in the process of being produced—one that is also other than itself. The phronetic capability is for rendering the tensions of one's given moral situation and one's yet unmet larger moral possibilities productive of greater narrative coherency. This narrative end is at once *narrated by* one's given historical situation and yet, paradoxically, *to be narrated* anew, to be "stretched" in as yet unknown

⁴² Luce Irigaray, *Speculum of the Other Woman*, trans. Gillian Gill (New York: Cornell University Press, 1985).

directions. The end in itself of an ongoingly coherent ethical narrative is also an end other than itself of a narrative always in the process of being formed. Poetic phronesis so understood is a practical wisdom of unceasing but not ungrounded narrative self-creation.

Most sharply of all, however, poetic phronesis is driven by the self's narrative tensions with others. As Richard Kearney has said, "the human self has a narrative identity based on the multiple stories it recounts to and receives from others."⁴³ Not only does one's narrative world transform over time as a matter of course, but it *must* be transformed in moral terms because it inherently marginalizes and does violence to others in their otherness. The other is both a particular storied other self, as Nussbaum argues, and at the very same time another who also narrates his own identity in ways that are irreducible to any story the self may tell of it. This other's meaning, as Gabriel Marcel says, is ultimately and implicitly a "mystery" that one could never fully capture or predict.⁴⁴ Or, as Levinas says, it is transcendental: forever beyond any possible present interpretation of it.⁴⁵ Yet poetic phronesis can approach this disorienting moral situation with the capability for stretching out toward the other by creating *more* inclusive narratives. In this case, poetic phronesis consists in narrating the meaning of one's own moral world in such a way as to become ever more open to its also being narrated by others.

The "end other than itself" of such a practice of poetic phronesis is a kind of narrative inclusiveness that always beckons from the future, never ultimately reducible to any particular self's creation of it in the narrative here and now. Aristotle more or less assumed that human moral ends were already inclusively formed within a right understanding of human nature. However, Greek tragic poetry shows that this was not true even within the relatively small and stable world of the Greek *polis*. Phronesis must deal with the tragic tensions by which lives and communities are torn apart, including the most profound moral tension of self and other as irreducibly self-creating others. Phronesis is faced with an endless end: the creation of moral narratives ever more inclusive of what they cover up. This is a

⁴³ Richard Kearney, *Strangers, Gods, and Monsters* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

⁴⁴ Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery of Being*, trans. G. S. Fraser (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960).

⁴⁵ Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969).

profoundly tragic task from which none of us can escape. No received moral tradition or fine-tuned attentiveness to others can relieve us of the ultimate cathartic necessity for creating our moral worlds ever anew.

Such a concept of poetic phronesis clearly takes Aristotle in uniquely contemporary directions that Aristotle himself could never have imagined. I submit, however, that it works out some of Aristotle's own deepest presuppositions, even if it also adds to them. Today we are perhaps more sharply faced with the tensional dimensions of moral life, living as we do not in relatively self-contained city-states but in an era of global terrorism, economic oppression, rapid technological advance, community fragmentation, and a heightened sense of cultural pluralism. It would be a mistake, in my view, to revive Aristotelian phronesis from its premodern past as a way of rehabilitating concrete standards within our changing world. A more useful response to our fractured times is to recognize the unique human poetic capability for narrating one's own moral world anew both with and in response to others. This narrative and transformative moral possibility has been gradually obscured over Western intellectual history as ethics and poetics have been assumed to occupy largely separate spheres of activity. It may be time to overcome this division with an inconclusive poetic responsibility which, while unsatisfying to our anxiety for fixed moral values or principles, may ultimately prove more rewarding and more human.

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VISUAL INTELLIGENCE IN PAINTING

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PHILOSOPHERS HAVE LONG AGREED that thinking is expressed in the use of language, that we “think in the medium of words.”¹ It is also true, however, that we think in the medium of pictures, and it is likely that these two ways of thinking are interrelated; certainly, we could not think in pictures if we did not have words, and perhaps we could not use words, in principle, unless we were also engaged in some sort of picturing, at least in our imagination. An ideographic language like Chinese would give greater support to the latter possibility than would our phonetically based form of writing.

Philosophically, words and pictures can be used to illuminate one another and to shed light on what it is to think. In both words and pictures, we deal with compositions, and in both cases the compositions are, to use a phrase of Michael Oakeshott, “exhibitions of intelligence.”² There is a difference between the two that we notice immediately: spoken words are fleeting and pictures are durable; words and pictures differ in their temporality. They also differ in other ways that are philosophically important. Let us explore these differences.

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¹ The phrase is from David Braine, *The Human Person. Animal and Spirit* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), xxii.

² See Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 15: “Thus the movement of a human eyelid is a categorially ambiguous identity; it may be a wink or a blink, a wink which is an exhibition of intelligence, a subscription to a ‘practice’ and has a reason, and a blink which is a component of a ‘process’ to be understood in terms of a ‘law’ or a ‘cause’.” See also p. 32.

I

Words and Their Structure. We begin with spoken words, and we ask what it means to think in the medium of speech.³ When we speak, we present things as articulated into wholes and parts, and we do so for ourselves and for others. The paradigmatic form of speech is found in conversation, whether between two people or among many, whether in private or in public. The focus of speech is not the speech itself but the things that are spoken about. Thoughtful speech is like a magic wand that we wave over things. As we wave the wand, the parts and wholes of things become disclosed: their identity, their features, their relationships, their essentials and their accidentals, in a word, their intelligibility, all come to light, for ourselves and for our interlocutors.

However, we do not articulate just the *things* that we present. While we explicate things, we also conjugate the words we speak. The speech that we declare is itself segmented into its own kinds of parts and wholes. We continually assemble and reassemble the wand itself as well as the things we wave it over. We display things by structuring our speech. Our listeners are intent on the things we talk about, but they must also be aware, marginally, of the words we speak. The eye is caught by the thing and the ear is caught by the sound, but the mind is shaped by both: we attend to what is seen as we listen to what is said.

Speech is articulated on two levels. First, on the higher level, each sentence and each argument is made up of lexicon and grammar, of content and syntax. Second, on the lower level, each word is internally made up of phonemes, of vowels and consonants. The phonemic structure inside a word establishes each word as a word, and these words are conjoined in grammatical and lexical sequences. When all this happens on the side of speech, parts of the world come to light. The artful combinatorics in words and sentences lets the articulation of things take place, and such exhibition occurs whether we speak of things in their presence or their absence. Human reason can articulate on all these levels; it keeps all of these dimensions in mind, and all of them are significant: human intelligence composes words

³ In the next six paragraphs I use, with additions and revisions, some material that I have published in "Language, the Human Person, and Christian Faith," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 76 (2003): 29–30.

out of phonemes and statements out of words, and simultaneously it displays things in their parts and wholes. We charge our words with so much intelligence that things themselves begin to appear in the light that the words give off. The person who accomplishes this, furthermore, does so for himself and for others. All discourse is in principle a matter of conversational reciprocity. Thinking in the medium of words is inherently intersubjective, and so is human reason.

The most conspicuous and most tangible feature of our verbal articulation is the way in which phrases are embedded into one another. This is the work of syntax; it makes it possible for us to segment our speech, and also to segment our displays, into parts that are not just concatenated sequentially one after the other, but parts that are stacked within one another, in the fashion of Chinese boxes or Russian dolls.⁴ Because of this syntactic embedding, speeches of unlimited complexity and exquisite intricacy become possible: think of the multilayered "boxing" that takes place in a novel or a scholarly book. It is specifically the syntactic element in speech that raises our verbalization into rational discourse. Syntax provides the rational form for the more material contents of what we say, and the syntax works not only in individual statements but also in long arguments, not only in particular judgments but also in extended reasoning. Speech is governed not only by predicate but also by propositional logic. We should not focus so much on the simple judgment that we forget the larger conversation in which each judgment is embedded.

Syntax, furthermore, should not be taken just by itself. Syntax has to be related to the phonemic structure within each word, and within each word it is specifically the consonants that function in a manner analogous to syntax. Consonants are like the syntax within words. Consonants clip and trim the words we speak, and we have to be socialized into them, just as we have to be socialized into syntax and judgment. Consonants order the more elementary vowel sounds of speech. The vowels require far less instruction. We come into the

⁴I have found the work of the American linguist Derek Bickerton to be very helpful in regard to syntax as constitutive of human speech. See his *Language and Species* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), and *Language and Human Behavior* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995). His work belongs to the tradition initiated by Noam Chomsky with *Syntactic Structures* (The Hague: Mouton, 1957) and *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). The relation of these notions of syntax to Husserl's doctrine on categorial intentions and categorial intuitions calls for investigation.

world crying and no one has to teach us how, nor do we need to be taught the wails and whimpers and giggles and glee that make up the basis for other vowel sounds. Vowels by themselves are unlettered; it is the consonants that make the sounds rational. This phonemic structuring of words, moreover, does not come to pass apart from the higher, syntactic structuring; rather, the consonantal shaping of sound occurs under the teleology of syntactic patterning. Consonants are introduced under the downward pressure of syntax. We shape sounds into words *because* we want to combine words into phrases and discourse (and we combine words into phrases *because* we want to display things).

The dimension of vowels in words is more associated with emotion, and the structure of consonants is more associated with reason. Vowels are especially involved with feeling, with our biological and sensory appreciation of what is going on and what is happening to us. The emotive dimension of vowels comes to the fore in singing, but human singing requires the clipping and cutting of consonants if it is to become thoughtful melody and not just humming and cooing, if it is to become a song that exhibits intelligence.⁵ Consonants introduce the rigor and determination of reason into the melody of vowels.

Vowels are the work of the lungs and vocal chords, consonants the work of teeth, tongue, and lips, with some help from the throat. Forming consonants is more under human control. It is also the more visible performance, and it makes speech seem like eating in reverse; in eating we take in, in speaking we send forth. Maritain has said that the human body is the most beautiful thing in the world and that the human face is naturally sacred.⁶ The face certainly has a cadence of its own, due partly to the consonant-work of the lower face and partly to the expressiveness of the eyes. Its natural design is "finished" by the life the person has lived; a baby's face does not yet show what one has done or what one can be expected to say.⁷

Human rationality is also expressed in laughter, which also requires the demarcation of consonants to be what it is. Laughter is

⁵ I once attended a master class given, in public, by Elly Ameling at the University of Maryland, and one of the things that impressed me most was the accuracy and force with which this wonderful soprano registered the consonants in her singing. She emphasized the importance of such precision in what she told the students.

⁶ Jacques Maritain, *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry* (New York: Meridian Books, 1954), 152.

made up of vowel sounds segmented into short bursts by simple consonants, as in ho-ho-ho, or ha-ha, or, in a more discreet manner, tee-hee. A plain, drawn-out vowel sound is not constituted as laughter and it does not express an intelligent appreciation, because it contains no consonants. It expresses anxiety or pain rather than rational amusement.

There is a still deeper level of linguistic structure, one that underlies both the grammatical patterns in sentences and the sound patterns in words. It is the level of prosody, the rhythms and beats that are proper to a language. In fact, the unborn child in the mother's womb is already sensitive to this aspect of the mother's voice, which reaches the child by being filtered through the amniotic fluid. Two writers on children's language, Kyra Karmiloff and Annette Karmiloff-Smith, observe that this form of speaking and listening, between the mother and the child in the womb, "blurs phonetic information but leaves intact the rhythmic properties of speech." They say that the baby "is learning to recognize the melody and rhythms of language, that is, the intonation contours and the stress patterns that constitute the particularities of both its mother's voice and the sounds that will become its native tongue."⁸ Thus the unborn child already has some experience of language and, therefore, "the newborn comes into the world prepared to pay special attention to human speech and specifically to his mother's voice."⁹ The child becomes familiar with his mother's tongue and his mother tongue even before he is born.

The rhythmic dimension of speech, the cadence of language, cushions the grammar and morphology that will take shape within it. For example, the child, as he grows, begins to express the rhythm and prosody of sentences and questions before actually stating and asking things: "By the end of the first year, the baby's babbling rises and falls in intonation to mimic questions and statements."¹⁰ The prosodic

⁷I am grateful to Kevin White for much of the material in this paragraph, as well as for many other remarks and suggestions that I have used in this paper. On the distinguished status of the human face: it is now often said that the human brain is the most complicated thing in the universe. It would be interesting to ask whether the brain or the face should enjoy the greater prestige.

⁸Kyra Karmiloff and Annette Karmiloff-Smith, *Pathways to Language. From Fetus to Adolescent* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 43.

⁹*Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 151.

level of speech also comes into play, with great sophistication, in poetry, singing, and music. Think of how music enhances the emotional meaning of words, how it expresses the human response to what is being presented in the song, and how it does so by engaging the dimensions of both vowels and rhythms.

We have distinguished three levels of human speech: the sentential and argumentative level, made up of vocabulary and grammar, or lexicon and syntax; the phonemic level, made up of vowels and consonants; and the deep prosodic level, made up of rhythms and beats.¹¹ Let us now explore parallels to these three levels in painting.

II

Pictures and Their Structure. In speech, the highest and most tangible level we have described is that of words and grammar, that of syntactic structure in sentences and arguments. We begin with this more visible level.

In pictures, the analogy to vocabulary and grammar, the analogy to syntactic structure, is the arrangement of images into a larger whole. A painting is one image, just as an argument or a sentence is one statement, but the painting also contains parts, which in turn also are pictures, and the parts are placed by the artist into an ordered whole. These parts are not randomly distributed any more than are the words in a statement. The painting enjoys a pictorial grammar. Consider the painting, *The Assumption of the Virgin*, by Murillo, in which Mary is surrounded by cherubs. Their placement in the painting is obviously significant, expressing the Virgin's innocence, her affinity with the angels, and her superiority over them. Her expression is childlike, because she represents not human nature healed and sanctified but innocence elevated by grace.¹² Consider the painting of

¹¹ The syntax in language makes it possible for us to go beyond stating things in speech; it permits us also to appropriate what we are saying. We do so when we use the first-person pronoun in what I would want to call a "declarative" manner, as opposed to a merely "informational" usage. We can say not only, "It is raining," but also, "I know it is raining." When Nietzsche says that "only the spirit of music allows us to understand why we feel joy at the destruction of the individual," he wishes to reduce speech to the rhythms that underlie both syntax and phonemes, a reduction that also removes any declarative expression of myself as speaker. See *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, trans. Ronald Speirs, ed. Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 80.

Napoleon at the Battle of Wagram, by Horace Vernet. The emperor and his horse are both looking in the same direction, both are tensed and alert, Napoleon is looking through a spyglass and receiving dispatches and is clearly in control. The smoky darkness of the battle in the distance, the wounded officer to the right, the mounted grenadiers and officers in their tall hats—all these elements combine to make a single statement or narrative about the general and the battle. For another image of the same personage, consider the triumphal *Consecration of the Emperor Napoleon and Coronation of the Empress Josephine*, by Jacques-Louis David, with the arrangement, expression, and attire of the crowd of people in the image.¹³ All these partial pictures are like so many subordinate clauses in a sentence or so many steps in an argument: they are linked by pictorial grammar into one thought, one complex thing being stated. The location of the subordinate images within the overriding image, the overriding statement, is analogous to the syntactic placement of phrases within phrases in speech. The location of images within images is the syntax of the painting, and it is a structure that the viewer himself has to articulate if he is to take in the image.

In speech, we move downward from syntactic composition to phonemes, to the composition of vowels and consonants within words. Phonemes are deeper than nouns and verbs and other grammatical forms. I would suggest that in picturing, the analogue to vowels is color and the analogue to consonants is line. Here also, color and line are deeper, they are more elementary, than are images and their position. Furthermore, color is related to line much as vowels are related to consonants. Vowels are the fundamental, spontaneous, and emotive component in words, while consonants are more rational and need to be learned. Analogously, color is chthonic and affective, while line, *disegno*, is more rational and determinative. Lines clip, cut, and trim colors just as consonants define vowels. Indeed, it is often possible to convey the meaning of a sentence by writing down the consonants without the vowels, by giving only the instructions for pronunciation. The correlative to this in pictures is the drawing or the sketch, lines encompassing space without color. Shading, I might add,

¹² The phrase about the Blessed Virgin is from Francis Slade.

¹³ The full title of David's painting is *Consecration of the Emperor Napoleon and Coronation of the Empress Josephine at the Cathedral of Notre-Dame in Paris on 2 December 1804*.

is an interesting intermediate case: it reflects the play of light into the bright and the dark, but it does not differentiate light into the color spectrum. Movies in black and white employ line and shading but no color, and they exhibit no less intelligence for that; in fact, black and white movies may appeal more to our reason than technicolor movies, which run the risk of becoming garish.

The British art historian Norbert Lynton recognizes the subrational character of color. In a review of an exhibition at the Royal Academy, he writes, "Color is notoriously difficult to engage with intellectually."¹⁴ He quotes John Gage as saying, "[I]n the nineteenth century color was still regarded with suspicion by 'many critics.' The academic tradition considered color an ornament added to *disegno*, subversive if unconstrained by correct draughtsmanship and truth, revealing base animal instincts." To draw out my analogy, sheer color would be like sheer vowels, a wail rather than a word, or, as the poet Allen Ginsburg would have it, a "Howl" without the definition of reason.¹⁵ Ginsburg's poem, incidentally, despite its title, had to make use of consonants and syntax if it was to be a poem at all, and even the title is more than a howl; the word "howl" frames, and so humanizes, the wolf's "ow" with two consonants. Something similar happens with "bark." The affinity of color with vowels is confirmed by Arthur Rimbaud's *Sonnet des Voyelles*, in which he attributes a particular color to each of the five vowels; the first line of the poem reads, "A noir, E blanc, I rouge, U vert, O bleu: voyelles."¹⁶

We have claimed that in pictures the syntax of images is analogous to the syntax of phrases in speech, and that color and line are

¹⁴ Norbert Lynton, "Masters of Color: Derain to Kandinsky. Eighty masterpieces from the Merzbacher Collection," *Times Literary Supplement* (13 September 2002). See also John Gage, *Color and Culture. Practice and Meaning from Antiquity to Abstraction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), chap. 7, "*Disegno* versus *Colore*."

¹⁵ Mark Rothko and Jackson Pollock both give up on *disegno* as well as representation, but they cannot do away with color. Their work is the opposite of a line drawing. It is interesting to note, however, that Rothko claimed that his work was governed by a metric and not just by color. In a response to a claim that it is the color that dominates in Rothko's work, John Gage writes, "For the painter himself this was far from being a matter of course, and he told Phillips [Duncan Phillips of the Phillips collection in Washington, D.C.] that 'not color, but *measures* were of greatest importance to him'; 'Rothko: Color as Subject,' in *Mark Rothko*, ed. Jeffrey Weiss (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 248.

¹⁶ My thanks to Kevin White for the reference to Rimbaud, as well as for some of the finer points about consonants in the words "howl" and "bark."

analogous to vowels and consonants. Let us move on to the third and deepest level of language, the prosody or rhythm that underlies both words and sounds. There is something analogous to this in a picture, although it is not obvious what we should name it. We could use the terms applied to language and simply call it the rhythm or the cadence of the painting. The word "cadence" is not inappropriate. The *Oxford English Dictionary* lists one of its meanings as, "Harmonious combination of colors," and it quotes Swinburne, "The cadence of colors is just and noble: witness the red-leaved book . . . on the white cloth, the clear green jug on the table, the dim green bronze of the pitcher." Adrian Stokes speaks about this rhythm and calls it "movement." He describes having an experience in which colors entered into unexpected harmony with one another: "[T]he young leaf-greens of intense luminosity and of the right area and disposition . . . had entered into companionship with the red, and with each other. . . . In my opinion every picture that really 'works' possesses in infinite reduplication this kind of relationship, this kind of *movement*."¹⁷ Still another name for this phenomenon can be found in a remark by Jeryldene M. Wood, who writes about a painting by Piero della Francesca and mentions "the *fluency* of Peiro's picture as a whole."¹⁸ The remark is especially pertinent, because the rhythm of an image can be presented only when the picture is taken as a whole.

The rhythm of a picture lies not only in the balance of colors, in which, for example, this red patch on the one side picks up something red on the other; it is also the cadence of the images as they make up the whole; it is the visual rhapsody of meanings, colors, and lines. Even the monochromatic, shaded background of a painting, such as the brown backdrop in a Rembrandt portrait or the charcoal grey or burnt and raw umber background in a work by Chardin, enters into this pictorial rhythm. This prosody is harder to distinguish than the more clearly defined images, lines, and colors, but we do sense this rhythm and we know when it is violated, when the colors do not rhyme, or when the lines and images look clumsy or unintentionally jar the viewer. A good positive example of such rhythm, one that is

¹⁷ Adrian Stokes, *Colour and Form* (1937; reprint, London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1950), 109 (italics original).

¹⁸ Jeryldene M. Wood, "Introduction," in *The Cambridge Companion to Piero della Francesca*, ed. Jeryldene M. Wood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 7 (my italics).

almost tangible, can be found in Piet Mondrian's aptly named *Broadway Boogie Woogie*, which captures not only the beat of the music but the tempo of New York City, as would be obvious to anyone who has spent some time there and has experienced what it is like to dodge pedestrians while walking on the streets of Manhattan. Both the painting and the title succeed in their prosody. A sense for cadence is probably the most unteachable thing in picturing. It underlies and encases both the sensibility and the intelligence in painting.¹⁹

In speech, rhythm comes into clear prominence in singing, where it underlies both the vowels and the thoughts, and it is more perceptible and measurable because of the temporal nature of speech and song, but cadence is also present in the pictorial arrangement of colors, lines, and images. After all, it takes time to be able to "read" a painting; one has to learn to see a painting as one learns to sing a song. We appreciate a painting properly only when we have lingered over it, when we have seen it many times and have looked at it at different times of day and during different moods of our own. It is especially the rhythm of the painting that needs this kind of repeated, protracted study, and only if the drumbeat of the picture has been caught will the significance of the image come to light. Indeed, the rhythm is a kind of repository in which further meanings, further articulations in the painting are kept in store, and it introduces a temporal aspect into the activity of viewing a painting.²⁰

I wish to conclude this comparison of pictures and words by using some sentences from Edith Wharton. In her short novel, *False Dawn*, she tells about a man, Lewis Raycie, who in the 1840s bought some old Italian paintings and tried to exhibit them at his home in New York. They were in fact painted by important artists, but no one

¹⁹ Piero della Francesca wrote a treatise on painting entitled, *De Prospectiva Pingendi* (Ravenna: Danilo Montanari, 2000). At the beginning of the work (p. 7) he says, "Painting contains in itself three principal parts, which we say are design (*disegno*), composition (*commensuratio*), and color (*colorare*)." His list encompasses only two of the three dimensions that we have distinguished (composition of images, and color and line). He does not mention anything equivalent to cadence, but the reason for this omission may be the fact that the book gives instruction on how to use perspective. Rhythm is too deep in the structure of painting to be teachable.

²⁰ An important contrast between speech and painting lies in the fact that speech moves us away from the words to the thing, while pictures bring the thing into themselves. There is, therefore, an interesting "spatial" difference between the two modes of presentation.

recognized or appreciated them. Wharton describes the situation by mingling terms that pertain to pictures with terms that pertain to speech. She describes the man's hopes: "Once let the pictures be seen by educated and intelligent people, and they would speak for themselves—especially if he were at hand to interpret them." But the exhibition was a catastrophic failure: "Even with Lewis as interpreter, the pictures failed to make themselves heard."²¹ What does it mean for a picture to "make itself heard"? It means that the image will provoke the viewer into the syntactic action that lets the composition of images, the patterning of colors and lines, and the cadences of the whole come to light. The viewer will then be able to speak intelligently about the picture, and his speech will show that he has taken in what the picture is, that is, that he has grasped what is identifiable within it.

III

Pictorial Intelligence and Human Happiness. So far my remarks have been rather formal. We have discussed the three linguistic levels of syntax, phonemes, and prosody, and the three pictorial levels of configuration, line and color, and cadence. So far we have not spoken about the content, about what is said or what is depicted, nor have we discussed the kind of intelligence that is needed for such presentation. Let us speak primarily about the intelligence that occurs in depiction. What does it reveal and how does it reveal it?

I wish to claim that picturing deals with human happiness, the *eudaimonia* described in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. We as human beings, by our simple existence, introduce the most dramatic activity in the universe, the activity of choosing the things that either achieve or lose our beatitude. We are the kind of thing that can be or fail to be happy, the kind of thing for whom happiness becomes an issue. We are caught up in this pursuit, and hence we become an issue for ourselves. We never just want to get something done; we always know that *we* are doing it and that what we do will modify how we will be. We are ineluctably so involved; we can't help it; we do not have a choice in the matter. We can make choices that either achieve or prevent our happiness (it can be achieved in no other way except through

²¹ Edith Wharton, *False Dawn*, in *Old New York* (1924; reprint, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), 60–1.

our choosing), but we do not have any choice about being the kind of thing that wants and needs to be happy. When philosophy describes the human being as wanting and needing to be happy, it describes an essential necessity, something neither cultural nor optional. We are that kind of part of the universe, that kind of entity, and we install that kind of activity into the world. In an unpublished lecture on Henry James, Francis Slade, echoing and modifying Aristotle, says, "This is what poetry imitates: the action that actualizes or destroys our beatitude."²² The term "poetry" does not mean just the sonnet, epic, or tragedy; it can mean the novel, and it can also mean a depiction. Specifically, it can mean a portrait.

We must distinguish between a likeness and a portrait. A likeness is a mere copy of a person; it shows what he looks like. It gives you enough to be able to identify the person. A portrait is more than this; it is a depiction of an essay at beatitude. It presents, poetically, someone's shot at happiness and self-identity. It presents what Aristotle would call a "first substance," an individual entity, an instance of the species man, but it does not present that substance as a mere compound; it presents that entity as an essence, with a necessity and a definition. This definition is individualized (it is a *first* substance), but it is also able to be universal, that is, it can flow back on life, and more specifically, it can become identifiable with the persons who view it, the other individuals who are also an issue for themselves, who are also engaged in beatitude.²³

The portrait contains a lot of images, a lot of subordinate clauses. It presents the person's face, but also his configuration, his posture, his clothing, and some of his things, those relevant to his way of being

²² The lecture was given at St. Francis College on 22 April 2003. I am grateful to Francis Slade for notes of his lecture and permission to quote from them. I am also grateful to him for telling me about Edmund Waller's poem, which I use at the end of this essay.

²³ One might ask whether the association of portraits with an individual's happiness is found especially in art that has been influenced by Christian belief. See Alain Besançon, *The Forbidden Image. An Intellectual History of Iconoclasm*, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 265: "The unrepeatable and continuing individuality of the human subject, the presence of a personal soul within, animates the portrait as it has been practiced in Europe since the Middle Ages." As a further point, we might say that the memory we each have of ourselves is something like a portrait, presenting, in a dramatic way, to ourselves as the exclusive audience, the self-identity we carry with us so long as we live.

and involved in his decisive choices. If the portrait is serious and successful, if it is poetic and not a mere likeness, the person depicted in it will look out at us and declare, "This is what I have done and what, consequently, I am. This is what I have done with the chance I was given." In a portrait the face and the things express a human life, choices for or against beatitude. It is up to the painter to capture this, and to do so by his combinatorics of image within image, lines enclosing colors, and the cadences underlying it all. A mere likeness is a lot less than this; it succeeds if the viewer can simply recognize who the subject is, if he can just *identify* him; a portrait of someone succeeds if it enables the viewer to *understand* him. It does not just show; it portrays. As Sir Joshua Reynolds put it, "It is not the eye, it is the mind which the painter of genius desires to address."²⁴

Like all works of art, a portrait exercises what Thomas Prufer has called "reflux" on life.²⁵ The image does not just present itself to us; it "flows back" on life and enables us to experience things as articulated wholes. In Hans-Georg Gadamer's phrase, we see the world "with sight schooled by art."²⁶ John Gage expresses this in an elegantly compressed way; he describes harmonious combinations of colors and says, "It is in pictures, *or when we see in terms of pictures*, that these color-relationships take on a coherence."²⁷ We not only see pictures; we also become able to "see in terms of pictures," that is, we learn to experience the world in the terms the image conferred on us, and when we do so, patterns show up that would not have been visible otherwise. What Gage says about colors is true about human action; life and action become framed into wholes and parts that they would not enjoy without the imprint of drama and picturing. As Slade puts it, "The imitated action flows back over . . . actual action, and it is by virtue of the reflux of imitated action, which is 'tragic,' that the actual

²⁴ Sir Joshua Reynolds, *Discourses on Art*, ed. Robert R. Wark (San Marino: Huntington Library, 1959), 50. See also p. 57, where Reynolds mentions "this exertion of mind, which is the only circumstance that truly ennobles our art."

²⁵ Thomas Prufer, "Providence and Imitation: Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* and Aristotle's *Poetics*," in *Recapitulations* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1993), 18–19.

²⁶ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *The Relevance of the Beautiful, and Other Essays*, ed. Robert Bernasconi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 31. The German reads, "mit durch die Kunst erzogenen Augen."

²⁷ Gage, *Color and Culture*, 9 (my italics).

action is seeable as tragic, is displayed as tragic.”²⁸ We become able to experience life in the terms the depiction affords us: “This is how art makes us see life. Without the art of tragedy, life could not be experienced as tragic.” We come to see objects and other people in terms of pictures, but more importantly, we also come to “see” ourselves in a more understandable way, as also engaged in the attempt at happiness that is depicted in the portrait. An image conveys not just knowledge about the world but self-knowledge as well; as Slade says, “Art is entangled with life with the aim of untangling life by making it clear to itself.” Everyone, the greatest and the least, needs such imaging to help define himself.

A portrait is the clearest instance of a visual imitation of “the action that actualizes or destroys our beatitude,” but other forms of painting, such as landscapes and street scenes, can also be related to human conduct. I would like to quote Francis Slade again, this time from a conversation. He and I once went to an exhibition of the paintings of John Singer Sargent. Some of the pictures in the show represented people in various settings: on the bank of a river, in a restaurant, on a street, in a room. Slade observed that in Sargent’s paintings the settings were always such that people could be at home in them. I replied that Sargent was very different from Edward Hopper in that respect; in Hopper’s paintings, nobody is at home. Slade responded: “It’s more than that. They aren’t at home—and *they know it*.” Not without reason has Hopper been called “the visual laureate of heart-break hotel.”²⁹

The point I wish to make is that landscapes, seascapes, and street scenes are presented as backgrounds for the possibility of human choices. They present worlds in which something like us can be. Even in landscapes and seascapes, poetry imitates and intimates action or at least a setting for action, and a setting with a certain quality: as enabling the action, or as hindering, threatening, inviting, absorbing, scorning, or annihilating it. Even Jackson Pollock and Mark Rothko express a context for human being. They present a particular setting, or even, by implication, the universe as such, as a place that is or is not habitable, a place where beatitude can or cannot be sought.

²⁸ Slade makes this point in the lecture mentioned above in n. 22.

²⁹ Peter Campbell, “At Tate Modern,” *London Review of Books* (24 June 2004): 33. Slade added the observation that Hopper’s *Nighthawks* was a favorite of Jean-Paul Sartre, and it is obvious why.

In extreme instances, they may present a place where it would be laughable to seek happiness, but even then they cannot extinguish our search for it. Eliminating any context in which beatitude can be sought, while still keeping the search for it alive, is precisely what nihilism is. Among contemporary artists, Francis Bacon may be the most vivid example of this combination.

IV

Pictorial Categoriality. What kind of intelligence is at work when we thoughtfully read a portrait as expressing an attempt at happiness? What sort of categoriality is at work, what kind of categorial intuition takes place? Consider as an analogue the way in which a diagram functions to illustrate and condense a complicated set of events and relationships in the world. Just drawing the right lines in a diagram will present a situation in a simple and easily perceptible way; it will provide a solution to a problem and put a confused, troubled mind to rest. A diagram conjugates a complex situation. Likewise, suppose that we know a certain person, perhaps a famous individual or just a friend who has lived a largely private life, and suppose we see a thoughtful portrait of him. What we see there is something like a few strategic, diagrammatic lines drawn through the shape of that person. The portrait is like a diagram in which not just a mathematical but a moral unity is constituted, and in which more than lines are put into composition. It is a presentation of a whole life in its significant, articulated parts. It provides just the right phantasm for an insight into *this* substance. Not any image will do; it must be so contrived that the intelligibility of the thing comes to light. The artist knows which lines to draw, what colors to choose, what things and features to highlight as the properties of that person. He thereby reveals the substance of that person and the substance of that life, which is, after all, simply the person unfolded. The portrait enfolds what the life unfolds. If the artist succeeds in capturing his subject, if he does depict this particular attempt at beatitude, he achieves a solution and a resolution of the presentational problem he undertook when he began the painting. He has exercised his artistic intelligence, not just in resolving the formal structures of composition, line and color, and rhythm, but in depicting an attempt at happiness, a human being.

The portrait calls for intelligence (*intellectus* or *nous*) and not reasoning (*ratiocinatio* or *sylogismos*). You do not draw inferences when you view the painting. You might carry out inferences when you are studying the painting, when you are decoding the symbols, being informed about the iconography, and examining the patterns of line and color; but when you see the painting as a whole, you engage not in inference but in articulated identification, in categorial synthesis, in an act of intelligence, an act of understanding. Furthermore, this insight makes an impact on you as the viewer, because of the way art flows back into life, the way in which the form expressed in the depiction shapes our own being and the life we live. We are therefore moved, we rejoice or we are stunned, not because we have solved a puzzle but because we have understood something about the kind of actuality we call happiness. We do not *infer* that the fact depicted in the portrait also applies to us; we grasp the form and its application in a single insight, a kind of "pairing," to use Husserl's term.³⁰ The intelligence in question encompasses the images and their relationships, the colors and lines, and also the cadences of the portrait, which envelop the picture in a way different from the way the frame encloses it and makes it one. The underlying rhythm is the reservoir for the painting, while the frame is the fence that surrounds it.

The frame of a painting isolates the image from its surroundings. The image so detached then flows back on life. It rejoins the word through its reflux, not through its spatial contiguity. Henry James gives a striking illustration of these two themes, the frame of a picture and the merging of a painting with life. In *The Ambassadors*, the protagonist, Lambert Strether, makes an excursion from Paris into the French countryside.³¹ His outing is described as taking place within "a certain small Lambinet," a landscape painting that he saw years earlier at a Boston dealer's, which he could not afford but had never forgotten. The frame is mentioned: "The oblong gilt frame disposed its enclosing lines," and an identification between image and life takes place: "It was what he wanted: it was Tremont Street, it was France, it was Lambinet. Moreover, he was freely walking about in it." Later, as

³⁰ On the concept of pairing see Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), §51.

³¹ Henry James, *The Ambassadors*, bk. 11, chap. 3.

he lay on the grass and took a nap, he "lost himself anew in Lambinet," and "[h]e really continued in the picture . . . all the rest of this rambling day." No matter where he walked, he had "not once overstepped the oblong gilt frame. The frame had drawn itself out for him, as much as you please." Strether's excursion sets the stage for the novel's central discovery and reversal. Something analogous happens, with a similar play of identities and differences, in *The Wings of the Dove*, when Milly Theall views a portrait of a woman by Agnolo Bronzino and finds herself identified with the personage.³² This event also involves something of a discovery and reversal, because it immediately precedes the first intimation of Milly's fatal illness.

I have a final point to make about the cadence of a work of art. My understanding of this dimension must be distinguished from the theory that lay behind nonrepresentational painting in the twentieth century. The original members of this movement, Kandinsky, Malevich, and to a lesser degree Mondrian, were theosophists.³³ They thought that art could express ultimate, quasi-divine powers of the universe. To reach these forces the artists bypassed individual things. The rhythms they were after were cosmic, analogous to the laws of nature that Francis Bacon said were behind the more particular forms of things, the laws of nature into which individual things and species could be resolved. These artists wanted to express not the truth of particular objects or even particular kinds of objects, not things they might imitate, not a nature that they might repeat, but the truth that lay hidden *behind* such particularities and not in them, a truth that only artists could reach and one that they could reveal to others. They wanted something analogous to a song without words. In what was called "supremacist" art, the artist was taken to be a prophet and not just a craftsman. He would share in the creative process of the universe and would be in touch with rhythms that were universal. The artist posits and does not copy; he does not subordinate himself to the way things seem to be. As Alain Besançon says about Malevich,

³² Henry James, *The Wings of the Dove*, chap. 11.

³³ See the treatment of these artists by Besançon, *The Forbidden Image*, 321–77. He considers their ideas a modern version of iconoclasm. At the end of his career, however, Kandinsky returned to representation and depicted fanciful biomorphic images.

"Ecstasy and mystical knowledge give access to the infinite, to the unreality of the phenomenon . . .,"³⁴ and, "The task of man is to wrest himself from the phenomenon, the figurative, and to sink into the mystery of the universe. . . . But the universe—in other words, God—does not think. Only man thinks, and it is through thought that he will identify with the universe, that is, with God."³⁵

My treatment of the rhythmic level in speech and in painting would keep us from overshooting the individual object. I would claim that the cadence in question is proper to this individual speech and this individual painting; it is not cosmic or universal. The rhythm underlies these particular lines, colors, and images, and it could not exist without them. The formal causes define the more material elements and make them to be what they are. Furthermore, I would observe that not only speech and depiction but individual entities each have their own built-in tempo, their own temporality, as part of their substance.³⁶ All living things have their biological rhythms, their daily and seasonal cycles, as well as their deeper genetic cadences that let them unfold as entities. The expression of genes in a cell needs an internal clock, as the regulatory genes turn the others on and off, and even atoms and molecules have their vibrations and harmonies. Things do not dissolve into cosmic laws; there are forms and finalities; things are differentiated from one another; in a word, there *are* entities, and light plays on them. Things are real, and they can be imitated. The rhythms of particular things are differentiated from one another. In the case of human beings, biological time provides a con-

³⁴ Besançon, *The Forbidden Image*, 366.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 369–70. I would have to differ with Gadamer's analysis of non-representational art in "Art and Imitation," in *The Relevance of the Beautiful*, 92–104. He sees it as mimetic, but not in either a Kantian or Aristotelian way; he says that it calls to mind Pythagorean doctrines about mathematical order in the cosmos. Modern art, he says, reflects and imitates this deep-seated pattern, not the forms of things. He claims that such a reduction is necessary because our modern industrial world has marginalized ritual and myth and has "also succeeded in destroying things," so that nothing familiar remains to be imitated or expressed in art (102). What modern art does offer is "a pledge of order" when everything familiar is dissolving (104). I would reply that Gadamer concedes too much to the technological age, and seems, in this passage, to capitulate to it. There still are things that provide a measure and a telos: not only organic entities, but also relationships, situations, and actions that need to be artistically registered for us.

³⁶ See Russell Foster and Leon Kreitzman, *Rhythms of Life. The Biological Clocks that Control the Daily Lives of Every Living Thing* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).

text for a temporality that involves memories, anticipations, and choices, which make up a human life. The end of speech and depiction is to show what things and persons are and how they present themselves, not to dissolve them in view of a deeper truth. Phenomena are not unreal; the cadences in speech and pictures bear witness to the way things are.

V

Christian Intelligence in Pictures. Christian art, the depiction of Christian things, is also an imitation of the action directed toward beatitude, but the action in question and the beatitude it is involved with take on a different tone.³⁷ The decisive action for Christian faith is what God has done in the world, the action of Incarnation and Redemption. God's work of Creation provides a background for this redemptive performance, and so the world itself is also depicted differently. The landscape of the world is not just a habitation for men but a place in which the Son of God *can* dwell and *has* dwelt. Christian art, therefore, presents and celebrates God's own beatitude, the happiness that is God's own life, which he has presented to us through the Death and Resurrection of Christ. Every Christian painting presents God's glory, his *doxa*, a Greek term that must be taken in its multiple senses of glory, appearance, doctrine, and truth, all of which are present in the compound term *orthodoxy*. Every Christian painting serves to convey the central message of the gospels that is summarized in the line of the *Benedictus*: "to give knowledge of salvation to his people, *ad dandam scientiam salutis plebi eius*."

What would the Christian faith be without its images? The Creed calls for the complementarity of depiction. How would the manifestation of the Incarnation be sustained without its reflection in pictures? Without images would it not become only a matter of words, and hence a gnostic illumination, a matter of thinking and not action? The iconoclastic heresy takes on deeper meaning when we ask this question, and the inevitability of its condemnation becomes more apparent. In Christian liturgy, the mystery of the sacrament must be played off against the glorious and brilliant iconostasis, as well as the statues

³⁷ The modification is not just cultural but theological. Christian belief understands itself to transcend cultures even while it finds its place in them.

and stained-glass windows. Christian images are not just pedagogical devices; they are witnesses to the truth of the Incarnation and the embodiment of grace. They help distinguish Christian faith from the Jewish and the Muslim by presenting the Incarnation to us in a way that words alone could not do. One might also think of the complex visual beauty of a fine cathedral at Solemn Mass.³⁸ Catholicism seems to know how to compose very simple images into very complex ones. Not only Jews and Muslims but also some Protestants seem to be in principle people of the word alone, and hence iconoclastic. Picturing seems to be a pagan remnant that Catholicism can incorporate and transform but that the other religions cannot.³⁹

The primary location where Christian images are meant to flow back on life is not the art gallery but the church, monastery, convent, or home. In religious imagery, the "lingering examination of the original"⁴⁰ that every painting demands is carried out, not as a merely intellectual inquiry, but as a prayer, which achieves its focus and intensity because the image makes present, pictorially, God's glory or its presence in one of the saints. Christian images can present a human being, an essay at happiness, but in this case the beatitude is accomplished not just by deeds but by grace. The image presents God's grace and glory shining through, but in a way specific to this particular saint, to the Blessed Virgin or St. Peter, to St. Francis Xavier or St. Theresa of Avila. Jan van Eyck and Fra Angelico depict more than people who have no regrets for what they have done with their lives. They depict people who have entered into a kind of happiness different from the kind determined simply by what we do ourselves, and it is also different, in ways that deserve exploration, from the beatitude depicted in images of the Buddha and his attendant Boddhisatvas.

Landscapes are also modified in Christian art. Here I would like to quote Besançon again. He writes about French Impressionist

³⁸ This affinity with imaging has been less true of the Catholic liturgy of the past thirty-five years, which is much more verbal and less ritualistic, less visually compositional, than the centuries-old liturgy that preceded it.

³⁹ Hobbes criticizes Catholicism for its use of images, claiming that the Church did *not* transform the statues it took over from the Gentiles but fell into idolatrous worship of them. See *Leviathan*, ed. Richard Tuck (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chap. 45, pp. 453–5.

⁴⁰ The phrase is from John Walsh, "Pictures, Tears, Lights, and Seats," in *Whose Muse? Museums and the Public Trust*, ed. James Cuno (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 79.

painting and says: "One is struck by the well-being (*le bien-être*) that radiates from it, its joyful harmony, its pleasure in contemplating creatures and landscapes, all of which is more in keeping with the Christian spirit than are the troubled and suspicious works of symbolism."⁴¹ He admits that people like Cézanne and Monet might have been anti-clerical, "*parfaits mangeurs de curés*," but he insists that they were children of a civilization that the Catholic Church had marked by her education,⁴² and he also claims that "the great epochs of *Christianisme* are always marked by the flowering of a happy lay culture (*une culture laïque heureuse*)."⁴³ Christian art, even as an unconscious inheritance, rejoices in the world as created by God, as a place where beatitude can be attained, where, one believes, the incoherence of life has been resolved by the redemptive Death and Resurrection of the Incarnate Son of God.⁴⁴

Christian truth is present not only in the iconography of a work of Christian art. It extends to the other levels of composition, from the placement of images to the combination of line and color to the cadences of the picture. All of these bodily elements become ingredient in the truth that is disclosed. They become ingredient not only as elements in the picture, but also as representing elements of the material world, which was created by God in the beginning, was incorporated into his act of Redemption, and will be transformed at the end of time, when it will become obvious what the body and flesh really are. Robert E. Wood relates Christian art to "the fundamentally incarnate character of Christian religion, rooted in the belief in God's own incarnation and culminating in the resurrection of the body."⁴⁵ Christian truth could not have been disclosed without the body, and so

⁴¹ Alain Besançon, *La confusion des langues. La crise idéologique de l'Église* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1978), 43. See also, *Trois tentations dans l'Église* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1996), 28.

⁴² Besançon, *La confusion des langues*, 44.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁴⁴ Besançon makes similar points in other passages. See *The Forbidden Image*, 33: "Plato posits the fundamental theological principle on which all art rests: that the world is good." On p. 265: "These points, it seems, can be reduced to one: creation is good." On p. 238 he speaks about seventeenth- and eighteenth-century French painting and says, "The reflection of that image [of God] . . . illuminated profane art, provided a sense of well-being, a happiness about being in the world which was also praise of its Creator."

⁴⁵ Robert E. Wood, *Placing Aesthetics. Reflections on the Philosophic Tradition* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1999), 327.

Christian intelligence does not escape from the material substrate but incorporates it into its faith. It is not gnostic and therefore eschews iconoclasm of any form, whether Byzantine, Reformed, or Modern. Christian art is essentially representational, and it depicts each thing and person, each *tode ti*, with its own internal necessity, as existing in its own form of being, both created and graced.⁴⁶

The Catholic University of America

⁴⁶ As an epilogue to my essay, I would like to comment on Edmund Waller's poem, "To Vandyck," which speaks eloquently about the presentational possibilities in a picture and about the effect a portrait has on those who view it. The artist's skill does not just entertain the viewer but makes him love the thing depicted: "Rare Artisan, whose pencil moves / Not our delights alone, but loves! / From thy shop of beauty we / Slaves return, that enter'd free."

People respond not simply to the image but to the thing imaged. In the one case, it is a response to someone unknown: "The heedless lover does not know / Whose eyes they are that wound him so; / But, confounded with thy art, / Inquires her name that has his heart."

In the other case, a response to someone once known: "Another, who did long refrain, / Feels his old wound bleed fresh again / With dear remembrance of that face, / Where now he reads new hope of grace."

The painter's work is not just an inert likeness or an aesthetic object, but presents the thing itself, or in this case the face itself, with its own causal efficiency: "Strange! that thy hand should not inspire / The beauty only, but the fire; / Not the form alone, and grace, / But act and power of a face."

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TEXTUALITY, REALITY,
AND THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE*

NICHOLAS RESCHER

I

HOW MUCH CAN A PERSON KNOW? *A Leibnizian Perspective on Human Finitude.* How much can someone possibly know? What could reasonably be viewed as an upper limit of an individual's knowledge—supposing that factually informative knowledge rather than performative how-to knowledge or subliminally tacit knowledge is to be at issue?

In pursuing this question, let us suppose someone with perfect recall who devotes a long lifespan to the acquisition of information. For seventy years this individual spends 365 days per annum reading for twelve hours a day at the rate of sixty pages an hour (with 400 words per page). That yields a lifetime reading quota of some 7.4×10^9 words. Optimistically supposing that, on average, a truth regarding some matter of fact or other takes only some seven words to state, this means a lifetime access to some 10^9 truths, that is, around a billion of them. No doubt most of us are a great deal less well informed than this. But it seems pretty well acceptable as an upper limit to the information that a human individual could probably not reach and certainly not exceed.

After all, with an average of 400 pages per book, the previously indicated lifetime reading quota would come to some 46,000 books. The world's largest libraries, the Library of Congress for example, nowadays have somewhere around 20 million books (book-length assemblages of pamphlets included), and it would take a very Hercules of reading to make his way through even one-quarter one of one percent of so vast a collection (= 50,000), which is roughly what our

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aforementioned reading prodigy manages. If mastery of Library of Congress-encompassed material is to be the measure, then few of us would be able to hold our heads up very high.¹ This means that while a given individual can read any book (so that there are no inherently unreadable books), the individual cannot possibly read every book (so that for anyone of us there are bound to be very many unread books indeed).

All this, of course, still only addresses the question of how much knowledge a given person—one particular individual—can manage to acquire. There yet remains the question of how much is in principle knowable—that is, *can be known*. Here it is instructive to begin with the perspective of the great seventeenth-century polymath G. W. Leibniz.

Leibniz took his inspiration from *The Sand Reckoner* of Archimedes, who in this study sought to establish the astronomically large number of sand grains that could be contained within the universe defined by the sphere of the fixed stars of Aristotelian cosmology—a number Archimedes effectively estimated at 10^{60} . Thus even as Archimedes addressed the issue of the scope of the physical universe, so Leibniz sought to address the issue of the scope of the universe of thought.²

Leibniz pursued this project very much in the spirit of the preceding observations. He wrote:

All items of human knowledge can be expressed by the letters of the alphabet . . . so that it follows that one can calculate the number of truths of which humans are capable and thus compute the size of a work that would contain all possible human knowledge, and which would contain all that could ever be known, written, or invented, and more besides. For it would contain not only the truths, but also all the falsehoods that men can assert, and meaningless expressions as well.³

Thus if one could set an upper limit to the volume of printed matter accessible to inquiring humans, then one could map out by combina-

¹ To be sure, there lurks in the background have the question of whether having mere information is to count as having knowledge. With regard to this quantitative issue it has been argued that authentic knowledge does not increase propositionally with the amount of information as such, but only proportionally with its logarithm. See chapter 13 of the author's *Epistemology* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003). This would suggest that the actual knowledge within the Library of Congress's many volumes might be encompassed in some far more modest collection. But this sort of complication can be put aside as irrelevant to the course of reflection that will be unfolded.

² On Archimedes' estimate see T. C. Heath, *The Works of Archimedes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1897).

torial means the whole manifold of accessible verbal material—true, false, or gibberish—in just the manner that Leibniz contemplated. This is exactly what he proceeded to do in a fascinating 1693 tract, *De l'horizon de la doctrine humaine*.⁴

Any alphabet devisable by man will have only a limited number of letters (Leibniz here supposes the Latin alphabet of twenty-four). So even if we allow a word to become very long indeed (Leibniz overgenerously supposes thirty-two letters⁵), there will be only a limited number of words that can possibly be formed (namely $24 \exp 32$). And so, if we suppose a maximum to the number of words that a single run-on, just barely intelligible sentence can contain (say 100), then there will be a limit to the number of potential “statements” that can possibly be made, namely $100 \exp (24 \exp 32)$.⁶ This number is huge indeed—far bigger than Archimedes’ sand grains. Nevertheless, it is still finite, limited. Moreover, with an array of basic symbols different from

³ See G. W. Leibniz, *De l'horizon de la doctrine humaine*, ed. Michael Fichant (Paris: Vrin, 1991). The quotation is from a partial translation of Leibniz’s text in Philip Beeley, “Leibniz on the Limits of Human Knowledge,” *The Leibniz Review* 13 (December 2003): 93–7 (see p. 95).

⁴ It is well known that Leibniz invented entire branches of science, among the differential and integral calculus, the calculus of variations, topology (analysis situs), symbolic logic, and computers. But there is also one branch in which subsequent developments have not arrived even now, namely *epistemetrics*, the measurement of knowledge. For while intelligence measurement (IQ assessment) is a well developed field, knowledge measurement is not—withstanding the proliferation of quiz shows comparing different people’s knowledge of various fields. The actual measurement of how much people do know—and no less importantly, or how much they can know—is still a substantially unrealized domain of investigation.

⁵ The longest word I have seen in actual use is the 34-letter absurdity “supercalifragilisticexpialidocious” from the musical “Mary Poppins.”

⁶ G. W. Leibniz, *De l'horizon*, 11. This of course long antedates the (possibly apocryphal) story about the Huxley–Wilberforce debate which has Huxley arguing that sensible meaning could result from chance process because a team of monkeys typing at random would eventually produce the works of Shakespeare—or (on some accounts) all the books in the British Library, including not only Shakespeare’s works but the Bible as well. (The story—which goes back, at least, to Sir Arthur Eddington’s *The Nature of the Physical World* [London: McMillan, 1929], 72–3) is doubtless fictitious since the Huxley–Wilberforce debate of 1860 antedated the emergence of the typewriter.) However, the basic idea goes back at least to Cicero: “If a countless number of the twenty-one letters of the alphabet . . . were mixed together it is possible that when cast on the ground they should make up the *Annals* of Ennius, able to be read in good order” (*De natura deorum*, bk. 2, chap. 27). The story launched an immense discussion on the contemporary scene, as is readily attested by a Google or Yahoo search for “typing monkeys.” It has also had significant literary repercussions, as exemplified by Jorge Luis Borges’s well-known story of “The Library of Babel,” which contains all possible books.

those of the Latin alphabet, the situation is changed in detail but not in structure. (This remains the case even if one adds the symbols at work in mathematics, where Descartes's translation of geometrically pictorial propositions into algebraically articulated format stood before Leibniz's mind, to say nothing of his own project of a universal language and a *calculus ratiocinator*.⁷)

The crux of Leibniz's discussion is that any propositionalizable contention can in principle be spelled out in print. There is only so much, so finitely much, that can be stated in sentences of intelligible length—and so also that can explicitly be thought of beings who conduct their thinking in language. Moreover, since this encompasses fiction as well, our knowledge of possibility is also finite, and fiction is for us just as much language-limited as is the domain of truth.

II

The Leibnizian Perspective. These considerations mean that as long as people transact their thinking in language—broadly understood to encompass diverse symbolic devices—the thoughts they can have—and *a fortiori* the things they possibly can know—will be limited in number. The moment one sets a realistic limit to the length of practicably meaningful sentences, one has to realize that the volume of the sayable is finite—vast thought it will be.

Moving further along these lines, let it be that the cognitive (in contrast to the affective) thought-life of people consists of the language-framed propositions that they consider. Let us suppose that people can consider textualized propositions at about the same speed at which they can read—optimistically, say, some sixty pages per hour where each page consists of twenty sentences. Assuming a thought-span of sixteen waking hours on average, it will then transpire that in the course of a year a person can entertain a number of propositional thoughts equal to $365 \times 16 \times 60 \times 20 \cong 7 \times 10^6$.

So subject to the hypotheses at issue, this is how much material one would need to replicate in print the stream of consciousness thought-life of a person for an entire year. Once again, this number of

⁷ Louis Couturat, *La logique de Leibniz* (Paris: Alcan, 1901), is still the best overall account of this Leibnizian project.

seven million, though not small, is nevertheless limited. These limits will again finitize the combinatorial possibilities. There is only so much thinking that a person can manage. In the context of a finite species, these limits of language mean that there are only so many thoughts to go around—so many manageable sentences to be formulated. Once again we are in the grip of finitude.

Now as Leibniz saw it, matters can be carried much further. For the finitude at issue here has highly significant implications. Consider an analogy. Only a finite number of hairs will fit on a person's head—say 1,000. So when there are enough individuals in a group (say 1001 of them) then two of them must have exactly the same number of hairs on their heads. And so also with thoughts. If only there are enough thinking intelligences in the eons of cosmic history while the number of thoughts—and thus also thought-days and thought-lives—are finite, then there will inevitably be several people in a sufficiently large linguistic community whose thoughts are precisely the same throughout their lives.

It also becomes a real prospect that language supposes limits on our grasp of people and their doings. Suppose that the detailed biography of a person is a minute-by-minute account of his doings, allocating (say) ten printed lines to each minute, and so roughly 15,000 lines per day to make up a hefty volume of 300 fifty-line pages. So if a paradigmatic individual lives 100 years we will need 365×100 or roughly 36,500 such substantial tomes to provide a comprehensive blow-by-blow account of his life.

But, as we have seen, the number of such tomes, though vast, is limited. In consequence, there are only so many detailed biographies to go around, so that it transpires that the number of detailed biographies that is available is also finite. This, of course, means that: If the duration of the species were long enough—or if the vastness of space provided sufficiently many thinkers—then there would have to be some people with exactly the same detailed biography. Given enough agents, eventual repetitions in point of action became inevitable.

Now moving on from biographies (or diaries) to public annals, Leibniz thought to encounter much the same general situation once again. Thus suppose that (as Leibniz has it) the world's population is one hundred million (that is 10^8) and that each generation lives (on average) for fifty years, then in the 6,000 years during which civilized man may be supposed to have existed, there have existed some $1.2 \times$

10^{10} people—or some 10^{10} of them if we assume smaller generations in earlier times.⁸

Recall now the above-mentioned idea of 36,500 hefty tomes needed to characterize in detail the life of an individual. It then follows that we would need some 36.5×10^{19} of them for a complete history of the species. To be sure, we thus obtain an astronomically vast number of possible overall annals for mankind as a whole. But though vast, this number will nevertheless be finite. Moreover, if the history of the race is sufficiently long, then some part of its extensive history will have to repeat itself in full with a *parfaite repetition mot pour mot* since there are only so many possible accounts of a given day (or week or year). For once again there are only a finite number of possibilities to go around and somewhere along the line total repetitions it will transpire that life stories will occasionally recur *in toto* (*ut homines novi eadem ad sensum penitus tota vita agerent, quae alii jam egerunt*⁹).

As Leibniz thus saw it, the finitude of language and its users carries in its wake the finitude of possible diaries, biographies, histories—you name it, including even possible thought-lives in the sense of propositionalized streams of consciousness as well. Even as Einstein with his general relativity (initially) saw himself as finitizing the size of the physical universe, so Leibniz's treatise saw the size of mankind's cognitive universe as a manifold of limited horizons—boundless but finite.

It was accordingly a key aspect of Leibniz's thought that the human understanding cannot keep up with reality. For Leibniz, the propositional thought of finite creatures is linguistic and thereby finite and limited. But he also held that reality—as captured in the thought of God, if you will—is infinitely detailed. Only God's thought can encompass it, not ours. Reality's infinite detail thus carries both costs and its benefits in its wake. Its cost is the unavoidability of imperfect comprehension by finite intelligences. Its benefit is the prospect of endless variability and averted repetition. The result is a cognitively insuperable gap between epistemology and metaphysics. Everything that humans can say or think by linguistic means can be comprehended in one vast but finite universal library.

⁸ Leibniz, *De l'horizon*, 112.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 54.

But what do these Leibnizian ruminations mean in the larger scheme of things?

III

Statements Are Enumerable. Let us now shift the theme of discussion from the issue of what a given person can know to the more massive issue of what can be known by people at large.

The preceding deliberations have unfolded on the basis of the emphatically contingent supposition that there are certain limits to human capabilities—and, in particular, to the length of the words and sentences with which our discourse can effectively operate. But let us now also waive this (otherwise surely realistic) restriction and break through the limits of finitude in the interests of getting a grip on the general principles of the matter.

Even if one construes the idea of an “alphabet” sufficiently broadly to include not only letters but symbols of various sorts, it still holds that everything stateable in a language can be spelled out in print through the combinatorial combination of some sequential register of symbols.¹⁰ With a “language” construed as calling for development in the usual recursive manner, it transpires that the statements of a language can be enumerated in a vast and indeed infinite but nevertheless ultimately countable listing.¹¹ Thus, since the world’s languages, even if not finite in number, are nevertheless at most enumerable, it follows that the set of all statements—including every linguistically formidable proposition—will be enumerably infinite.

As a matter of principle, then, we obtain the following contention:

Thesis 1: The Enumerability of Statements. Statements (linguistically formulated propositions) are enumerable and thus (at most) denumerably infinite.

Our linguistic resources for describing concrete states of affairs are thus subject to quantitative limitation. Insofar as our thought

¹⁰ Compare Philip Hugly and Charles Sayward, “Can a Language Have Indenumerably Many Expressions?” *History and Philosophy of Logic* 4 (1983): 112–26.

¹¹ This supposes an upper limit to the length of intelligible statements. Even if this restriction were waived, the number of statements will still be no more than countably finite.

about things proceeds by recursively developed linguistic means, it is inherently limited in its reach within the confines of countability. And so, the upshot is that the limits of textuality impose quantitative limitations upon propositionalized thought—albeit not limits of finitude.

IV

Truth vs. Facts. It serves the interests of clarity to introduce a distinction at this stage, that between truths and facts. Truths are linguistically formulated facts, correct statements which, as such, must be formulated in language (broadly understood to include symbol systems of various sorts). A “truth” is something that has to be framed in linguistic/symbolic terms—the representation of a fact through its statement in some language—so that any correct statement formulates a truth.

A “fact,” on the other hand, is not a linguistic item at all, but an actual aspect of the world’s state of affairs. A fact is thus a feature of reality.¹² Facts correspond to potential truths whose actualization as such waits upon their appropriate linguistic embodiment. Truths are statements and thereby language-bound, but facts outrun linguistic limits. Once stated, a fact yields a truth, but with facts at large there need in principle be no linguistic route to get from here to there.

V

Truths Though Infinite in Number Are Denumerable. Being inherently linguistic in character, truths are indissolubly bound to textuality, seeing that any language-framed declaration can be generated recursively from a sequential string of symbols—that is, that all spoken language can in principle be reduced to writing. Since they correspond to statements, it follows that truths cannot be more than countably infinite. On this basis we have it that:

¹² Our position thus takes no issue with P. F. Strawson’s precept that “facts are what statements (when true) state.” See his “Truth,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supplementary vol. 24 (1950): 129–56 (see p. 136). Difficulty would ensue with Strawson’s thesis only if an “only” were added.

Thesis 2: *The Denumerability of Truth.* While the manifold of the truth cannot be finitely inventoried, nevertheless, truths are no more than denumerably infinite in number.

VI

The Inexhaustibility of Fact. Facts, however, are another matter altogether. It is a key facet of our epistemic stance toward the real world that its furnishings possess a complexity and diversity of detail so elaborate that there is always more to be said than we have so far managed. Every part of reality has features beyond the range of our current cognitive reach—at any juncture whatsoever.

Moreover, any adequate account of inquiry must recognize that the process of information-acquisition at issue in science is a process of conceptual innovation. Caesar did not know—and in the then extant state of the cognitive art could not have known—that his sword contained tungsten and carbon. There will always be facts about a thing that we do not know because we cannot even express of them in the prevailing conceptual order of things. To grasp such a fact means taking a perspective of consideration that as yet we simply do not have, because the state of knowledge (or purported knowledge) has not reached a point at which such a consideration is feasible. The ongoing progress of scientific inquiry always leaves various facts about the things of this world wholly outside the conceptual realm of the inquirers of any particular period. Accordingly, the facts about any actual physical object are theoretically inexhaustible. After all, any such thing has dispositions that run off into infinity.

Its susceptibility to further elaborate detail—and to changes of mind regarding this further detail—is built into our very conception of a “real thing.” And so the range of fact about anything real is effectively inexhaustible. There is, as best we can tell, no limit to the world’s ever-increasing complexity that comes to view with our ever-increasing grasp of its detail. The realm of fact and reality is endlessly variegated and complex. And so we also arrive at:

Thesis 3: *The Inexhaustibility of Fact.* Facts are infinite in number. The domain of fact is inexhaustible: there is no limit to facts about the real.

In this regard, however, real things differ in an interesting and important way from fictive ones. For a key about fictional particulars is

that they are of finite cognitive depth. In discoursing about them we shall ultimately run out of steam as regards their nongeneric features. A point will always be reached when one cannot say anything further that is characteristically new about them, when one cannot present nongeneric information that is not inferentially implicit in what has already been said.¹³ New generic information can, of course, always be forthcoming through the progress of science. When we learn more about coal-in-general then we know more about the coal in Sherlock Holmes's grate. But the finiteness of their cognitive depth means that the presentation of ampliatively novel nongeneric information must by the very nature of the case come to a stop when fictional things are at issue.

With real things, on the other hand, there is no reason of principle why the elaboration of information that is nongenerically idiosyncratic need ever end. On the contrary, we have every reason to presume these things to be cognitively inexhaustible. The prospect of discovery is open-ended here. A precommitment to description-transcending features—no matter how far description is pushed—is essential to our conception of a real thing. Something whose character was exhaustible by linguistic characterization would thereby be marked as fictional rather than real.¹⁴

And so we have it that facts regarding reality are infinite in number. But just how infinite?

VII

Facts Are Transdenumerable. While statements in general—and therefore true statements in particular—can be enumerated, so that truths are denumerable in number, there is no reason to suppose that the same will be true of facts. On the contrary, there is every reason

¹³ To deny inferentially implicit information the title of authentic novelty is not, of course, to say that it cannot surprise us in view of the limitations of our own deductive powers.

¹⁴ This also explains why the dispute over mathematical realism (Platonism) has little bearing on the issue of physical realism. Mathematical entities are akin to fictional entities in this—that we can only say about them what we can extract by deductive means from what we have explicitly put into their defining characterization. These abstract entities do not have nongeneric properties since each is a "lowest species" unto itself.

to think that, reality being what it is, there will be an uncountably large manifold of facts.

The reality of it is that facts, unlike truths, cannot be enumerated. For no listing of fact-presenting truths—not even one of infinite length—can possibly manage to constitute a complete register of facts. Any attempt to register-fact-as-a-whole will founder: the list is bound to be incomplete because there are facts about the list-as-a-whole that no single entry can encompass.

We thus arrive at the next principal thesis of these deliberations:

Thesis 4: *The Transdenumerability of Facts*. The manifold of fact is transdenumerably infinite.

The idea of a complete listing of all the facts is manifestly impracticable. Consider the following statement: “The list F of stated facts fails to have this statement on it.” But now suppose this statement to be on the list. Then it clearly does not state a fact, so that the list is after all not a list of the facts (contrary to hypothesis). And so it must be left off the list. But then in consequence that list will not be complete since the statement is true. Thus, facts can never be listed *in toto* because there will always be further facts—facts about the entire list itself—that a supposedly complete list could not manage to register.

This conclusion can be rendered more graphic by the following considerations. Suppose that the list $F: f_1, f_2, f_3, \dots$ were to constitute a complete enumeration of all facts. Now consider the statement

(Z) the list F takes the form f_1, f_2, f_3, \dots

By hypothesis, this statement will present a fact. So if F is indeed a complete listing of all facts, then there will be an integer k such that $Z = f_k$. Accordingly, Z itself will occupy the k th place on the F listing, so that

f_k = the list L takes the form $f_1, f_2, f_3, \dots, f_k, \dots$

But this would require f_k to be an expanded version of itself, which is absurd. With the k th position of the F listing already occupied by f_k , we cannot also squeeze that complex f_k -involving thesis into it.

The point here is that any supposedly complete listing of facts f_1, f_2, f_3, \dots will itself exhibit, as a whole, certain features that none of its individual members can encompass. Once those individual entries are

fixed and the series is defined, there will be further facts about that series-as-a-whole that its members themselves cannot articulate.

Moreover, the point at issue can also be made via an analogue of the diagonal argument that is standardly used to show that no list of real numbers can manage to include all of them, thereby establishing the transdenumerability of the reals. Let us begin by imagining a supposedly complete inventory of independent facts, using logic to streamline the purported fact history into a condition of greater informative tidiness through the elimination of inferential redundancies so that every item adds some information to what has gone before. The argument for the transdenumerability of fact can now be developed as follows. Let us suppose (for the sake of *reductio ad absurdum* argumentation) that the inventory f_1, f_2, f_3, \dots represents our (nonredundant but yet purportedly complete) listing of facts. Then, by the supposition of factuality we have $(\forall i)f_i$. Further, by the supposition of completeness we have it that

$$(\forall p)(p \rightarrow (\exists i)[(f_i \rightarrow p)])$$

Moreover, by the aforementioned supposition of nonredundancy, each member of the sequence adds something quite new to what has gone before.

$$(\forall i)(\forall j)[i < j \rightarrow \sim[(f_1 \& f_2 \& \dots \& f_i) \rightarrow f_j]]$$

Consider now the following course of reasoning.

(1) $(\forall i)f_i$, by "factuality"

(2) $(\forall j)f_j \rightarrow (\exists i)(f_i \rightarrow (\forall j)f_j)$, from (1) by "completeness" via the substitution of $(\forall j)f_j$ for p

(3) $(\exists i)(f_i \rightarrow (\forall j)f_j)$, from (1), (2)

But (3) contradicts nonredundancy. This *reductio ad absurdum* of our hypothesis indicates that the facts about any sufficiently complex object will necessarily be too numerous for complete enumeration. In such circumstances, no purportedly comprehensive listing of truths can actually manage to encompass all facts.

VIII

More Facts than Truths. The long and short of it is that the domain of reality-characterizing fact inevitably transcends the limits of our capacity to express it, and *a fortiori* those of our capacity to canvas it completely. In the description of concrete particulars we are caught up in an inexhaustible detail: There are always bound to be more descriptive facts about things than we are able to capture explicitly with our linguistic machinery. Given that concrete reality is—so we must suppose—endlessly complex, detailed, and diversified in its make-up, the limitedness of our recursively constituted linguistic resources means that our characterizations of the real will always fall short.

Thesis 5: *There are quantitatively more facts than truths.* Facts, then, are too numerous for enumerability.

Cognition, being bound to language, is digital and sequentially linear. Reality, by contrast, is analogue and replete with feedback loops and coordinated in nonsequentially systemic interrelations. It should thus not be seen as all that surprising that the two cannot be brought into smooth alignment. But, of course, the aspect of the situation that is paramount for present purposes is the resultant discrepancy of numbers.

The basic reason why the domain of fact is ampler than that of truth is that language cannot capture the entirety of fact. We live in a world that is not digital but analog, and so the manifold of its states of affairs is simply too rich to be fully comprehended by our linguistically digital means. The domain of fact inevitably transcends the limits of linguistically formulable truth. Truth is to fact what film is to reality—a merely discrepant approximation.

When facts and language play their game of musical chairs, some facts are bound to be left in the lurch when the music of language stops. The discrepancy manifests itself in the difference between “any” and “every.” Any candidate can possibly be accommodated. (We have $(\forall x)\Diamond(\exists y)Sxy$.) But it is not possible to accommodate every candidate. (We do *not* have $\Diamond(\forall x)(\exists y)Sxy$.) The same situation of a quantitative discrepancy between fact and language-formidable knowledge imposes the cognitive limits and limitations that have been highlighted in the present discussion. For the limits of knowledge are in the final analysis quantitative. The crux of the problem is a

discrepancy of numbers. They have roots in the musical chairs perplex—in the fact that propositionalized knowledge is language bound, and that the realm of fact is too vast to be encapsulated in the confines of language.

Twentieth-century philosophers of otherwise the most radically different orientation have agreed on preeminetizing the role of language. “The limits of my language set the limits of my world” (“Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt”) says the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* at 5.6. “There is nothing outside text” (“Il n’y a pas de hors de texte”) say the devotees of French constructionism. But already centuries earlier Leibniz had taken the measure of this sort of textualism. He looked at it up close and saw that it could not be more wrong.

There is a fundamental qualitative discrepancy between the realms of the real and that which is text-characterizable. Reality bursts the confines of textualization.¹⁵ And *that* this occurs must be accepted despite the inherent and unavoidable impossibility of indicating just where it does so. For, of course, we cannot possibly adduce any concrete example of an unstateable fact.

IX

Limits of Knowledge. The cognitive beings that concern us here are language-dependent finite intelligences, and these are by their very nature imperfect knowers. For the information at their disposal by way of propositional knowledge that something or other is the case will—unlike how-to knowledge—have to be verbally formulated—unlike performative how-to knowledge. Language-encompassed textuality will, as we have seen, be outdistanced by the facts themselves. But what is one to make of the numerical disparity between facts and truths, between what is knowable in theory and what we finite intelligences can actually manage to know? Just what does this portend?

¹⁵ The circumstance that not every actual fact can be articulated in a (true) statement shows *a fortiori* that not every possible situation can be characterized linguistically. If the domain of fact outruns the bounds of language articulation, then the manifold of possibility must certainly do so as well. We must accordingly acknowledge that not everything is sayable!

It means that our knowledge of fact is incomplete—and inevitably so!—because we finite intelligences lack the means for its comprehensive characterization. Reality in all its blooming, buzzing complexity is too rich for faithful representation by the recursive and enumerable resources of our language. We do and must recognize the limitations of our cognition, acknowledging that we cannot justifiably equate reality with what can explicitly be known by us through the resources of language. What transpires here for the circumstantial situation of our sort of mind also obtains for any other sort of finite mind as well. Any physically realizable sort of cognizing being can articulate—and thus can know—only a part or aspect of the real.

The situation as regards the knowing of facts is akin to that of the counting of integers—specifically in the following respects.¹⁶

- (1) The manifold of integers is inexhaustible. We can never come to grips with all of them as particular individuals. Nevertheless—
- (2) Further progress is always possible: we can always go beyond whatever point we have so far managed to reach. In principle we can always go beyond what has been attained. Nevertheless—
- (3) Moving forward gets ever more cumbersome. In moving onward we must be ever more prolix and make use of ever more elaborate symbol complexes. Greater demands in time, effort, and resources are inevitable here. Accordingly—
- (4) In actual practice there will be only so much that we can effectively manage to do. The possibilities that obtain in principle can never be fully realized in practice. However—
- (5) Such limitations nowise hamper the prospects of establishing various correct generalizations about the manifold of integers in its abstract entirety.

A parallel situation characterizes the cognitive condition of all finite intelligences whose cognitive operations have to proceed by a symbolic process that functions by language. Inductive inquiry, like counting, never achieves completeness. There is always more to be done: In both cases alike we can always do better by doing more. But we can never do it all.

¹⁶ We here take “counting” to be a matter of indicating integers by name—for example, as “thirteen” or “13”—rather than descriptively, as per “the first prime after eleven.”

Does this state of affairs mean that those unknown facts are unknowable? The answer is neither "yes" nor "no." As already foreshadowed above, it all depends upon exactly how one is to construe this possibilistic matter of "knowability." Using Kxf to abbreviate "the individual x knows the fact f ," there will clearly be two rather different ways in which the existence of an inherently unknowable fact can be claimed, namely,

$$(\exists f)\Box(\forall x)\sim Kxf \text{ or equivalently } \sim(\forall f)\Diamond(\exists x)Kxf$$

and

$$\Box(\exists f)(\forall x)\sim Kxf \text{ or equivalently } \sim\Diamond(\forall f)(\exists x)Kxf$$

The first of these logically entails the second. This second is in the circumstances inevitable, there being more facts than finite humans ever will or can know. However, the first, stronger contention is clearly false. For as long as the nonexistence of an omniscient God is not a necessary circumstance, there can be no fact that is of necessity unknown.

The difference in the quantifier placement in the preceding two formulas is crucial when one contemplates the prospect of unlimited knowability—of the idea that all facts are knowable. Insofar as the issue is problematic, the idea of unknowable facts will have to pivot on the acceptability of the first thesis.

But of course even though there are—or may well be—unknowable facts (in the indicated sense of this term), they can never be identified as such, seeing that to identify a fact as such, namely as a fact, is effectively to claim knowledge of it. It is, accordingly, in principle impossible for us ever to give an example of one.

X

Cognitive Finitude. First the good news. Generalizations can of course refer to everything. Bishop Butler's "Everything is what it is and not another thing" holds with unrestricted universality. Once continuous quantities are introduced, the range of inferentially available statements becomes uncountable. "The length of the table exceeds x inches." This clearly opens the door to uncountably many al-

ternatives. However—and this is the crucial point—only a countable number of statements can ever be specifically made.¹⁷

Fortunately, a case-by-case determination is not generally needed to validate generalizations. We can establish claims about groups larger than we can ever hope to inventory. Recourse to arbitrary instances, the process of indirect proof by *reductio ad absurdum*, and induction (mathematical and scientific) all afford procedures for achieving generality beyond the range of an exhaustive case-by-case check.

But will this always be so? Or, are there also general truths whose determination would require the exhaustive surveying of all specific instances of a totality too large for our range of vision?

At this point our cognitive finitude becomes a crucial consideration. The difference between a finite and an infinite knower is of fundamental importance and requires closer elucidation. For an “infinite knower” need not and should not be construed as an omniscient knower—one from whom nothing knowable is concealed (and so who knows, for example, who will be elected U. S. President in the year 2200). Rather, what is at issue is a knower who can manage to know in individualized detail an infinite number of independent facts. Such a knower might, for example, be able to answer such a question as: “Will the decimal expansion of π always continue to agree at some future point with that of $\sqrt{2}$ for 100 decimal places?” (Of course, the circumstance that an infinite knower can know some infinite set of independent facts does not mean that he can know every such set.)

Finite knowers can, of course, know universal truths. After all, we must acknowledge the prospect of inductive knowledge of general laws. We will have it that a knower can unproblematically know, for example, that “All dogs eat meat.”¹⁸ But what finite knowers cannot manage is to know this sort of thing in detail rather than at the level of generality. They cannot know specifically of each and every u in that potentially infinite range that Fu obtains—that is, while they can know collectively that all individuals have F , they cannot know

¹⁷ To make a statement is effectively to name it, and the inherently limited resources of language will only put countably many names at our disposal. On this issue see the Appendix below.

¹⁸ To be sure, the prospect of inductively secured knowledge of laws is a philosophically controversial issue. But this is not the place to pursue it. For the author’s view of the matter see his *Induction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).

distributively of every individual that it has F. Finite knowers can certainly know (via the U. S. Constitution) that every President is over the age of thirty-five. But of course one has this knowledge without knowing of every President (including those one never heard of, let alone the yet unborn) that each individual one of them is over the age of thirty-five—something one cannot do without knowing who they individually are.

XI

Surd Facts and Unknowability. One cannot, of course, provide concrete examples of specific facts that are unknowable for finite knowers, seeing that a claim to factuality automatically carries a claim to knowledge in its wake. However, while we cannot know what is such a fact, we can certainly establish that there are such things.

Given any collection of items, there are two importantly different kinds of general properties: those that all members of the collection *do* have in common, and those that all member of the collection *must* have in common. The latter are the necessity-gearred general features of the collection, the former its contingency-gearred features. Thus that all prime numbers greater than 2 are odd is a necessity-gearred feature of these primes. Or consider the set of all post-Washington U. S. presidents. That all of them are native born and that all of them are over thirty-five years of age is a necessity-gearred feature of the collection in view of our Constitution's stipulations. However, that all were the favored candidates of a political party will (if indeed true) be a contingently geared feature of the collection that is nowise necessitated by its constituting characterization.

Now the crucial consideration for present purposes is that the necessary features of a collection must inhere in (and be derivable from) the generalities that govern the collection at issue as a matter of principle. But its contingent features will be "surd" in that they cannot be established on the basis of general principles. When and if they actually hold, this can only be ascertained through a case-by-case check of the entire membership of the collection. This means that finite knowers can never decisively establish a surd/contingent general feature of an infinite collection. Whenever a generality holds for a

collection on a merely contingent basis, this is something that we finite intelligences can never determine with categorical assurance. The determination of such kind-pervasively surd would thus require an item-by-item check, which is *ex hypothesi* impracticable for us.

Whenever a situation of this kind actually obtains—which for aught we know to the contrary is often the case—then we can never manage to ascertain all the facts regarding an unsurveyable totality! Actual knowledge of the matter is beyond our reach here. The best and most that we can ever do here is to employ inductive or plausible or probabilistic reasoning in a way that leaves the issue beclouded with a shadow of doubt.

Consider an illustration. *The New York Times* is an English-language newspaper. As such, it is a necessary feature of the *Times* that throughout the history of its publication, mostly English words appear on its front page. This circumstance is inherent in the general principle (the “laws”) of the matter. With these general principles in hand we can settle the issue of front-page vocabulary. With such law-constrained facts—let us call them “nomic”—we certainly do not need to carry out a case-by-case check through every issue; and knowledge reacts on the general principles of the situation. A nomic property of something is a necessary feature for its kind: one that everything of its type not only does but must exhibit as a member of that particular “natural kind.”

However, it must also be presumed to be a fact that as long as the paper exists, every issue of *The New York Times* will be such that the word “the” occurs more than ten times on its front page. This is almost certainly a fact. But to determine that it is actually so, a case-by-case check becomes unavoidable. Such a fact—one whose determination cannot be settled by general principles (laws) but whose ascertainment requires a case-by-case check—is generally characterized as surd. Such a property of something is contingent: it cannot be accounted for on the basis of the general principles at issue.

Consider now a set of objects of a certain sort *S* that is infinite or interminably open-ended (lions, say, or sunrises at Acapulco). Let *P* be a surd/contingent property of some *S*-item *X* that, while in principle applicable to *S*-members, is nevertheless unique to *X*—that is, is such that no other *S*-member actually has *P*. Now note that this uniqueness could only be determined on a case-by-case check across the whole range of *S*. That *X* is unique within *S* in point of *P*-possession is (by

hypothesis) a truth that no finite intelligence could ascertain, seeing that an item-by-item canvas of an infinite/indefinite range is beyond its capacity. Such truths illustrate the prospect of truths beyond the cognitive grasp of finite knowers.

Of course, “unknowably true” is a vagrant predicate—one that has no determinate address in that it admits of no identifiable instance. Instantiating this sort of thing can only be done at the level of schematic generality and not that of concrete instantiation. But we can convince ourselves—for good reason—that there indeed are such things even though it is in principle impracticable to provide examples of them.

XII

Lessons. Overall, however, the situation is not as bleak as it may seem. For even though the thought and knowledge of finite beings is destined to be ever finite, it nevertheless has no fixed and determinate limits. Return to our analogy. As is counting integers, there is a limit beyond which we never will get. But there is no limit beyond which we never can get. For the circumstance that there is always room for linguistic variation—for new symbols, new combinations, new ideas, new truths and new knowledge—creates a potential for pushing our thought ever further. While the thought of finite beings is destined ever to be finite, it nevertheless has no fixed and determinable limits.

The line of thought operative in these deliberations was already mooted by Kant:

[I]n natural philosophy, human reason admits of *limits* [“excluding limits,” *Schranken*], but not of *boundaries* [“terminating limits,” *Grenzen*], namely, it admits that something indeed lies without it, at which it can never arrive, but not that it will at any point find completion in its internal progress. . . . [T]he possibility of new discoveries is infinite: and the same is the case with the discovery of new properties of nature, of new powers and laws by continued experience and its rational combination.¹⁹

Here Kant was right—even on the Leibnizian principles considered at the outset of this discussion. The cognitive range of finite beings is indeed limited. But it is also boundless because it is not limited in a way that blocks the prospect of cognitive access to ever new and continu-

ally different facts, thereby affording an ever ampler and ever more adequate account of reality.²⁰

Some writers analogize the cognitive exploration of the realm of fact to the geographic exploration of the earth. But this analogy is profoundly misleading. For the earth has a finite and measurable surface, and so even when some part of it is unexplored *terra incognita* its magnitude and limits can be assessed in advance. Nothing of the kind obtains in the cognitive domain. The ratio and relationship of known truth to knowable fact is subject to no fixed and determinable proportion. Geographic exploration can expect eventual completeness, cognitive exploration cannot. There are no boundaries—no determinate limits—to the manifold of discoverable fact.

Appendix

Further Implications. It is worthwhile to note that the numerical discrepancy between truths and facts that textuality imposes recurs time and again in other contexts, and in particular as between

- names and entities
- statements and possibilities
- descriptions and objects
- novels and plots
- instructions and actions
- explanations and phenomena

¹⁹ *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, sec. 57. Compare the following passage from Charles Sanders Peirce: "For my part, I cannot admit the proposition of Kant—that there are certain impassable bound to human knowledge. . . . The history of science affords illustrations enough of the folly of saying that this, that, or the other can never be found out. Auguste Comte said that it was clearly impossible for man ever to learn anything of the chemical constitution of the fixed stars, but before his book had reached its readers the discovery which he had announced as impossible had been made. Legendre said of a certain proposition in the theory of numbers that, while it appeared to be true, it was most likely beyond the powers of the human mind to prove it; yet the next writer on the subject gave six independent demonstrations of the theorem"; *Collected Papers*, 2d ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931–58), vol. 6, sec. 6.556.

²⁰ This discussion has profited from the constructive comments of several Pittsburgh colleagues, including Jason Dickinson, Mickey Perloff, and Laura Ruetsche.

The same quantitative discrepancy between the verbal and the ontological occurs throughout. In each the former is a verbalized indicator for the latter. There are just not enough of the former to go around, so that there is a recurrence of the musical chairs situation touched upon above: any one of these "players" can find a seating accommodation in language, but not every one. The problem is that of deficient accommodation for an oversize group of candidates. We have $(\forall x)\diamond(\exists y)Sxy$ but emphatically not $\diamond(\forall x)(\exists y)Sxy$.

In particular, consider names. Of course everything is capable of being named. Nothing is name-resistant. We could (as someone has quipped) simply name everything Charlie. The real question is if everything could have a unique name characteristic of itself alone, an identifying name.

Now everything that is in fact identified could be named via the specification: "the item identified in such and such a way." Or at least this would work if the identification process answered to some verbalized formula or other. Now supposing this to be the case, the real question becomes: Are there enough verbal/textual identifiers to go around? Can everything that has an identity be individuated by verbalized formulas?

The answer is "no." Select any language you please—take your pick. As long as it is produced recursively—like any other human language—it will only have countably many expressions (words, sentences, texts). But we know full well that the number of objects is transdenumerable: uncountably infinite. (Think of the real numbers for example.) So there just are not enough names for everything. In musical chairs not everybody gets to be seated. In reality not everything gets to be named.

Of course, things will stand differently if we radically revise the concept of language. Thus, if we are prepared to countenance a thing-language (rather than a word language), then we could adopt the rule that everything names itself. Then, of course, everything is namable. But this sort of thing is clearly cheating.

The question, "Is everything nameable?", bears the format: "Can everything of type 1 be uniquely associated with something of type 2?" Only if we are definite about what type 1 and type 2 are will a question of this format be well defined and meaningful. As long as that type at issue is construed so broadly as to include the real numbers, and

“naming” calls for specification within a recursively articulated language, a negative answer to our question becomes unavoidable.

And so, while nothing is name-resistant and everything is namable in the sense of being able, in principle, to bear a name, the possibility of realizing this prospect across the board—with everything whatsoever bearing a name—is precluded by the general principles of the situation. Things and names also engage in a game of musical chairs in a way that renders it unavoidable that some of the former must lose out.²¹

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²¹ This Appendix has benefited from exchanges with C. Anthony Anderson.

POTENTIALITY, CREATIVITY, AND RELATIONALITY: CREATIVE POWER AS A "NEW" TRANSCENDENTAL?

ROBERT E. WOOD

TO SUGGEST AN ADDITION to the transcendental properties of being requires some work—a great deal of it necessarily sketchy and dogmatically presented. But we will try to build everything from the bottom up, from the structures given in experience and what we can infer from them, proximately and remotely.¹ That will constitute the first and densest part of the paper. This part has two subsections that we might designate roughly as "Nature" and "History." Regarding Nature, in a basically Aristotelian analysis with Nietzschean overtones, we will look at the notion of potentiality as that entails creativity and relationality in a hierarchy of powers and beings. At the human level, in a basically Hegelian analysis, we will claim that the notion of being founds History as the accumulation of creative human empowerment through institutionalization. A second major part—which we might call "History of Nature"—will extend the analysis by appealing to the results of scientific investigation that will retain but resituate the previous part. The concluding third part will then suggest an extension of the transcendentials to include creative empowerment through relation.

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¹This paper is a tribute to Kenneth Schmitz on the occasion of the celebration of his eightieth birthday. The dispositions and directions it exhibits have their roots in his courses in the history of modern and recent thought. His treatment of the history of thought showed his students a model of how to enter sympathetically into the most diverse points of view. His introduction to Husserl showed how to get back, from mere historical exposition, to "the things themselves." The combination of the two dispositions showed us how to study each thinker sympathetically by focusing through him on the things themselves. This paper has a special relation to Prof. Schmitz's course on nineteenth-century thought: it began as an attempt to appropriate Nietzsche and went on to develop in an Hegelian direction, but it aims directly at "the things themselves."

I

Nature. Our starting point involves reflection upon potentiality. Potentiality is an inference from actuality, but both notions occupy a very high level of abstraction from what is always already given. The most proximate to us are things and persons presented in the Now of sensed actuality but understood in terms of the powers they exhibit in and through the patterned sequence of that actuality.²

We who make these observations stand in our awareness at the pinnacle of a hierarchy of structures functionally copresent in ourselves, but we also stand as the term of a developmental process that reveals the potentialities immanent in the earliest stages of that development. Our reflections rest upon sensory activity that presupposes an organic base, each level of which emerges serially from our earliest stage as a fertilized ovum. The series of stages exhibits two critical thresholds: the passage from organic life to sentient awareness and the passage from sentient awareness to reflective awareness. Observation of the exhibition in sensed actuality of the developing sequence leads to the inference that the earliest stages contained the not-yet-exhibited active potentialities for the actualizations that followed. An exhaustive empirical inventory of the observable actuality of the fertilized ovum yields no insight into the potentialities it contains. Given its relative incompleteness, its presentation of nothing remotely approaching its eventual articulation, it is not too difficult to regard it as nothing but what it actually presents itself to be at that moment for an outside inspection and thus allow it to be dispensed with when it conflicts with our ends. A more thoughtful relation to the fertilized ovum retains an awareness of the inference to the active powers it contains, still only in the earliest phases of the actualization process.

The sequence of actualization occurs in relation to the environment that corresponds to the active and passive powers of the developing human being. In the environment we find the tri-level phases

² The following phenomenological descriptions follow the path of Aristotle in his *On the Soul* from act to object to power and essence. However, the description does not depend upon Aristotle; it illustrates Heidegger's claim that phenomenology is a return to the practice of Plato and Aristotle (*Prolegomena to a History of the Concept of Time*, trans. Theodore Kisiel [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992], 136). I have tried to illustrate this in Plato and Aristotle in "Phenomenology and the Perennial Task of Philosophy: A Study of Plato and Aristotle," *Existentialia* 12, no. 3-4 (2002): 252-63.

concurrent in us distributed into three kinds of beings outside us: plant life, animal life, and the life of other humans. Plant life together with the corresponding organic level of our own life draws continually upon the elements in the nonliving environment for its own development and sustenance. That gives us four levels: human, animal, plant, and elemental. Whatever we know of the beings occupying these four levels we know through their being actualized in our own sensory field as sensory objects. But their differing modes of behavior allow us to infer differing underlying potentialities systematically linked and to sort out functioning wholes of differing types at each of the levels in correlation to our own functioning wholeness.

From the organic types upward we find a process of what one might call "creative self-transcendence," involving our second notion, creativity. Organic beings set themselves off over against their environment to which they remain essentially tied. They circle back inside themselves and articulate themselves from within: they are the first level of what we call "selves." They are self-contained processes that are self-formative, self-sustaining, self-repairing, and self-reproducing. Their articulation is a matter of increasing self-empowerment that begins with destroying and transforming those aspects of the environment essential to that empowerment, beginning, at the lowest level of life, with the externally available elements. The initial stages of a seed or a fertilized ovum contain the active powers to take in and transform external materials into a progressively more articulated set of organs. The employment of the newly constructed organs allows further powers hitherto latent to be actualized. This self-empowerment involves continual transcendence of the earlier phases. The articulation involved in the growth process culminates in the power of reproduction, the sign of the full maturity of the organism. Here the self-transcendence in progressive self-articulation transcends itself in the production of another of the same type. One might say, with Nietzsche, that living forms exhibit the will to power as self-transcending creativity.³

In the case of the animal organism, a much more complicated articulation occurs. In addition to the organs for extracting and processing energy from the environment, new instruments for a completely different function emerge: organs of perception. Embedded also within the causal networks of preliving processes, animals receive the

³ *Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1967) II, #12, p. 79.

causal impact of various forms of energy upon the organs of perception, which terminates in the selective manifestation of things astonishingly given outside the organism as colored, sounding, smelling, and the like.⁴ In the animal case, what emerges at a certain stage of development is a mode of being totally unlike anything lower on the scale: the mode of manifestation or appearance. Empirically linked to the integration and complexification of a nervous system we find the exhibition of a mode of inwardness, an incipient self-presence. Because it occurs, what is outward is, for the first time, shown; it not only is, but it appears as other than the perceiving animal. Incipient self-presence is the condition for the possibility of the appearance of what is other.

However, the appearance of otherness here is in function of the needs of the organism to which it appears.⁵ The manifestation of things outside involved in awareness is correlated with the self-experience of the upsurge of desire and serves such desire. Emergent in its own ontogenesis out of the self-enclosing character of organic process, animal self-presence grounds the manifestation of what is outside itself. But with the emergence of the manifestation of the environment goes the emergence of hunger and, in the case of the fully adult organism, of sexual desire as well. Another appears as a necessary complement to itself; and from relation to that other, still others emerge as offspring. Thus central to sensory manifestation is the display and instinctive recognition of appropriate instances of its own

⁴ I underscore "*astonishingly*" here as well as "*outside the organism*" because an empirical description traces the route of light transmission, absorption by and reflection from bodily surfaces, refraction through the lenses inside the eyeballs, projection of images on the rods and cones of the retina, and electrical stimulation of the optic nerve that carries the stimulus to the visual cortex in the back of the brain. All this naturally leads one to conclude that what I see are images in the back of my brain produced by the process just described. But of course if this were the case, I could not exhibit the visual evidence for the description just given of events outside my organic inside. Vision itself is not part of visual evidence. I call the conclusion above "natural" because it spontaneously follows from taking empirical objectivity as the exclusive index of reality—an instance of the "empiriomorphic fallacy" to which I will return later. Democritus had a less refined version of the above: seeing for him was having an image in his head. Aristotle noted that Democritus would then have to explain why mirrors do not see (*On Sensing and the Sensory Object* 6.445b10).

⁵ Aristotle, parallel to the inseparability of act and object, and act and power, maintains the inseparability of sense and appetite (*On the Soul* 3.7.431a13).

kind essential for the work of reproduction and nurturing. As in the case of plant forms, one organism is thus in essential continuity with its line, an instance of a type.

The most elemental mode of sensory manifestation involves the sense of touch which, like the organic body, remains the most fundamental presupposition for all higher functions. Unlike other senses, it has no specifically localized organ but suffuses the body as a functioning whole. I consider this of extreme importance. Touch is the diffuse self-presence of animal being as the essential condition for the possibility of the manifestation of what is other than itself. It involves the first and organically pervasive awareness of awareness that gets articulated in further and organically localized modes of sensation. Prior to that self-presence there is causal impact but no manifestation.⁶

With the addition of other sense powers, manifestation involves another kind of processing of the environment. Through retention of what is received from each of the senses, self-presence involves the integrated operation of the senses to present integrated aspects of integrally functioning wholes outside the perceiver. Because such processive presentation is essentially in function of desire, it is also tied to locomotion and culminates in tactility.⁷ It requires retention of the past and anticipation of the future of satisfaction to establish an extensive flowing Now of awareness focused upon the manifest sensory actuality of individual bodily beings in the environment. The presentation of the types of objects correlative to the desire for nourishment and sexuality moves the animal in the direction of the object that it comes to apprehend tactually and in apprehending consumes or mates with or cares for or fights with. The reproductive capacity of

⁶ This pushes some otherwise disjunct observations of Aristotle in *On the Soul*: that touch is the basic sense (2.3.415a4, 3.12.434b24); that the specialized senses are rooted in a "common sense" that involves "awareness of awareness" (3.2.425b12); and that Democritus, who held seeing as identical with mirroring, had no explanation of why mirrors do not see, even though they hold an image. See my "On Touch: A Phenomenological Inquiry," *Southwestern Philosophy Review*, 17, no. 1 (January 2000): 19–26. For an application of reflection along these lines to the question of the plurality of the arts, see Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Muses*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 16–24.

⁷ This is why Aristotle's order of treatment *On the Soul* moves from the general notion of *psyche* (2.1.412a and following) through the hierarchy of capacities—from nutritive (2.4.415b28 and following), to sentient (2.5.416b33 and following), to rational (3.4.429a10 and following)—only to "descend" to locomotion (3.9.432a15) and culminate in touch (3.12.434a22 and following).

such entities involves the peculiar relationality of sexual union. Even in the case of plants, the final self-transcendence in reproducing others like itself involves the active functioning of what is other in the pollination process.

As with plant life, the power of creative self-transcendence in growth and reproduction involves a preservation of earlier phases and a continued enhancement of power until the animal falls into decline, increasingly unable to mate, care for offspring, and fight its enemies.⁸ But unlike the plant, animal being in its higher levels involves the capacity to learn and thus a greater empowerment in its command over the environment. It develops habits of response to its manifest environment, habits that make it more flexibly adaptable to the challenges the environment poses and thus more efficient in reaching its ends.

At the distinctively human level, manifestation takes a new turn. Our account takes its point of departure primarily from what is available through seeing. Seeing here is a function of a distinctively human interest: a theoretical interest. But that interest arises later in the process of human development. In the early phase of animal-like development, seeing is a function tied to the growth and sustenance of the organism.

Seeing is a cognitive power, that is, a capacity for manifestation. As such it is correlative to the type of object appropriate to it.⁹ Though in each case the power of seeing is an individual aspect of an individual animal being, as a power it is open to all the instances of its generic object: the type of aspect we call color. Correlatively, the color of a thing shows its visibility to all who can see. As seeing is a universal openness to all the seeable, color involves a universal openness to all seers on the part of the colored object. But what is manifest through the actualization of the active power of seeing in relation to the passive power of being seen is always only individual and actual. The powers underpinning the actually manifest are available only to reflective awareness that is able to focus upon the sameness and disregard the differences present in the individual sensed actuality.

⁸ *Will to Power*, #715.

⁹ I develop this notion in "Individuals, Universals, and Capacity," *The Review of Metaphysics* 54, no. 3 (March 2001): 507–28. It is an insight found in *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind* (hereafter, "HPM"), trans. William Wallace and A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), #401.

Initially, one arrives at the notion of power by a reflective inference from observing the types of sensed actuations expressive of the power. At a most rudimentary level, seeing a red bird, one ignores everything but the particular visual quality, and indeed even ignores the peculiar suchness of the red instance in order to grasp redness as common to all its instances. One moves further up the line to the notion of color as the generic correlate to seeing. Cutting through the peculiarities of instances, intellectual power here grasps in an immediate *Wesensschau* the horizon of a given organic power in its generic object. One retains the sameness and ignores the differences among the red of the cardinal, the red of the shirt, and the red of the pickup truck to grasp the species redness; and one retains the sameness and ignores the differences among the species red, blue, yellow, black, white, and their combinations to grasp the generic object, color. The latter is indifferent in itself to the color-species. Though the species of color have peculiar images associated with them, the generic color has no such associated image. There is no existent color that is not specific. Berkeley found that a problem.¹⁰ However, that feature of lack of direct imagery involved in the grasp of the notion of color is parallel to the cognitive activity correlative to color, namely, seeing: neither the activity of seeing nor color as its generic object is seeable, but they are intellectually apprehensible. One can also move inferentially at the same time to the seeability of the seen and the power to see in the seer that are likewise not available to vision. Visibility and visual power are universal orientations toward their mutual activation in the peculiar manifest relation between individual instances of the types that can be seen and the types that can see in individual instances of color. Sense reveals the individual and actual instance. It operates in terms of the universality of its own orientation, but it never by itself shows the universality of the power or the correlative universal type of its object. The sensing animal is identical with itself as an organic process and unreflectively present to itself as a functioning whole in its wakeful life. But though the sensory agent is necessarily present to itself in its act, it cannot reflect upon itself. The capacity to grasp the specific and generic universality of the types involved as well as the concrete universality of the powers is a capacity activated, not by individuals as such, but by the modes of universality peculiar to

¹⁰ George Berkeley, *The Principles of Human Knowledge*, "Introduction," #8.

understanding the situation focally apprehended. This power, activated by the universal as such, we have come to call "intellect" as the power of reflective self-presence.¹¹ Intellect is, we might say, the self-presence of the types as abstract universals and of the powers, abstractly and concretely universal, immanent in nature whose locus of manifestation is sensorially grounded intellect. But that is because it is present to itself as the concrete universal that, through the notion of being, includes all by way of reference within itself. The universals or types it apprehends are themselves potentialities for instantiation in the individuals that exhibit them.

What I want to do at this point is to show a necessary linkage among the levels of the universe outside ourselves correlative to our own powers. Return, then, to the initial and enduring nontheoretical function of seeing. It identifies opportunities and threats to the organic well-being of the seer. As such, it is essentially tied to eating. Now eating is oriented, not, as is seeing, to aspects of environmentally given things but to those kinds of things that are correlative to the appetite. One might think of seeing as in a sense phenomenal and thus as a kind of illusion. Nietzsche said that the senses lie.¹² Seeing presents to us solid and stable objects separated from us by empty space. However, the space is anything but empty and the objects are ultimately processes composed of processes. Now appetite requires not simply the appearance but the reality of objects, those that, as natural prey, can really sustain the organism. Phenomenal food might satisfy the eye, but the appetite requires real food; and the test of its reality is the actual nourishing of the organism that eats it. As a variation on a Feuerbachian theme—itsself a variation on what I think is a Stoic theme—we might say, *Primum edere deinde philosophari*, "First eat, then philosophize."¹³ But I might add that eating ought to be a primary object of philosophic reflection that moves us reflectively beyond Kantian phenomenalism because we have already been carried beyond it by eating.¹⁴ Both individual sense powers and the appetitive powers they serve are concrete universal orientations requiring specific kinds of aspects and things in the environment.

¹¹ Compare Aristotle: "The soul is, in a way, all things"—"all things sensible by sense, all things intelligible by intellect" (*On the Soul* 3.8.431b22).

¹² *Daybreak*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), #117, p. 73.

¹³ Compare Ludwig Feuerbach, *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*, trans. Manfred Vogel (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986), #52–3.

Such things, through their active and passive powers, are essentially interrelated hierarchically in the food-chain. Carnivores have their appetitive powers oriented toward herbivores and herbivores toward plants; the powers of plants in turn are oriented toward the kinds of elemental forms that nourish them. All of this has one of the conditions for its possibility in the location of the earth in the solar system, for that location provides the heat-range within which organic forms can grow and makes possible the photosynthesis requisite for plant life near the bottom of the food-chain. These factors can appear only because light is reflected upon bodily surfaces from the same source of heat and photosynthesis.

The first point here is that things are the locus of powers, active and passive, that are systematically integrated, both within living and conscious things and in the systems to which they necessarily belong. One might imagine a separate and self-contained entity, but any real entity is oriented, via its active and passive powers, to the things that sustain and threaten it. Each of those things, in its turn, is oriented toward still others to constitute the ecosystem, the solar system, and, indeed, the cosmic system.¹⁴

The second point is that all these powers, though individual aspects of individual things, are nonetheless concretely universal orientations requiring the kinds of aspects and things in the environment that are correlative to them. Each power anticipates all the instances of its correlative objects, wherever and whenever they might appear. If there are powers, there are not simply sensed individuals but kinds of correlative objects.

Let me add a third point: the kinds of things that can see and eat are necessarily the results of a reproductive process and are in principle capable of reproducing offspring. They thus necessarily belong to a species, that is, a natural kind. That means also that the specific powers found in the individual are also in the genetic line, so that seeing, for example, is not simply my power, but a type of power found diachronically in one's genetic line. One also finds the same types of

¹⁴ The Kantian distinction of noumena and phenomena is significant, involving as it does the setting off of a discursive and receptive intellect from a hypothetically intuitive and creative one. It is the severance of the two that I think reflection upon eating overcomes. Compare Leon Kass, *The Hungry Soul: Eating and the Perfecting of Our Nature* (New York: Free Press, 1994).

¹⁵ The "enemy" here is Hume's notion of sensations as "loose and separate" in *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977), 49.

functions distributed synchronically in other species and thus in their genetic lines. Not only objects but also their natural powers come in kinds.

The conclusion is that these observations, it seems to me, give the lie to nominalism. Cognitive and appetitive powers are necessarily oriented toward kinds of aspects and things and can only exist because the things that have them necessarily belong to a species. The relation between intelligible and sensible, universals and particulars, functions in any natural power and not simply in intellectual beings. Powers are relations to the whole of space and time as the possible locus of their activation under the specific conditions of their operation. Not only are cognitive powers "in a way all things," but each power of any being is in a way all those things correlative to it that can act upon it and upon which it can act. That way is the way of a priori reference. The problem of induction is solved at the level of natural cognitive and appetitive powers, for the generic features of their objects are always verified and not subjected to falsifiability as the verifiers themselves are oriented toward types of aspects and things and necessarily come in biological kinds.¹⁶ This cuts through the problem of universals by showing what the *fundamentum in re* is: native power. Intellect is the capacity to recognize types of powers as powers in their active and passive types and their correlative types of objects.

These observations give grounds for Plato's claim in the *Sophist* that the definition of being is the *dynamis* of acting and being acted upon.¹⁷ To be anything is to be the locus of powers, active and passive, each systematically interrelated with everything else within its system.¹⁸ This raises us to the level of intellectual apprehension that corresponds to the native object of intellect: being as such. And this brings us to the second subsection (the *secunda primae*): human history.

History. Let us consider more closely the notion of being.¹⁹ It is, I would claim, what grounds the distinctively human as the being that

¹⁶ Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Basic Books, 1959), 40–2.

¹⁷ *Sophist* 247e.

¹⁸ This is a point Leibniz made with his notion of compossibility. Each thing that is must be compossible with the system within which it exists. The difference here is that Leibniz was not simply talking about compossibility of powers as we are but with compossibility of every concrete act. Compare *Monadology*, #56 and 57.

creates history. In our own ontogenesis, the notion of being emerges at a certain stage to turn the monopolar animal, fixated on the individuals presented sensorially as objects of desire, into a bipolar human being distinguished by its orientation toward the Whole.²⁰ ("Bipolarity" is obviously intended here in the nondysfunctional sense, though I would say that the emptiness of the notion of being blows the lid off the reliability of animal appetite and makes the human being the potentially chaotic animal.²¹) Though initially empty, the notion of being includes everything by way of reference because outside being there is nothing. The initial emptiness of the notion makes us the locus of the question of being as the question about the Whole: the whole of all beings and the wholeness of each being within that Whole.²² "What's it all about? How do we fit in the whole scheme of things? What is the whole scheme of things?" These are the perennial questions built into human existence. But what we know of the Whole has to be constructed through sensation, abstraction, reflection, and inference along the lines explored above. Things rise up to meet us in the actuated sensory field, but they fall back into the mystery of their own being that draws on inquiry.

The notion of being pries us loose from the environmentally given, allows us to consider it apart from our needs, and condemns us to choose among the possibilities revealed by what we come to understand of it and of ourselves. The understandings and choices sediment into habits. Passed on to others, they constitute the institutions in which succeeding generations are raised. Together they form a cultural world, a predetermined and interlinked set of ways of thinking, acting, and feeling that comprises the accumulated power of the culture. Institutions are related in various forms of complementarity and tension, both internally and externally, that propel a culture at any given time beyond itself. Into such a complex each of us is thrown.

¹⁹ I am much indebted to the analysis of the notion of being in Bernard Lonergan's *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 348–74.

²⁰ Compare my *Placing Aesthetics* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1999), chap. 1, for a further development of the structure of the field of experience.

²¹ For Nietzsche man is the chaotic animal, and the task of life involves the practice of natural asceticism to compel the chaos to take on form. See *Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vantage, 1967), #868, #915.

²² Compare Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 27.

Having the bipolar structure of organically grounded empty reference to the Whole, an individual human being comes into possession of itself through the mediations of others. Reference to the Whole places each individual at a distance from its own embodiment and, indeed, from all finitude, and condemns it to choose. What it has to choose from is determined by three antecedent structures. First is its genetic endowment that sets its basic possibilities. Second is the cultural stamp that has already identified possibilities immanent in the human gene pool, focused them, and honed them through the creation of institutions. Those who raise the individual mediate the culture within their own limited understanding. Through the emergence of the reflective I, the individual's own limited understanding and consequent choices give further focus. Any adult human has already made his own choices from the possibilities, genetic and cultural, in the limited way he has become aware of them. In this way the human individual develops its own set of habits as a third level of determinants specifying its current concrete possibilities. These three levels—genetic, cultural, and personal-historical—constitute what we might call the Me, that is, what I can objectify about myself as my real determinants setting the scope of my real possibilities at any given moment in my own history. They sediment into the heart as the locus of spontaneous tendencies to behave correlated with the appearance of significant presences. But by reason of its reference to the Whole of being, the I that objectifies and chooses stands at an infinite distance from the determinate Me.²³ Reference to the Whole establishes a desire beneath all particular desires, a passion for the Whole.²⁴ On its basis I have to ask myself, "Where is my heart? Is it where it ought to be? Where ought it to be?" On that basis, too, the individual becomes not simply the recipient of the culture; it can also be its cutting edge by its ability to create new possibilities of understanding and action that can be added to the cultural repertoire. What is crucial is that such understandings and skills are accumulated by passing them on to others. It is by reason of such systematic interrelations that individuals are empowered. As individuals take their places within these systematically functioning cross-generational wholes, both the individuals and the wholes are further empowered.

²³ *HPM*, #413.

²⁴ See my forthcoming "The Heart in/of Augustine's *Confession*," to appear in the proceedings of the Baylor Symposium on the *Confessions*.

To concretize this a bit, at this point I want to look briefly at two particular institutions, one encompassing and one more specific, namely, language and music.

Basic to any cultural accumulation is the institution of language. Without it intellectual power would largely lie fallow. Together with the organic requirements, language constitutes the enduring foundation for any human community. It binds individuals together in a given geographical region and across generations as it separates its speakers from other linguistically united groups. A language as the ability to speak about anything and everything is founded on the notion of being.²⁵ It is this notion that makes possible the interrelation of individuals and universals, tagged and retained through language, that fills in the initially empty reference to the Whole. Referred to the Whole via the notion of being, we are also referred to the whole of space and time as the basis for grasping types as indefinitely repeatable wherever in space and whenever in time they might be encountered. The "light of Being" thus makes abstraction itself possible.²⁶ But what is grasped is retained in the conventions of a given language.

To those who enter into a language it is a given, but from the beginning it had to be brought into being by human inventiveness, grasping the possibility of correlating conventional sound patterns with meanings and the things to which the meanings refer. Language functions on the basis of the recognition of the indefinite repeatability of the same sound patterns—even in the different modulations of their being sounded out in an individual speaker—in order to hold for oneself and others the recognition of repeatable types found in experience or brought to it by invention. The reduction of language to a mechanical habit grounding its flexible employment is the most basic human empowerment.²⁷ It opens the communal space for all other human achievements.²⁸ It allows us to pass on the results of our observations, inferences, and skills to future generations. The invention of writing expands the scope of the audience from the face-to-face

²⁵ Compare Jacques Derrida against Benveniste in "The Supplement of the Copula: Philosophy Before Linguistics," *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 175–206.

²⁶ This is a direction followed by Karl Rahner in *Spirit in the World*, trans. William V. Dych (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 117 and following.

²⁷ *HPM*, #461–3.

²⁸ Compare Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, and Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 73–4.

relation of oral transmission, secures the independence of the reader from the writer, and ratchets up the power of the culture though providing immediate total retrieval of the externally, spatially, and therefore statically recorded past that, in itself, disappears as it is generated.

Let us look at the second example of creative empowerment through the relationality involved in cultural institutionalization: let us consider music.²⁹ Music presupposes first of all the discovery of systematic harmonic relations of sound from out of the cacophony of sound generated by the environment, natural and human. Based upon the creation of the sound system, musical genius invents new genres of harmonic combination or brings existent forms to perfection. Musical pieces stand in a history of institutions formed by the development of various techniques: the technology of instrument construction, compositional technique, and the techniques of instrumental performance. Each involves the developed capacity to identify recurrent structures, that is, to abstract the universal. It also involves initially the grasp of recurrent possibilities of combination not yet envisioned by others. It is such interrelation that allows those talents, otherwise only latent in the human gene pool, to be identified, focused, and honed into excellent performance. How many potential classical pianists were there among the Neanderthals? Proximately none, but remotely—in terms of genetically based possibilities—probably as many as there are now. It is the development of institutions generally that evokes competencies among those who have the suitable genetic endowments. Institutions, developed over very long periods of time, bring the individuals inducted into them to a distinctively more complex level of freedom to unlock otherwise fallow talents and to perform at a significantly higher level. They create the conditions for the ability to create further.³⁰

History is the process of a cumulative unlocking not only of the hidden potentialities of nature outside us but especially of those human potentialities of operation hitherto undiscovered. In working

²⁹ I have tried to limn the eidetic space for music along with several other artforms in a work nearing completion, *Artforms: A Phenomenological Introduction*. Compare also my forthcoming introduction to Gabriel Marcel, *Music and Philosophy* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2005).

³⁰ Nietzsche claimed that all significant art rests upon a host of conventions, upon discipline established over centuries that enables a given artist to bring a given genre to perfection. See *Will to Power*, #809.

over nature we discover what we could not discover by mere description, but at the same time we develop the correlative skills to work it over and new ways of employing both the knowledge and the skills.³¹ In our working for the community, knowledge of the powers of nature and of skills in discovering and employing them lead over time to the increasing self-empowerment of the human community as such.

Let me add that the ability to stand back from the environment sensorially given in function of need allows one not only to know and use, but also to identify appreciatively with any given other. It allows one to exhibit the kind of love that creatively empowers the other as well as oneself. Indeed, self-empowerment in all the legitimate ways in which that can happen is a way of being able to empower others ever more effectively.

II

At this point I want to extend the field of application of the notion of creative empowerment through relational systems until we arrive at their transcendental extension. We will attempt to do so by moving from a view based on the enduring givens of our experience to one based upon extensive, specialized, empirical investigation.

Patient empirical inquiry accumulated over generations lifted the scientific community beyond the limitation of an Aristotelian cosmos of eternally repeated forms—even the forms of history³²—and pointed to a series of species appearing sequentially over time, an evolving rather than a static set of forms, systems on the move rather than eternally repetitive systems. Empedocles had inferred as much in a very general way from examining the geological strata in the quarries at

³¹ This insight lies at the center of Hegel's discussion of the master-slave relation in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 111–18. It is the center of Alexandre Kojève's brilliantly one-sided interpretation of Hegel's work, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols (New York: Basic Books, 1969).

³² In his *Politics* (7.10.1329b25) Aristotle said that the arts and sciences are lost and found again and that philosophy rises from and declines again into mythology as the polis supporting the arts and sciences develops and declines again and again for all eternity. Even the fine arts have their "natural form," as it appears for tragedy in Sophocles (*Poetics* 4.1229a10).

Syracuse that showed less complex fossils at the lowest levels and more complex forms at the higher levels. He postulated mutations through random combinations.³³ Aristotle dismissed all this with the observation that cows produced cows produced cows, and tomatoes produced tomatoes produced tomatoes, leaping from this observation to *et sic ad infinitum*. He also noted that deviations from normality in each species died out rather than persisted as new species.³⁴

I take it that the sequence of forms is well established by the fossil record. The problem is explanation of that sequence as the serial appearance of the three distinctively different kinds of things—living things, awareness, and reflective awareness—operating within and drawing upon the environment of nonliving things that preceded them. The Aristotelian view is based upon the irreducibility of the properties belonging to each of the levels. Each level beyond the elemental requires soul, and each requires a different kind of soul than the others, though the higher presuppose and subsume the lower.³⁵ “Mere bodies” remain as the elemental basis from which organic bodies are produced by the offspring of adult organisms and as the residue of living forms.³⁶

Now, given the three critical thresholds, it is not unintelligent to infer first of all, as did Aristotle, that each is independently immanent in the universe—until the accumulation of data through modern scientific investigation showed the chronological sequence in their appearance in the known universe. What emerged was the awareness of the limited temporality of at least the phase of the universe since the Big Bang and the factual temporal sequence of forms from incomplex to complex passing the critical thresholds. But it is also not unintelligent to infer that, if we grant the temporal succession of threshold types, some “higher power” is needed to introduce each newly appearing level—self-replicating systems, awareness, and reflective intelligence—in an evolving universe.³⁷ But we would here suggest that the same argument that projects all the powers of the fully adult hu-

³³ G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1966), #442–7, 336–40.

³⁴ *Physics* 2.8.

³⁵ *On the Soul* 2.3.415a; 3.7.431a15.

³⁶ Robert Sokolowski notes that the notion of organic matter as residue of living forms reestablishes Aristotle’s distinction between earthly and heavenly matter on a new basis. See “Modern Science and Material and Formal Causality,” in *Recovery of Form, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, ed. Thérèse Duarte (1995): 61.

man back into the fertilized ovum could also be used to do the same for the earliest stages of the universe—in fact, I see nothing to preclude that necessarily. What is required is to preserve attention to the differences at each level, which is why we spent some time in the first part of this paper showing the essential differences. But we can never claim to know enough about the lower to preclude the possibility of the higher emerging out of it. Like the case of the fertilized ovum, no empirical inspection of the earliest stratum in scientific inquiry yields the potentialities it contains. One would not have expected from an empirically based model of the atom that it contained the possibility of combination that would release hitherto unheard-of power in atomic fission or fusion. This involved the transformation of the notion of matter composed of bits of extension moved from without to a notion that involves the interchangeability of mass and energy. An inference, parallel to that from reflective adult to the active powers of the fertilized ovum, would transform the notion of the elements or “mere matter” to the locus of creative powers that, under specific combinations, would exhibit the levels that have factually succeeded one another. What is crucial to observe, however, is that the potentialities would not lie in isolated individual particles, as if a subatomic particle, an atom, or a stone could be aware. The power would lie in their systematic relations. Joining with others unlocks the potentialities for form-bestowal that would otherwise remain fallow in the initial system. Here we would have, at the lowest level of the universe, the creative empowerment through relationality that we have observed at the human level.³⁸

Living forms gathering power to transcend themselves in growth and reproduction would themselves have come into being through the self-transcendence of elements initially functioning outside the combinations that unlocked the powers of the system. This is the first stage of the form-giving powers at the base of the system. The repetition of the same in each species would transcend itself in the progressive emergence of more complex forms, increasingly more integrated until

³⁷ In the Catholic tradition, Pius XII in *Humani generis* allowed that forms up to the level of the rational could emerge evolutionarily, but he claimed that the emergence of the distinctively human soul required “special creation” by God.

³⁸ For the scientific basis for such a view see Errol Harris, *The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science* (New York: University Press of America, 1983), summarized in *Cosmos and Anthropolos* (New York: Humanities Press, 1991).

they emerge as beings self-present through being in touch with their own functional totality. Here their own incipient self-presence makes possible a self-transcendence through the manifestation of what is other than themselves. Finally, the highest modality of self-transcendence occurs through reflective awareness set at an infinite distance from its determinate self by being referred to the Whole that it presupposes. This makes the human the locus of manifestation of the underlying powers of the empirically given universe. Human awareness is the manifestation of the evolutionary cosmos itself, but at the same time also the self-present center of creative empowerment. Such manifestation and creativity are only possible through the development of centuries-long institutions of inquiry and practice.³⁹

One of the consequences of such a view is the defeat of the notion that the embodied human spirit lives in an alien place. Whatever belongs to embodiment is not temporary, but belongs to the essence of humanness. Its relation to the physical environment is a relation to its home rather than its prison. Nietzsche's "fidelity to the earth" expresses an essential imperative of the human condition.

As has natural science generally, evolutionary theory has been dogged by a basic but utterly unnecessary materialism. Our initial notion of matter is what appears to an empirical inspection: extended, moving, colored, sounding, actual individuals, presented as contained within their own boundaries and in seamless observable connection with their antecedents and consequents.⁴⁰ What we come to know about the most elemental level was modeled upon such objectivity. Awareness came to be considered some intracerebral occurrence that was either identical with or epiphenomenal to brain processes. Evolution was a matter of more and more complex externally observable mechanisms. But such a view gives a distorted framework for understanding the Whole. It exhibits what I call the "empiriomorphic fallacy," considering all things in the form of the sensorially given.⁴¹

There is another way of looking at nature, equally compatible with the externally observed phenomena, but especially attentive to

³⁹ Minus the evolutionary view for which he thought evidence during his time was still insufficient, the view is basically that of Hegel in the *Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Spirit*.

⁴⁰ See my "Individuals, Universals, and Capacity" for a further discussion of this idea.

⁴¹ I introduced this expression in my *A Path into Metaphysics: Phenomenological, Hermeneutical, and Dialogical Studies* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 36; but it was never picked up.

the inner conditions for observation and inference that we have presented in our first section. Over against the dominant empiriomorphism, this view reestablishes anthropomorphism on a more sophisticated basis. One of the first to advance it was Schelling, who viewed matter as “frozen mind.”⁴² He was foreshadowed by Leibniz’s idea that “perception and appetition” constituted the inward nature of all things,⁴³ and followed by twentieth-century thinkers like Alfred North Whitehead⁴⁴ and theological popularizers like Teilhard de Chardin.⁴⁵ The position is known as “emergent evolutionism,” according to which the most basic explanation is from higher to lower, that is, from the later, more complex, to the earlier and simpler forms. It is actually Aristotelian in form: the simpler and earlier are potentially what the later, more complex forms are actually. Since the later possess the inwardness of perception and desire and, more deeply, of thought and choice, the earlier must possess the same potentially—though only remotely. An immensely long and complex intervening set of stages has to be traversed, statistically well-nigh impossible under the assumption of chance and the denial of teleology.⁴⁶

In such a view, “matter,” not as “stuff” but as a principle, would still remain a principle of passive potency with all the work assignable to such a principle (change, individuation, spatiotemporal location, passivity, exteriority, asunderness, self-opaqueness).⁴⁷ But matter in the sense of the elements would have the active potencies inferable from what emerges out of them. Such “matter” is neither a region absolutely other than mind nor the ultimate explanation of mind; it is mind in an early phase of its development, mind still immersed in the principle of exteriority, asunderness, and darkness. Though matter in observed exteriority furnishes the factual conditions for the

⁴² F. W. J. Schelling, *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*, trans. Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 181.

⁴³ *Monadology*, #14–15.

⁴⁴ *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Free Press, 1967), 39–55, 100 and following.

⁴⁵ *Phenomenon of Man*, trans. Bernard Wall (New York: Harper, 1959).

⁴⁶ Compare Lonergan, *Insight*, 259–61, on the idea that the universe of our experience exhibits the general form of “emergent probability” that presents to us “systems on the move” rather than a universe of statically repeated forms.

⁴⁷ This is an agglomeration of insights in Aristotle, Aquinas, Schopenhauer, and Hegel. On Aristotle see my *Path into Metaphysics*, 165–6; on Aquinas, *ibid.*, 180; on Schopenhauer see my *Placing Aesthetics*, 188; on Hegel, *HPM*, #381.

emergence of the higher levels, the explanation for the lower lies teleologically in the higher as act explains potency.

This leads us to our concluding section.

III

Briefly to recapitulate our path: A reading of the hierarchy of experienced beings from the living upward yields the notion of the active power of creative self-transcendence manifest to the kind of being that can grasp the essential structure of that hierarchy and creatively empower itself to develop in history through the relational systems it creates. Natural scientific inquiry suggested an extension of the notion of creative empowerment through relationality down below the threshold of organic process to the level of the elemental. This now puts us in a position to suggest that relational creative empowerment is a transcendental property. Here we will have to be even more sketchy than we have been thus far.

The traditional notion of the transcendentals goes back to the ancient Greeks. In Plato we find all things participating in goodness, unity, and beauty, which function together as ground of truth and as term of the human ascent.⁴⁸ In Aquinas's list in *De Veritate* we find an expansion of the list to include thinghood (*res*) and otherness (*aliquid*) as modes of articulating that formality under which the mind operates, namely the notion of being as *esse habens*.⁴⁹ Each transcendental property is coterminous with being. Each is realized according to the degree to which a being participates in being. Each thing that is, insofar as it is, is thingly, unitary, other, intelligible, good, and—some have added—internally beautiful. "Insofar as it is" means insofar as it fulfills its essence and stands at a higher or lower level of types in the hierarchy of being determined by degrees of "remotion from matter." Each higher level is less restricted in its realization of being by what it is essentially in itself. But the hierarchy in which things operate was conceived of as essentially static. As Aristotle saw it, the cosmos involves the eternal repetition of the same types imitating the eternally same Unmoved Mover, who functioned as exemplar for all the rest.⁵⁰ Elsewhere Aquinas points out that not only notions

⁴⁸ *Republic* 508c and following, and *Symposium* 210e and following.

⁴⁹ *On Truth*, I, 1.

⁵⁰ *Metaphysics* 12.5.1071 and following, and *On the Soul* 2.4.415b.

like being and unity but also notions like act and potency extend beyond the sensorially given things from which we take our point of departure; they apply to all things.⁵¹ I underscore act and potency here, where potency has to mean active potency. We might then suggest that the *esse* which each *ens habet* is itself creative act.

The act of existence is not only a standing outside of nothing. Each thing that is ex-sists as standing outside of its earlier phases by contributing to the self-transcendence involved in the universe we inhabit. Material elements transcend themselves by joining to unlock the power of self-replication. Self-replication leads to progressively higher forms of self-development. The hierarchy of being involves the mutual creative empowerment of individuals and relational systems. One might suggest also that relationality as the basis for creative self-transcendence mirrors an all-powerful creative divinity whose own being is relational.

If we follow the direction of the notion of being and are faced with any putative limit—like the Big Bang and the expanding universe that some cosmologists suggest is the locus of all meaningful questioning⁵²—we can always ask what lies beyond the limit. This direction of the excess of the question beyond any limit may be linked to questioning the ground of finitude itself.⁵³ If the horizon of the questioning of beings is unlimited, how can being be limited in the things that are? It would seem then that the only adequate explanation of finitude would be absolute infinitude. This would transcend not only the finitude of an Aristotelian divinity but also its lack of awareness of, concern for, or effective power over things beneath it in the hierarchy. Absolute infinity is absolute creative power giving being to all finitude. But we might also suggest that the existence of what is other than divine infinity requires a principle of otherness within God that precontains all the ways in which what is other than God can be.⁵⁴ The notion of persons as grounded in and contributing to ongoing community suggests inner personal relatedness within God Himself.⁵⁵ God is the One and the Other linked by Love. Creation is the

⁵¹ *Summa theologiae* I, q. 84, ad 1.

⁵² Stephen Hawking in a television interview.

⁵³ This direction is taken by Karl Rahner, *Spirit in the World*, 57 and following and 179 and following.

⁵⁴ Von Balthasar makes this argument.

⁵⁵ This is related to the notion of *imago dei* advanced by Richard of St. Victor, following Genesis 1:27, "In his image he made him, male and female he made him."

overflow of divine power by reason of the generosity of divine love through the Otherness within God.

If the unity, goodness, intelligibility, beauty, and otherness of creatures are their ways of imitating God, might one not say the same for creative power? God's power is omnipotence by which, as community of Persons, He is Creator of heaven and earth. Creatures imitate Him by transcending themselves, gathering power to create beyond where they are at any given moment, and, in the human case, passing on the results of their creativity to subsequent generations. In the static view of the hierarchy, the elements do not have the power of creative self-transcendence. In an emergent evolutionist view, they do. Following Whitehead, we could then claim that everything is in the grip of a primordial creativity.⁵⁶

This view resituates the observations made in our first part and involves a transformation of our understanding of the nature of *theoria* and its relation to creative activity. Empirical inquiry linked to active manipulation through creative technology uncovers hidden properties not available to simple contemplation. But inquiry is also linked to creative theorizing, producing the successive paradigms that expand our theoretical and practical hold on things. The primacy of *theoria* in Aristotle was linked to a notion of what we might call a narcissistic divinity who cared not for and did nothing to those beneath it. In Plotinus it involves the ultimate aspiration to be "alone with the Alone."⁵⁷ In a view in which God is the power of being as a community of love, creativity under the aegis of love carries the community forward as *imitatio dei*. It is a way of being together with the Together, imitating the togetherness of the divine Trinity. Love transcends the self into the community that continues on after the death of the individual. It is ever creative of fresh ways of showing itself in all the small things in life as well as in the greater.⁵⁸

But the community of love is not only the human community: it is that community enriched by the humans' appreciative relation to all that stands along the hierarchy leading up to it. Emergentism has as a significant consequent that the respect due to human being has to be extended downward to our antecedents, even to the bottom of the chain of being.⁵⁹ Respect for the integrity of natural things follows.

⁵⁶ *Process and Reality*, pt. 1, chap. 1, sec. 1.

⁵⁷ *Enneads* 5.1.6; 6.7.34; 6.9.11.

⁵⁸ See Marcel's notion of "creative fidelity" in his book by the same title, *Creative Fidelity*, trans. Robert Rosthal (New York: Noonday Press, 1964).

But this also entails a set of priorities, with the lower yielding to the higher as instrumental, exhibited quite clearly in the need to eat. The resultant is a respectful instrumentalism, not wanton imposition. Such appreciation would not only let nature be, it would also gather it up into formative activity.⁶⁰ This can occur not only in art but also in technology itself when the aesthetic properties learned from nature are brought over into technological transformations.⁶¹ Further, a form of government that respects the free self-disposition of every human being unleashes the creative potential of the whole community, giving as free reign as possible to creative enterprise in all its forms.⁶²

A merely theoretical approach to things—such as the one we have given—is not necessarily a superior approach. In a universe of emergent creativity, active service through creative empowerment across the height and breadth of human activities stands at least at as high a level. “Being alone with the Alone” might even be inferior to being together with the Together, assimilating the past to create a future of greater human empowerment as *imitatio dei*. Such a view would be able to respond to Nietzsche’s charges: it would be “faithful to the earth”⁶³ and to a divinity who, having created the crocodile as well as the deer, saw it all as good.

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⁵⁹ For a splendidly argued development of this theme, see Holmes Ralston, III, *Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988).

⁶⁰ Compare Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 117.

⁶¹ See Frank Lloyd Wright, *The Future of Architecture* (New York: Mentor, 1963), 43, and Le Corbusier, *Towards a New Architecture*, trans. Frederick Etchells (New York: Praeger, 1960), 8 and 23.

⁶² See Michael Novak, *The Spirit of Capitalism* (Lanham: Madison Books, 1982). This remarkable book, combined with my youngest sons’ development of a landscape design and installation company, removed the blinders from my eyes regarding business and engineering. In my own seminary and liberal arts background there was at least a covert looking down upon such “worldly” or “base and mechanical” things in favor of the contemplative life or *theoria*.

⁶³ “Fidelity to the earth” is Zarathustra’s basic charge to his disciples against at least one strong strand in Christianity, exemplified by Dostoevski’s Fr. Ferapont in *Brothers Karamazov*. See my “Monasticism, Eternity, and the Heart: Hegel, Nietzsche, and Dostoevski,” *Philosophy and Theology* 13, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 193–211.

BOOK REVIEWS

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

ELIZABETH C. SHAW AND STAFF

AQUINAS, Thomas. *Commentaries on Aristotle's "On Sense and What Is Sensed" and "On Memory and Recollection."* Translated with introductions and notes by Kevin White and Edward M. Macierowski. Thomas Aquinas in Translation Series. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005. x + 268 pp. Cloth, \$49.95; paper \$29.95—In the traditional ordering of Aristotle's works, *On Sense and What Is Sensed* and *On Memory and Recollection* are the first of the *Parva Naturalia* that come directly after the *De anima*. The *De sensu* is Aristotle's detailed account of how the five senses work. The *De memoria* is his account of memory, recollection, and the difference between them. This volume, based on the 1985 Leonine critical edition of R.-A. Gauthier, does the great service of making Aquinas's commentaries on these two short works available in English for the first time. It presents White's introduction, translation, and relatively brief notes on the *De sensu* commentary (pp. 1–165), Macierowski's introduction, translation, and more extensive notes on the *De memoria* commentary (pp. 167–260), and a well-organized joint bibliography (pp. 261–8).

These commentaries will obviously be of interest to students of Aquinas. They should also be of interest to students of Aristotle, but with one caveat. The translators have had the delicate task of rendering into English not Aristotle's Greek but the Latin translation of it on which Aquinas is commenting. As the Latin translates Aristotle on something close to a word-for-word basis, so the translators have translated the Latin version of Aristotle into English almost word-for-word. Further, as Macierowski explains (p. 170), they have taken care to preserve the opacity of terms that Aquinas explains in his commentary; to have clarified these opaque terms in the initial translation of Aristotle's text would have made Aquinas's later clarifications nugatory. The rationale is clear and the policy defensible, but the resulting translation of Aristotle can be rough going, for example, "for it is not just from a distance, and not close up, that one of the mixed colors appears, but from anywhere" (p. 68); "Therefore they seek in this way, and, not seeking, they still recollect in this way, when that motion comes into being after the other one; but it used to come about when the other motions such as we have

*Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers.

spoken of had come about, as it were, much" (p. 210). It is not always easy to tell which difficulties arise from the translators' rendering of the Latin and which from the Latin version itself. In any case, students whose primary aim is to understand Aristotle should have access to a translation from Greek directly into English. The translation of the commentaries usefully gives Aristotle's own words in italics.

Much of what the *De sensu* has to say about the five senses would seem to have at most an antiquarian interest, and the same would seem to be true of much of Aquinas's commentary. Still, it is good to be reminded that *De anima* 2 is by no means a complete statement of Aristotle's theory of sense perception, and Aquinas's commentary makes clear his interest in the details, not merely the generalities, of Aristotelian science. Aquinas is alert to the aporetic element in the two treatises themselves, but he also raises aporiae of his own, notably questions about the relationship between the teachings of the *De sensu* and the doctrines of the *Physics* and the *De anima*. The *De memoria* commentary will be of interest to anyone who is trying to understand the workings of memory and recollection; and Macierowski draws attention to a passage in Samuel Taylor Coleridge indicating that Hume read, annotated, and drew on Aquinas's commentary on the *De memoria* for his theory of the association of ideas (compare pp. v, 253). Both translators, but especially Macierowski, underline the extent to which Aquinas stands in debt to Alexander and to the Arabic commentary tradition.

Readers who have used the Marietti edition of these commentaries edited by Spiazzi will be familiar with its system of paragraph numbers for the text of Aristotle and Aquinas's commentary. This volume drops those paragraph numbers in favor of Bekker numbers (though Macierowski gives a table matching the paragraph numbers of the *De memoria* commentary with the Bekker numbers, pp. 179–82). A more thorough review process might have saved the translators from some errors, and more careful editing might have removed some mistakes. Most of these are minor and harmless, but some are more serious (for example, in the second paragraph on p. 202). All in all, however, this volume makes a serious and worthwhile contribution to the study of Aquinas, Aristotle, and the tradition to which they both belong.—Arthur Madigan, S.J., *Boston College*.

BATES, Jennifer Ann. *Hegel's Theory of Imagination*. SUNY Series in Hegelian Studies. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. xlv + 202 pp. Cloth \$50.00—Imagination is a central topic in many of Hegel's writings, but it is not a topic within his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which claims to be the science of all forms of experience. What then is Hegel's view of imagination, and why is it apparently absent from the *Phenomenology*? These questions frame *Hegel's Theory of Imagination*.

The Introduction outlines how the topic of imagination developed in Kant and German Idealism. Bates focuses on Fichte's establishing of imagination as the primary dynamic structure of consciousness itself,

and on Schelling's transformation of this epistemological conception into a metaphysical one, interpreting imagination as the very self-sundering of the Absolute. Chapter 1, "The Sundering Imagination of the Absolute," then looks at Hegel's early, Schellingian interpretation of imagination. In Hegel's *Differenzschrift* and in *Faith and Knowledge*, philosophy is construed as a self-conscious reconstruction of the acts of imaginative synthesis by which the factual world of experience was generated.

Chapters 2 and 3 focus on Hegel's *Philosophy of Spirit* lectures of 1803–04. Here Hegel starts to develop his own dialectical interpretation of imagination. Chapter 2, "Dialectical Beginnings," interprets fragment 17 of this work to show that Hegel is arguing that all identity entails consciousness, and that therefore the Schellingian philosophy of nature must be integrated with the Fichtean philosophy of subjectivity. Chapter 3, "The Dialectical Imagination," interprets fragment 20 of the same lecture course to show how imagination is realized initially in the dialectical unity of time and space. Her interpretation of the *Philosophy of Spirit* as a whole notes especially Hegel's growing concern to interpret the Absolute intersubjectively as "Spirit."

Chapter 4, "The Inwardizing Imagination," studies Hegel's *Philosophy of Spirit* lectures of 1805–06. In these lectures the dialectic of imagination is especially developed into the intersubjective terrain of language. The fundamental task for Hegel's philosophy of imagination here is to explain how the transition is made from the subjective inwardizing of a sense of the world—the meanings that live in the "Night" of imaginative subjectivity—to an objective externalizing of imaginative symbols into the shared signs of intersubjective meaning. This theme is continued in chapter 5, "The Communicative Imagination," which shifts from the pre-*Phenomenology* Jena lectures to Hegel's final 1830 text of the *Philosophy of Spirit*. Bates turns here to find Hegel's final, systematic understanding of the dialectic of imagination, and the fullest development of his analysis of the culmination of imagination in signs.

Chapter 6, "Memory, the Artist's *Einbildungskraft*, *Phantasie* and Aesthetic *Vorstellungen*," takes its cue from the single use of *Einbildungskraft* in the *Phenomenology*. In the preface to that work, Hegel distances himself from the Romantic conception of imagination. This leads Bates to the *Aesthetics* to investigate specifically what it is about the Romantic conception of imagination that Hegel rejects. Bates demonstrates, among other things, the importance of attending to Hegel's precise and consistent distinguishing of *Einbildungskraft* (imagination in general, but sometimes reproductive imagination), *Phantasie* (creative imagination) and *Vorstellen* (presentation, representation, or picture-thinking). This chapter especially allows us to see the importance of Hegel's language of *Vorstellen* for his philosophy of imagination.

Chapter 7, "Imagination and the Medium of Thought," brings us back to the question that initiated this study: where is imagination in the *Phenomenology*? The concept of *Vorstellen* has allowed us to see imagination realized in any representations that are not adequately conceptualized. All the forms of experience studied in the *Phenomenology* are in this sense *Vorstellungen* (and are so called by Hegel) and must

consequently be understood as enactments of imagination. Bates focuses in particular on the transition from revealed religion to absolute knowing and from hard-hearted moral judgment to forgiveness, to clarify the transition from representation to thought proper. Bates concludes that imagination is not present in the *Phenomenology* as an isolated content but is, rather, the entire form of that work.

This book is convincing in its demand that the place of imagination in the *Phenomenology* be determined, and the using of Hegel's theoretical accounts of imagination in the *Philosophy of Spirit* lectures to establish an interpretive framework seems a sound method. Because the book endeavors to cover so much textual material, the treatments of Hegel's complex arguments are often rather formal, but the overall thrust of the analysis is clear and plausible enough. Chapters 2 and 3 are tenacious and complex in their efforts to make sense of fragments 17 and 20, two small but important pieces of Hegel's writing, and these two chapters may be the strongest part of the book, not so much because of the precise details of the analyses, but because they demonstrate the form any successful interpretation of Hegel must take.—John Russon, *University of Guelph*.

BORRADORI, Giovanna. *Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. 224 pp. Cloth, \$25.00; paper, \$15.00—A book entitled *Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida* sounds promising. Here we find two philosophers whose views are normally regarded as diametrically opposed, contemplating the threat that is permeating our lives today: 9/11 and its aftermath.

However, the book, with its promising title, is in many ways disappointing. You may have expected to find a rare discussion between Habermas and Derrida, but there is no dialogue at all. Instead we are presented with two separate fairly short interviews conducted by Giovanna Borradori in New York just after 9/11. The interview with Habermas comprises twenty pages and the one with Derrida fifty-two pages. The rest of the book is written by the interviewer Borradori herself, who compares and contrasts Habermas's and Derrida's positions in a rather didactic fashion. Considering that both interviews are easy to follow, such detailed commentary seems rather superfluous, although it may be of help to readers who are not familiar with the thought of the two philosophers.

What may appear as striking—and is of particular interest to Borradori—is the manner in which these interviews reveal a close proximity of two thinkers who are generally regarded as having opposing views. According to Borradori, Habermas is usually regarded as a thinker of the Enlightenment, while Derrida is seen as an anti-Enlightenment thinker. Yet the interviews reveal that both philosophers regard themselves as thinkers of the Enlightenment. Indeed, both understand

9/11 within the context of and as a response to the project of the Enlightenment. In their eyes, 9/11 poses a philosophical problem which calls for a philosophical response.

Habermas, for example, interprets fundamentalism as a modern phenomenon. It has to be understood within the context of modernity which advocated the separation of state and religion and thus facilitated religious pluralism. According to Habermas, fundamentalism is not only in cognitive dissonance with modern life—insofar as it seeks to uphold the strict universalism of its faith—but is itself a product of modernity because the division of state and religion went hand in hand with the loss of normative ideals. Fundamentalism is a response to this loss and to widespread nihilism. It is a symptom of the malaise of modernity.

Similarly, Derrida interprets 9/11 as a symptom of modernity when he refers to its autoimmunitary process. Autoimmunity refers to the manner in which we tend to destroy our own protection. According to Derrida, 9/11 has to be understood as a continuity of the Cold War; a war which was entirely virtual. However, though virtual, it had serious consequences. For example, it led the U.S. to fund Islamic Afghan fighters during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, many of whom later formed the Taliban regime. The autoimmunitary process since 9/11 has even more serious consequences than the one during the Cold War. Whereas the latter could guarantee a balance of power between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., no such advantage exists today. Today's threat does not come from one particular state or partisan movement but from incalculable and disseminated forces. The forces of terror have thus turned elusive. Indeed, Derrida reminds the reader that "terrorism" is a slippery concept: terrorists for some are often (later) regarded as freedom fighters. The distinctions between war and terrorism, state and nonstate terrorism, national and international terrorism are not necessarily as clear-cut as we are made to believe. Derrida points to a well-known problem: we tend to promote what we fear. The more the West alerts us to possible terrorist threats, the more these play into the hands of the terrorists. The West produces what it, in turn, rejects; this is what Derrida means when he refers to autoimmunity.

Borradori is not mistaken when she detects a clear proximity between both thinkers. They both understand 9/11 as a distinctly modern problem and attempt to articulate a philosophical response. Both believe that the only way out of this modern malaise is to overcome nationalism and to allow for the institutionalization and enforcement of international law. Yet, this shared view is in no way surprising or new. It does not prove that a rapprochement has taken place or that their thinking has changed. They always have shared the view that politics cannot be divorced from philosophy and that we need to read philosophical problems with respect to the tradition of the Enlightenment. In this manner, they are and always have been thinkers of the Enlightenment. Indeed, it is precisely this view that turns them into so called Continental philosophers. Their disagreement merely stems from the question of how we should respond to the project of the Enlightenment. For Habermas the Enlightenment is an unfinished project which can only be

achieved if we adopt a more substantive notion of reason. Derrida, in turn, believes that we are only truly enlightened thinkers if we allow for the possibility of the Enlightenment's own overthrow.

This view is reiterated in the interviews. Their disagreement comes to the fore most clearly when we look at the way in which each addresses the question of how a cosmopolitan legislation and jurisdiction can be achieved without masking particular interests in universalistic disguise. Habermas has faith in the role of the U.N. and believes that the institutionalization of international law can be achieved only if the concept of tolerance is fostered. However, like Derrida, he is aware that this is not an unproblematic concept since the traditional concept of tolerance is essentially paternalistic in nature. It holds the paradoxical position that there cannot be freedom for the enemies of freedom. Habermas believes that we can overcome this paradox by refusing to determine the boundaries of what is tolerated one-sidedly. "On the basis of the citizens's equal rights and reciprocal respect for each other, nobody possesses the privilege of setting the boundaries of tolerance from the viewpoint of their own preferences and value-orientations" (p. 41).

Derrida, in turn, is less optimistic. He believes that no matter how hard we try to redefine the concept of tolerance, it inevitably fosters intolerance, since it is always seen as a form of charity. True tolerance can never be achieved—it merely leads to repression and, in its most aggressive form, to fundamentalism. In Derrida's eyes hospitality needs to replace the concept of tolerance. Unlike tolerance, unconditional hospitality sets no limits. "Hospitality *itself* opens or is in advance open to someone who is neither expected nor invited, to whoever arrives as an absolute foreign *visitor*, as a new *arrival*, nonidentifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly other" (pp. 128–9). Hospitality is not a form of invitation. It should be understood as visitation where we are open to the unexpected before we even choose to be open.

What Habermas and Derrida each envisage is both similar and distinct. Habermas idealizes the idea of world citizenship. He expresses trust in the legitimizing power of international organizations and in liberal democracy. Relying on his notion of an "ideal speech situation," he believes that what should be tolerated cannot be monologically established but can only be dialogically achieved. Derrida, in turn, places his hopes in a "Europe to come" in which it will be possible to establish international rights without a world government. Such a Europe "consists precisely in not closing itself off in its identity and in advancing itself in an exemplary way towards what it is not, toward the other heading or the heading of the other" (p. 171).

So while one promotes reason or reasonableness in its dialogical form, the other believes that the only hope lies in allowing for the possibility of the emergence of the unexpected which may even undermine our "reasonableness." Readers familiar with Habermas's and Derrida's works will not be surprised by their respective positions. Their philosophical stance is merely reiterated in these interviews. Michel Foucault once observed that "we should free ourselves from the intellectual blackmail of 'being for or against the Enlightenment'" (*The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rainbow [London: Penguin Books, 1984], p.

45), and indeed these interviews make visible why such labels are of no consequence: they will never help us to grasp the true difference between Habermas's and Derridas's thought and only lead us to detect rapprochements where there are none.—Lilian Alweiss, *Trinity College Dublin*.

BRADSHAW, David. *Aristotle East and West. Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xiv + 279 pp. Cloth, \$75.00—Under a wide-ranging title, Professor Bradshaw examines the history of the metaphysical concept of *energeia*, in an attempt to trace the development of theology in Byzantine Christianity and in the West. Our culture, he believes, operates under the assumption that the two theological traditions are not in harmony, although they share the same heritage in classical culture. The first part of the book is a toilsome investigation of the use of *energeia* in Aristotle's writings: as *dynamis* is acquiring the meaning of all sorts of capacity, *energeia* begins to be used in later texts also in the sense of static actuality, so there is a widening of meaning from activity to actuality. Bradshaw prefers to consider the First Mover of *Metaphysics* 12 as both a final and an efficient cause, a position, however, which is far from certain. He argues that "Thought of thought" cannot be typical of God, since it can also be said of the human mind (p. 36). But he overlooked that God's thinking is identical with his being which is his object.

After Theophrastus, *energeia* passed into neglect among the Peripatetics, but the notion of an activity that is at once restful and creative continued to fascinate philosophers up to the time of Plotinus (p. 64), who used *energeia* to explain how things can come forth from the One, *energeia* becoming a sort of "emission." One of Bradshaw's theses is that this concept was transformed into that of the Thomistic *esse*. This theory, however, does not agree with the secondary place assigned to being in Neoplatonism.

In Jamblichus, *energeia* means divine power man can participate in (p. 146). In Christian authors as well as in Eunomius the term has different shades of meaning. For Gregory of Nyssa, the divine names signify operations (*energeiai*). Divine simplicity on the one hand, a plurality of names on the other, created a problem for theologians. The Cappadocian Fathers identified God's being with his operation (p. 170). After some pages on Dionysius the reader finds a fine exposé of the spiritual theology of St. Maximus, which, however, has little to do with the central theme of the book. According to St. John Damascene, the divine "irradiation" is one, but it is diversified in divisible things (p. 209), a position which agrees with that of St. Thomas.

With St. Gregory Palamas we are back to a certain confusion as to how to reconcile divine simplicity with a multiplicity of names and effects. One might be reminded of the fine solution in *Summa theologiae* 1.13 where the infinite riches of God's being makes us use a plurality of

terms; in our mind these are different concepts, which all signify the transcendent unity of God. Surprisingly Bradshaw brings up the question of free will and simplicity in God, suggesting that free choice involves some potentiality, but failing to notice that divine freedom totally differs from human freedom of choice. He blames Aquinas for his "opinion" that the blessed in heaven *see* God. Christians will answer that this is not an opinion but a revealed truth. A second shortcoming of Aquinas, according to Bradshaw, is his almost exclusive reliance on efficient causality and exclusion of formal causality (p. 255), but this is to safeguard divine transcendence and to exclude pantheism. However, the perfections of created beings express some similarity with their source in God.

The study is a learned and original undertaking, presents many valuable insights, and is a fairly complete history of the career of the term *energeia*; yet the concentration on this term is too narrow to allow an adequate comparative study of Eastern and Western theology up to the fourteenth century B.C.—L. J. Elders, *Institute of Philosophy and Theology "Rolduc" Kerkrade, The Netherlands*.

CAPALDI, Nicholas. *John Stuart Mill: A Biography*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xvii + 436 pp. Cloth, \$40.00—There are a number of reasons one might be interested in reading a biography of a figure such as John Stuart Mill. One might be interested in learning about the particular figure's life. Many historical figures, such as Mill, lived interesting lives, met interesting people, and had remarkable experiences, all of which makes reading about their lives interesting in the way that reading about certain fictional characters is interesting. One might be interested in reading a biography of a figure such as Mill because one wants to learn more about the forces that directed such a remarkable life as Mill's. One's interest in reading about someone such as Mill might derive from one's interest in other historical figures whose lives and thought either influenced Mill or were influenced by him. In Mill's case, such figures included Alexis de Tocqueville, Jeremy Bentham, Auguste Comte, David Ricardo, Thomas Carlyle, William Wordsworth, and others. Or one might be interested in reading such a biography in order to learn more about the social forces that were at work during that phase of history's progress.

Nicholas Capaldi, in the preface of his definitive biography of Mill, lists several reasons why "an intellectual biography of Mill is especially useful" (p. x). According to Capaldi, one of these reasons Mill would appreciate: "As he [Mill] said in an 1846 article, 'What shapes the character is not what is purposely taught, so much as the unintentional teaching of institutions and social relations.' Mill was very much a figure of his time, both shaped by it and helping to shape it. He was, in the best sense, the quintessential Victorian Liberal. Recent scholarship has begun to make a more balanced assessment of Victorian Britain, both its

influence upon and its continuing relevance to our own world. An intellectual biography of Mill constitutes a contribution to that larger enterprise and benefits from that larger contextualization" (p. xiii–xiv).

Capaldi places Mill and his life in historical context. In Capaldi's biography one reads about the emerging liberalism of Mill's day, the dissatisfaction of the Philosophic Radicals (including Mill's father, James Mill, and Jeremy Bentham) with the then current British social and political system. Mill himself, as Capaldi points out, was a practical philosopher. Although Mill made "significant contributions to all of the major areas of philosophy, including metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, social and political philosophy, the philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of education" (p. ix), his philosophizing was directed to practical applications. "In short, Mill's views on metaphysics, epistemology, and religion were always another expression of his moral and political agenda" (p. 160).

Capaldi's intellectual biography is organized chronologically. Drawing on his extensive understanding of Mill's writings and the secondary literature (correcting the latter, where necessary), Capaldi begins with a brief discussion of Mill's father and a description of Mill's remarkable and famous upbringing and education. Capaldi proceeds to consider Mill's intellectual life with discussion of several of Mill's important writings, his intellectual success, worldly success, and finally his passing in 1873. Where appropriate, Capaldi explains the influences on Mill's thought. As Capaldi points out, the two most important relationships in Mill's life were those with his father and with Harriet Taylor, the woman who, after a long acquaintanceship and intellectual partnership, became his wife. Capaldi explains both Mill's need to become independent of his father's intellectual influence and the remarkable intellectual and personal relationship Mill had with Taylor. Taylor's acknowledged influence on Mill's thought is carefully explained, as is Mill's belief in the importance of autonomy.

What is, perhaps, most impressive about Capaldi's biography is his obvious grasp of and ability to explain the intellectual environment in which Mill lived—from the surging social changes which brought about the Philosophic Radicals to Mill's exposure to Continental Romanticism. Capaldi's ability to explain how this environment affected Mill's intellectual development is a pleasure to the reader.

Capaldi's intellectual biography passes, with flying colors, the important test for the success of a biography: after reading it, I have both a sense of having learned a great deal and a desire to learn more about the part of history that both influenced and was influenced by John Stuart Mill.—P. A. Woodward, *East Carolina University*.

CARMAN, Taylor. *Heidegger's Analytic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xii + 328. Cloth, \$60.00—*Heidegger's Analytic* belongs to the school of Anglo-American philosophers who are challenging decades of academic dysfunction by effecting an analytic appropriation of

phenomenology and hermeneutics. "Like any philosophical view," Carman writes, "Heidegger makes sense only in relation to the competing alternatives" (p. 128). The book is a detailed study of *Being and Time* with generous citations from primary sources. It is written in a clean, linear style which, given the topic, manages to remain remarkably free of jargon. In Carman's view, *Being and Time* has been unjustifiably neglected by contemporary analytic philosophers. If they bothered to read the book, analysts would discover that Heidegger has much to say to Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam, and John Searle.

Drawing an analogy with Kant, Carman argues that *Being and Time* is a transcendental analytic of the hermeneutic conditions of the possibility of intelligible experience. In defense of this thesis Carman makes a well-stated case for the implementation of the phenomenological attitude in the philosophy of mind. Against thinkers like Daniel Dennett, who insist on interpreting consciousness as a thing among things, Carman argues that intentionality, the defining feature of consciousness, can be properly accessed only as it shows itself, that is, from within intentional experience itself. This leads to a solid critique of contemporary analytic interpretations of intentionality, whether objectivistic (Dennett) or subjectivistic (Searle). Intentionality is neither objectively explicable nor merely subjective; the phenomenon shows the inadequacy of the objective/subjective distinction. This, according to Carman, is the main contribution of *Being and Time*: intentionality is only possible on the grounds of an a priori belonging to the world. *Being and Time*'s archeology of the "situatedness" of understanding breaks with Husserl's naive Cartesian approach to consciousness, for it shows how the human being always understands things in historical contexts: first, the pragmatic contexts of everyday human activities; second, the social contexts of received beliefs and interpretations. It follows that the analytic of Dasein is utterly unlike the investigation of any natural phenomenon; it requires a sensitivity to historicity typically foreign to metaphysics.

Carman describes Heidegger's position as "social externalism," by contrast with the externalism advocated by Putnam and Kripke. "The world that has authority over the contents of our intentional attitudes is not the physical world itself, but the social world, that is, the world of human customs and institutions made accessible to us by our ordinary shared normative standards of intelligibility" (p. 137). Elsewhere Heidegger is described as a pragmatist and a realist. By the use of such terms, Carman intends to overcome the distance between Heidegger and the contemporary philosophical community. This apparently innocent motive, however, leads to serious difficulties. By insisting on reading Heidegger through traditional metaphysical categories, Carman fails to recognize what is arguably the central point of hermeneutic phenomenology, the necessity of a *Destruktion* of the metaphysical tradition. Carman ignores Heidegger's concerted effort to reconfigure philosophical discourse in such a way as to preclude the use of certain conceptually loaded categories: "internal," "external," "idealist," "realist," "practical," "skeptical." For example, Carman calls Heidegger an "ontic realist" because "occurrent entities . . . do not depend on Dasein's being-in-the-world" (p. 134). The essence of Heidegger's realism is his "fidelity to a

kind of metaphysical common sense" (p. 136). It will no doubt come as a surprise to readers of Heidegger that he is a defender of common sense. It certainly surprises this reader. Granted, Heidegger denies that beings can be reduced to Dasein's understanding of them. But Heidegger also denies that beings can be emancipated from Dasein's understanding of them. Neither idealism nor realism is possible when Dasein is understood as the site of the unveiling of beings.

Carman could argue that he is merely subjecting Heidegger to the same kind of violent interpretation to which Heidegger subjected historical philosophical texts. Yet Carman does not make this argument. On the contrary, he presents his work as a faithful exegesis of Heidegger's meaning. Bringing Heidegger into metaphysical debates which he no longer believes to be possible is not necessarily wrong. It must, however, be recognized that such a retrieval is in tension with the essentially exhortative nature of *Being and Time*. The text is not intended to add arguments to existing debates, or to decide metaphysical issues; it is meant to destroy the ways of thinking enshrined by these debates in order to make possible a new way of thinking. While there is much to be learned from Carman's book, particularly with regard to the rediscovery of intentionality in recent Anglo-American philosophy, Carman's underplaying of the radicality of Heidegger's *Destruktion* will be an obstacle for most Heideggerians. If the received terms of the metaphysical tradition must be destroyed, reduced to their original sources, because they are impediments to thinking, then one cannot arrive at the fundamental insights of *Being and Time* via the debates of the contemporary philosophy of mind.—Sean McGrath, *Mount Allison University*.

DA COSTA, Newton C. A. and Steven FRENCH. *Science and Partial Truth: A Unitary Approach to Modeling and Scientific Reasoning*. Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. x + 259 pp. Cloth, \$55.00—Are the conclusions reached by mature sciences merely "likely stories" or are they "really true"? Questions of this sort have been live issues from Étienne Tempier's March 1277 condemnation of theses of the Radical Aristotelians of Paris to the May 2005 Kansas State Board of Education deliberations on Darwinism. One major difficulty with the view that scientific findings are "really true" is that, from the historical record, all such statements are recognized as being revisable, even replaceable. Several attempts to formalize a notion of "approximate truth" have addressed this difficulty—without notable success. This book proposes a new solution to the problem—a resolution that stands in the tradition of the American Pragmatists: Peirce, James, and Dewey (with due regard for their differences).

The main motivation for the study was interest in the curious circumstance that scientists routinely use theories and approaches that have been convincingly refuted, even disproved. Clearly, there are situations

in which a theory is accepted, at least in part or for certain purposes, but is not believed to be true, in the sense of truth-as-correspondence that Tarski developed. This flexibility provides opportunity for the growth and development of scientific understanding, but at the cost, so it may seem, of calling into question the rationality and even the *bona fides* of the scientific enterprise.

The General Correspondence Principle of H. R. Post holds that "once a theory has proved itself useful in some respects, it will never be scrapped entirely." If a scientific approach has been shown to be pragmatically effective in some domain, it will remain so (within the limits of that domain) indefinitely—even though the theoretical frameworks in which that approach is embedded may change radically. (Students of civil engineering will always need to study Newtonian mechanics, even though that theory is no longer considered true without qualification, as it once was. Whether or not string theory prevails as the best understanding of how the world works at some ultramicroscopic level will make little difference to the ordinary concerns of those who build bridges.) Earlier philosophy of science recognized a sharp distinction between observed data and theoretical explanation, and a corresponding difference between factual and theoretical belief. As Suppes has emphasized, scientists generally deal with artfully constructed models of data from which phenomena are inferred. Theories generally rationalize phenomena. The data/theory distinction is not as useful as formerly supposed, and the difference between factual and theoretical belief correspondingly fades. Much of the active practice of science involves qualified acceptance and use of theoretical models *as if* they were true. The question of belief in a statement or theory as true without qualification rarely (if ever) arises in strictly scientific contexts.

The authors propose a formal notion of "pragmatic," or "partial," or "quasi" truth, and they introduce it into the model-theoretic or "semantic" understanding of scientific practice through the concept of "partial structure." A statement is a pragmatic truth if it is correct for all relevant purposes. It is a partial or quasi truth if it is true as far as it goes. In both these cases, some features of the situation to which the statement refers are left unspecified. A "partial structure" is a set of relationships built on a domain—but with some such relationships remaining undefined. These concepts are fully formalized in the early chapters and then carefully applied to a range of currently important topics, including models that are used in scientific practice, models of science itself, acceptance of and belief in theories. Final chapters explore similarities and differences between the "constructive empiricism" of van Fraassen—held to be the most viable variety of antirealism—and the "pragmatic realism" and "ontic structural realism" that the authors favor. The authors believe that either side of the realism/antirealism debate may profitably employ the "partial truth" perspective that this monograph develops. The presentation is well organized, provides extensive summaries of recent relevant research, and is generally quite convincing.

This is an important book. It summarizes and connects significant recent developments in several areas of philosophy, and develops a coherent approach to a well defined and important problem. That approach

may well prove to be useful in many contexts. Perhaps it can clarify the discussion of philosophical questions of current societal interest.—Joseph E. Earley, Sr., *Georgetown University*.

DICKERSON, A. B. *Kant on Representation and Objectivity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. x + 217 pp. Cloth, \$65.00—All who are familiar with the history of philosophy know of the centrality of the transcendental deduction of the categories to Kant's project in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and of its complexity and difficulty. The work at hand is a close study of the second-edition version of the transcendental deduction (the "B-deduction"), and it succeeds admirably in providing an interpretation that is subtle, faithful to the text and to Kant's intentions, and philosophically interesting. It is an extremely helpful contribution to the field.

Contrary to most interpretations of the transcendental deduction that take it to depend upon the ideas of personal identity, the "ownership" of mental states, or the ontological unity of the mind, the author argues that Kant's principal concern is to show how the objective reality of a complex representation is consistent with the spontaneity of the mind. The short answer to this question is that objective reality is consistent with spontaneity precisely because the categories are universal and necessary. Ultimately, as Dickerson emphasizes—and this is the novel claim of the book—the problem addressed within the B-deduction ought to be seen as the representationalist parallel to the semantic question of what it is to understand a complex sign or the question of the unity of a proposition.

The book is divided into four chapters. In chapter 1, "Representation," it is argued that Kant, like his modern predecessors, is a representationalist but that, because of his different conception of what it means to represent an object, he does not have to give an account of the inference from representations to objects that Descartes (as an indirect realist) must, nor does he have to give an account of the construction of objects from representations that Berkeley (as an idealist) must. Rather, Kant regards the representation of objects as essentially involving an act of synthesis, which, according to Dickerson, is "analogous to the act of seeing something *in* a picture, for it is the awareness of a representation as a representation and not simply as an internal state" (p. 29). Chapter 2, "Spontaneity and Objectivity," contains a very helpful overview of the argument of the B-deduction and makes clear that, for Kant, spontaneity (or the capacity to arrive at a spontaneous synthesis of a complex representation) is essential to objectivity. Ultimately, Dickerson claims, Kant's remarkably complex argument can actually be seen as consisting of two premises and a conclusion: "(a) All our cognition must involve a spontaneous synthesis. (b) If our cognition involves a spontaneous synthesis then this synthesis must be governed by the categories. [Therefore,] [t]he categories make our cognition possible" (p. 51). This over-

view in turn sets up the remaining two chapters: "The Unity of Consciousness" is devoted to a detailed analysis of §16 of the B-deduction, which contains Kant's argument for (a), and "Judgment and the Categories," an analysis of §§17–20 and 26, which contains Kant's argument for (b).

These chapters are detailed and insightful, but space constraints prevent me from discussing the argumentation in detail. Instead, I should like to highlight what I take to be two of the more interesting points of interpretation. At the opening of chapter 3, Dickerson carefully explicates Kant's notion of apperception and shows that much confusion in the secondary literature could be avoided if one were to follow Kant himself and distinguish apperception from inner sense or self-consciousness. As is made clear, apperception ought to be regarded as "the reflexive act whereby the mind grasps its own representations as representing" (p. 81). This account of apperception helps to elucidate the troubling opening sentence of §16, in which Kant tells us that the "I think" must accompany all my representations, as well as the rest of the deduction, when talk turns to the "transcendental unity of apperception." Second, as mentioned above, Dickerson argues that there is a parallel between Kant's account of the spontaneous synthesis of complex representations and the problem addressed by Frege and Russell concerning the unity of the proposition. Frege said, for example, "I do not begin with concepts and put them together to form a thought or judgment; I come by the parts of the thought by analysing the thought" (cited p. 121). Thus, according to Dickerson, Kant was, like Frege, a holist, who thought that judgment itself was irreducible but that this primacy of judgment requires that there be a priori rules governing our synthesis of representations. The author concludes that if we adopt his reading of the unity of apperception and of Kant's holism with respect to judgment, then we are in a better position to understand how the B-deduction can contain an antiskeptical argument, for inner sense is no longer epistemically privileged over outer sense (p. 210).

These points are important and very suggestive. One misgiving about the book that I have, however, is that the account of representation is not as fully developed as possible. Dickerson presents his view as a working hypothesis, which seems to be confirmed by the fact that we can then make good sense of the B-deduction. I wonder, though, if there are not stronger, independent reasons for adopting this view. Still, this book ought to be studied by all who are interested in Kant's thought.—Brandon C. Look, *University of Kentucky*.

ELDERS, Leo. *The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas: Happiness, Natural Law and the Virtues*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2005. 313 pp. Cloth, \$49.95—As an expositor of the moral philosophy of Aquinas, Leo Elders's credentials are impeccable. He is the author of thirty-one books on the philosophy of Aristotle and on the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas. Elders writes and lectures, in addition to his native

Dutch, in French, German, Spanish Italian and English, and his books have been translated into all of those languages. The present work is his own translation of a previously published work in Dutch, *De ethiek van Thomas van Aquino* (2000). There are chapters on free will, on the passions, on habits in general, on virtues, on natural law and the common good, on happiness, and on love and friendship. The book follows Thomas's own order of the subject as given in the I-II part of the *Summa Theologiae*. One of the merits of the book is Elders's rendering of the historical context of the various topics under discussion. In elucidating the difference between biblical morality and that of the Greek ethical theorists, he writes, "The Church Fathers adopted a considerable portion of the ethical teachings of the Greek and Roman classical authors. Despite their fundamental criticism of the pagan way of life and its widespread immorality, many Christian theologians were convinced that there is a fundamental correspondence between much of what the great classical authors taught and Christian moral doctrine." He finds this especially true of doctrines concerning the virtues and natural law.

Early on in the volume, Elders acknowledges the methodological difficulty of talking about the moral philosophy of Aquinas, given that St. Thomas is first of all a theologian. Yet, as a theologian in addressing moral issues, Thomas works within the framework of natural reason, much in the manner of Aristotle and the Stoics. Elders finds it impossible to render faithfully the ethics of Aquinas without delving into his philosophical anthropology, and even deeper into his metaphysics.

Elders brings to his study an almost encyclopedic knowledge of the history of philosophy. Although he advises his readers not to look for any novel interpretations of Thomas, the book is full of surprises. Time and again, he offers a concise history of the moral issue under consideration, frequently discussing the issue as found in the thought of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Ambrose, and Augustine, among others. He points out that until the second half of the thirteenth century, only two of the ten books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* were known in the Latin West. Around 1240, Robert Grossteste translated the entire work, a translation used by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas.

In discussing Thomas's use of Aristotle and the Stoics, Elders notes that when Thomas finds a difference between the two, he usually comes down on the side of the Peripatetics. In discussing the relation of positive law to natural law, we find an enlightening comparison of Thomas with Suarez, Grotius, and Prufendorf. In his treatment of the relation between intellect and will, he provides a rare, in depth discussion of the origin of a free will act. The volume is replete with commentary and analysis that could be provided only by someone with as much experience and learning as Elders. A more authoritative introduction to the moral philosophy of Aquinas is not likely to be found. In fact, it is a delight to read.—Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America*.

ENÇ, Berent. *How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. xiv + 252 pp. Cloth, \$45.00—*How We Act* presents Enç's argument that "by assuming nothing more than a world of material things, we can understand the nature of decisions, of intentions, of voluntary actions" (p. 2). It is a thorough and detailed account of such a naturalizing program and provides an excellent introduction to the field of action theory in general and a rigorous defense of the claim that volition can be accommodated into a naturalistic system.

The first chapter of the book is a helpful review of much of the current literature on action theory, focused around the idea of "volition." Enç's foil, set out in this chapter, is the existence of "irreducible mental acts"—acts that have no antecedent (natural) events as causes—as defended by proponents of agent causation. He claims he can fully account for human action without appeal to such acts.

The second chapter lays the groundwork for Enç's position. It is a detailed and somewhat difficult exposition of biological action theory. His particular interest here lies in what he calls "the basic behavioral repertoire of organisms." That is, organisms have a basic set of behaviors that are elicited by various environmental inputs and various internal states (he includes some helpful diagrams to illustrate these concepts). Upon this groundwork he builds his claim that human volitional action is a complex version of this natural biological process.

After forays into some special considerations for causal theories of action (chapter 3) and an extended discussion of the problem of deviance in action (chapter 4), related to the now-famous Gettier problems in epistemology, Enç returns to the central question raised by his theory: in the face of a naturalized account of volition (that is, an account that provides a complete description in terms of antecedent natural causes), can we maintain belief in our own agency? He addresses this question in chapter 5.

The question of agency leads Enç into the realm of the free-will debate. He maintains that his position is not inherently deterministic and that he can distinguish between hard-wired behavior and rational behavior. He expands on his description of natural actions from chapter 3 with some more helpful process diagrams. What is distinctive about human behavior, as distinguished from more limited biological actions, is that "in acting for a reason, the agent typically considers alternatives, and chooses among them" (p. 150). Rationality involves deliberation, which is the process of having certain desires, deciding which desires should be pursued, computing the consequences of different methods of trying to satisfy those particular desires, and settling upon the action that has the best consequences in terms of achieving the attendant desire (along with, I assume, any concomitant consequences). Such a model, he insists, aligns with compatibilism in the free will debate, because the determination of rationality is just that the reasons the person had for acting cause him or her to act, whether "the complex causal relations that connect the reasons of the agent to her action are governed by deterministic or indeterministic laws" (p. 162).

Chapter 6 is an extended discussion of intentions and their relationship to beliefs and desires. It is only peripherally connected to the preceding chapters, and the overall argument and might function better as an appendix.

In the final chapter, Enç applies his model to the related issues of autonomy, the will, and freedom. Having reviewed the current discussion, he finds that there is nothing in any of these ideas to challenge his causal theory of action. The current definitions of each of these ideas can accommodate naturalized volition.

Enç's work is a thorough and detailed example of the naturalizing project. He connects human volition to naturalistic causal processes via instructive and interesting models and illustrations. He is aware of the challenge his theory poses to the possibility of free agency, and he believes his theory can make room for it. However, in modeling his theory of action on biological action models that seem quite clearly to be deterministic, he seems to undermine his claimed compatibilist position and to lose the distinction he needs between hard-wired action and free action. In addition, its appeal to consequentialist and desire-satisfaction models of agency will invite weighty criticisms that have been directed at those models. Enç claims that "the causal theory, as I have presented it, is silent on how an agent's beliefs and desires or long-term priorities are shaped" (p. 167). But the libertarian and defender of agent causation will respond that he has avoided the very question at issue.—Daniel R. Kern, *Pasadena City College*.

FINOCCHIARO, Maurice A. *Retrying Galileo: 1633–1992*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. xii + 485 pp. Cloth, \$50.00—A fascinating survey of what the author calls "The Galileo Affair," from Descartes to John Paul II, that is, from Galileo's condemnation in 1633 to his alleged rehabilitation 1992. The fruit of decades of research (the notes and bibliography comprise 100 pages of the volume), this is not Finocchiaro's first book-length study of the Galileo affair. He is the author of *Galileo and the Art of Reasoning* (1980), *The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History* (1989), and *Galileo on the World Systems: A New Abridged Translation and Guide* (1997). The present work is a historical and critical account of the various interpretations and evaluations of the Galileo trial.

Without doubt the Galileo affair is one of the most studied events in the history of Western culture. The past four centuries have produced vast amounts of commentaries, countless interpretations and evaluations advanced by physicists, astronomers, theologians, philosophers, churchmen, historians, and even playwrights. Although the literature on the original affair is enormous, the story of the aftermath, says Finocchiaro, has never been told: "The reflective commentary has never been systematically examined, and the subsequent controversy has never been anchored in the textual sources."

The Galileo affair remains something of a Rorschach test for the historically curious, yet what one makes of it has nothing to do with whether one is clerical or anticlerical. The basic facts are well known. Galileo subscribed to and defended the Copernican heliocentric world-view, a view that seemed contrary to the Hebrew Scriptures and centuries of Church teaching. Although subsequent inquiry by the early nineteenth century was to prove conclusively that the earth is not the center of the solar system, Galileo at the time was not able to demonstrate the truth of his position. Absent demonstration, Galileo was enjoined to teach his position only as a hypothetical explanation. At this point the story becomes murky. Immersed in the theological debate about how Scripture is to be interpreted, Galileo made no friends and unnecessarily engendered some of the animosity toward him. Bellarmine understood that from an Aristotelian point of view, Galileo had not demonstrated his conclusion, although Galileo himself thought that the motion of the tides proved his thesis. The record indicates that absent proof, Galileo agreed to teach the heliocentric view of the world only as a hypothesis. Whether he complied is a matter of dispute. In subsequent years, Galileo pressed his case. The record is complex, but the case culminated in the trial of 1633 and his condemnation. Nothing new here, but what is new is Finocchiaro's painstaking account of contemporary reactions to Galileo's difficulties, primarily as a result of his study of the correspondence between Galileo and others, some of which is translated into English for the first time.

Descartes may have been the first to use the expression "l'affaire Galileo." Although Descartes regarded the Copernican view of the universe to be "certain and evident," he also knew that Galileo had not demonstrated the heliocentric view. Descartes thought that he himself could provide the evidence, but he was reluctant to become entangled with ecclesiastical authorities and withheld the publication of his *Le monde*. In correspondence with Mersenne, Descartes was anxious to know whether the geokinetic idea had been condemned merely by a congregation of Roman cardinals or by the pope speaking *ex cathedra*. Descartes was aware that the former did not have the binding status of an *ex cathedra* pronouncement or that of an ecumenical council of the Church universal. Clearly Galileo was not regarded as a heretic.

Readers may be fascinated by Napoleon Bonaparte's personal interest in l'affaire Galileo. On 2 February 1810, when the French army still occupied Rome, Napoleon ordered everything in Rome pertaining to the papal government to be moved to France. Thus 3,239 cases were subsequently transported to Paris. A special convoy was assigned to transport the Inquisition archives. Napoleon's primary interest may have been the papal bull that excommunicated him, but he authorized his personal librarian to translate and publish the original proceedings of Galileo trial into French, side by side with the original Italian and Latin. The first twenty-five folios were published, although the project was never completed.

Interest in the Galileo affair was widespread. It may be expected that scientists and men of letters, such as Pascal, Newton, and Leibniz, would be curious. By Finocchiaro's count, almost sixty books were written about the trial during the period 1633-51. The episode was

seized on by D'Alembert, Voltaire, and other Enlightenment figures to bash the Church. Domenico Bernini, for one, contributed to the invention and diffusion of myths about the affair when he maliciously asserted that Galileo was held in an Inquisition prison for five years. Voltaire picked up the theme and either in ignorance or hatred wrote that Galileo was thrown into prison and made to fast on bread and water. Of course, Galileo was never imprisoned in any usual sense. When detained in Rome, his "prison" was the palace of the Duke of Tuscany where he was treated as an honored guest; so too when he endured confinement as the guest of the Archbishop of Sienna.

Finocchiaro concludes his study with John Paul II, who, in November 1979, at a celebration to commemorate the centennial of Einstein's birth, called for a reopening of the Galileo affair. A Vatican commission was subsequently appointed with a view to the rehabilitation of Galileo. Paul Cardinal Poupard, thirteen years later in 1992 made the formal report of the commission at a meeting of the Pontifical Academy of the Sciences, with John Paul II in attendance. In his own speech after receiving the report, John Paul II seemed to be admitting not only that Church authorities had been in error but that they had acted unjustly, something Descartes in his day would not have conceded. As subsequently reported the condemnation of Galileo was itself seemingly condemned. Whatever his intent, John Paul II's speech has not ended the centuries-old controversy. Galileo's apparent rehabilitation has merely started a new episode of Galileo studies. Bellarmine has his defenders even in the secular academy.

In Finocchiaro's telling, the history of the *cause célèbre* is a veritable page turner, but not one that can be absorbed in a single sitting. Clearly for anyone tempted to venture an opinion on the Galileo affair this book is required reading.—Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America*.

FRANCO, Paul. *Michael Oakeshott: An Introduction*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. xi + 209 pp. Cloth, \$30.00—We are faced here with quite a bit more than an introduction. Along with the book of Robert Grant, this is the most serious assessment of the work of a man who is perhaps the leading and most substantial political philosopher of the past century. Although Franco proceeds ostensibly by themes, the chapters unfold chronologically, and the author should be congratulated for it. It is quite important to examine the sources and influences of Oakeshott, since he was all too often seen as a man of the present, to the point that he was incongruously described as "influenced" by one or another of ephemeral political figures.

Franco's book is meticulous and objective, but it does underline two points. The first is that Oakeshott cannot be portrayed simply as a "conservative"; thus T. S. Eliot was a more typical conservative than Oakeshott, the latter being rather a conservative Whig, in the tradition

of Edmund Burke and Sir Robert Peel. The second is that throughout his life, Oakeshott, far from being an agnostic and religious indifferentist, interacted with religious theories and responded to them, even though this is not always visible in his (sparse) published writings.

The book begins therefore with an analysis of the ways in which T. H. Green, the neo-Hegelian (now somewhat, and unjustly, forgotten) F. H. Bradley and, to a smaller extent, R. G. Collingwood, influenced the young Oakeshott, and with the way in which his earliest studies (in the 1920s) were equally divided between theology and political philosophy. According to Franco, Oakeshott was then and remained later "an unorthodox religious thinker" (p. 36) whose orientation was however clearly an "idealist" one (pp. 24-55). Personally, I would go farther and say that later, knowingly or not, Oakeshott took the model of religious cognition as a standard against which other forms of knowledge and experience (philosophical, historical, literary) ought to be measured.

Thereafter Franco splices the "conservatism" of Oakeshott into several pieces. One of them is the critique of rationalism in politics, which includes, but is not limited to, the rejection of utopianism, which was so prominent in the twentieth century. In fact, Franco argues, Oakeshott is part of a whole generation of brilliant thinkers such as Berlin, Arendt, Aron, Strauss, Hayek, Butterfield, and perhaps others (p. 183), who raised similar objections to the political-historical orientations of their time and made rather analogous arguments. This is probably quite true, but there is a danger here, which Franco does not always avoid: to emphasize too much that Oakeshott relied upon Hobbes and Machiavelli; he did, but always in complex combinations with others, not least Pascal and Augustine. In fact, I would rather agree with Rorty, who tried to define Oakeshott as one among those who sought "to retain Enlightenment liberalism while dropping Enlightenment rationalism" (p. 180). Although, on the other hand, Franco is quite right in rejecting (p. 181) Rorty's attempts to subsume Oakeshott to mere pragmatist clichés.

In fact, and it is in my view here that Oakeshott unveils his fully conservative disposition, his Burkean theory of "politics of passion" (p. 103) and of individualist skepticism and pluralism amount to a wholesale rejection of most of the modernist political practices. Oakeshott was aware of Halifax's fundamental essay "Character of a Trimmer" (1688), and I am convinced that this exceptional though, unfortunately, less than well-known piece must have played some role in Oakeshott's definition of the category of "tradition of behavior" as based on "the pursuit of intimations" (pp. 92-3), on "conversation," habit, custom, and un-self-consciousness (p. 96). It is these concepts that Oakeshott opposed to "rationalism in politics."

Oakeshott, like many prominent thinkers, resorted to aesthetics when he wanted to suggest a pattern for a fully rounded human activity. His outstanding discussion of poetry, in which he interestingly does not resort to any of the well-established points made in the tradition that started with Kant and Schiller, provides a good example of a noninstrumental type of activity that can illustrate a "conservative" creation and recreation of the values of society (p. 128), based on contemplation and on delight. According to Franco, Oakeshott also applied the same kind of analysis to the "voice of history."

Oakeshott's last book, which was received (wrongly) with much reserve, brings his splendid and essential distinction between "societas" and "universitas" as basic modes of social organization. He clearly thinks that the first of the two (a contractual civil organization, the purpose of which is to act as kind of neutral referee) is preferable to the "universitas," which points toward totalitarian, or at least totalizing tendencies (by establishing targets and by asking for a certain degree of uniformity of the participants), although he pessimistically (and, alas, realistically, I would say) sees "universitas" as gaining ground in the last two centuries.

There are a number of typos, and the text is less than perfectly written and edited, but these seem rather forgivable faults compared to the merits of Franco's book. He has "translated" the simple, straightforward, and transparent idiom of Oakeshott in the discourse of contemporary philosophy, a discourse more opaque, but also, for the specialists, more convincing. Oakeshott becomes more firmly embedded as a thinker of his own time. This is a meritorious achievement, and I would be surprised to see that Franco can be overlooked in the future as an Oakeshott exegete.—Virgil Nemoianu, *The Catholic University of America*.

HENRICH, Dieter. *Between Kant and Hegel*. Edited by David S. Pacini. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003. lix + 341 pp. Cloth, \$55.00—Dieter Henrich's *Between Kant and Hegel* is one of those rare scholarly works by which others are, and will be, judged, just as Henrich's scholarship more generally provides a standard by which others in the area of German Idealism have been judged for no less than thirty years. David Pacini's foreward, then, otherwise exemplary, likely overstates the degree to which Henrich's "forgotten" (p. xiii) Harvard lectures required "recovery" (p. xi). One might suggest instead that these lectures, and Henrich's contribution more generally, have never been lost, and indeed that Anglophone scholarship finds its own way along interpretive paths already indicated by Henrich. (Few critical works have had an influence on *Forschung* equal to, for example, *The Proof Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction*, which appeared in this journal in 1969.)

The title already announces Henrich's methodological reorientation, from the trajectory *von Kant bis Hegel*, to a constellation of post-Kantian theoretical philosophies comprehended as "three comparable and competing positions [those of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel] that cannot be reduced to each other" (p. 9). Chapters 1 through 3 provide the context for the later content of the work by introducing the theme of the formal interdependence of mind and world, of "internal experience" and our experience of a law-governed world external to us. This co-relation Henrich understands as fundamental to both Kant's own and post-Kantian philosophy, theoretical and practical (p. 20). Henrich takes as basic "the insight that mental activity always implies a world within which

such activity occurs." This yields the claim that "the concept of mind as the subject of knowledge is not possible without the idea of a world that laws govern" (p. 19). Henrich then adumbrates the ways in which Kant's account of the structure and dynamics of this relation were taken to be either problematic or insufficient in theoretical philosophy between Kant and Hegel.

Chapter 4 reviews Fichte's reformulation of Kant's construal of the "self-world corollary," and his advance of a genuinely "dialectical" method and doctrine, an advance too often attributed only to Hegel (p. 24; see also 177, 246). Chapters 5–8 (pp. 65–156) introduce the contribution to the development of Idealism made by Jacobi, Reinhold, and Schulze. Chapters 9 and 10 treat of the historical importance and philosophical insufficiency of Reinhold's position of the problem of "the internal unity of consciousness" across the distinction among subject, object, and representation (pp. 127–39). The contextual role of Schulze's 1792 *Aenesidemus* for Fichte's early philosophy—which occupies one-third of the book—is fully exploited (chapters 10–11). Henrich begins with Fichte's *Aenesidemus Rezension* and its intimation of "an analogy between the logical principle of noncontradiction," interpreted dialectically as a unity of identity and difference, "and the structure of opposition," as governs the experienced and synthetic relation between mind (I) and world (~I) (p. 167). Henrich then turns to an exegesis of the early, unpublished *Meditationen* (chapters 12–13), which elaborates Fichte's "discovery" of this unity of identity and difference as the fundamental structure of mental activity. Many readers will find sufficient Henrich's analyses of Fichte's *Meditationen* (chapters 12–13); they may rest, however, on an imprecise understanding of the problem-context and character of Fichte's exposition. A closer reading of the *Grundriss* (p. 209) alongside the *Meditationen* might have revealed the "new deduction of time and space" common to both. This focus might have resulted in a closer understanding of Fichte's (and Maimon's, and Schelling's, who are also left untreated) critique of Kant's doctrine of time as form of inner sense, which Henrich apparently finds unproblematic (pp. 36, 42–43; however, see also 43–5, 47, 48, 50, 52–3, 118).

A shorter chapter (chapter 15) follows on the influence of Fichte's early doctrine of cognition and the imagination on Schlegel, Novalis, and Hölderlin. Chapter 16 returns to Fichte and his later (1794–95) *Wissenschaftslehre*. The latter chapter contains a more fully articulate depiction of Fichte's account of the formal structure of self-consciousness, as containing both an "original and immediate self-acquaintance" and a discursive or mediate, objectifying self-consciousness (p. 242). Chapter 17 further explicates the "paradoxical character of the self-relatedness of consciousness" through the (1) "historical" concept of the *plene resolvens* (pp. 246–51), and through the (2) "philosophical" concept well-known to Henrich's readers: the threefold "paradoxical" character of self-consciousness (pp. 252–9). Henrich argues that this paradoxical character "requires of [Fichte] a conceptual apparatus" contained only in his "speculative theology" (p. 259). This "Turn to Speculative Theology" (chapter 18) Henrich names Fichte's "ultimate insight" (as opposed to his "original insight"). Henrich advances an analysis of vision (*das Auge*; pp. 266–7) important also for post-Fichtean theologies such as

Michel Henry's "doctrine of manifestation." Henrich's analysis of "the first modern theology" (p. 273), unique for its combination of both philosophical and theological desiderata (p. 275), is insightful and, unfortunately, virtually unique in English.

Exegesis is interspersed effectively with discussions of more general themes: the concepts of *henôsis* and *oikeiôsis* (and *allogriôsis*) as formative for Idealistic concepts of self-consciousness (pp. 85–95); the manner in which particular forms of medieval, Neoplatonic theology are left untouched by Kant's critique (pp. 67–72); and Kant's debt to Rousseau (pp. 55–8). Such far-ranging discussions provide further reason to study this exceptional text. Henrich thus leaves himself only the final two chapters (pp. 299–331) for the "analysis of the systematic structure of Hegel's work." The task is not (in this text) accomplished in full detail, although the analysis given is helpful with regard to general structures and is suggestive of ways in which problems hidden therein can be further pursued. On precisely this point Henrich's work evinces its importance: Henrich has managed to write, and Pacini to edit, a book which has met two recalcitrantly opposed criteria—the detail and intricacy of a specialized study and the broad historical significance of an introductory study. One is tempted to say that while many works in the area have taken up this task before and after Henrich, none has met this desideratum as well.—Garth W. Green, *Boston University*.

HERSCH, Edwin L. *From Philosophy to Psychotherapy: A Phenomenological Model for Psychology, Psychiatry, and Psychoanalysis*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003. xviii + 417 pp. Cloth, \$65.00—From their founding, psychology and psychotherapy have grown and developed in the absence of systematic dialogue with philosophy. And yet it does not take much reflection before it becomes clear that philosophy is inevitably an important part of any theory and any application of psychotherapy. This book by Hersch is one of the few to do systematic justice to this problem, namely, how are psychotherapy and philosophy related, and how can this relationship be usefully identified? The author is a highly experienced psychotherapist and psychiatrist with a good deal of academic training in philosophy and in phenomenological psychology at Duquesne University. Hersch makes four primary contributions. First, throughout the book he identifies many ways in which philosophical assumptions, almost always unexamined, are operating in the practice and theory of psychotherapy. Almost all readers will grant this useful and important point. The second contribution is the author's hierarchical model of how philosophy relates to psychology/psychotherapy. This model has seven levels of theoretical enquiry, and the philosophical rationale and implications are spelled out at each level. Hersch begins with ontology, laying out his case for belief in the reality of truth that exists independently of us. He is, at this level, a realist. At the next level,

also ontological, he proposes—and explains why he does so—that at least some of this reality is available for human understanding.

The next levels in the hierarchy are epistemological. At level 3, he presents a very general epistemological model; at level 4, an explanation of how the validity of what we can generally know takes place. He develops at level 5 what he calls a field-specific epistemology that addresses the problem of how we can learn and know in a specific field. He then (level 6) describes how a field-specific epistemology can be validated. At the last and highest level—level 7—he deals with psychological knowledge directly.

As a psychologist (not a philosopher), I found the hierarchical levels a helpful way to approach the problem. Hersch's hierarchical model should be useful to those trying to understand how philosophy and psychology relate—even if his particular hierarchical ordering is not entirely accepted.

The highest level—the only psychological level—in his hierarchical analysis is a phenomenological one: here the author moves directly from phenomenological philosophy and its understanding of human experience (for example, Husserl, Heidegger, Marcel) to psychological experience. His approach is also strongly influenced by existential psychologists. This phenomenological/existential position is a third major characteristic of Hersch's approach.

A fourth contribution of the book is the author's representation of both the therapist and patient interacting in the therapeutic session. He calls this process a "beams of light through time" model. It is a summary description of how his different levels of reality and knowing relate to both patient and therapist as they interact.

According to Hersch, key features of the model are: "It is *relational* and intrinsically *interactional*, and does not involve merely the simple addition of separable, isolated parts"; "It is *temporal, historical* and *dynamic* rather than a static, timeless, or 'snapshot' approach"; "It implies a continuous process, involving the *active* structuring and restructuring of the phenomenological world, not merely the passive revealing of it"; "It is *direct* and *immediate* in showing real objects, not mere representations of them"; "It includes, but is not limited to, reason as one of its component *interpretive factors*" (p. 78).

I found this book extremely stimulating; many of its points are well made. While much of the vocabulary is technical, the author writes about as clearly as is possible given the nature of the material. I strongly recommend that any reader or library interested in the philosophical underpinnings of psychology or psychotherapy own this book. My reservations concern the phenomenological/existential model, in that the serious mental problems of many patients are not obviously addressable from this approach. This therapeutic framework is often too intellectual—too philosophical—to help many patients. For example, how does Hersch's philosophical model address borderline, narcissistic, seriously depressed or addicted patients? This may be possible, but examples would be useful.

The phenomenological material would also have been enriched if some of the recent Catholic understanding of the person (also phenomenological in nature) had been included; I am thinking here of the work of

Ratzinger, Wojtyla, and other personalists. The interesting discussions of the importance of the body given by Hersch in his welcome and persistent critique of Cartesian dualism would perhaps have benefited from the contributions of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999).

The book is obviously a labor of many years in which Hersch has wrestled with these issues; during this period he has been in close contact and dialogue with both philosophers and psychotherapists. The result is well worth the reader's effort.—Paul C. Vitz, *New York University, Institute for the Psychological Sciences*.

HICKS, Stephen R. C. *Explaining Postmodernism: Skepticism and Socialism from Rousseau to Foucault*. Tempe, Arizona: Scholarly Publishing, 2005. v + 230 pp. Paper, \$18.95—The opening sentence of this instructive book declares that “we have entered a new intellectual age.” “Postmodernism” is a name that some scholars give to the academic *zeitgeist*. Hicks's task is to explain the topology and the genesis of postmodernism. This is a welcome achievement since many people wonder what rationale, or lack thereof, postmodernists have used to make their case and what historical philosophical changes have caused the proliferation of postmodernists in university culture. To answer, Hicks writes six chapters. Chapter 1 describes postmodernism as a movement, trying to identify traits that give various postmodernist theories a family resemblance. The rest of the book—chapter 2: “The Counter-Enlightenment Attack on Reason”; chapter 3: “The Twentieth century Collapse of Reason”; chapter 4: “The Climate of Collectivism”; chapter 5: “The Crisis of Socialism”; chapter 6: “Postmodern Strategy”—expands the original description of postmodernism by identifying and discussing its origins and the emergence of its principal themes over the past two centuries. This explanation is exceedingly helpful to those readers who regard postmodernism as having fashioned a strange and inhospitable cultural landscape. In such an alien milieu, classically trained academics (not to mention nonacademics who sometimes encounter postmodernists) may wonder what has happened to the university and perhaps even the wider culture it influences. By the end of the book, the reader may remain ill at ease with postmodernist malaise, but Hicks's lucid account will demystify the subject.

Hicks's impressive grasp of the history of philosophy over the past few centuries enables him to explain postmodernism by identifying its signposts. He lets sensitive analysis of the memorable episodes of postmodernism speak to the essential issues that drive it. His treatment of the importance of Kant's skepticism in getting the postmodernist engine going down the track is especially instructive. However, Hicks understates, or perhaps does not see, that the origins of postmodernist skepticism are already in what he calls “modernism.” Postmodernists and

historians of postmodernism often overlook this because they want to play on the device that modernism really is different in kind from postmodernism. And certainly the latter differs in its radicalization of modernist assumptions. But modernist assumptions nonetheless—whether one calls them “Enlightened” or not—are the remote reasons for postmodernism. Mortimer Adler made this point some years ago in his book, *Ten Philosophical Mistakes*, in which he argued that the seeds of radical irrationalism, epistemological relativism, and antihumanist nihilism were planted when Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume disconnected the intellect from real, extramental things and made ideas, states of intramental consciousness, the objects of knowledge. If anti-realism is implicit in modernism, then postmodernism is a working out of modernist assumptions, not a philosophical movement different in kind from modernist philosophies. Postmodernism unmasks modernism, making explicit and radical what is implicit and undeveloped.

But my complaint on this fine point does not detract from Hicks's overall impressive achievement. As a historical analysis, his exposition focuses on two broad lines of development, one epistemological, the other, social or moral. The epistemological line is skepticism; the social or moral is collectivism. In keeping with this twofold development, Hicks explains that postmodernism is enthusiastically antirealist. This current of postmodernism descends from Kant and his epigones. Hicks quotes Marcuse, who triumphantly proclaims that “Reason [in the Hegelian sense] signifies the ‘absolute annihilation’ of the common-sense world” (p. 188 n. 19). Moreover, postmodernism is an attack on classical liberalism and capitalism. Accordingly, it champions collectivism. This stream emanates out of Rousseau. Hicks covers these historical developments thoroughly and effectively in merely 200 pages.

His closing chapter is clever in the way he gently and almost imperceptibly lets criticisms of postmodernism percolate and emerge in his telling the postmodernist tale. By the end of the book, Hicks has made a persuasive and disturbing argument that postmodernism is not philosophy, but antiphilosophy, and offers nothing salutary for civilization. Its obsessive antirealism is a sophistical cover for irrationalism and its adherence to collectivism persistently rationalizes totalitarianism (characterized as “reverse Thrasymacheanism,” p. 182). Postmodernist socialists claim to advocate the interests of the common people, but their advocacy seems disingenuous if they seek the “absolute annihilation” of the commonsense world.

Hicks intelligently analyzes his subject and cleverly criticizes it. These virtues he complements with (for the most part) historical acumen and clear writing. I hope that books like Hicks's become a trend. The restoration of our philosophical and cultural health depend on it.—Curtis L. Hancock, *Rockhurst University*.

HUSSERL, Edmund. *Philosophy of Arithmetic: Psychological and Logical Investigations with Supplementary Texts from 1887–1901*. Edmund

Husserl Collected Works, vol. 10. Translated by Dallas Willard. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003. lxiv + 513 pp. Cloth, \$72.00—In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, philosophy of mathematics was a relatively new subject divided into a variety of dynamically opposed research programs. Edmund Husserl's (1891) *Philosophie der Arithmetik* joined the ensuing debate by offering a unique phenomenological perspective on the psychological origins of arithmetical concepts. Husserl's theory, apparently going against the grain of what was to become the dominant Platonist and extensionalist *force majeure*, was destined to be misunderstood, its purpose and arguments sometimes willfully misrepresented. As a result, despite its brilliant down to earth discussions of the nature of mathematical ideas, Husserl's text has remained obscure, virtually unacknowledged except as an illustration of how not to explain the principles of arithmetic by mainstream analytic movements in the philosophy of logic and mathematics.

Husserl might at last begin to receive the attention his philosophy of arithmetic deserves now that Willard's translation of his first major work is on the shelf. Willard brings to the task a solid grasp of Husserl's philosophy in all its phases, with special sympathy for the early period when Husserl was still powerfully under the influence of Franz Brentano. Willard has produced not only an accurate rendering of Husserl's technical prose but has crafted a fluid and graceful text that is as much a pleasure to read as if Husserl had originally composed it in English. Willard's substantive background in phenomenology and the history of logic and mathematics in the German tradition enable him to grasp what is essential in each sentence of Husserl's text, where he finds the most natural equivalent at no sacrifice of exact meaning. The result is a book that is faithful to Husserl's purpose and technical distinctions and serves to make his ideas highly accessible to contemporary English readers.

The book opens with Willard's informative 52-page "Translator's Introduction." Willard does a superb job of guiding the reader through the essentials of Husserl's philosophy of arithmetic, providing historical context and important sidelines to Husserl's thought to aid in understanding what he is trying to achieve in the text, what sources influenced him positively or negatively, and the book's critical reception as well as its role in the later development of Husserl's phenomenology. The text itself, in two parts and thirteen chapters, is followed by Husserl's *Selbstanzeige*, or personal advertising blurb; by a set of "Supplementary Texts" (1887–1901), some of which have previously been translated from the *Husserliana* by Willard, including Husserl's *Habilitationsschrift*; and by five essays on special topics relating to the concept and theory of totality, operation, the completeness of axiomatic systems, and the formal determination of a manifold, with Husserl's notes on lectures in mathematics by David Hilbert.

Brentano's descriptive psychology provides Husserl with the fundamental proto-phenomenological distinction of his philosophy of mathematics. Following Brentano, Husserl distinguishes authentic from inauthentic mathematical presentations. Authentic presentations relevant to arithmetical reasoning include small aggregates of things that we can

take in perceptually and conceptually at a glance. They feature the most basic intuitions concerning handfuls of easily comprehended things and their augmentation, depletion, and division into subgroups that can be held in thought without much effort. Authentic presentations of such basic collectivities and the operations that we can witness perceptually or imagine before the mind's eye provide the intuitive foundation for all of arithmetic in Husserl's philosophy. Where authentic presentations give out at the natural limits of human cognitive abilities, inauthentic presentations take over for the comparatively more sophisticated superstructure of advanced arithmetic involving numbers too large to comprehend except with the assistance of informative mathematical notations, axiom systems, algorithms, and inference mechanisms.

Husserl's two-stage theory of arithmetical knowledge is attractive in many ways. It combines an intuitive basis for mathematical judgment in perception that is consistent with reasonable anthropological and developmental psychological assumptions about the origins of caveman arithmetic ($II + III = IIIII$), while avoiding the implausibility of trying to account for more complicated levels of mathematics in terms of immediate sense impressions where vision, imagination, and conceptualization evidently fail us. Husserl considers the cutoff between authentic and inauthentic arithmetical presentations as falling somewhere between eight and twelve, with ten as the standard number of fingers a good compromise. These items within a totality can still be grasped, considered, and manipulated on a small scale in ways that are conceptually related to the arithmetical operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. They are enough to give us the basic ideas of arithmetic, after which we invent or learn notations that provide at best inauthentic presentations of mathematical concepts removed from the immediate perception of things by which we are able to work with larger numbers and more complex algebraic operations. Husserl is not interested in the exact maximum number of authentically presentable items in such a totality, which in any event is presumably variable from subject to subject with different mental capabilities. It is nevertheless noteworthy that where other theories begin with the idea of a unit as the basis of arithmetic, to which successor functions or the like are iteratively applied in order to generate the whole number series, Husserl takes his point of departure from the immediate perception of entire groupings and pluralities of things from which he arrives at the concept of the individual item only analytically by removing and subdividing the collection until its absolute minima are derived.

Whether psychology is a good or bad thing as the basis for an analysis of arithmetical concepts is another question, and whether Husserl was committed to an objectionable or unobjectionable type of psychologism, may have yet to be decided. That he developed some sort of psychological account of arithmetical concepts that falls between Frege's extreme complaints and Willard's flat denial seems only reasonable after working through Husserl's writings on logic and mathematics. Now that a new audience has access to Husserl's work in translation, these historical-philosophical questions can be profitably reopened, and the value of his phenomenological approach to the foundations of arithmetic can be reexamined from a more impartial standpoint as a legiti-

mate alternative to Fregean extensionalism. The real debate over the advantages and disadvantages of Frege's and Husserl's philosophies of arithmetic may accordingly have only just begun.—Dale Jacquette, *The Pennsylvania State University*.

INGHAM, Mary Beth and Mechthild DREYER. *The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus: An Introduction*. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004. 228 pp. Cloth, \$39.95—John Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308) is a name that many know but far fewer have studied. No doubt, many professors shy away from teaching Scotus for the very reasons that make the study of Scotus so daunting in general: an awkward writing style, a technical vocabulary, a subtle and seemingly obscure style of argumentation. Now there is help. Ingham and Dreyer have performed a valuable service to study of medieval thought with the publication of *The Philosophical Vision of Jun Duns Scotus* by providing a lucid and comprehensive introduction to Scotism. While they clearly wrote the book for the student beginning to study Scotus, they write with such clarity and insight about subtle points in scholastic disputes that even more advanced students and scholars will benefit from reading this book.

The book is divided into eight chapters, covering various branches of philosophy, beginning with epistemology and proceeding through metaphysics to psychology and ethics. The book's first chapter prepares the reader for this philosophical overview by sketching the historical and intellectual context in which Duns Scotus lived and worked. In this chapter the authors walk their reader through the maze of the Scotistic corpus acting as skilled guides. Scotus, they explain, has three different commentaries on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard: his earliest commentary, referred to as the *Lectura*; a later, revised commentary, the *Ordinatio*; and a third, final commentary done in Paris, the *Reportatio Parisiensis*. Chapter 2 explains Scotus's foundational doctrine about the univocity of being. Chapter 3 then shows how this univocal concept works in the science of being, that is, metaphysics. The authors next take up the problem of contingency as Scotus conceives of it in the light of necessitarian views of reality. Scotus argues for a radically contingent universe that is dependent on the divine will, yet has a deep basis for the necessity found in its natures in nothing less than divine knowledge. Ingham and Dreyer carefully discuss how Scotus attempts to remain firmly within the realm of metaphysical realism by his teaching that each common nature possesses a real unity that serves as the basis for the mind's universal concept, even if this unity is less than the numerical unity of the individual. In itself "horseness" is just "horseness" and thus indifferent to being either universalized in the mind or individuated in the concrete horse. In chapters 5 through 7, Ingham and Dreyer provide a balanced reading of the Scotistic ethics by explicating in some

detail his notion of the will as the rational potency within the human soul. The final chapter of the book provides a general appreciation of the significance and enduring value of Scotus's thought.

Ingham and Dreyer's treatment of the foundation of freedom in the will's act of self-control is particularly interesting. Intellectual desire is not sufficient to explain rational choice in Scotus's eyes, because "the intellect is determined by external factors" (p. 161). One must come to understand a deeper basis in the will's capacity for self-restraint. The will possesses two capacities: choosing between two objects and choosing between willing and not willing. Not willing (or self-restraint) is itself a positive act of the will. Because of this capacity the will is "undetermined by any cause or series of causes external to its own act of choice" (p. 150); the will is "self-determined" and a self-moving cause.

Even this, however, is not the whole story, for this discussion sets the stage for the authors to enter into the scholarly dispute about Scotus's view of the foundation of the will's freedom: whether this foundation is found merely in the will's being undetermined by external causes or in being a rational potency with two innate inclinations toward the good, that is, an affection for possession (*affectio commodi*) and an affection for justice (*affectio iustitiae*). The first inclination is a natural desire for happiness or possession. It terminates in the useful or pleasurable good. The affection for justice terminates in goods worthy of love in themselves, that is, disinterested love. According to this reading of Scotus, it is when the affection for justice moderates and guides the affection for happiness that the moral agent loves in an orderly manner. The affection for justice orients the rational moral agent to an objective order of created goods and, in so doing, leads to the fullest rational perfection of such an agent. "These two innate inclinations make the will rational by virtue of their interaction in every moral choice" (p. 158). Ingham and Dreyer thus argue that Scotus maintains a rational foundation for freedom.

Not everyone will agree on this issue, but Duns Scotus is at least given a sympathetic hearing. He has rarely been presented with greater skill and insight than in Ingham and Dreyer's introduction to his philosophy.—Christopher Cullen, *Fordham University*.

JAROSZYNSKI, Piotr and Mathew ANDERSON. *Ethics: The Drama of the Moral Life*. Staten Island: Alba House, 2003. xxvii + 145 pp. Paper, \$14.95—There is no dearth of ethics texts today. Most of the texts are cafeteria plan anthologies, which offer point/counterpoint essays on almost any theory or applied topic one can imagine. Very few of the texts, however, actually offer an ethic as such. They are filled with problems, but virtually empty of principles. Universal moral norms and metaphysical or anthropological ethical foundations appear to have been anathematized from their contents.

Jaroszynski's text defies this cultural *mélange* because it does offer an ethic. As Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., remarks, "This book offers an attractive synthesis of classical virtue ethics with a Christian ethic of love" (text back cover). Explanations of the hierarchy of the good (chapter 2), the moral decision (chapter 3), and the natural law (chapter 4) are firmly grounded in Christian anthropology and are integrated into a comprehensive areteology. This areteology presents in-depth treatment of the virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice, and it clearly shows why they can and should make a concrete and significant difference in the drama of a person's moral life.

Cardinal Dulles also observes that because the text "restricts itself to basic principles, it is well suited to introduce undergraduate students to the great tradition of ethical thinking." The text would indeed be a worthwhile selection for an introductory ethics course. In addition to its lucid presentation of basic principles and its polished writing, chapter study and reflection questions and a useful lexicon of key terms would certainly enhance its pedagogical effectiveness. Moreover, it successfully updates its classical and Christian heritage with discussions of many topical issues, including sexual morality, environmentalism, just war theory, abortion, and the cultural impact of the media.

Beyond its pedagogical merits, however, there is an aspect to the text which is unique. This aspect is the text's background. Mathew Anderson notes in his introduction that Jaroszynski, who holds the Chair of the Philosophy of Culture at the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland, originally wrote the text for high school students in Poland as part of the important task of reintroducing to Polish education gems of Western and Christian civilization that had become lost due to the censorship of Communism (p. xvi).

Fr. Krapiec explains in his foreword that the so-called socialist morality based on deception and class hatred cast out religion and Christian morality from Polish schools and publications. He avers that, "We need a deeper understanding of morality and a great moral effort. It is easy to destroy the moral order and good customs, but it is very difficult to rebuild them once they are gone" (p. xix).

The text was written with a mission, which is expressed in its formal dedication to Pope John Paul II, and supported in a letter that the Holy Father sent to Jaroszynski (published in the text). This mission emerges at various points, indicating moral difficulties in current United States society. Though many examples could be cited, a prominent one is Jaroszynski's discussion of justice (chapter 4). Contrary to the ideological egalitarianism of socialism and communism, Jaroszynski states plainly that in classical and Christian tradition, "Justice is not based on equality but equity" (p. 99).

In U.S. society, "justice" has become practically synonymous with "fairness," and fairness is becoming more and more understood exclusively as the sameness of equality. Equity, however, advances the fairness of deservedness. Equity, then, is more basic than equality because equality is a condition, which, depending on circumstances, we deserve. For instance, we deserve equal opportunity for education. Does this

entail, however, that those who properly deserve admission into a law or medical school should be rejected in favor of equalizing minority representation in these professional fields?

Jaroszynski warns that "when the masses of people have not received a proper moral education, they simply follow the suggestions of the mass media, which is the most organized cultural force in society" (p. 72). This text not only provides an alternative to the mass of "principleless" ethics anthologies extant today, but with its mission, it communicates moral foundations upon which mature moral decisions can be made.—Tom Michaud, *Wheeling Jesuit University*.

KAINZ, Howard P. *Natural Law: An Introduction and Re-Examination*. Chicago: Open Court, 2004. xvi + 151 pp. Paper, \$25.95—In a relatively short span, Kainz has written a remarkably comprehensive and incisive introduction to natural law thinking. Of the book's eight chapters, the first four are historical, taking the reader from ancient Greece and Rome, to Aquinas and Suarez, Grotius to Kant, and finally to contemporary articulations of the topic. The final four chapters are analytical, addressing subjects such as the conceptual analysis of key terms, problem areas, types of natural law, and the natural law response to contemporary moral problems. The book has a comprehensive bibliography.

Kainz's handling of natural law thinking in ancient Greece and Rome is precise, for although he uses as his chapter heading "Concepts of Natural Law in Ancient Greece and Rome," he is careful not to ascribe explicit natural law thinking to the Presocratics, Plato, or Aristotle, though in the case of the latter two thinkers, especially Aristotle, they were arguing for what is the essence of natural law thinking: an eternal, unchanging, absolute standard for human conduct. Kainz does use the caption, "Natural Law and Natural Justice in Aristotle" (p. 5), but he qualifies it: "it is conceivable that natural human sociability itself constitutes a significant element of a latent natural law theory in Aristotle [but] . . . explicitly Aristotle neither enunciates nor expands on any natural law theory in the traditional sense" (p.10). This parsing is prudential since, if a thinker does not explicitly refer to a theory or position, it is not correct to say that he holds it. But when it comes to the Stoics, there is no need to temporize, as they were explicit, full-fledged natural law theorists. Kainz appropriately accords them the attention they deserve. It is remarkable to find overviews of natural law that omit the Stoics entirely. Chapters 2 and 3 reveal the bridge from natural law, as treated by Aquinas and Suarez, seen as part of divine law, to the secularization of natural law theory at the hands of Grotius and Hobbes. Although acknowledging that earlier thinkers like Robert Bellarmine and other scholastics had adverted to the possible validity of natural law without God, Kainz limns Grotius's bold assertion of the independence of the natural law theory from any grounding in theological or religious premises as the decisive proclamation of the secularization of the natural law theory. Kainz's discussion of Aquinas includes the very impor-

tant question of whether Aquinas is “actually ‘deriving’ moral laws from natural inclinations—thus falling into the ‘naturalistic’ fallacy” (p. 22)? He puts that question to rest with the observation that Aquinas does not suppose that any deductions from natural law principles rely on the necessity used in theoretical reasoning but rather apply “for the most part” (p. 23) and thus have exceptions. Chapter 4 provides a glossary of frequently misunderstood concepts that are basic in natural law discussions, such as “nature,” “natural,” and “perversion.”

Kainz’s focus on the debate between traditional and new Thomistic approaches to natural law on today’s American scene in chapter 4 contradicts modern beliefs that Thomism is monolithic and static. Departing from traditional natural law ethics, which has its proximate starting point in human nature, the new natural law theorizing of Grisez and those it influenced, like John Finnis, find the starting point in value rather than nature, thereby avoiding the fact/value controversy: how derive an *ought* from an *is*? This discussion ties in with the question Kainz raises in his earlier discussion of Aquinas as to whether Aquinas commits the “naturalistic fallacy.”

Unless explicitly confining its scope to a specific historical period or thinker, any book on the natural law will leave its readers unfulfilled if it avoids a discussion of how it addresses contemporary ethical issues. Here Kainz does not disappoint, as he devotes the final chapter to the positions that a natural law ethics should take on the hot-button topics of the day: abortion, contraception, homosexuality, assisted suicide, terrorism, affirmative action, stem-cell research, and “political correctness.” Kainz’s formulation of the question of abortion in the instance of pregnancy caused by rape is problematic: does the natural law injunction to reproduce require the woman to carry the rapist’s baby to term or does it no longer apply, thereby allowing her to abort? He concludes in favor of the latter alternative. But why does he posit as the governing principle the duty to reproduce rather than the first and most important duty, the duty to preserve life? The latter duty would point to a different answer than abortion.

Nevertheless, Kainz’s book is a masterful treatment of natural law theory and is both a delight and an illumination to read.—Raymond Dennehy, *University of San Francisco*.

KROKER, Arthur. *The Will to Technology and the Culture of Nihilism. Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Marx*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004. vii + 228 pp. Cloth, \$50.00; paper, \$24.95—This is the first volume in a series called “Digital Futures,” edited by Marilouise Kroker, the author’s wife, and the author, who teaches in the Political Science Department at the University of Victoria, British Columbia. The text consists of two related parts of unequal length: “The Culture of Nihilism,” which takes up most of the volume, and “Art and Technology,” a brief concluding part. Each part is a mixture of theoretical essays and quasi-

autobiographical "stories" (p. 169, note: pp. 36–7, 68–72, 100–16, 149–53, 178–81, 184–202) that illustrate the ideas discussed in the essays. A sense of the author's position in each part may be gained by reading the section on "Disappearing into Images" (pp. 163–5) from the first part, where the dominance of the image in contemporary culture is demonstrated, and the concluding section of the book, "Body and Codes" (pp. 208–12), in which the author briefly discusses the ethical dilemma of "*living in a culture of twenty-third century engineering and nineteenth century ethics*" (p. 209, author's emphasis), a solution to which, he suggests, will be found only in art. Professor Kroker is both a critic of and fascinated participant in events he believes signal the impending "post-human" era (pp. 33–72 and *passim*) which he discusses in the context of the analyses of Marx (the philosopher of "*streamed capitalism*," who is curiously termed "the first post-Marxist" [p. 135]), Nietzsche (the prophet of "*cynical data*"), and Heidegger (the thinker of "*hyper-nihilism*") (p. 31). Among Kroker's three intellectual heroes, Heidegger emerges as the central figure, "the key philosopher of fully realized technological society" (p. 37) who "overcame the oblivion of disciplinary boundaries" (p. 64) and whose "philosophy of technology is itself a transition between the modern century . . . and a future not yet disclosed" (p. 54). For the author, "Heidegger's mind lies between past and future" (p. 42) and "[h]is writing is the future of the past" (p. 45). Heidegger's 1953 essay, "The Question Concerning Technology," is the central text of the book.

It may seem remarkable that Professor Kroker also cites with nearly equivalent reverence Bill Gates's *Business @ the Speed of Thought*, but the incongruity is eased when one realizes that, for the author, Gates is the living clue to the Heidegger–Marx/Heidegger–Nietzsche connections he identifies. In Kroker's analysis, Gates plays the role of both heroic visionary and subtly sinister harbinger of the end of the fully human. Moreover, "[w]hat is disclosed in [Gates's] book is nothing less than a general political philosophy" (p. 106) that serves as a basis for understanding the construction of the "digital nervous system" in which, Kroker contends, we are all irrecusably implicated and its disembodiment in the first "virtual class" (pp. 127–8), "the self-realized form of the knowledge theory of value" (p. 141) of which we are all already members and which Heidegger foresaw. The "virtual class is . . . a specialist class of the digital nervous system." It is "how the circulation of the digital circuit is deep-time coded into every dimension of human experience. . . . It is a Heideggerian class working in the practico-inert of Marxist social history" (p. 128; see also p. 219 n. 8, where Kroker finds an equivalence between Marx's surplus-value and Heidegger's notion of "standing reserve," to which he believed human beings have been reduced). "Gates as the ascetic priest of the digital world is Nietzsche's *übermensch*, the 'overman' whose ascetic task lies in establishing the value-direction of the softwaring of human flesh" (p. 115) and "Heidegger is Nietzsche recombinant" (p. 74). Kroker mines *On the Genealogy of Morals* for its premonitions of Heidegger's insights into the impact of technology on human beings, asserting that "Nietzsche is the fatal object of attraction and repulsion around which Heidegger's thought hovers like a captive moon" (p. 75).

The reader hurried and harried by the onrush of information—print and other media—that demand his attention may turn first to “The Despot Image or the Bored Eye?” (pp. 166–8), where we learn how “human flesh literally struggles to become the image of its own impossible perfection,” given that “we ourselves are images to the world surrounding us” (p. 166). Often turning to Heidegger’s observation that we have become bored with being human, in this section Kroker declares emphatically: “*It is the age of the bored eye,*” “*The bored eye is a natural nihilist*” (author’s emphases) and it is the fate of our generation “to experience the fatal destiny of the image as both *goal and precondition* of human culture” (p. 167, author’s emphasis; see also pp. 34–6, 59–62). Thankfully, the intervention of art will provide an anodyne to the hegemony of the image (pp. 62–6, 157–9), not art in the sense of representations of the past guarded day and night in those fortresses known as museums, but art as a Frankensteinian recreative force that aims to better or improve upon nature, yet in the process alters the body’s senses with machinery originally developed as extensions of the senses by functionally interfusing tissue and electronic instruments. The book concludes with “stories” illustrating some nerve-racking and perhaps for some readers shocking projects underway in a variety of engineering laboratories around the world (pp. 178–88) that are intended to produce means for such interpenetrations of the organic and the electronic. “Literally,” Kroker warns, as a result of these undertakings “the organic body is about to be replaced, redesigned, and left behind as gene kill by biotechnology acting as a predatory war machine” (p. 187). “With or without our consent or public discussion the digital future leaps beyond the old forms of twentieth century politics, finance, culture, and society to create an unpredictable future in which the programmer, the engineer, the eugenicist, the multinational multimedia czar install the ruling codes of the digital eye” (p. 185). About to enter the impending post-human era, “we are one of the last generations before something fundamentally new” (p. 188).

The breathless rhetoric of Kroker’s book requires taking pause from time to time to assess and reflect on the details of the author’s presentation, which often has the quality of Nietzschean declamation rather than the formal argumentation to which most readers of this journal are probably accustomed. If there is a certain incredulity in seeing Kant juxtaposed with Gates, Kathy Acker and William Burroughs with Hegel and Heraclitus, after reading a few sections the reader may wonder whether he should have purchased the book. There will be good reason for him regret, too, since one need not purchase a “hard copy” of it. The text is available in virtual form, online, at the author’s own www.cttheory.net, the internet site of *ctheory*, “an international peer-reviewed journal of theory, technology, and culture.”—Miles Groth, *Wagner College*.

LAPORTE, Joseph., *Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change*. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. x + 221 pp. Cloth, \$70.00—LaPorte's monograph addresses a number of eminently important topics in the philosophy of science, biology, and language and undertakes the ambitious task of reassessing the causal theory of reference and its role in contemporary philosophy.

In chapter 1 it is argued that species and other biological taxa are natural kinds. This view is defended (i) against accounts according to which biological taxa are not kinds at all, but individuals, and (ii) against accounts according to which biological taxa are kinds but not natural. With regard to (i), LaPorte argues for the minimalist position that both the species-as-individuals interpretation as well as the species-as-kinds interpretation can be viewed as an adequate reconstruction of scientific species-talk. With regard to (ii), he first adopts the liberal conception that a natural kind is a kind with explanatory value—thus allowing for naturalness to come in degrees and respects—and he then shows that, unsurprisingly, biological kinds qualify as natural.

Essentialism with respect to biological taxa according to which at least some interesting statements about biological kinds are necessarily true is discussed in chapter 2. Defending a broadly Kripkean line with respect to identity and necessity concerning biological taxa, LaPorte argues that theoretical identity statements like "Mammalia = the clade that stems from the ancestral group G" contain a rigid description that is supposed to state the (historical) essence of the kind in question. In LaPorte's view, this essentialism accords well with contemporary systematics. The same holds for the essentialist claim that if a species or higher-ranked taxon belongs to a genus, family, order, and so on, it does so essentially. On the other hand, for quite general reasons, no current account of species can tolerate the essentialist claim that members of a species belong to that species essentially. Nor do populations and subspecies essentially belong to the relevant species. Nevertheless, a "healthy portion of essentialism about kinds withstands scrutiny" (p. 62).

The widely held view according to which scientists' conclusions about kinds' essences are discovered to be true by empirical investigation is addressed in chapter 3. Here LaPorte parts way with the Kripke-Putnam orthodoxy: It is argued that, contrary to the received view, scientists' conclusions about the essence of natural kinds are generally not discovered to be true. Rather, essence-revealing statements that mark empirical advancement like "whales are mammals, not fish" and "guinea pigs are not rodents" are stipulated to be true and the meaning of the kind terms in question is changed. Biologists discover historical relationships between groups of organisms. As LaPorte convincingly argues, however, they do not discover that earlier speakers, who knew less about guinea pigs and rodents, for instance, were straightforwardly wrong about whether guinea pigs are rodents. After having discovered empirically that guinea pigs are not as closely related to mice and rats as previously supposed, biologists had two options to refine the meaning of "rodent": They could have concluded—as they in fact did—that the traditionally recognized rodents do not form a historical group and suggested that guinea pigs be ousted from the rodent camp. But they could

just as well have urged that "rodent" is far more inclusive than previously realized and insisted that guinea pigs are rodents. (A third option would have been to continue to say that guinea pigs are rodents without changing the extension/meaning of "rodent" by denying that rodents are a historical group worthy of taxonomic recognition.) Neither the conclusion that guinea pigs are rodents nor the conclusion that they are not rodents is quite right or quite wrong on the earlier use of "rodent": It was vague about that matter. To eliminate that vagueness, the meaning of "rodent" had to be refined, and it could have been refined either way.

The lessons drawn in the previous chapter for biological kinds are shown to apply also to chemical kinds, another paradigmatic group of natural kinds in chapter 4. LaPorte agrees with Kripke and Putnam that the microstructure of samples plays some role in the reference of chemical-kind terms. However, contrary to Kripke and Putnam, the familiar qualities of chemical kinds also play some role in the reference of the terms in question, and according to LaPorte, there is no clear answer as to what should be said when familiar qualities and the underlying microstructure come apart. In such cases, a hitherto unrecognized vagueness in the application of the term is exposed, which calls for meaning refinement. This thesis is nicely illustrated by the history of the term "jade" (or Chinese "yü"). LaPorte further argues that even if we assume that a term definitely refers to a microstructural natural kind, there is still trouble for the orthodox claim that scientists' conclusions about the nature of substances are discoveries rather than stipulations due to the existence of related microstructures: For example, "[t]he majority of what we prescientifically called water has more than one microstructural feature that we could have concluded distinguishes the true from the spurious samples believed to be water" (p. 103).

LaPorte discusses the consequences for incommensurability and scientific progress of his account in chapter 5. It is typically assumed that the causal theory of reference provides reference stability across theory change, thus blocking incommensurability and accounting for scientific progress. According to this view, scientists today offer better descriptions of the same entities that earlier theories referred to (Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'," in *Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 2 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975], p. 237). According to LaPorte, there is good reason to resist, with Kuhn, this naive picture of knowledge accumulation, since as has been shown in the previous chapters, the reference/meaning of kind terms may change, even given the causal theory: Scientists often refine the use of a term in the light of empirical information that could not have been anticipated by the coiner of the term. LaPorte thus opts for a moderate Kuhnianism that is supposed to leave enough common ground between a theory and its successor to account for scientific progress "either in form of statements that do not lose their original meaning or in form of refined descendants of vague statements" (p. 134).

In *Two Dogmas* Quine argued that there is no difference between theory change and meaning change by attacking analyticity (W. V. O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," *The Philosophical Review* 60 (1951): 20–43). Although it is widely acknowledged that Quine has cast serious

doubts on analyticity, it is generally assumed that these doubts, *pace* Quine, do not carry over to necessity, for the causal theory of reference allows for statements to be necessary yet not analytic. Thus, proponents of the causal theory appear free to accept a posteriori necessity and deny analyticity. LaPorte argues otherwise in chapter 6. According to him, a commitment to the necessity associated with the causal theory implies a commitment to analyticity. We thus have to choose: We can have either the familiar necessity or the familiar dismissal of analyticity, but we can't have both. According to LaPorte, it is the Quinean arguments against analyticity that should be rejected.

LaPorte's style is clear and concise, his arguments challenging and generally convincing. I warmly recommend this book to anyone interested in the philosophy of science, biology, and language.—Jochen Faseler, *University of Bonn*.

MAGEE, Glenn Alexander. *Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001. xii + 287 pp. Cloth, \$39.95—Reading Glenn Alexander Magee's *Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition* is very much like a walk down memory lane. This is not just because Magee generously references my own dissertation of almost thirty years ago but also because he covers ground on which I have written with sympathy and interest since then. Magee has produced a splendid study that marshals all the available evidence for the Hermetic background and interests of Hegel. This is no small achievement. It involves mastering a side of intellectual history that is frequently referenced but rarely comprehended and an exhaustive account of its application to the formidable philosophical apparatus of Hegel. The result deserves to become the standard reference work for this dimension, not only of Hegel, but of the entire idealist context.

The value of what Magee has done can best be appreciated by recalling the number of times that scholars of Hegel have pointed toward the relationship with the esoteric and mystical sources in which he had been immersed. The romantic and idealist circle at Jena seemed at times consumed with an unquenchable thirst for the Gnostic, Hermetic, theosophical, and speculative mysticism that they felt resonated with their own project. Moreover, the connection between the philosophical and the mystical does not have to be discerned through some secret reading of their texts. It is openly acknowledged, and they make no secret of their admiration. Both Schelling and Hegel extensively reference Jacob Boehme, a pivotal link within this mystico-speculative tradition. Hegel singles him out in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* as the great speculative source of the modern world, comparable in significance to the Baconian empiricist foundation of natural science. With Magee's study in hand, scholars need no longer shy away from this acknowledged connection and can certainly no longer employ the excuse of its obscurity to resist closer examination.

But having conceded the need for a reconsideration, it is not entirely clear that the result will yield the kind of direct relationship that Magee and I, too, at one time thought. The most obvious problem is that when Hegel or Schelling reference their parallels with Boehme it is also to emphasize their distance from him. Boehme is portrayed as expressing through figurative language what they are conceiving philosophically. The question then is, how are we to understand the relationship? Is Hegel to be read as a variant of Hermetic Gnosticism or is it the other way around? Does Hegel provide us with access to the existential sources from which Gnosticism is derived? When one is flush with the excitement of uncovering a new path into German idealism one is inclined to overlook the realization that it leads both ways. To this extent we all suffer from the dominance of the chronological model of history, an occupational hazard of intellectual history as a discipline, and it requires considerable distance in order to see the privileging of one direction for what it is. Later we can see that the phenomenon of Gnosticism with all of its variants can perhaps be better understood as an inchoate attempt to get at what is expressed with much greater precision in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* or Schelling's *Philosophy of Revelation*. It is perhaps of some considerable significance that Hegel's claim to have arrived at absolute knowledge is shot through with such ambivalence that it seems to undermine its own claim. Schelling of course flatly denies the possibility, thus burying the aspiration of gnosis definitively.

This does not mean that a study of the Hermetic background is without relevance. The very extent to which it is referenced by the idealists themselves justifies the attention of scholarship. It is merely to point out that the relationship is complex, far more complex than one suspects at first glance. The approach I now would prefer is to begin with Hegel or Schelling themselves and, having gained an understanding of their enterprise, move back toward an examination of the sources. When this is done it becomes evident that such thinkers loom larger than the resonances on which they draw. They cannot be assimilated to a Gnostic or Hermetic pattern but must be viewed as engaged in such a profound reorientation of philosophy that they cannot be assimilated to any preceding patterns. A theosophical speculation on the emergence of all things from the divine One hardly does justice to the idealist project of understanding the all within which the possibility of thinking emerges. The significance of German idealism is that it is the point at which the meaning of the unity of thinking and being first begins to be unfolded. Philosophy has thereby entered a new mode in which the results of speculation no longer occupy the center of interest, because it is now the movement of thought by which they are reached that becomes of overriding importance. There may indeed be affinities with earlier mystico-speculative ventures but less is gained by noting this than meets the eye. In particular, one is likely to overlook the originality of the turn into which the idealist revolution has brought us. If Hegel and Schelling have opened up a fundamentally new mode of thinking philosophically then they can only be understood in their own terms. For that reason I am inclined to value more lightly the approach so

eminently displayed by Glenn Alexander Magee and to take leave from it with the words of Yeats on a comparable occasion: "Begone Von Hügel but with blessings on your head."—David Walsh, *The Catholic University of America*.

PANICHAS, George A. *Joseph Conrad: His Moral Vision*. Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 2005. xviii + 165 pp. Cloth, \$35.00—One does not normally think of Conrad as a moral philosopher, but it does not take Panichas long to convince the reader that, indeed, he was one. In successive chapters the book explores Conrad's "moral vision" as exemplified in *The Secret Agent*, *Lord Jim*, *Victory*, *Nostromo*, *Under Western Eyes*, *Chance*, and *The Rover*. This by no means exhausts Conrad's oeuvre, but it is in these imaginative novels that Conrad records the enigmatic spectacle of human existence, with all its rhythms and fluctuations, its tragedies and triumphs, hopes and fears, "Conrad's novels," writes Panichas, "are in the end great meditations on the conditions of life." Although one could not call him a philosopher, Conrad's descriptions of evil would rival that of any phenomenologist, and his teleological conception of nature and society could not be gainsaid by any student of Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics*. Few authors have better described the human condition. In *Nostromo*, Holroyd is described as "a frightful phenomenon—a will haunted by a fixed idea," Emilia Gould as a "woman with the genius of sympathetic intuition," and Decoud as a man of thought, "incorrigible in his skepticism." Yet acute observation does not necessarily make one wise. To see things as they are does not tell us how they ought to be, but to see them from a divine perspective, as did Conrad, is a different matter. Conrad was not a religious person. As a matter of fact, he professed a dislike of Christianity for "its doctrines, ceremonies, and festivals." He had more than an intuitive grasp of nature and nature's order, symbolically represented throughout his novels. Human frailty—evil, if you will—is presented against the backdrop of an ordered universe that includes the spiritual as well as the material. Stability in the social order entails a respect for tradition, the recognition of which is a necessary condition for growth and fulfillment. Evil is seen as disorder, the absence of what ought to be, the absence of stability.

In the decades since his death in 1924, Conrad has elicited analyses and commentaries from some of the great literary figures of the twentieth century, including T. S. Eliot, Henry James, George Orwell, and Virginia Woolf. George Panichas, a distinguished professor of comparative literature at the University of Maryland, is second to none in his appreciation of Conrad for both his prose and his moral vision. One cannot put this book down without wanting to reread Conrad's greatest novels or enjoy them firsthand if somehow they have escaped the reader's attention.—Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America*.

PROUDFOOT, Wayne, Editor. *William James and a Science of Religions*. Columbia University Press, 2004. 138 pp. Cloth, \$34.50—This collection of essays provides a critical analysis of the contribution *The Varieties of Religious Experience* has made over the past century and continues to make today. It is composed of papers that were given at a colloquium celebrating the centenary of the publication of *Varieties*. It offers a multi-disciplinary approach with scholars from philosophy, religion, history, and literature. The chapters were written by David A. Hollinger, Wayne Proudfoot, Ann Taves, Jerome Bruner, Richard Rorty, and Philip Kitcher. Each has a detailed knowledge of James and expertise in his or her respective field, so that the end product is a book that brings depth and breadth to the study of James and his views on religion. The collection itself does not have any specific theme that ties the essays together beyond the general analysis of James's influence. There is a sense in which this is positive in that the essays can be used together in the book or individually for study on a specific topic. The following review will look at some of the general aspects of James's approach to religion that are brought out in the book, and at two of the chapters more specifically to give an idea of how the authors address James's *Varieties*.

The central assumption behind James's project, which is noted in many of the essays, is that religious knowledge is not possible. This assumption shapes the approach James takes, and limits the possible conclusions he can reach. It was an assumption shared by William Clifford, who is the chief target of James's *The Will to Believe*. However, James goes in a different direction than Clifford. James agrees that religious knowledge is not possible, and yet asserts that religious experiences are useful. His hypothesis is that while religious experience does not provide knowledge, it can be the cause of beneficial effects in a person's life. His focus on results or effects is an important part of his pragmatism, and seems to grow out of his assumption that religious knowledge is not possible. It is the combination of making religious experience an object of scientific inquiry and a pragmatic assessment of religious experience that makes James unique during his time.

In his essay titled "Some Inconsistencies in James's *Varieties*," Richard Rorty asserts that while James asked some good questions, he does not offer a coherent set of answers to them. "The book is riddled with inconsistencies" (p. 86). The specific inconsistency that Rorty identifies is that James sometimes argues that supernaturalism might be true because it has beneficial effects, and sometimes that it is true because of all the experiential evidence for it. This is a tension between empiricism and pragmatism, where empiricism is taken as asserting that an experience can change one's worldview (p. 92). Rorty believes that the pragmatic approach is best and is consistent with naturalism.

This tension is set in its historical setting by David A. Hollinger in his essay "Damned for God's Glory: William James and the Scientific Vindication of Protestant Culture." He sees the tension as being between the inherited culture of Protestant Christianity, and the demands of modern science (p. 9). The latter emphasizes empirical testing and tends to assert that only physical explanations can be given to account for events. James attempts to combine both by arguing that if an individual has a

religious experience, and that experience produces beneficial results, then he can believe based on this experience without violating the ethics of belief. However, this does not constitute grounds of belief for someone who has not had this same experience. "He calls upon everyone to respect one another's beliefs except when those beliefs have been uncontrovertibly disproven" (p. 21). A problem that both Hollinger and Rorty point out is that James's use of the term "religion" is ambiguous. Hollinger quotes Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who remarked that James tried "to turn the lights down low so as to give miracle a chance" (p. 9). Hollinger concludes, "James rendered religion so general that it had a much better chance of being accepted in the modern structure of plausibility than did any particular religious doctrine" (p. 28).

This ambiguity seems unavoidable as long as James assumes that religious knowledge is not possible and also seeks to justify religious belief. This is consistent with his belief that religion is a feeling about the divine, and that arguments and reasoning have little influence in the area of religion. If religion is a feeling, then two obvious problems in determining if religion is beneficial are that not everyone has such a feeling, and that this feeling is interpreted in many different ways. In terms of the effects of a religious experience on one's life, it seems that the interpretation of the experience is what makes all the difference, not the experience itself.

This book is a good model of a multidisciplinary approach. It is best suited for an academic audience who already has some acquaintance with James and wishes to learn more. It would be an excellent resource for a class about James or about the study of religion.—Owen Anderson, *Arizona State University West Campus*.

PUTNAM, Hilary. *Ethics Without Ontology*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004. ix + 160 pp. Cloth, \$29.95—This book is composed of six lectures, four delivered at the University of Perugia in the fall of 2001 and two delivered at the University of Amsterdam in the previous spring. The Amsterdam lectures represent what Putnam calls his "more 'positive' ethical thinking" (p. 5). The lectures given at Perugia prepare for this more positive thinking by providing an explanation for why ontology ought to have an obituary, having been dead for so long. Once ontology is no longer in the way, clear thinking can prevail. Although Putnam has been associated with a variety of schools of thought, in this book he is most aligned with John Dewey and the Pragmatist tradition.

This text is the integrated vision of a man who has read widely and who does not hesitate to affirm truths from a variety of philosophical traditions whose presuppositions are not ontologically compatible. And this is precisely Putnam's point: ontology has artificially divided thinkers into different schools. The division of contemporary philosophy into separate fields, he says, conceals the fact that arguments in one area are often just as valid in another. He notes that some thinkers who reject realism in ethics do not realize that by the same reasoning they must also

reject realism in mathematics. *Ethics Without Ontology* is Putnam's attempt to show an interrelatedness that has been hidden by inadequate understandings of objectivity and objects. He does not attempt to resolve the ontological differences. Rather, he takes them to be man-made.

Putnam explains what he thinks are the central concerns of ethics by referring to Emmanuel Levinas, Immanuel Kant, and Aristotle. He singles out Levinas for his rejection of the idea of founding ethics on a theory of being. For Levinas, ethics is founded on "*my* immediate recognition, when confronted with a suffering fellow human being, that *I* have an obligation to do something" (p. 24). Kant is mentioned for his emphasis on ethics as universal, and Aristotle is noted for his definition of human flourishing. Most ethicists, Putnam writes, choose one concern or another, but not "all of the above." He introduces John Dewey as one who offers a different conception, not simply a different concern. Dewey holds that the purpose of ethics is not primarily to arrive at universal principles but to "contribute to the solution of practical problems" (p. 4). The fact of disagreement does not justify the view that there is no truth in ethics. The focus should be on better solutions to particular problems, not on finding infallible laws. In short, Putnam wants to hold on to fallibilism without surrendering to skepticism. He wants to be able to hold apparently contradictory views in tension and not to give in to the false choice between ontology and relativism. Putnam rejects the idea "that there is a set of substantive necessary truths that it is the task of philosophy to discover," yet he also rejects the view that "everything we presently believe can be revised" (p. 16).

Critical to Putnam's argument is a subject called "mereology," "the calculus of parts and wholes" (p. 35). Mereology constitutes a way of rejecting Aristotle's notion of substance. For the sake of having a "tidy theory," Putnam writes, "the sum of my nose and the Eiffel Tower is regarded as a perfectly good subject in mereology" (p. 36). He does not give an argument for this shift in thinking, and there is no discussion of whether this new approach is reasonable or more warranted than an Aristotelian approach. Here Putnam defines his way into a key presupposition because it is "tidy." And this is a major flaw with Pragmatism, its arbitrary naming of "collections" of things as if they were substances. The end result is that, building upon this arbitrary decision, Putnam has put forth the claim that Aristotle's substances are themselves arbitrary.

The text includes some insightful critiques of a variety of thinkers and traditions, especially in light of Putnam's defense of the claim that the thinking of John Dewey represents a "third enlightenment," the first two being Plato/Socrates and seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy. In his rejection of contemporary skepticism about enlightenment, Putnam calls into question the thinking and presuppositions of thinkers such as John Rawls, Bernard Williams, Jacques Derrida, as well as the traditions of rationalism, empiricism, and utilitarianism. Putnam argues that traditional empiricism is as aprioristic as traditional rationalism (p. 98). And he has a thought provoking discussion of the difference between historical contingency (against Bernard Williams and Richard Rorty) and his own pragmatic "enlightenment" of situated resolutions

(p. 129). In other words, he rejects the claim that a lack of ontology will lead to contingency and relativism. There is a pragmatic alternative, he argues.

Rich as this text is, there are at least two difficulties. One is that medieval thinkers are not dealt with at all. Hence much of the discussion of metaphysics and ontology involves examples of rather limited articulations of "imaginary objects." Putnam does not engage the thought of those who defend the importance of ontology for ethics, such as those in the natural law tradition. Perhaps this is because the book is a series of lectures and he is "painting" as he says "with a broad brush." But the result is that he does not seem to realize that persons who defend ontology have thought about the challenges that he thinks are insurmountable. The second problem is a problem with Pragmatism in general. Certain things are taken for granted, for example, egalitarianism over hierarchy. Although hearing from the "person on the street" is highly valued by the Pragmatists, one might wonder whether mereology and many of the claims of John Dewey would be accepted by the average person, even if such views were properly understood.

Putnam thinks that he can avoid the shipwrecks of the Derrida, Rorty, Williams, and the cultural relativists without catching the disease of believing that there are things in themselves that can be more or less known. But to say that one resolution can be more warranted than another cannot help but leave one with the question "according to what nonrelative criteria?" Like the postmoderns, Putnam deconstructs rather well the thinking of other philosophers. However, also like them, he is not sufficiently attentive to deeper questions that challenge his views of ontology and ethics.—Fr. Anthony Giampietro, *University of St. Thomas in Houston*.

QUANTE, Michael. *Hegel's Concept of Action*. Translated by Dean Moyar. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xvi + 199 pp. Cloth, \$60.00—This book is a translation of Michael Quante's *Hegels Begriff der Handlung*, originally published in 1993. It is one of the first efforts to bridge the divide between Hegel scholarship and analytic philosophy, and it is unique among these in its systematic, close study of Hegel's text. Leaving any dogmatic commitments of analytic philosophy aside, Quante applies its methodology to the Morality chapter of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. Quante's study has two aims. His first and primary goal is to analyze "action" as a central concept of Hegel's philosophy. His second is to bring Hegel's insights into the context of the debates on action theory in analytic philosophy. The book is clearly written, and Quante sets out his arguments in discrete steps, hence neither an expertise in neither Hegel nor analytic philosophy is essential for an appreciation of this book.

Quante's intent is to open a dialogue between Hegel scholars and analytic philosophers that proves valuable for both areas of study. He succeeds on a number of levels. Hegel scholars working in practical philos-

ophy will be intrigued by his argument that §§104–13 of *Philosophy of Right* have an internally consistent structure that has been missed previously because they have not been understood as addressing action theory. Since scholars have paid little attention to Hegel's subjective will as an action theory, Quante's burden is not to situate his position within current scholarship; but rather to defend his thesis that these sections can be read as an action theory that can stand on its own without presupposing Hegel's system. He meets this burden but acknowledges that it is problematic to address any Hegelian concept apart from its placement and role in the system, and that his analysis serves only as a study of the questions inherent in action theory and not as a commentary on this part of the *Philosophy of Right*. However, while Quante treats these sections as an action theory that does not depend upon Hegel's larger metaphysical commitments, he does not treat the concepts with which he works in abstraction, but sensitively employs Hegel's logical works to elucidate their structure.

In defending his thesis that Hegel not only presents a theory of action but also addresses questions of action-justification in ways that are of interest for contemporary analytic philosophers, Quante argues that Hegel foreshadows Castaneda in analyzing the logical form of knowledge of action as a "first-person" proposition. In addition, he maintains that Hegel distinguishes, as do Anscombe and Davidson, the event-aspect of actions from their description-aspect, allowing Hegel to separate event-causality from attribution of actions. Perhaps the most valuable contribution, however, is in the form of Quante's methodology. He demonstrates the precision that can result from the careful application of analytic tools to the analysis of Hegel's prose. At the very least, his approach does much to identify the textual locus and facilitate debate in cases of disagreements over interpretation.

Part 1 is an examination of §§104–13 of *Philosophy of Right*. It addresses both the emergence of morality from legal right and the transition from person to subject before treating the subjective will in detail. Quante presents a clear analysis of the will's structure as that of the Hegelian concept and of the role of the will in bridging the subject-object distinction. The first chapter concludes with a discussion of the moral standpoint as "an ought" demanded of the subject as a consequence of the formal freedom without content of the subjective will. Chapter 2 treats intentionality as the form of subjective freedom and the translation of subjectivity into objective form through actions. Here Quante interprets Hegel as drawing the conclusion, currently debated in contemporary action theory, that the interpretation of an action held by the agent while it is being completed is not correctable, but that the motivation of an action is correctable both by the agent and by others after it has been expressed through action.

Part 2, which follows Hegel's text more loosely, addresses questions of explanation of action, offering interpretations of Hegel's positions on whether reasons or intentions can serve as efficient causes of action and on the attribution of responsibility. Quante argues that while rationality on the part of the agent is implied by Hegel's action theory, his

action theory itself does not entail the moral attitude. Since action theory touches on the mind-body problem, Quante concludes with an account of Hegel's reduction of it to a category mistake.

Quante's interpretation of Hegel's work on the subjective will as applicable to action theory debates in analytic philosophy is intriguing, but his claim is that Hegel anticipated some important insights, not that Hegel offers fresh ones. However, Quante shows that Hegel's theory of action adeptly navigates among several problem areas of action theory and that analytic methodology can be a valuable tool in the interpretation of Hegel.—Patricia Calton, *Rushford, Minnesota*.

RICOEUR, Paul. *The Just*. Translated by David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. xxiv + 161 pp. Cloth, \$20.00; paper, \$14.00—Paul Ricoeur writes of these essays that they “do not properly speaking constitute the chapters of a book. . . . Yet these texts do not come down simply to being occasional writings for some particular circumstance” (p. vii). This is too modest. This short volume limns a comprehensive account of ethics, politics, and the law that “one might call neo-Aristotelian” (p. 148). What makes Ricoeur's position neo-Aristotelian is the insistence that “the question *what ought I to do?* is secondary in relation to the more elementary question of knowing how I might wish to live my life” (ibid). When legal push comes to philosophical shove we must acknowledge the priority of the good over the right.

“Was not our first entry into the region of lawfulness,” asks Ricoeur, “marked by the cry: ‘that’s not fair’? This is a cry of *indignation*” (p. x). By the time we are able to express this indignation we have already been socialized into a world that accords, if only implicitly, goods to individuals on the basis of status or achievement. Everyone at table, for instance, is entitled to a piece of the pie or to some explanation why it is being withheld. The appropriate response to indignation, when that indignation is justified, is either redistribution or compensation. If the outrage is more perceived than real, then we need to make the rules explicit.

But justice demands more. Even the perception of unfairness gives rise to the desire for vengeance. “The great conquest,” writes Ricoeur, “consists in separating vengeance and justice. For the short-circuit of vengeance, justice substitutes creating a distance between protagonists, where establishing a difference between the crime and the punishment is the symbol of penal law” (p. xi). Formally speaking, law displays three features: interdiction, universality, and human plurality (p. 149). Making the demands of our moral world explicit, and thus assuaging that initial indignation, requires an explicit prohibition. That prohibition, if it is to be just, must claim to be universal; otherwise, it is simply a denial of fairness.

Human plurality points to the fact that real law is made to apply to real persons, not “the mere expression of an abstract humanity” (p. 152). To make a finding the judge must know both the law in general and the

facts in particular. "The pronounced sentence," as Ricoeur puts it, "would not have any juridical meaning if it were not deemed fair, equitable, in the sense that Aristotle gives the term 'equity'" (p. 153). Human beings interact in complex ways, determined by diverse relationships, governed by potentially conflicting norms. "It is this tragic dimension of action," Ricoeur insists, "that is left out in a wholly formal conception of moral obligation, reduced to the test of universalization of a maxim" (p. 154). The prospect of tragedy demands the exercise of *phronesis*. Aristotle's practical wisdom, the virtue that allows a person to see what is and what ought to be done, is always exercised in a particular time and place, in order to resolve a distinct and immediate problem. That doesn't make it arbitrary, but it does insist that interpretation is inescapable in judging human affairs and that "interpretive 'fit' [is] verified by what Dworkin calls the 'facts of narrative coherence'" (p. 113).

The discussion of Ronald Dworkin is one of Ricoeur's portraits in the landscape of political and legal philosophy. They allow him to situate himself over and against the dominant figures in the field. Dworkin's distinction between rule and principle acknowledges that "hard cases," situations where we're presented with "the opportunity and often the necessity to choose between the spirit and the letter of the law" (p. 123), are the legal analogues to tragedy. A legal system that did not allow for the exercise of discretion would be tyrannical.

Michael Walzer's pluralism in *Spheres of Justice* attempts to avoid "the political paradox that is constituted by treating the State in terms of distributive justice" (p. 89). Walzer treats access to political power as one good among many, but that generates paradox because that same political power makes distributing other goods possible. Whoever controls the levers of government has the advantage in deciding which goods take precedence. Put in contemporary American terms, the party in power gets to decide who is nominated for judgeships and how debate will proceed.

The priority of the good means that Rawls's account of justice must ultimately be rejected, or at least severely qualified. It is impossible to exclude "comprehensive doctrines" (p. 69) from working legal systems because the good, in one understanding or another, always drives the exercise of equity and practical wisdom. Procedure can only settle the hard cases if it smuggles in some minimal consensus about the good. And even a minimal account of the good opens the argument to its rivals.

In addition to Rawls, Walzer, and Dworkin, there are discussions of Hannah Arendt, Charles Taylor, and a host of others, American, English, and Continental. In drawing out both their virtues and their limits, Ricoeur highlights how unsettled the situation is in contemporary moral, political, and legal philosophy. At the same time, he joins the growing ranks of those, Bernard Yack and Danielle Allen, for example, who believe Aristotle still has an important role to play in negotiating that landscape.—G. Scott Davis, *University of Richmond*.

SHEROVER, Charles M. *Are We In Time? And Other Essays on Time and Temporality*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2003. xv + 226 pp. Cloth, \$79.95; paper \$29.95—This rich book consists of a collection of eleven essays published in widely disparate venues between 1975 and 1992. The inquiry concerning time carried on within them is broad, deep, and in no danger of going out of date.

The essays are grouped into four parts, dealing respectively with these topics: (1) The concept of time in Western thought, offering both a historical and conceptual overview. (Compare Sherover's *The Human Experience of Time*, reissued in 2001, a well-introduced compendium of major texts on time and a splendid textbook for a course.) (2) An analysis and rethinking of Kant on time in critical (theoretical) and practical (moral) respects. (Compare Sherover's acute treatment of Heidegger's descent from Kant in *Heidegger, Kant and Time*, 1971.) (3) An ontological treatment of time, including an overview of Sherover's own metaphysics of temporality. (4) The political philosophy that issues from Sherover's ontology of time. (Compare *Time, Freedom, and the Common Good*, 1989.) The collection is perspicaciously arranged and helpfully prefaced with a summary of each essay by Gregory R. Johnson.

In the title essay—which is also the central, sixth, piece in the book—the italicized preposition *in* of the question “Are we *in* time?” is to be taken seriously; consequently, the essay opens with a discussion of time metaphors in ordinary speech and then goes to a trenchant phenomenology of temporal experience. The outcome is that we are not *in* time because time is in *us*, that “a temporalist theory of internal relations” implies that humans are existentially futural, and that, consequently, the distinction between the theoretical or cognitive and the practical or social view of temporality is untenable—as is indeed evident from the essays in which, grouping notwithstanding, these aspects are intermixed.

Here is the briefest overview of the other ten essays: (1) “The Concept of Time in Western Thought” traces the development of time theories as a progress from the Greek understanding of time as the structure of physical processes, through time as the structure of human experience in later antiquity, to the modern attempt to reconcile quantitative with experienced time and finally to make temporality the crucial feature of human being. (One might cavil at Aristotle's role in this overview by pointing out that his understanding of the generation of time by counting is amazingly close to Kant's in the transcendental schematism.) (2) “Talk of Time” examines tensed statements, to conclude that time is the “form of all existence at least insofar as we can think about it” (p. 27). (3) “The Question of Noumenal Time” argues that Kant used at least three “divergent notions of time,” among them a noumenal, that is, a transcendent time, which is necessary to moral reasoning. (This argument is the more persuasive since the longer one studies the first *Critique* the more “subreptions” of transcendental into transcendent notions one discovers—though Sherover implies that Kant was aware of these transgressions.) (4) “Time and Ethics: How is Morality Possible” continues the argument of (3): “Moral reason is fundamental just because of our temporal nature” (p. 65). Practical reason does not depend only on the distinction between sensibility and reason but on our “ability to transcend momentary time” (p. 65). (5) “Experiential Time and

Religious Concern" approaches our belief in God from Kant's three questions—what can I know, should I do, may I hope?—to show that God must be conceived in temporal terms, commensurate with our practical activity. (Sherover here achieves the fleshing out of the thin Kantian divinity, who is simply the answer to a requirement of morality, into a meaningful experience.) (7) "Perspectivity and the Principle of Continuity" deals with the relation of dates to the continuity of time: "When a dating is regarded, not as a mythic point on a mythic line, but as a sort of shorthand for a durational complex, we no longer regard a beginning or an end as more than a proximate limit" (p. 113). (8) "Res Cogitans: The Time of Mind" goes beyond Descartes's notion of mind as a thing by postulating its essential temporality, while preserving the original Cartesian postulate that mind and nature are different but that understanding depends on their correlation. (9) "Toward Experiential Metaphysic: Radical Temporalism" sets out Sherover's own philosophy of time with its human consequences, which involve the "priority of practice." Freedom is "not a free option the exercise of which can be abjured" (p. 152), but "*the continuing necessity to make interpretative decisions*" (p. 153), the test of which is "workability" (p. 155). From this real experience we derive a right to infer, speculatively, a corresponding real world. (10) "The Temporality of the Common Good: Futurity and Freedom" asks: How are individuality and sociality, those temporal processes, intertwined? Both are grounded, in the openness of futurity, in freedom, individual and institutional. (11) "The Process of Polity" is a subtle argument for a simple truth: "The goods of free citizens are . . . degrees of temporal self-control to be attained by . . . social deserts" (p. 203).

In sum: These essays combine faithfulness with originality; they put Sherover's mastery of the time tradition nondestructively in the service of its deeply pondered revision.—Eva Brann, *St. John's College*.

SMITH, Steven G. *Worth Doing*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. xii + 261 pp. Cloth, \$48.00—This book is a foray into the concept of worth and an attempt to get a handle on what "a theory of worth would look like" (p. xii). Moreover, it is an effort at least to begin the conversation about how it is that we might go about ranking worthy pursuits and the variations within the realms of worth that we ought to recognize. The book is divided into seven chapters, with chapters 1 and 7 serving respectively as a sort of introduction and conclusion to the volume, while chapters 2 through 5 address the concept of worth as it applies to certain dominant aspects of our lives: play, work, action, and loving. Chapter 6 surveys a few alternative realms of our lives where worth seems a relevant moral concept.

Chapter 1 makes a persuasive case for the "worthiness of worth thinking" within moral thought. Perhaps more importantly, it demonstrates that any systematic attempt to consider the meaning of a good and

worthwhile life must seriously address the concept of worth: "we need ideals of worthiness to address the more threateningly and excitingly open questions about how to live" (p. 10).

Chapter 2 is a thought-provoking and helpful treatise on the philosophy of sport. Grappling with the distinction between play, sport, and work, Smith adeptly employs a wealth of examples and illustrations to add some clarity to our pretheoretical assumptions about the distinctions that exist in these fields. The chapter also contains an exceptionally noteworthy discussion of rooting and what it means to be a fan. In this chapter, Smith also draws some key distinctions between play and nonplay.

Chapter 3 follows nicely on the heels of the previous discussion. We all inevitably have moments in our lives where we assess the worthiness of the work that we do. We wonder if we have a job, a career, a vocation, a profession, or if we simply earn a paycheck as a means to care for our family. We struggle with what these distinctions are in the first place. This chapter helps make sense out of our wonder about the worthiness of work. Not only does Smith nicely lay out the different realms of work, but he includes a helpful historical discourse on the worthiness of work which even goes so far as to include an interesting discussion of the Buddhist concept of "right livelihood." Smith asks exactly the question we all wonder about: "Are all occupations of equal worth?" He goes on to help us flesh out our assumptions about why they are not.

Chapter 4 deals with the concept of worth as it might be applied to notions such as deeds, honor, fame, glory, power, helping, fighting, leading, following, crime, and war. The chapter ends with an interesting discussion of divine and human actions as they appear in Hellenistic, Hebrew, and Chinese intellectual traditions.

Chapter 5 addresses "worth thinking" as it appears in our conceptualizations of love. Smith draws important distinctions between the different realms of love and overlays notions of worthiness upon them. The chapter includes helpful discussions of worth as it appears in our thoughts about sex, friendship, and parenting. Smith also discusses the worth of love as it appears in the notion of loving one's enemy, demonstrating love toward the dead, and the love of the self.

Chapter 6 serves as a quick survey of "worth thinking" as it appears or might appear in a variety of domains not worthy of their own chapter. This chapter, entitled "On the Borders of Worth" delves into the worth within our notions of dying, sleeping, drunkenness, worship, music, and meditation.

The seventh and final chapter of the book urges us to recognize the centrality of the concept of worth in our moral thinking and persuasively argues that more systematic thought about worth is important.

Although not presented in a tightly analytic style, nor reaching clear and resolute conclusions, the book traces ideas and the implications of ideas to appealing endpoints. More notably, the book provokes original and interesting thoughts on behalf of the reader along the way. In many ways *Worth Doing* touches on some of the best aspects of philosophical inquiry: it is conceptually rich, well written and thought out, and provocative. It is definitely a philosopher's book, a book for the curious mind.—Michael P. Nelson, *University of Idaho*.

SOLOMON, Robert C. *Living with Nietzsche: What the Great "Immoralist" Has to Teach Us*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 243 pp. Cloth, \$35.00—Robert Solomon has himself lived with Nietzsche for a long time, beginning with a lecture on Nietzsche that, Solomon recounts, prompted him to leave medical school to study philosophy. This book reflects Solomon's long engagement with Nietzsche, drawing not only upon his previously published works but also on a range of student reactions to Nietzsche and a life of reading Nietzsche, culling favorite passages that resonate in different contexts, and changing opinions concerning doctrines. Substantively, Solomon focuses in this work on what Nietzsche has to teach us concerning how to live or on the question, in Solomon's punning formulation, "What would Nietzsche make of us?" Thus, *contra* much current Nietzsche interpretation by both Continental and analytic philosophers (as postmodernist, metaphysician, or epistemologist), Solomon argues that Nietzsche ought to be understood as an existentialist and a virtue ethicist, a philosopher chiefly concerned to describe and exhort us to live the best human life—a life of character, passion, enthusiasm, and exquisite taste.

Solomon's project is twofold: to characterize Nietzsche's affirmative virtue ethics (as superior to Kantian or Christian morality), and to defend Nietzsche against common moral criticisms, for example, that he is an elitist, a nihilist, a relativist, a proponent of cruelty and delight in suffering, a biological determinist and/or a fatalist, who precludes the possibility of personal responsibility or the cultivation of virtue. Solomon argues that Nietzsche provides a virtue ethics of self-cultivation, particularly the cultivation of our emotions. Like Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, Nietzsche's ethical doctrines do not comprise a universal principle or absolutely grounded morality, but rather a description of admirable character traits (virtues) that would characterize a fully flourishing human being and that comprise the development of our natures as teleological, "value-seeking" organisms. Nietzsche's virtues include Aristotelian virtues such as courage and justice, though construed not as moderate "means" between extremes, but as "overflowing" emotion that allows a person to perform great deeds or overcome great obstacles (for example, Achilles's revenge of Patroclus, or Nietzsche's criticism of Christian morality against the grain of his age). Nietzsche's virtues include Romantic, aesthetic virtues as well—for example, exuberance and style—and comprise an open-ended collection of human possibilities that may not be reconcilable in a "unity of virtues," nor achievable by all human beings. Rather, each individual can recognize, and cultivate, those emotional and characterological possibilities available to him (given his history, biological make-up, and so forth).

Nietzsche is, thus, neither a moral relativist nor a nihilist, but a pluralist recognizing many forms of human excellence. Solomon defends Nietzsche's "elitism" and (to some degree) Nietzsche's apparent endorsement of "master" morality: these positions reflect Nietzsche's honest recognition that people are not equally talented, and his exhortation of all to aspire to the highest human life (possible for us), not to be limited by the false doctrines of Kantian morality—a metaphysical, purely rational free will, and human equality—nor dampened in our

enthusiasm for positive excellence by its prohibitive, negative character. Likewise, Nietzsche's *ad hominem* polemics, his doctrine that all moral claims are made from a "perspective," and his criticism of Christian morality as arising from *ressentiment* reflect his concern with character: doctrines are meaningful and ethically important only insofar as they express the character of the speaker or form such character (though Solomon argues that *ressentiment* in particular may not be as base and ineffectual as Nietzsche believes). So too, Solomon argues, may we consider Nietzsche's own writings and life as relevant to his ethical claims: Nietzsche's quiet, courteous life, and his most positive exemplars (for example, Goethe) suggest that Nietzsche holds a "rich inner life," not the cruelty of the "blond beasts," to be the highest human life.

This book is not a scholarly work: there is little detailed engagement with other commentators, nor detailed discussion of texts (other than the first essay of the *Genealogy of Morals*). A number of philosophical questions remain unresolved as well; for example, Solomon praises virtue ethicists (including Nietzsche) for seeing that virtue is grounded in communal practices (in agreement with MacIntyre), but he also argues that Nietzsche holds that we do not now have such shared communal values, leaving the grounding of Nietzschean virtues open to question. Likewise, Solomon's discussion of the potential conflict between Nietzsche's ethics of self-cultivation and his fatalism seems to waver between a Strawsonian incompatibilism of first personal and third personal perspectives, and a Humean compatibilism. In concert with Solomon's concerns with lived life, however, this book is pleasantly conversational and may be useful for those who are attracted by Nietzsche's passion but find the doctrines of the will to power or the *Übermensch* hard to live with.—Rachel Zuckert, *Rice University*.

TAYLOR, Charles. *Modern Social Imaginaries*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004. 215 pp. Cloth, \$64.95; paper, \$18.95—Taylor begins his discussion of modern social imaginaries by contrasting the modern moral order with the premodern. Whereas the premodern moral order was based on a law of people and a cosmic hierarchy mirrored in society, the modern moral order stems from beliefs found in the tradition of natural law from Grotius to Locke that society is (1) an order of mutual benefit between individuals, (2) for the concerns of common life, (3) to secure freedom expressed in rights (4) secured to all participants equally.

That moral orders infiltrate social imaginaries is the focus of Taylor's study. A social imaginary is "the [way] people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations" (p. 23). Taylor carefully notes that imaginaries are constituted by practices and norms that are both ideal and material; changes occur on both levels.

Taylor finds it helpful to think about the individualism of our modern social imaginary by comparing ancient to axial religions. Ancient religions (1) relate to the divine as a whole, (2) tie religious life inseparably to social life, and (3) focus on human flourishing, while axial religions put human flourishing in its place behind higher values. From his analysis, Taylor distinguishes a formal and material meaning of "social": formally, all human beings are social beings in that they receive their identities from their society, but materially, persons can be taught to be either social or individualistic. Moderns, according to Taylor, mistake the material for the formal.

Three fields are central to modern social imaginaries: the economy, the public sphere, and popular sovereignty. In the chapter on popular sovereignty, Taylor presents his major case for the claim that multiple social imaginaries exist by discussing the differences in trajectories of modern social imaginaries between France and the United States. In each of these discussions, Taylor highlights how modernity is secular, horizontal, and immediate. Modernity is secular in that it defines a new space for God and rejects the notion that political society has some foundation in a transcendent order. It is horizontal in that it rejects the notion that hierarchies in society mirror some cosmic hierarchy. Finally, it is immediate because the individual need not relate to society through the mediation of others. This immediacy, though not always actualized, is normative.

Seeing ourselves as occupying a horizontal, secular, immediate world entails that moderns, at one and the same time, view themselves as engaged in society and yet see social processes as disengaged from human agency. At this point, Taylor importantly describes a fourth characteristic of modernity, namely human rights, viewed as prior to and untouchable by political structures. Further, the horizontal, secular, immediate world of modernity brought with it new conceptions of space and history. Grounded in secular time, changes in polity must be explained through progress, revolution, and nation-building. In this understanding of space and time, the notion of civilization as civility and peace becomes normative. The dark side to this ideal is the exclusion of others and the belief that human beings have lost something important by abandoning the heroic age, which dark side is played out in the Rousseauian search for equal self rule and the Nietzschean rejection of equality for the dominance of the will. Even so, such ideologies as are found in modernity are not only destructive but constitutive of society. Summarizing his point, Taylor holds that, however philosophy eventually answers the question of what binds people to their societies, people must at least imagine that they belong to society for society to survive.

Taylor's *Modern Social Imaginaries* is rich in ideas and histories; yet, it could be more careful in its argument. Taylor finds it important to reject strictly idealist and materialist explanations of historical change by engaging in a case study of the historical changes in the notion of civility and civilization (chapter 3), but he does not clearly note when the material and the ideal are at work. The notion of practice, on which his discussion hinges, could be more fruitfully discussed and utilized. Further, the discussion of French and American history composes the longest

chapter of the book, and yet, the differences between French and American practices of popular sovereignty are often left unexamined. Yet, the work overall is important for its attempt to continue a project which has engaged Taylor for some years now: to investigate the foundations of modernity and to uncover the good and the bad. This book is worth reading for those concerned with ethics, politics, and modernity and rises to the top of Taylor's more recent work.—Jeffery L. Nicholas, *Villanova University*.

TONSOR, Stephen J. *Equality, Decadence and Modernity*. Wilmington, Delaware: ISI Books, 2005. xviii + 357 pp. Cloth, \$24.00; paper, \$14.40—Those schooled in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy have for the most part abandoned the notion that philosophy is the pursuit of wisdom. Philosophy since Kant has rejected the claim that there is a fixed body of truth waiting to be known and passed to succeeding generations. Yet historians are there to remind us that there is meaning to the phrase, “the wisdom of the past,” and furthermore that man cannot long remain adrift in a sea of ignorance and uncertainty. Old truths may be periodically erased from social memory, but societies, like nature, remain subject to universal, irreversible laws. Writing in the mode of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee, Stephen J. Tonsor, long time professor of history at the University of Michigan, reminds us that ideas have consequences.

The picture he paints is not a pretty one. “Societies,” he writes in the first section of the volume, “do not decay and fall into ruin because of what happens to them from the outside but rather as a result of an internal process.” One of the most important indicators of social decadence, Tonsor thinks, is the breakdown of traditional political forms, which is itself the result of the decay of aristocratic norms and republican virtue. The contemporary secular, anti-Christian culture promoted by our academic and media elites, in Tonsor's judgment, has replaced its traditional calling of providing uplifting intellectual and artistic standards. In providing evidence of decadence, Tonsor hardly needs to call attention to the breakdown of the family, the dissolution of conventional morality, the increase in crime and use of addictive drugs, and a declining birth rate. Troubling, he thinks, is the transformation of the army from a citizen body to a professional army of paid mercenaries and the propensity of the government to radiate its power outward to world conquest and domination. Above all, Tonsor is concerned about the nation's loss of the moral tradition represented in the country's founding documents. Can a civilization survive, he asks, without the unity provided by a common core of values? The crisis of Western civilization, detected early in the last century and addressed by philosophers as different as Husserl, Heidegger, and Santayana, remains. The denial of the Christian and classical sources of Western civilization and the cultural hostility to religion as found among our governing elites has created a moral vacuum. When a consensus with respect to the desired goals of society disap-

pears, there is no basis for an ordered civic life. Tonsor fears that absent virtue in the people, it is inevitable that a dictator or authoritarian regime will arise to impose order from without. Tonsor tries to avoid the outright pessimism of Spengler and Toynbee by pointing out that man is not fated but chooses his own life. There is, he believes, a parallel between the personal and the social. Of the twenty-six essays collected for the volume, only three in the first part are devoted to the topic of "decadence." Others are organized under such headings as "Equality," "Historiography," "Intellectual History," and "Politics." Throughout the volume we find a highly informed, philosophical mind at work, one fully equipped to address the pressing issues of the day.—Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America*.

TUCKER, Aviezer. *Our Knowledge of the Past: A Philosophy of Historiography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 291 pp. Cloth \$70.00—Aviezer Tucker's philosophy of historiography is epistemological as opposed to the philosophy of historical interpretation, which is ethical, political, and aesthetic. What is presented in textbooks and other popular accounts as "history" is historiographical interpretation, the end product of historiography. There are no pure empirical facts in historiography. Historiographers do not observe historical events but study them inferentially from what can be observed. Evidence may confirm some theories more than others; or theories may explain evidence more or less well, or both.

Neither history, nor historiography, nor other fields of inquiry have essences that determine method, Tucker tells us. However, scientific historiography has been successful, and its progress can be studied empirically and descriptively, as distinct from a "phenomenological" (p. 3) approach focused on historiographers' own and often misleading self-awareness.

Critical cognitive values about sources first emerged—other than in juridical evaluation of conflicting testimony—in biblical scholarship and were then extended to classics by Friederich August Wolf. Simultaneously, there arose a scientific quest for an extinct common ancestor of European and Asian languages. All these disciplines used evidence to infer a common cause, not directly knowable, as does evolutionary biology. Leopold Ranke, son of a lawyer, descendent of Lutheran ministers, student of theology and philology, is the key figure in developing the paradigm of historiographical method inspired on the methods of biblical scholarship and classical philology. The Rankean paradigm is closer to realism, realism "is a better explanation" (p. 257) of the Rankean paradigm than constructionism.

Traditionalist historiography, which is guided by the fact that something has been handed down, is the target of critical historiography. Tucker affirms that historiographical traditions are not causally connected with the events they write about and that traditionalist consen-

sus can only be maintained by coercion. Underdetermined constructionism "is the best explanation" (p. 258) of traditionalist historiography.

Perhaps the central thesis of the present book is that consensus on historiographic beliefs in an uncoerced, heterogeneous, and sufficiently large group of historians is indicative of the knowledge of history, although consensus neither guarantees knowledge nor is a necessary condition for knowledge. Indeed, Tucker prefers the label of "uniquely heterogeneous" (p. 28) for the group likely to possess knowledge. Unique heterogeneity tends to exclude the possibility that a consensus based on something other than knowledge like cultural, gender, or ideological bias make them "less probable than the knowledge hypothesis" (p. 30). Disagreement among uncoerced, heterogeneous, competent historians is a sign of historiographical opinion rather than knowledge.

When historians agree in their historiography, they agree on evidence and theory. Sometimes there is not enough evidence to rule out all but one historiographical hypothesis. Underdeterminism (as opposed to indeterminism or determinism) holds that evidence plus theories constrain historiography to a finite range of outputs. Historiography may be underdetermined in three ways: because the evidence is limited, because theories and hypotheses manage to cover more evidence by sacrificing economy and clarity to scope, and finally because they are *ad hoc* interpretations of vague underdetermined theories.

In studying the relation between historiography and evidence, the present work follows Quine's 1985 "Epistemology Naturalized." Quine and Duhem insist that evidence is not sufficient to choose between scientific theories, since different and incompatible theories may use the same evidence. Quine stresses that theories are wholes some of whose parts have close links to empirical observations, while some parts simply depend on other elements of the theory. Quine and Duhem may not have the last word on science, since scientists tend to find agreement on the basis of simplicity and avoid *ad hoc* hypotheses. But their underdeterminism thesis could still hold for historiography.

Fidelity is the degree to which a piece of evidence preserves information about its cause. But the cause is contained in a hypothesis, so that the degree of fidelity depends on correctly identifying the cause or "on the hypothesis it is produced as evidence for" (p. 121). The Donation of Constantine has fidelity as evidence about medieval church-state relations, but not about Constantine's relations with the Church.

The criteria for the best theories are consilience, simplicity, and analogy. Greater consilience is the character of explaining more different kinds of evidence. The value of theory is the product of its consilience and its simplicity. While the simple theories of a historical school will be consilient, the factoring in of necessary *ad hoc* interpretations, which are mutually inconsistent, reduces its value to zero.

Colligation is the grouping of particular historical events as part of one large event. Thus the effort is to understand a context—given background information and theories—as one whole rather than as an instance of general principles. Scientists deal with complex properties of

unique events by reducing them to lower level simple properties, but Tucker is not convinced that we know what a historiographic reducing theory would be like.

A critic might say that Tucker offers mainly a phenomenology of the philosophers of historiography. I suspect that this will limit the book's appeal: too much epistemology for historians, too little historiography for nonspecialist philosophers.

Tellingly, the history developed at greatest length is the history of a method, biblical criticism. Those who hold that method is dictated by what is studied may well think that Tucker leapfrogs over what is studied into the reflection upon the studying.

One wonders how useful Tucker's basic signs of historical knowledge really are. Further, there is not likely to be consensus about new theories. A popular consensus such as that the earth is round is frequently traditional, not based on any kind of scientific understanding. More importantly, one could argue that scientists, not to mention mathematicians, are homogeneous qua scientists. Physicists are people who think like physicists, whatever their religion or politics.

Finally, if George Washington is not a fact, but a hypothesis (however solid), because we can't know him directly but rather by reports, it would seem that George W. Bush is a hypothesis for most of us. This odd use of "hypothesis" does not reflect something specific to historiography, but a peculiar epistemology.—James G. Colbert, *Fitchburg State College*.

WIELENBERG, Erik J. *Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. x + 193 pp. Cloth, \$60.00; paper, \$20.99—This book explores the ethical implications of "naturalism," which, for Wielenberg, is a worldview that holds that there are no gods and no nonphysical souls, and that consequently, there is no afterlife. On the other hand, for Wielenberg, naturalism does not deny that there are "ethical facts" and does not require that ethical facts must be reduced to natural facts. Thus, naturalism, for Wielenberg, is a strictly ontological thesis. In this book, Wielenberg does not argue for the truth of naturalism; he neither criticizes the standard arguments for the existence of God nor defends naturalistic accounts of creation and evolution, nor materialistic accounts of the mind. His interest is solely in the ethical implications of this worldview. His discussion of these implications, however, does involve the defense of naturalism against a number of antinaturalistic arguments developed by certain Christian philosophers "who sometimes seek to refute naturalism by claiming that it has all sorts of nasty ethical implications" (pp. 5–6).

Wielenberg begins with a consideration of the claim that if God did not exist and human life ends at death, then life would have no meaning. He discusses three naturalistic accounts of how such a life can be meaningful, including the view that a meaningful life is one in which there is a

"correspondence between a person's desires and that person's activities" (p. 19); that a meaningful life is one spent pursuing some objectively worthwhile goal (such as the elimination of unnecessary suffering); and that a meaningful life is one filled with intrinsically valuable activities. Rejecting the first alternative, Wielenberg argues that the last two are plausible, *if* a naturalistic account of morality is possible.

Chapter 2 examines the question of the possible relationships between God and morality. As might be expected, most of the chapter is taken up with an attack on divine command theory. Wielenberg considers—and rejects—two theses, whether God could make any consistent ethical claim true if He so willed, and whether ethical claims are true because God wills them. This chapter covers familiar ground, including the question of whether God's will could transform some great evil into a good and whether God's nature prevents this from occurring. In the course of his attack on the theistic account of morality, Wielenberg interestingly connects these questions to the debate over the argument from evil. Unfortunately, his alternative naturalistic account of the grounds of morality is unsatisfying as it depends on the undefended assertion that some moral truths are necessary truths.

If Wielenberg's naturalistic account of morality succeeds, however, it immediately raises the question as to whether there are any reasons available to the naturalist to act morally. He considers several familiar answers based on the idea that morality and self-interest coincide or that moral reasons are by their nature determinative. Finally, he uses a discussion of Kant's argument that the existence of God is a necessary postulate of practical reason, to argue against the theist that the divine guarantee of perfect justice, which Kant holds is essential to morality, itself makes moral action incoherent for all but the egoist.

Chapter 4 attempts to develop a naturalistic account of the specifically Christian virtues of humility, charity, and hope. If humility involves giving proper credit for one's accomplishments, then, Wielenberg argues, both Christians and naturalists can hold it as a virtue: Christians can be humble because they realize that their accomplishments are due in large part to God; naturalists can be equally humble because they realize that their accomplishments are due in large part to natural factors outside of their control. Whether or not this is sound, it reveals an interesting thing about Wielenberg's approach. Throughout, he argues that morality can find equally strong grounds in theistic or naturalistic assumptions. In making this argument, however, he assumes that the morality of naturalists would be virtually identical to that of Christians. This seems implausible. Wouldn't naturalists give an account of humility, for example, in terms of its social benefits rather than its epistemological correctness, and wouldn't it therefore be a different virtue? One wonders if throughout Wielenberg's approach is too conservative.

In the last two chapters, Wielenberg begins to discuss how a naturalistic morality would differ from a Christian morality, but this discussion is entirely too thin. Wielenberg hints that such a morality might be superior to at least one type of theistic morality, but this discussion, as essential as it is, is too short to be convincing. As a result, the book is not entirely satisfying.—Roger Paden, *George Mason University*.

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CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES*

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 79, No. 3, Summer 2005

Aquinas and the Human Desire for Knowledge, JAN A. AERTSEN

This essay examines Aquinas's analysis of the human desire to know, which plays a central role in his thought. (I) This analysis confronts him with the Aristotelian tradition: thus, the desire for knowledge is a "natural" desire. (II) It also confronts him with the Augustinian tradition, which deplores a nonvirtuous desire in human beings that is called "curiosity." (III) Aquinas connects the natural desire with the Neoplatonic circle motif: principle and end are identical. The final end of the desire to know is the knowledge of God. (IV) Aquinas also connects the end of the natural desire to know with Christian eschatology, teaching that man's ultimate end is the *visio Dei*. This end, however, is "supernatural." (V) Duns Scotus severely criticizes central aspects of Aquinas's account. (VI) As a rejoinder to Scotus's objections, we finally consider Aquinas's view on the proper object of the human intellect.

Participation Metaphysics in Aquinas's Theory of Natural Law, CRAIG A. BOYD

Interpreters of Aquinas's theory of natural law have occasionally argued that the theory has no need for God. Some, such as Anthony Lisska, wish to avoid an interpretation that construes the theory as an instance of theological definism. Instead, Lisska sees Aquinas's ontology of natural kinds as central to the theory. In his zeal to eliminate God from the Aquinas's theory of natural law, Lisska has overlooked two important features of the theory. First, Aquinas states that the desire for God is a primary precept of the natural law and thus constitutes a critical aspect of his ontology. Second, Aquinas's theory of natural law must be seen in the larger context of his theory of participation since he says, "The natural law is the rational creature's participation in the eternal law."

*Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review*. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed.

Bonaventure on the Impossibility of a Beginningless World: Why the Traversal Argument Works, BENJAMIN BROWN

This paper examines St. Bonaventure's arguments for the impossibility of a beginningless world, taking into consideration their historical background and context. His argument for the impossibility of traversing the infinite is explored at greater length, taking into account the classic objection to this argument. It is here argued that Bonaventure understood the issues at hand quite well and that his traversal argument is valid. Because of the nature of an actually infinite multitude, the difference between the infinite by division and the infinite by addition collapses, and a beginningless past entails a day infinitely distant from the present, as Bonaventure claims. Because such a chasm is not traversable, as virtually everyone admits, Bonaventure's conclusion that the world must have a beginning is correct.

Defining the Semiotic Animal: A Postmodern Definition of Human Being Superseding the Modern Definition "Res Cogitans," JOHN DEELY

As modernity began with a redefinition of the human being, so does postmodernity. But whereas the modern definition of the human being as *res cogitans* cut human animals off from both their very animality and the world of nature out of which they evolved and upon which they depend throughout life, the postmodern definition of the human being as semiotic animal both overcomes the separation from nature and restores the animality essential to human being in this life. Semiotics, the doctrine of signs suggested by Augustine, theoretically justified by Poincaré, and developed in our own day after Peirce, introduces postmodernity by overcoming the Kantian epistemological limits on the side of *ens reale* and showing the social constructions superordinate to *ens reale* as essential to animal life.

"Ethics Overcomes Finitude": Levinas, Kant, and the Davos Legacy, IAN LEASK

This article situates Levinas's reading of Kant in terms of his opposition to Heidegger. It suggests that, although Levinas and Heidegger both put great stress upon the affective aspect of Kant's philosophy, ultimately they diverge sharply over the issue of finitude: where Heidegger's Kant suggests that there is "nothing but finite Dasein," Levinas stresses the significance of transcending finitude, ethically. In this respect, Levinas's reading converges strongly with the interpretation Heidegger so strongly opposed: Cassirer's. As such, Levinas's anti-Heideggerian position commits him—perhaps surprisingly—to a kind of neo-Kantian Manichaeism: on the one hand, finite and senseless Being; on the other, an ethical intrigue beyond ontology. The article concludes that Levinas thereby maintains (rather than "deconstructs") central schisms of High Modernity.

On the Eudemian and Nicomachean Conceptions of Eudaimonia,
ROOPEN MAJITHIA

The gathering consensus on the inclusive/exclusive debate regarding happiness in the *Nicomachean Ethics* seems to be that both sides of the story are partly right. For while the life of happiness (understood as the total life of an individual) is inclusive of ethical and contemplative virtue among other things, the central activity of happiness is exclusively contemplation. The discussions of the *Eudemian Ethics*, on the other hand, seem to think that this text is broadly inclusive. The view the author defends here is that the Eudemian text is no more and no less inclusive than the Nicomachean version, although there are significant differences between them regarding the life of contemplation. That is, he argues that the *Eudemian Ethics* is concerned with the political life and the actualization of *theôria* in this context, and he suggests that the *Nicomachean Ethics* is concerned with contemplation in the context of both the political and philosophical lives.

Prolegomena to a Study of John Buridan's Physics, JOHANNES M.
M. H. THIJSEN

After a brief sketch of the state of Buridan studies, this review article examines the recent study, by Benoit Patar, of a commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* that is generally attributed to Albert of Saxony, but which Patar believes to have been authored by John Buridan (the text is preserved in the manuscript Bruges, Stadsbibliotheek 477, fols. 60va–163vb, and was edited by Patar himself in 1999). Patar is utterly convinced that the Bruges *Quaestiones* represent Buridan's *prima lectura*, that is, his first course of lectures on the *Physics*, which preceded the two other redactions that are traditionally attributed to him. However, there is no textual evidence in support of this assumption, but only speculative circumstantial evidence. The article therefore rejects Patar's thesis as highly problematic.

Aquinas in Dialogue with Contemporary Philosophy: Eleonore
Stump's Aquinas, THOMAS WILLIAMS

In her volume on Aquinas composed for Routledge's *Arguments of the Philosophers* series, Eleonore Stump aims at an interpretation of Aquinas that is historically faithful but also responsive to the concerns of contemporary philosophers. Here Williams assesses her success in attaining this twofold aim by examining in detail Stump's overview of Aquinas's metaphysics, which engages with contemporary debates over constitution and identity, and her interpretation of Aquinas's account of justice, which brings Aquinas into dialogue with Annette Baier and Thomas Nagel. Williams concludes with a brief evaluation of the merits of Stump's twofold aim.

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 42, No. 4, October 2005

Egoistic Friendship, TARA SMITH

This paper disputes the common belief that egoists cannot enjoy genuine and worthwhile friendships. Part 1 explains how love of another person is selfish, based on recognition of the value of the friend to the lover. Concern for a friend can come to be part of the egoist's own interest, as the well-being of one's friend and of the friendship become values that nourish the egoist's flourishing. Part 2 explains how the egoist can love his friend "for his own sake." Dissecting the different possible interpretations of this phrase shows how the egoist will love another person not on a causeless or indiscriminate basis and not for a person's nonessential characteristics, but for his unique identity. Finally, since it is widely assumed that the egoist must see all values (friends included) as merely instrumental, part 3 explains how, while all values are relational, for an egoist, they need not be narrowly instrumental.

Is Choice Self-Evident? KAI HAUSER

The axiom of choice (AC) states that for any partition of a set into disjoint nonempty pieces there exists a function picking an element from each piece. Nowadays its acceptance rests mainly on extrinsic grounds in view of its fruitful consequences. This article asks whether and in what sense choice is intrinsically plausible. The first half examines, and finds defective, traditional arguments appeal to a particular concept of set or treating AC as a logical principle. Ideas from Husserl's phenomenology are used in the second half to obtain precise characterization of what is and is not evident about choice and thereby to distinguish it in terms of evidential style from the formally equivalent well-ordering principle—a distinction that is crucial for Zermelo's proof of the well-ordering theorem.

Going from Bad (or Not So Bad) to Worse: On Harmful Addictions and Habits, CHRISOULA ANDREOU

Self-destructive addictions and habits do not usually have the redeeming feature of benefiting anyone else. In extreme cases, addictive behavior completely ruins both the addict's life and the lives of those who are closest to the addict. Yet addictive behavior is not, at least not typically, performed with the aim of harming oneself or others. Contemporary theoretical work on addictions and bad habits suggests that self-destructive behavior can stem from a variety of sources, including powerful cravings, a failure to recognize hidden costs, temporary preference reversals, and the discounting of future

utility. This paper aims to add to the tools we have for understanding harmful addictions and habits by bringing out a source of self-destructive behavior that has been neglected in the literature on "getting hooked," but that is relevant when it comes to understanding and modeling at least some addictive and quasi-addictive behavior. The proposal defended is that harmful addictions and habits can rest on stable but intransitive preferences.

The Myth of Posthumous Harm, JAMES STACEY TAYLOR

The view that the dead can be harmed is widely accepted. It is argued in this paper, however, that the most influential arguments in favor of the view that the dead can be harmed—those offered by Feinberg and Pitcher—are mistaken. Of course, one might hold that even if the Feinberg-Pitcher account of how the dead can be harmed is mistaken, the intuitions that give rise to it are so well entrenched that an alternative account of posthumous harm should be developed to accommodate them. To extinguish this belief it will be shown in this paper that the intuitions that lead many to believe that the dead can be harmed can be fully accounted for without endorsing the possibility of posthumous harm.

Times of Our Lives: Negotiating the Presence of Experience, YURI BALASHOV

On the B-theory of time, the experiences we have throughout our conscious lives have the same ontological status: they all tenselessly occur at their respective dates. We do not, however, seem to experience all of them on the same footing. In fact, we tend to believe that only our present experiences are real, to the exclusion of the past and future ones. The B-theorist has to maintain that this belief is an illusion and explain the origin of the illusion. The paper argues that this cannot be properly done unless one rejects endurantism in favor of the stage view of persistence.

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 43, No. 1, January 2006

Epistemological Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument, JESPER KALLESTRUP

This paper offers a new solution to the knowledge argument. Both a priori and a posteriori physicalists reject the claim that Mary does not know all the facts, but they do so for different reasons. While the former think that Mary gains no new knowledge of any fact, the latter think that Mary gains new knowledge of an old fact. This paper argues that on a broad understanding of what counts as physical, it is consistent with physicalism that Mary does not know all the physical facts, and that on a narrow understanding, it is

consistent with physicalism that Mary knows all the physical facts, but not all the facts. Either way, Mary gains new knowledge of a new fact that is not nonphysical. The resultant view—epistemological physicalism—has it that although one cannot know everything just by knowing complete physical theory, everything is metaphysically necessitated by what one can know just by knowing such theory. Finally, some objections that have been raised against this view are presented and replies are considered.

Luck Egalitarianism and the See-Saw Objection, GERALD LANG

The doctrine of "Luck Egalitarianism" tells us that a person should not be worse off than other people, in respect of some given metric or currency of goods, as a result of his brute bad luck. This paper pursues an objection to Luck Egalitarianism, which is concerned with bad luck's tendency to backfire if it is used as a device to fix just distributive shares. This objection, which is called the "See-Saw Objection," is loosely inspired by the "Egalitarian Fallacy," described by Susan Hurley, though it penetrates more deeply than the Egalitarian Fallacy. The concluding section assesses the level of damage on Luck Egalitarianism inflicted by the See-Saw Objection, and adverts to some future trajectories for those who are in basic sympathy with the Luck Egalitarian project.

Explaining Actions With Habits, BILL POLLARD

This paper proposes that habits explain actions in a distinctive, and philosophically important, way. Since habits are not psychological items, this challenges a prevailing philosophy of action which takes such items to be the only source of action explanations. The argument proceeds by first distinguishing habits from reflexes, addictions, compulsions, and phobias. Second, habits are related to agency via the notions of control and second nature. Third, the charge that habit explanations do not convey intentionality, and thus cannot explain actions, is answered. Finally, it is argued that habit explanations are not psychological, causal or teleological in form. Instead, it is proposed that habit explanations represent a form of constitutive explanation, the merits of which have been underappreciated in philosophy of action, and perhaps quite generally. Analyzing habit explanations in this way allows us to capture the ontological interdependency between habits and the actions that constitute them.

Denying Responsibility Without Making Excuses, BRAIN WALLER

Philosophers have often examined the specific conditions under which one is excused from moral responsibility, focusing on the special circumstances (such as coercion, incompetence, and insanity) that provide legitimate reasons to excuse wrongdoers from receiving their just deserts. In his well-known universal denial of moral responsibility, Hospers takes the same approach, extending the range of excuses to cover everyone. As a result, the universal rejection of moral responsibility is often attacked as if it were based on the universal denial of skill (Dennett), or the universal denial of mo-

rality (van Inwagen), or the universal attribution of insanity (Strawson). When the actual grounds for universal denial of responsibility are recognized, those attacks are revealed as straw men, the burden of proof is shifted from those who deny moral responsibility to those who affirm it, and a standard line of argument in favor of moral responsibility is refuted.

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY,
Vol. 83, No. 3, September 2005

Moral Fictionalism versus 'The Rest', DANIEL NOLAN, GREG RESTALL, and CAROLINE WEST

In this paper a distinct methaethical position is introduced: fictionalism about morality. This position is clarified and defended, showing that it is a way to save the moral phenomena, while agreeing that there is no genuine objective prescriptivity to be described by moral terms. In particular, moral fictionalism is distinguished from moral quasi-realism, and fictionalism is shown to possess the virtues of quasi-realism about morality, while avoiding its vices.

Considering Empty World as Actual, LAURA SCHROETER

The attitude of considering a world as actual is the cornerstone of David Chalmers's influential interpretation of two-dimensional semantics. Considering a world as actual, Chalmers argues, gives us access to a distinctively epistemic kind of modality—possibilities and necessities that capture what the world could be like, for all we can tell, wholly a priori. By basing his interpretation of 2-D semantics on this epistemic notion of modality, rather than the standard metaphysical notion, Chalmers thinks he can defend a rationalist and internalist account of meaning. In particular, he hopes to vindicate the idea that meanings forge a constitutive link between what is a priori accessible to the subject and what is objectively possible. The core thesis of Chalmers's rationalist project is that a sentence (or thought) is knowable a priori if and only if it is true in all possible worlds considered as actual.

The Ethics of Empty Worlds, ROY A. SORENSEN

Drawing inspiration from the ethical pluralism of G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica*, it is here contended that one empty world can be morally better than another. By "empty" is meant that such a world is devoid of concrete entities (things that have a position in space or time). These worlds have no thickets or thimbles, no thinkers, and no thoughts. Infinitely many of these worlds have laws of nature, abstract entities, and perhaps, space and time. These nonconcrete differences are enough to make some of them better than others.

The Hypothetical Imperative? MARK A. SCHROEDER

According to the standard view, Kant held that hypothetical imperatives are universally binding edicts with disjunctive objects: take the means or don't have the end. Yet Kant thought otherwise; he held that they are edicts binding only on some—those who have an end.

The Logical Form of Universal Generalizations, ALICE DREWERY

First order logic does not distinguish between different forms of universal generalizations; in this paper it is argued that lawlike and accidental generalizations (broadly construed) have a different logical form, and that this distinction is syntactically marked in English. A consideration is then made of the relevance of this broader conception of lawlikeness to the philosophy of science.

A Localist Solution to the Regress of Epistemic Justification, ADAM LEITE

Guided by an account of the norms governing justificatory conversations, it is here proposed that person-level epistemic justification is a matter of possessing a certain ability: the ability to provide objectively good reasons for one's belief by drawing upon considerations for which one responsibly and correctly takes there to be no reason to doubt. On this view, justification requires responsible belief and is also objectively truth-conducive. The foundationalist doctrine of immediately justified beliefs is rejected, but so too is the thought that coherence in one's total belief system is sufficient, or indeed necessary, for justification. The problem of the regress is solved by exploiting the "localist" idea that in order to possess the ability to justify any given belief, one needs only to be in a position to draw upon appropriate justified background beliefs, in order to provide good reasons for holding the belief; one needn't be able to defend the relevant background beliefs, and so on, all in one sitting.

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 45, No. 4, December 2005

Praxis of the Middle: Self and No-Self in Early Buddhism, JOHN W. M. KRUMMEL

This paper considers the controversy surrounding the Buddhist doctrine of *ino-selfi* (*anatt*, *an*, *tman*), and especially the question of whether the Buddha himself meant by it unequivocally the ontological denial of the self. The emergence of this doctrine is connected with the Buddha's attempt to forge a "middle way" that avoids the extreme views of "eternalism" in regards to the soul and "annihilationism" of the soul at bodily death. By looking at

the earliest works of the *Pli* canon, three of the five *Nikayas* (*Dogha*, *Majjhima*, and *Sayutta*) along with later Abhidharmist developments, this discussion shows that its original intent was not explicitly ontological. The intent was more practical than theoretical, with the aim of bringing about a freedom from attachment to such theories as eternalism and annihilationism. The Buddha's "middle" position was hence a praxis toward freedom rather than a theoria about the existence or nonexistence of the self.

Religion and its Modern Fate: The Shaping of the Concept Between the West and China, THIERRY MEYNARD

"Religion" is usually thought of as a Western concept that has penetrated into China in the modern era. This paper, however, argues that the modern concept of religion was in fact shaped through the mutual exchange between the West and China. Three moments of this exchange are examined: (1) the late-Ming and early-Qing periods, when Western missionaries discovered in China a reality that compelled them to invent the term of "*civil religion*"; (2) the Enlightenment in Europe, which seized and transformed the new concept; finally, (3) the end of Qing dynasty and Republican era in China, when the concept of religion was reintroduced. This historical enquiry may help us to examine critically the boundaries usually fixed between the secular and the religious.

Cultural Crossings Against Ethnocentric Currents: Toward a Confucian Ethics of Communicative Virtues, SOR-HOON TAN

Despite contemporary Confucianism's aspirations to be a world philosophy, there is an ethnocentric strand within the Confucian tradition, most glaringly exemplified in Han Yu's attacks on Buddhism. This paper reassesses Confucian ethnocentrism in the context of contrary practices that indicate a more pragmatic attitude among Confucians toward cross-cultural interactions. It argues that while the ethnocentric tendency serves as constant reminder of the need for vigilance and for recognition of the difficulties of crossing cultural boundaries, there are nevertheless resources within Confucianism for constructing an ethics of communication that is urgently needed to deal with the moral problems of cultural pluralism. The paper analyzes the role of various common Confucian virtues such as *ren* (benevolence, cohumanity), *yi* (appropriateness), *li* (ritual), and *zhi* (wisdom) in communication, and it argues that a virtue of flexibility is implicit in Confucius's insistence of *bugu*, and could contribute significantly to a Confucian ethics of communicative virtues.

Real Apprehension in Newman's "An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent", R. MICHAEL OLSON

In *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, John Henry Newman articulates his fundamental philosophical orientation by giving priority to real apprehension over notional apprehension. He distinguishes between the two by saying that notional apprehension has to do with things internal to the

mind and admits of exactness and clarity, whereas real apprehension has to do with things external to the mind and does not admit of the same degree of clarity and exactness. This paper argues that the connection between "inside the mind" and "clarity and exactness" lies in the constructive activity underlying notional thinking. Real apprehension, on the other hand, involves a given apprehension of unity, mainly the concrete unity of intelligent life, which includes, but cannot be reduced to, the constructive activity of notional thinking. Thus, it is argued, Newman's realism undercuts any form of modern transcendentalism and evinces a more classical form of human realism.

Saving Whitehead's Universe of Value: An 'Ecstatic' Challenge to the Classical Interpretation, BRIAN G. HENNING

While most scholars readily recognize that Alfred North Whitehead had deep and penetrating misgivings about the substantial view of individuality, fewer note that these misgivings stem as much from axiological considerations as ontological ones. This paper contends that, taken in the context of the "classical interpretation" of his metaphysics, Whitehead's bold affirmation that actuality and value are coextensive introduces a potentially serious problem for the adequacy and applicability of his axiology. For if actuality is coextensive with value, but is itself limited to subjects of experience, then the objective world can have no intrinsic value. The author's aim is to demonstrate that in order to respond to the very serious challenge which the problem of subjectivism represents, and to save Whitehead's intended universe of value, an alternative to the classical interpretation of Whitehead's metaphysics must be sought. This alternative is referred to as the "ecstatic interpretation."

Richard Rorty's Anti-Foundationalism and Traditional Philosophy's Claim of Social Relevance, MANUEL ARRIAGA

The paper is a critical examination of Rorty's argument against foundationalism, on which depends his view of the social irrelevance of traditional philosophy. It tries to demonstrate the incoherence and speciousness of his reasoning against foundationalism, and in the process to refute his view that traditional philosophy is a tool which can and should be cast off from the public, and even private, spheres of human life, and that its universal concepts can therefore be circumvented. This demonstration is accomplished in two complementary stages. First, there is provided a general justification of the "argumentative" style in engaging Rorty's position against his objection to this approach, while showing that what he calls his strategy of "re-description" is really nothing but a form of logical argumentation. Second, an attempt is made to show how, in order to substantiate his rejection of traditional philosophy's claim of social relevance, Rorty's "re-description" of the motivation underlying traditional philosophy is no different from the strategy of unmasking that he has called into question as an instance of a radical or foundationalist critique. It is shown that, despite his protestations to the contrary, "unmasking" is precisely what—at least on a number of occasions—Rorty quite inconsistently does in demonstrating that the claim of social relevance arises from a form of self-deception engaged in by the traditional phi-

osopher. It is further shown that the antifoundationalist stance that defines his characteristic manner of extricating himself from such self-referent problems is based on faulty reasoning and lands him in a deeper incoherence. Since his depoliticization of traditional philosophy depends on the cogency of this antifoundationalist view, it is concluded that this depoliticizing project fails.

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A Plea For Things That Aren't Quite All There (Or, Is There a Problem about Vague Composition and Vague Existence?),
NICHOLAS J. J. SMITH

Orthodoxy has it that mereological composition can never be a vague matter, for if it were, then existence would sometimes be a vague matter too, which is impossible. Here, it is accepted that vague composition implies vague existence, but denied that either is impossible. This paper develops degree-theoretic versions of quantified modal logic and of mereology, and it combines them in a framework that allows one to make clear sense of vague composition and vague existence, as well as the relationships between them.

Standing on Common Ground, JODY AZZOUNI and BRADLEY
ARMOUR-GARB

David Lewis has long maintained that certain debates about fundamental logical matters (such as the law of noncontradiction or whether quantification can occur over nonexistent entities) are not really matters for debate or rational adjudication, because too much that is fundamental is under contention. He is wrong. It is illustrated, in particular, how dialetheists and consistentists can join in a fruitful debate over the value of the law of noncontradiction, without begging questions against one another. One reason that such fruitful debates can take place is that the common ground that the debaters can stand upon is not the logical laws themselves that are under contention, but rather a subset of instances or applications of such laws that the debaters can hold in common.

Is There a Single Objective, Evolutionary Tree of Life? JOSEPH
LaPORTE

It is often said that there is just one "objective" tree of life: a single accurate branching hierarchy of species reflecting order of descent. For any two species there is a single correct answer as to whether one is a "daughter" of the other, whether the two are "sister species" by virtue of their descent from a common parental species, whether they belong to a family line that

excludes any given third species, and so on. This is incorrect. We may whittle a tree of life, paring troublesome branches, in order to portray an ordering that admits of no legitimate dissent. The history of life can sustain many legitimate arrangements of the same branches. This observation affects relationships of much interest. It undermines a thoroughgoing cladistic systematics.

Bays, Steiner, and Wittgenstein's "Notorious" Paragraph About the Gödel Theorem, JULIET FLOYD and HILARY PUTNAM

A reply to Timothy Bays's criticisms of an earlier article by Floyd and Putnam ("A Note on Wittgenstein's 'Notorious Paragraph' About the Gödel Theorem," *Journal of Philosophy* 45, no. 11 [2000]: 624–32). Bays's criticisms turn on misconstruals of Floyd and Putnam's original claims, and problematic interpretations of Wittgenstein partly derived from Mark Steiner ("Wittgenstein as his Own Worst Enemy: The Case of Gödel's Theorem," *Philosophia Mathematica* 9 [2001]: 257–79). They also forward a view of the notion of truth that Floyd and Putnam question. Bays assumes throughout his paper that his remarks have a direct bearing on philosophical problems about the notion of truth, yet also believes that the existence of model theory will resolve these problems. Floyd and Putnam reject this idea.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
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Hume on Promises and the Peculiar Act of the Mind, RACHEL COHON

Hume's account of the virtue of fidelity to promises contains two surprising claims: (1) Any analysis of fidelity that treats it as a natural (nonconventional) virtue is incorrect because it entails that in promising we perform a "peculiar act of the mind," an act of creating obligation by willing oneself to be obligated. No such act is possible. (2) Though the obligation of promises depends upon social convention, not on such a mental act, we nonetheless "feign" that whenever someone promises he performs such an act. This paper explains both claims in light of the philosophical questions about promising that lie behind Hume's investigation, his virtue theory, and the general difficulties he believes we face trying to understand virtues that are in fact artificial in terms of our commonsense, natural conception of virtue. It extracts a lesson for contemporary virtue ethics about the motive of duty.

Narrative, Imagination, and the Religion of Humanity in Mill's Ethic, COLIN HEYDT

This paper shows how the ethical benefits of Mill's "Religion of Humanity"—a life imbued with purpose, an improved regard for others, and greater happiness for oneself from the pleasures of fellow feeling—are to be actualized through the imagination's creation of compelling narratives about humanity. Understanding the ethical importance of the Religion of Humanity therefore implies understanding the central role of imagination in Millian ethical life. This investigation serves to articulate a feature of Mill's utilitarianism that differentiates it from Bentham's, namely, his commitment to the importance of a religious sensibility in the moral agent. It also raises the broader philosophical issue of what narratives a psychologically tenable humanist worldview requires.

'Despair' in Kierkegaard's "Either/Or", MICHELLE KOSCH

The category of despair plays a central role in Kierkegaard's pseudonymous corpus, but its meaning is controversial. This paper offers an interpretation of its use in *Either/Or* (in particular, in the claim the aesthetic life is despair and the ethical life freedom from despair). After examining and rejecting two recent alternatives, it is argued that despair is the conscious or unconscious assumption of a passive or fatalistic attitude toward one's existence, which attitude is informed by a misconstrual of the nature of human agency.

Maxims in Kant's Practical Philosophy, RICHARD McCARTY

A standard interpretation of Kantian "maxims" sees them as expressing reasons for action, implying that we cannot act without a maxim. Recent challenges to this interpretation claim that Kant viewed acting on maxims as optional. Kant's understanding of maxims derives from Christian Wolff, who regarded maxims as major premises of the practical syllogism. This supports the standard interpretation. Yet Kant also viewed commitments to maxims as essential for virtue and character development, which supports challenges to the standard interpretation and raises questions about the coherence of Kant's overall conception of the role of maxims in practical philosophy.

Plotinus' Ethics of Disinterested Interest, PAULINA REMES

Plotinus recognises the possibility of conflict between self-referential aims and the good of the cosmos. His solution resembles closely one attributed sometimes to the Stoics. The inner reformation Plotinus proposes will yield a detached understanding of the whole universe. This view is accompanied by a realisation that one's happiness lies in functioning as a part of the whole and in contributing to the perfection of the universe. Other-regard cannot, therefore, be seen as altogether missing from Neoplatonic ethics. What gives Plotinus's ethics an agent-centered spin is its emphasis on how this state can be attained. Promoting the self's true well-being by an inward turn is the only means to an understanding of what is good *simpliciter*.

Smith's Humean Criticism of Hume's Account of the Origin of Justice, ERIC SCHLIESSER and SPENCER J. PACK

It is here argued that Adam Smith criticizes David Hume's account of the origin of and continuing adherence to the rule of law for being not sufficiently Humean. Hume explained that adherence to the rule of law originated in the self-interest to restrain self-interest. According to Smith, Hume did not pay enough attention to the passions of resentment and admiration, which have their source in the imagination. Smith offers a more naturalistic and evolutionary account of the psychological preconditions of the establishment and morality of justice than Hume had. However, Smith's account also makes room for a thin conception of Lockean natural right to property, while rejecting the contractualist and rationalistic elements in Locke. It emerges that Smith severs the intimate connection that Hobbes and Hume made between justice and property.

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How International Relations Theorists Can Benefit by Reading Thucydides, W. J. KORAB-KARPAROWICZ

Thucydides's *History of the Peloponnesian War* is often seen as an archetypal statement of power politics. He is regarded as a political realist who asserts that the pursuit of moral principles does not enter the world of international affairs. This paper argues, on the other hand, that we find in Thucydides a complex theory of international relations. He supports neither extreme realism, in which international morality is denied, nor utopian idealism that overlooks the aspect of power in international relations. His realism can be compared to that of Raymond Aron, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hans Morgentau, the twentieth-century classic realists who, although sensible to the demands of power and national interest, would not deny that political actors on the international scene come under moral judgment. He is profoundly engaged in reflecting on ethical issues in domestic and international politics.

Democracy, National and International, PHILIP PETTIT

Democracy, if it is to involve a rule of the people in the fullest sense, should have a contestatory as well as an electoral aspect. Subject to satisfaction of various tests, it should allow people to be able to contest what the government does and command a potentially effective hearing, as well as allowing for the popular election of those who serve in the government. This two-dimensional ideal of democracy fits domestic democracies very well but serves at the same time to point us toward significant respects in which domestic democracy can be improved. Perhaps even more strikingly, it pro-

vides a basis for arguing that the ideal of democracy has a place in international networks and organizations as well as within national boundaries.

Hobbes on Trade, Consumption, and the International Order,
THOMAS SORELL

If the conditions for national or state self-sufficiency exist, according to Hobbes, so do conditions of local international peace. Self-sufficiency in the relevant sense does not mean a capacity in one country for producing goods that will meet all local demand. Self-sufficiency can involve local production capable of reliably financing imports to meet local demand. As for local demand, this does not include everything consumers want to buy, but only things they need. In Hobbes's view, to aim for more than self-sufficiency, for example, through imperialist expansion, is out of keeping with good government; and so too is over-consumption at home. If this makes international stability in Hobbes look economic rather than military, that is not a count against its plausibility. Neither is its quiet endorsement of sustainability and restrained consumption.

The Problem of International Order and How to Think About It,
MARC TRACHTENBERG

To get a handle on the problem of order in international politics, we first need to grapple with a purely theoretical question: the question of how politics works in a highly stylized world, a world characterized by the absence of overarching authority, a world in which power is the only thing that matters. Only then can questions about the role of particular real world factors (like international law or economic interdependence) be brought into focus. The answer to this theoretical question is not as obvious as one might assume. One can, however, get at that question indirectly, by studying particular empirical issues, and especially specific historical issues. Students of international relations might focus on theory or history or policy, but people from all three areas need to interact with each other intellectually, so that the field as a whole can be something more than the mere sum of its parts.

*Neither Marxist nor Whig: The Great Atlantic Crises, 1774-1962,
and the Foundations of Domestic and International Order,*
DAVID KAISER

During the 1990s, William Strauss and Neil Howe elaborated a theory of generations, eras, or "turnings," and periodic crises every eighty years that have reshaped American life at least since the period 1774-96. This article extends their analysis to the entire Atlantic world, including the nations of Great Britain, France, and Germany, as well as the United States, and explores the interactions among them. In the eighteenth-century crisis (roughly 1774-1803), the United States created the world's first democracy, while Britain actually moved away from democracy and reinforced aristocratic rule, and France created the modern bureaucratic state. Both the nineteenth- (1854-75) and twentieth- (1929-55) century crises brought the U.S. and

Europe closer together. Now the world the last crisis created is dying, and so far, Western Europe and the United States seem to be diverging again.

Democratic Government and International Justice, KRISTEN
HESSLER

Doctrinal War: Religion and Ideology in International Conflict,
ROBERT JACKSON

Self-Determination and International Order, TOMAS KAPITAN

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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Just War and the Supreme Emergency Exemption, CHRISTOPHER
TONER

Recently a number of liberal political theorists, including Rawls and Walzer, have argued for a "supreme emergency exemption" from the traditional just war principle of discrimination which absolutely prohibits direct attacks against innocent civilians, claiming that a political community threatened with destruction may deliberately target innocents in order to save itself. This paper argues that this "supreme emergency exemption" implies that individuals too may kill innocents in supreme emergencies. This is a significant theoretical cost. While it will not constitute a decisive refutation of all arguments for a supreme emergency exemption, the hope is that many will see this cost of endorsing the exemption as unacceptable.

Global Justice and the Limits of Human Rights, DALE DORSEY

To a great extent, recent discussion of global obligations has been couched in the language of human rights. This paper argues that this is a mistake. If, as many theorists have supposed, a normative theory applicable to obligations of global justice must also respect the needs of justice internal to recipient nations, any such theory cannot take human rights as an important moral notion. Human rights are inapplicable to the domestic justice of poor nations, and thus cannot form a plausible basis for international justice. Instead, this paper proposes an alternative basis, a form of welfarist maximizing consequentialism. This alternative is superior to rights-based theories in dealing with the special problems of justice found in poor nations.

Humean Supervenience and Personal Identity, RYAN WASSERMAN

Humeans hold that the nomological features of our world, including causal facts, are determined by the global distribution of fundamental properties. Since persistence presupposes causation, it follows that facts about personal identity are also globally determined. This paper argues that this is unacceptable for a number of reasons, and that the doctrine of Humean supervenience should therefore be rejected.

Prinz's Problematic Proxytypes, RAFFAELLA DE ROSA

Jesse Prinz has argued that a proxytype theory of concepts provides what he calls the "intentionality" and "cognitive content" desiderata better than any current competitor, and that the hybrid nature of proxytypes allows his theory to combine the informational component of informational atomism with the view that concepts are semantically structured entities. In response, this paper argues that the hybrid character of proxytypes, far from delivering the advantages Prinz claims, generates a threatening dilemma: either his theory is novel but fails to deliver the intentionality and cognitive content desiderata, or it delivers these desiderata but is not novel.

Resisting Imaginative Resistance, KATHLEEN STOCK

Recently, philosophers have identified certain fictional propositions with which one does not imaginatively engage, even where one is transparently intended by their authors to do so. One approach to explaining this categorizes it as "resistance," that is, as deliberate failure to imagine that the relevant propositions are true; the phenomenon has become generally known (misleadingly) as "the puzzle of imaginative resistance." This paper argues that this identification is incorrect, and it dismisses several other explanations. It then proposes a better one, that in central cases of imaginative failure, the basis for the failure is the contingent incomprehensibility of the relevant propositions. Why the phenomenon is especially commonplace with respect to moral propositions is illuminated along the way.

Rule-Circularity and the Justification of Deduction, NEIL TENNANT

This paper examines Paul Boghossian's recent attempt to argue for skepticism about logical rules. It is here argued that certain rule and proof theoretic considerations can avert such skepticism. Boghossian's "Tonk Argument" seeks to justify the rule of tonk-introduction by using the rule itself. The argument is subjected here to more detailed proof-theoretic scrutiny than Boghossian undertook. Its sole axiom, the "Meaning Postulate for tonk," is shown to be false or devoid of content. It is also shown that the rules of disquotation and of semantic ascent cannot be derived for sentences with tonk dominant. These considerations deprive Boghossian's skepticism of its support.

Law Necessitarianism and the Importance of Being Intuitive,
DANIEL Z. KORMAN

The counterintuitive implications of law necessitarianism pose a far more serious threat than its proponents recognize. Law necessitarians are committed to scientific essentialism, the thesis that there are metaphysically necessary truths which can be known only a posteriori. The most frequently cited arguments for this position rely on modal intuitions. Rejection of intuition thus threatens to undermine it. This paper considers ways in which law necessitarians might try to defend scientific essentialism without invoking intuition. It then considers ways in which law necessitarians who accept the general reliability of intuition might try to explain away the intuitions which conflict with their theory.

Putting Extrospection to Rest, AARON Z. ZIMMERMAN

Jordi Fernandez has recently responded to Aaron Zimmerman's objection that his "extrospectionist" account of self-knowledge posits necessary and sufficient conditions for introspective justification which are neither necessary nor sufficient. This shows that Zimmerman's criticisms survive his response unscathed.

PHILOSOPHY
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Almog's Descartes, FRED ABLONDI

The answer which Joseph Almog gives to the question which serves as the title of his recent book *What Am I?* (subtitled: *Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem*) is based upon his interpretation of and objection to (1) Descartes's argument for the distinction of the mind and the body raised by Antoine Arnauld, as well as Descartes's response to it, and (2) Descartes's letters of 9 February 1645 to Denis Mesland. This paper argues that both of these interpretations are incorrect, and as such do not support the conclusions which Almog claims to draw from them. The answer to the question of "what I am" which Almog provides is, then, neither one Descartes would have held nor one which his writings support.

Is There an "End" to Philosophical Skepticism, LILIAN ALWEISS

P. F. Strawson advocates a descriptive metaphysics. Contrary to Kant, he believes that metaphysics should be "content to describe the actual structure of thought about the world," there is no need of postulating a world that lies beyond our grasp. We neither need to refute nor accept skepticism since we can ignore it with good reasons. Yet this paper argues that Strawson fails to provide us with good reasons. He fails to realize that one cannot do meta-

physics by construing its claims as being merely descriptive of a conceptual scheme we find ourselves to possess without even purporting to establish the legitimacy of that scheme. This paper shows that it is possible to overcome this impasse if we endorse Kant's transcendental idealist position. The significance of Kant's position is that it not only allows us to describe our conceptual scheme but, moreover, that it acknowledges that the world may be (radically) otherwise without however instantiating the truth of skepticism.

A New Look at the Logic of the "Is-Ought" Relation, JOEL J. KUPPERMAN

In the 1950s some prominent philosophers suggested the presence of a logical relation weaker than entailment between primarily descriptive statements and ethical conclusions. This paper revisits that suggestion. It examines four ways in which ethical statements can be supported by descriptions and evaluations. This provides a similarity between some kinds of reasoning in ethics and familiar cases of logical inference, making it plausible to speak of a logic. The similarity, however, is limited, and the strength in ethics of descriptive reasons is never precise and always somewhat contestable.

Philosophy's Neglect of the Arts, BRYAN MAGEE

It is widely agreed that the arts can give us some of the most valuable and profound experiences of which we are capable, yet the conceptions of experience to which epistemology has addressed itself during its long history have usually omitted experience of the arts. This has had harmful consequences, because it has led to theories of experience being accepted which would have been falsified by a consideration of experience of the arts. The error still occurs, and there are important current examples of it: for instance, some widely held theories about the relationship between thought and language do not survive attempts to apply them to the thought-processes involved in composing a double fugue.

The Unity of the Fact, STEPHAN READ

What binds the constituents of a state of affairs together and provides unity to the fact they constitute? This paper argues that the fact that they are related is basic and fundamental. This is the thesis of factualism: the world is a world of facts. Three corollaries are here drawn: first, that the identity of truth is mistaken in conflating what represents (the proposition) with what is represented (the fact). Second, that a popular interpretation of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, due to Steinus, whereby false propositions are taken to picture nonexistent state of affairs, cannot be right. For Wittgenstein, propositions had two poles, and a proposition and its negation picture the same fact. Finally, it is argued that the metaphysics of modal realism must be wrong, for there are no nonactual states of affairs to constitute any world other than the actual world.

Transcendence Without Reality, JOHN R. WRIGHT

Thomas Nagel has held that transcendence requires attaining a point of view, stripped of features unique to our perspective. The aim of transcendence on this view is to get at reality as it is, independent of our contributions to it. In this paper, Wright shows this notion of transcendence to be incoherent, yet he defends a contrasting notion of transcendence. As conceived here, transcendence does not require striving for an external, objective viewpoint on nature, or looking at matters from someone else's or an impartial point of view. On Wright's view, which builds on the work of Iris Murdoch, transcendence consists of a refinement of our concepts and sensibility to make them more adequate to the individuals we encounter.

The Place of Pain in Life, TRULS WYLLER

In his "Pains and Places" (*Philosophy* 78 [2003]), John Hyman is right that pains are not located in their causes or effects but in the hurting limbs. However, his position may be consonant with Wittgensteinian expressivism or the view that consciousness is the locus of pain. In producing its own parts, a living organism "autopoietically" sustains itself as an activity functionally present in its limbs. It thus supplies the biological basis for pain consciousness as something wholly present in organs that hurt.

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
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Perception and Representation, WILLIAM ALSTON

Alston opposes the popular view that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience consists in the subject's representing the (putative) perceived object as being so-and-so. The account of perceptual experience he favors instead is a version of the "Theory of Appearing" that takes it to be a matter of the perceived object's appearing to one as so-and-so, where this does not mean that the subject takes or believes it to be so-and-so. This plays no part in his criticisms of Representationalism. He mentions it only to be up front as to where he stands: Alston's criticism of the Representationalist position is in sections: (1) There is no sufficient reason for positing a representative function for perceptual experience. It doesn't seem on the face of it to be that, and nothing serves in place of such seeming. (2) Even if it did have such a function, it doesn't have the conceptual resources to represent a state of affairs. (3) Even if it did, it is not suited to represent, for example, a physical property of color. (4) Finally, even if Alston is wrong about the first three points, it is still impossible for the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience to consist in its representing what it does. Alston's central argument for this central claim of the paper is that it is metaphysically, *de re pos-*

sible that one have a certain perceptual experience without its presenting any state of affairs. Since all identities hold necessarily, this identity claim fails.

Altruism, Grief, and Identity, DONALD L. M. BAXTER

The divide between oneself and others has made altruism seem irrational to some thinkers, as Sidgwick points out. Here, Baxter uses characterizations of grief, especially by St. Augustine, to question the divide, and uses a composition-as-identity metaphysics of parts and wholes to make literal sense of those characterizations.

Concepts and Epistemic Individuation, WAYNE A. DAVIS

Christopher Peacocke has presented an original version of the perennial philosophical thesis that we can gain substantive metaphysical and epistemological insight from an analysis of our concepts. Peacocke's innovation is to look at how concepts are individuated by their possession conditions, which he believes can be specified in terms of conditions in which certain propositions containing those concepts are accepted. The ability to provide such insight is one of Peacocke's major arguments for his theory of concepts. This paper critically examines this "fruitfulness" argument by looking at one philosophical problem Peacocke uses his theory to solve and treats in depth. Peacocke (1999, 2001) defines what he calls the "Integration Challenge." The challenge is to integrate our metaphysics with our epistemology by showing that they are mutually acceptable. Peacocke's key conclusion is that the Integration Challenge can be met for "epistemically individuated concepts." A good theory of content, he believes, will close the apparent gap between an account of truth for any given subject matter and an overall account of knowledge. Davis argues that there are no epistemically individuated concepts, and critically analyzes Peacocke's arguments for their existence. He suggests more generally that the possession conditions of concepts and their principles of individuation shed little light on the epistemology or metaphysics of things other than concepts. Davis's broader goal is to shed light on what concepts are by showing that they are more fundamental than the sorts of cognitive and epistemic factors a leading theory uses to define them.

Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data? LUCIANO FLORIDI

There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information. This paper contributes to the current debate by criticising and revising the Standard Definition of semantic Information (SDI) as meaningful data, in favor of the Dretske–Grice approach: meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful. After a brief introduction, SDI is criticised for providing necessary but insufficient conditions for the definition of semantic information. SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on semantic information, and misinformation (that is, false semantic information) is not a type of semantic information, but pseudoinformation, that is not semantic information at all. This is shown by arguing that none of the reasons for interpreting misinformation

as a type of semantic information are convincing, while there are compelling reasons to treat it as pseudoinformation. As a consequence, SDI is revised to include a necessary truth-condition. The last section summarizes the main results of the paper and indicates some interesting areas of application of the revised definition.

Chance and Counterfactuals, JOHN HAWTHORNE

Suppose the world is chancy. The worry arises that most ordinary counterfactuals are false. This paper examines David Lewis's strategy for rescuing such counterfactuals and argues that it is highly problematic.

Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs, BRIAN KIERLAND and BRADLEY MONTON

One's inaccuracy for a proposition is defined as the squared difference between the truth value (1 or 0) of the proposition and the credence (or subjective probability, or degree of belief) assigned to the proposition. One should have the epistemic goal of minimizing the expected inaccuracies of one's credences. Kierland and Monton show that the method of minimizing expected inaccuracy can be used to solve certain probability problems involving information loss and self-locating beliefs (where a self-locating belief of a temporal part of an individual is a belief about where or when that temporal part is located). The authors also analyze the Sleeping Beauty problem, the duplication version of the Sleeping Beauty problem, and various related problems.

Easy Knowledge, PETER J. MARKIE

Stewart Cohen has recently presented solutions to two forms of what he calls "The Problem of Easy Knowledge" ("Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 65, no. 2 [September 2002]: 309–29). Here Markie offers alternative solutions. Like Cohen's, his solutions allow for basic knowledge. Unlike Cohen's, they do not require that one distinguish between animal and reflective knowledge, restrict the applicability of closure under known entailments, or deny the ability of basic knowledge to combine with self-knowledge to provide inductive evidential support. Markie's solution to the closure version of the problem covers a variation on the problem that is immune to Cohen's approach. His response to the bootstrapping version presents reasons to question whether the problem case, as Cohen presents it, is even possible, and, assuming it is, Markie's solution avoids a false implication of Cohen's own. The key to Markie's solutions for both versions is the distinction between an inference's transferring epistemic support, on the one hand, and its not begging the question against skeptics, on the other.

Intrinsicity without Naturalness, D. GENE WITMER, WILLIAM BUTCHARD, and KELLY TROGDON

Rae Langton and David Lewis have proposed an account of "intrinsic property" that makes use of two notions: being independent of accompaniment and being natural. The authors of this paper find the appeal to the first of these promising; the second notion, however, they find mystifying. In this paper it is argued that the appeal to naturalness is not acceptable, and an alternative definition of intrinsicity is offered. The alternative definition makes crucial use of a notion commonly used by philosophers, namely, the notion of one property being had in virtue of another property. The authors defend their account against three arguments for thinking that this "in virtue of" notion is unacceptable in this context. They also take a look at a variety of cases in which the definition might be applied and defend it against potential counterexamples. The upshot is a modest but adequate account of what is undersood by "intrinsic property."

Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson, ANTHONY BRUECKNER

Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge, STEWART COHEN

The Comforts of Home, EARL CONEE

Knowledge and Evidence, JOHN HAWTHORNE

Precis of Knowledge and its Limits, TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON

Prime Causation, STEPHAN YABLO

PHRONESIS

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Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition, KEIMPE ALGRA

La figure d'Ulysse chez les Socratiques : Socrate polutropos, DAVID LEVYSTONE

At the end of the fifth century B.C.E., the character of Odysseus was scorned by most of the Athenians: he illustrated the archetype of the

demagogic, unscrupulous and ambitious politicians that had led Athens to its doom. Against this common *doxa*, the most important disciples of Socrates (Antisthenes, Plato, Xenophon) rehabilitate the hero and admire his temperance and his courage. Yet it is most surprising to see that, in spite of Odysseus' lies and deceit, these philosophers, who condemn steadfastly the sophists' deceptions, praise his rhetorical ability, his *polutropia*. The word *polutropia* is ambiguous: for Antisthenes, it means either "diversity of styles and discourses" or "diversity of dispositions, characters, or souls." It is argued that the same distinction is implicitly at work in Plato's *Hippias Minor*, where Socrates defends Odysseus' *polutropia* against the pseudo "simplicity" of Hippias' favourite hero, Achilles. However, whereas Antisthenes tries to clarify these different meanings, Plato's Socrates exploits the ambiguity to confuse his interlocutor. Such a distinction sheds a new light on the *Hippias Minor*: Odysseus is *polutropos* in the first (positive) sense, while the simplicity of Achilles should be understood as a bad kind of *polutropia*. It provides an explanation for the first paradoxical thesis of the dialogue which many commentators do not admit as an expression of the true Socratic view, on the ground of its supposed immorality: that he who voluntarily deceives is better than he who errs, for falsehood is, in one case, only in words, while in the other, it is falsehood in the soul itself. It is thus proposed that Odysseus' skill in adapting his *logos* to his hearers was probably a model for Socrates himself. The analogy between the hero and Socrates is especially clear in Plato's dialogues, which show the philosopher in an odyssey for knowledge.

Ignorance and Opinion in Stoic Epistemology, CONSTANCE
MEINWALD

This paper argues for a view that maximizes in the Stoics' epistemology the starkness and clarity characteristic of other parts of their philosophy. Meinwald reconsiders the evidence concerning *doxa* (opinion/belief): should one really take the Stoics to define it as assent to the incognitive, so that it does not include the assent of ordinary people to their kataleptic impressions, and is thus actually inferior to *agnoia* (ignorance)? Meinwald argues against this, and for the simple view that in Stoicism assent is either, in the case of the fool, *doxa* = *agnoia*; or alternatively, in that of the sage, *episteme* (knowledge). This view, together with reflection on the appropriate sense of "between" in the relevant reports of Sextus Empiricus and Cicero, yields a sympathetic reading of an otherwise problematic challenge. Sextus reports Arcesilaus as having prepared for the Stoic claim that *katalipsis*, which is the criterion of truth, is between knowledge and opinion; on Meinwald's view each side is proceeding in a philosophically legitimate way.

Zeno's Cosmology and the Presumption of Innocence.
Interpretations and Vindications, SERGE MOURAVIEV

The present study partly supports, partly corrects, and partly complements recent discussions of Arius Didymus fragment 23 and fragment 25 Diels, Aetius I, 20, 1 and Sextus Empiricus AM X, 3-4 = PH III, 124. It proposes a comprehensive interpretation of the first text (A.I), defends the attribution of its content to Zeno of Citium (A.II), interprets the Stoic definitions

of space, place and void to be found in the other sources (B.I), and again vindicates the attribution of the core definitions to Zeno (B.II). The central methodological principle is the presumption of innocence for sources. The main conclusions of (A) are: first, Arius Didymus' fragment 23 deals only with the coherence and the structure of the cosmos, not with its immobility; second, the coherence of the cosmos, as that of any object, is determined by its hexis which pushes its parts toward its center; third, the structure of the cosmos, its stratification into the four concentric spheres of the elements, is determined by the combined effect of the thrust downward they all undergo from the cosmos's hexis, their own natural weight or lightness, and the relative quantitative values of these weights or lightnesses; and fourth, the reasons adduced against Zeno's authorship are not based on the evidence but on the now prevalent disparaging skeptical approach toward Stobaeus' way of excerpting from Arius. The main conclusions of (B) are: first, there is no deep contradiction between the various definitions of space ascribed by our sources to Zeno, Chrysippus, and the Stoics in general: what Chrysippus denied was the form of the definition attributed to Zeno by Aetius, not the concept defined, even though this form seems to have prevailed later in the school; second, there is no good reason therefore to question its ascription to Zeno as some modern researchers have done; and third, here again the error is due to a predominantly skeptical approach toward the reliability of our sources.

PHRONESIS

Vol. 50, No. 4, October 2005

Recollection and Philosophical Reflection in Plato's "Phaedo", LEE FRANKLIN

Interpretations of recollection in the *Phaedo* are divided between ordinary interpretations, on which recollection explains a kind of learning accomplished by all, and sophisticated interpretations, which restrict recollection to philosophers. A sophisticated interpretation is supported by the prominence of philosophical understanding and reflection in the argument. Recollection is supposed to explain the advanced understanding displayed by Socrates and Simmias (74b2–4). Furthermore, it seems to be a necessary condition on recollection that one who recollects also perform a comparison of sensible particulars to forms (74a5–7). This paper provides a new ordinary interpretation which explains these features of the argument. First, we must clearly distinguish the philosophical reflection which constitutes the argument for the theory of recollection from the ordinary learning which is its subject. The comparison of sensibles to forms is the reasoning by which we see, as philosophers, that we must recollect. At the same time, we must also appreciate the continuity of ordinary and philosophical learning. Plato wants to explain the capacity for ordinary discourse, but with an eye to its role as the origin of philosophical reflection and learning. In the *Phaedo*,

recollection has ordinary learning as its immediate explanandum and philosophical learning as its ultimate explanandum.

Melissus And His Opponents: The Argument of DK 30 B 8,
STEPHEN MAKIN

In this paper Makin offers a new interpretation of Melissus' argument at DK 30 B8. In this passage Melissus uses an Eleatic argument against change to challenge an opponent who appeals to the authority of perception in order to support the view that there are a plurality of items in the world. Makin identifies an orthodox type of approach to this passage but argues that it cannot give a charitable interpretation of Melissus' strategy. In order to assess Melissus' overall argument we have to identify the opponent at whom it is aimed. The orthodox interpretation of the argument faces a dilemma: Melissus' argument is either a poor argument against a plausible opponent or a good argument against an implausible opponent. Makin's interpretation turns on identifying a new target for Melissus' argument. Makin explains the position he calls "Bluff Realism" (contrasting it with two other views, the "Pig Headed" and the "Fully Engaged"). These are positions concerning the dialectical relation between perception on the one hand, and arguments to counterperceptual conclusions on the other. Makin argues that Bluff Realism represents a serious threat from an Eleatic point of view, and is in the first place an attractive position in its own right. He then give a charitable interpretation of Melissus' argument in DK 30 B8, showing how he produces a strong and incisive argument against the Bluff Realist position he identified. Melissus emerges as an innovative and astute philosopher.

Presocratics, JAAP MANSFELD

Neoplatonism, ANNE SHEPPARD

'Creeping Spatiality': The Location of Nous in Plotinus' Universe, J. WILBERDING

There is a well known tension in Plotinus' thought regarding the location of the intelligible region. He appears to make three mutually incompatible claims about it: (1) it is everywhere; (2) it is nowhere; and (3) it borders on the heavens, where the third claim is associated with Plotinus' affection for cosmic religion. Traditionally, although scholars have found a reasonable way to make sense of the compatibility of the first two claims, they have sought to relieve the tension generated by (3) by both downplaying the importance of cosmic religion to Plotinus and reinterpreting his spatial language metaphorically. In this paper Wilberding argues that both of these maneuvers are unsatisfactory. Rather, it is possible to reconcile Plotinus' metaphysics with the worldview of cosmic religion, that is, to retain the spatial sense of Plotinus' language without making his metaphysics incoherent. In the first part of this paper, Wilberding shows that cosmic religion is not just an awkward appendage to Plotinus' metaphysics. After explaining what

cosmic religion involves, he argues that the cosmic religion world-view is in fact central to Plotinus's natural philosophy. Then Wilberding turns to the problem of the compatibility between cosmic religion and Plotinus' thought. By carefully considering how Aristotle's Prime Mover is present to his universe, Wilberding shows how we can make claims (2) and (3) compatible for Plotinus. He then argues that Plotinus' own account of the omnipresence of soul and its actualizations of its powers in particular locations provides a parallel to the problem of the compatibility between (1) and (3), and further that these two accounts can be combined to resolve completely the tension between the cosmic religion worldview and Plotinus' metaphysics. In the final section, Wilberding discusses the implications this has for our understanding of the soul's ascent and descent.

RATIO

Vol. 18, No. 3, September 2005

A Note on Kripke's Footnote 56 Argument for the Essentiality of Origin, ROSS P. CAMERON

In footnote 56 of his *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke offers a "proof" of the essentiality of origin. On its most literal reading the argument is clearly flawed, as was made clear by Nathan Salmon. Salmon attempts to save the literal reading of the argument, but Cameron here argues that the new argument is flawed as well, and that it can't be what Kripke intended. He offers an alternative reconstruction of Kripke's argument but shows that this suffers from a more subtle fault.

Discussion: Kantian Punishment: Rejoinder to Brooks, MICHAEL CLARK

The Essential and the Accidental, MICHAEL GORMAN

The distinction between the essential and the accidental is nearly always understood in modal terms. In this paper, after criticizing some recent writings by Kit Fine that question that understanding, Gorman develops a theory according to which whether a given feature of a thing is essential turns on whether it is explained by other features of that thing. The theory differs from the modal view by leaving room for features that are accidental even though their bearers cannot exist without them. The theory has the additional advantage of being open to the results of scientific theory.

Incommensurable Alternatives and Rational Choice, CHRISOULA
ANDREOU

Andreou considers the implications of incommensurability for the assumption, in rational choice theory, that a rational agent's preferences are complete. It is here argued that, contrary to appearances, the completeness assumption and the existence of incommensurability are compatible. Indeed, reflection on incommensurability suggests that one's preferences should be complete even over the incommensurable alternatives one faces.

Nonidentity, Wrongful Conception, and Harmless Wrongs, P. J.
MARKIE

Joel Feinberg and Dan Brock have independently developed a solution to the problem of nonidentity as it occurs in cases where a mother's negligent act of conception causes her child to be born with a severe disability. Here Markie displays three problems in the Feinberg-Brock proposal and develops an alternative view that explains both cases of wrongful conception, as well as additional instances of the problem of nonidentity presented by Derek Parfit and others.

*Easy's Gettin' Harder All the Time: The Computational Theory and
Affective States*, JASON MEGILL and JON COGBURN

This paper argues that A. Damasio's (1994) Somatic Marker hypothesis can explain why humans don't generally suffer from the frame problem, arguably the greatest obstacle facing the Computational Theory of Mind. This involves showing how humans with damaged emotional centers are best understood as actually suffering from the frame problem. Megill and Cogburn are then able to show that, paradoxically, these results provide evidence for the Computational Theory of Mind, and in addition call into question the very distinction between easy and hard problems in the contemporary philosophy of mind.

Blocking the Path from Vagueness to Four Dimensionalism,
KRISTIE MILLER

There is a general form of an argument which Miller calls the "argument from vagueness" which attempts to show that objects persist by perduring, via the claim that vagueness is never ontological in nature and thus that composition is unrestricted. Miller argues that even if we grant that vagueness is always the result of semantic indeterminacy rather than ontological vagueness, and thus also grant that composition is unrestricted, it does not follow that objects persist by perduring. Unrestricted mereological composition lacks the power to ensure that there exist instantaneous objects that wholly overlap persisting objects at times, and thus lacks the power to ensure that there exists anything that could be called a temporal part. Even if we grant that such instantaneous objects exist, however, Miller argues that it does not follow that objects perdure. To show this she briefly outlines a coherent version of three dimensionalism that grants just such an assumption. Thus con-

siderations pertaining to the nature of vagueness need not lead us inevitably to accept perdurantism.

The Paradox of Beneficial Retirement, SAUL SMILANSKY

Morally, when should one retire from one's job? The surprising answer may be "now." It is commonly assumed that for a person who has acquired professional training at some personal effort, is employed in a task that society considers useful, and is working hard at it, no moral problem arises about whether that person should continue working. Smilansky argues that this may be a mistake: within many professions and pursuits, each one among the majority of those positive, productive, hard-working people ought to consider leaving his job.

Reason-Explanation and the Contents of the Mind, JULIA TANNEY

This paper takes a close look at the kinds of considerations we use to reach agreement in our ordinary (nonphilosophical and nontheoretical) judgments about a person's reasons for acting, and the following theses are defended. First, considering the circumstances in which the action occurs is often enough to remove our puzzlement as to why someone acts as he does. Second, in those situations where we do need to enquire about the agent's state of mind, this does not, in the normal case, lead us to look for hidden, inner events that are candidates for the causes of his action. Finally, even though there are cases in which the agent's introspections, reflections, and deliberations are relevant to our search for reasons, such cases do not lend support to the idea that reasons are hidden or inner causes of action. This suggests a problem for most philosophical accounts of what it is to act for reasons and for most philosophical accounts of the nature of mental states.

Monkeys, Typewriters, and Objective Consequentialism, ERIC WILAND

There have been several recent attempts to refute objective consequentialism on the grounds that it implies the absurd conclusion that even the best of us act wrongly. Some have argued that we act wrongly from time to time; others have argued that we act wrongly regularly. Here Wiland seeks to strengthen *reductio* arguments against objective consequentialism by showing that objective consequentialism implies that we almost never act rightly. He shows that no matter what you do, there is almost certainly something else you could do that would have even better consequences. If objective consequentialism is true, the ratio of the number of your right actions to the number of your wrong actions is very close to zero.

IN MEMORIAM

EDWARD POLS (1919–2005)

Edward Pols died on 14 August 2005, in Brunswick, Maine, within weeks of completing his volume of philosophical essays, *On Rational Agency*, and his volume of poetry, *Remembrance of Things to Come*. That his life ended in active engagement with both philosophy and poetry befits his extraordinary career, which spanned almost sixty years. He made substantial contributions to metaphysics and epistemology, as well as to logic, ethics, and aesthetics. In some of his poetry his philosophy is expressed in a form that transcends even his own elegant and lucid prose. A philosopher of the natural sciences, the humanities, and the arts, a remarkable poet, and a person of uncommon grace and dignity, he was surely a Renaissance man of our time.

He was born in Newark, New Jersey, on 1 February 1919. There he attended St. Benedict's Preparatory School, after which he earned his bachelor's degree in English at Harvard College, from which he graduated magna cum laude in 1940. His graduate study in philosophy at Harvard was postponed by active service during and after World War II in Army Intelligence and in Military Government (1942–46). He was stationed in England, France, and Germany, and he earned a Bronze Star. During those years he wrote hundreds of letters about the war to his wife, Eileen Sinnott Pols, whom he married in 1942 and with whom he had six children. These letters eventually became the basis for a series of poems entitled "Sequence: War's End, World's End," which appears in *Remembrance of Things to Come*; some of these poems were previously published in *The Sewanee Review* and *The Massachusetts Review*. He also served in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence in the Korean War (1951–52).

Pols received his doctorate in philosophy at Harvard University in 1949. He was an instructor in philosophy at Princeton University in 1948–49, after which he joined the Department of Philosophy at Bowdoin College in Brunswick, Maine. There he would remain for the rest of his formal teaching career; from which he retired in 1984. In 1975 he became the first to be named Bowdoin's William R. Kenan, Jr., Professor of the Humanities, on which occasion he delivered a two-part inaugural lecture entitled "Florentine Neoplatonism and the Art of Michelangelo." In 2001, Bowdoin honored him by naming the Department of Philosophy's new home the Edward Pols House.

His six books of philosophy and his essays in *The Review of Metaphysics* (among other journals) provide a roadmap of the theme to which he would return again and again: the nature of agency, or what he would eventually call "rational agency," including, especially, our causal capacity for direct knowing, which he also called "rational awareness" or "rational-experiential engagement." The six books include *The Recognition of Reason* (1963), *Whitehead's Metaphysics* (1967), *Meditation on a Prisoner* (1975), *The Acts of Our Being* (1982), *Radical Realism* (1992) (for which he won the John N. Findlay Award of the Metaphysical Society of America in 1995), and *Mind*

Regained (1998). In the 1992 and 1998 books and in the final volume of essays, he sought to clarify the ontological basis for our knowing powers, which he grounded in the "unity/universality of nature intrinsic to the causality of mind." He insisted that the "received scientific doctrine of causality" is inadequate for a full understanding of conscious awareness. Thus, his life's work was devoted to the mind-body problem, especially to reversing the pervasive trend he called "the negative philosophical judgment about the powers of the mind" and "about knowing." He rejected the absolute reduction of mind to biological infrastructure and the reduction of knowing to attainment of mere appearances and (linguistic) constructions/representations. Instead he maintained that mind exists "at the apex of a hierarchy of causes" and that knowledge of an independent reality is fundamental to mind's causal powers. Because he swam against the currents of mainstream philosophy, he was especially delighted to receive the Paul Weiss Medal (known as the "Founder's Medal") from the Metaphysical Society of America. He also delighted in encouraging young scholars to think for themselves.

His antireductionist philosophy led him to pursue a nonreductionist basis for harmonizing knowledge in the humanities, arts, and sciences. This pursuit was formalized when he became one of three founding members (along with Michael Polanyi and Majorie Grene) of the "Study Group on Foundations of Cultural Unity," later called the "Study Group on the Unity of Knowledge." The Group, supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation, held its first two meetings in August 1965 and August 1966 at Bowdoin College. His sabbatic-leave affiliations with the Warburg Institute of the University of London (1958–59) and with Villa I Tatti, the Harvard University Center for Italian Renaissance Studies in Florence (1965–66 and 1972–73), reflected his love of Classical and Renaissance art and knowledge. His devotion to art is most evident in his haunting poem "Fiesole Night-Piece," first published in *The Massachusetts Review*.

Near the end it was in his own poetry that he put most of his remaining energy; and so it seems fitting to end this tribute with a sample of his verse. He may be best known for his first published poem, "For John Kennedy of Harvard," which appeared in the 1964 anthology *Of Poetry and Power*. Although his philosophy is implicit in some of his poems, in the poem that is published here for the first time (with permission of his family) he makes his philosophy explicit, not least by appealing to the universality that he finds in the particularity of his own mind's causal powers.—Barbara S. Held, *Bowdoin College*

The Poet's First Philosophy

*First philosophy: Aristotle's
name for the discipline later
misleadingly named metaphysics.*

You who act in words: if you ever bind
them in such array that lets you look
clear through them to your being's root and find
there duty, ardor, and that hope you took
for granted once, shall you have any right
to claim those words as Edward's own,
intrinsic to your blood and private sight,
their origin in you and you alone?

When once you played philosopher, you learned
the answer, though to tell it in that mode
amazes us: the source of your acts exceeds
your owning, since you are the one that needs
to be owned before needed words explode
in you to yield the light you'd never earned.

Edward Pols
(3–4 August 2001)

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The Publisher of *The Review of Metaphysics*, the Philosophy Education Society, Inc., announces its annual Dissertation Essay Competition. The competition is open to all participants who have been awarded the Ph.D. degree in philosophy in the United States or Canada during 2005. Entries must be either a chapter from a dissertation or an essay based directly upon a dissertation. Essays may be on any topic dealt with in the dissertation.

Essays will be judged anonymously. The author of the prize winning essay will receive \$500. It is expected that the winning essay will be published in *The Review of Metaphysics*.

Participants are requested to employ the following procedure for submitting essays:

- Essays should be no more than twenty-five double-spaced typewritten pages and should be submitted in triplicate.
- Essays should be free of all identifying marks, both in the body of the paper and in the footnotes.
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- On matters of style and form, *The Chicago Manual of Style* and a recent issue of *The Review of Metaphysics* should be consulted. A style sheet is available upon request.
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